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Saturday, September 13, 2008
Will Conservatives Try to Block a President Obama's Judicial Nominees?
MSNBC wonders whether conservative groups will mobilize to defeat controversial judicial nominations if Senator Obama is elected president. I hope not. While I doubt a President Obama's nominees would be much to my liking, I do not think the Senate should reject a President's judicial nominees on ideological grounds. Rather, I believe the Senate's "advise and consent" role should be limited to ensuring that judicial nominees have the necessary qualifications and temperament (as in, an understanding of what it means to be a judge).
As Alexander Hamilton explained in Federalist 76, we are likely to get better nominees from a single decision-maker (the President) than a committee, and the primary purpose of Senate confirmation is to place a "check upon a spirit of favoritism in the President" and "to prevent the appointment of unfit characters from State prejudice, from family connection, from personal attachment, or from a view to popularity." His concern was cronyism, not differences in judicial philosophy. Allowing the Senate to have a greater role, he warned, would encourage an undue focus on narrow and parochial concerns, and I think that is what we've seen as the confirmation process has become more politicized. Senators spend hours trying to get nominees to tip their hand on specific issues or cases, whereas recent Presidents have largely focused on a prospective judge's overall judicial philosophy. In my view, the latter is the better way to do it.
So if we get a President Obama, and he nominates accomplished left-leaning lawyers and judges to the Supreme Court and federal appellate courts, I hope most conservatives and Republican Senators let them go through without much of a fight. This is how most Republicans treated President Clinton's nominations of Stephen Breyer and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and equally qualified Obama nominees deserve nothing less. If this means that a President Obama gets to place several quite "liberal" jurists on the bench, so be it. Republicans have long argued that Senate Democrats have treated President Bush's judicial nominees unfairly. They're right, but the proper principled response is to set the right example, not to respond in kind, let alone to make our excessively politicized judicial confirmation process even worse.
UPDATE: Several comments make good points and raise important questions that I will address in a follow-up post. What is odd, however, is that some commenters seem to believe that Republicans have never obstructed Democratic judicial nominees. This is silly. While Republican opposition to Bill Clinton's Supreme Court nominees was far less that Democratic opposition to both Bushes' Supreme Court nominees, the Republican Senate certainly obstructed some of Clinton's nominees to lower courts -- obstruction which led Senate Democrats to respond in kind, and then some. I've blogged on this extensively before. For round ups with links, see here and here.
Will Biden or Palin Influence Judicial Picks?
The Legal Times has an interesting article suggesting that either prospective VP could play a role in the selection of judicial nominees during the next administration.
In Biden, Sen. Barack Obama selected a running mate who, as chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee from 1987 to 1995, officiated at the confirmation hearings of five Supreme Court justices, one would-be justice, and hundreds of lower court judges.
Palin brings less of a record in this regard, but she already has had more impact on the Alaska judiciary than her predecessor. Since taking office in December 2006, Palin has seated more than a dozen judges, including a state Supreme Court justice and a state court of appeals judge, the first appellate appointments in the state in more than a decade.
The article also includes some good reporting on Palin's approach to judicial selection as Governor of Alaska. Among other things, it notes that during interviews for prospective appointments, Palin asked prospective judges about their overall judicial philosophy, but avoided asking about specific cases.
Harrington, executive director of Alaska Legal Services Corp., interviewed with Palin in November 2007, days after the state Supreme Court issued a ruling striking down a law that required girls less than 17 years old and younger to get permission from their parents before receiving an abortion. Palin, who opposes abortion except in cases where the mother's life is threatened, called the ruling "outrageous." Harrington anticipated a question about the ruling. But Palin never asked about the case or any other, Harrington says.
"I was pleasantly surprised that the topic did not come up," he says. "I thought that was an indication that the governor and her staff were cognizant of the ethical responsibilities of someone who is a candidate for the court."
He and Palin discussed Alaskan native law, his role models and his work history. At one point, she asked him to define an activist judge. He said he was expecting that, too.
"I think she has a good sense of the separation of powers and the proper role of the judiciary," Harrington says. "She thinks the role of the court is to decide cases and controversies that come before it, and she wants judges to do a good job of applying the law and precedent."
UK Court Greenlights Green Vandalism:
A British jury cleared a half-dozen Greenpeace activists of charges they caused £35,000 of damage to a coal-fired power plant on the grounds that such actions were justified to help prevent the threat posed by climate change. Among those who testified on behalf of the activist was NASA scientist James Hansen. The Independent reports on the verdict:
Jurors accepted defence arguments that the six had a "lawful excuse" to damage property at Kingsnorth power station in Kent to prevent even greater damage caused by climate change. The defence of "lawful excuse" under the Criminal Damage Act 1971 allows damage to be caused to property to prevent even greater damage – such as breaking down the door of a burning house to tackle a fire. . . .
Kingsnorth was the centre for mass protests by climate camp activists last month. Last year, three protesters managed to paint Gordon Brown's name on the plant's chimney. Their handi-work cost £35,000 to remove. . . .
During the eight-day trial, the world's leading climate scientist, Professor James Hansen of Nasa . . . called for an moratorium on all coal-fired power stations, and his hour-long testimony about the gravity of the climate danger, which painted a bleak picture, was listened to intently by the jury of nine women and three men.
Professor Hansen, who first alerted the world to the global warming threat in June 1988 with testimony to a US senate committee in Washington, and who last year said the earth was in "imminent peril" from the warming atmosphere, asserted that emissions of CO2 from Kings-north would damage property through the effects of the climate change they would help to cause. . . .
During the trial the defendants said they had acted lawfully, owing to an honestly held belief that their attempt to stop emissions from Kingsnorth would prevent further damage to properties worldwide caused by global warming. Their aim, they said, was to rein back CO2 emissions and bring urgent pressure to bear on the Government and E.ON to changes policies. They insisted their action had caused the minimum amount of damage necessary to close the plant down and constituted a "proportionate response" to the increasing environmental threat.
This was not the first time a British jury bought a "lawful excuse" defense by Greenpeace activists. In 1999 a jury acquitted activists who sabotaged a field of GM crops.
Ohio GOP Challenges New Voting Rules:
In 2004, Ohio Democrats alleged Republican Secretary of State Ken Blackwell was applying the state's election rules to benefit Republicans. Now the shoe is on the other foot and Ohio Republicans are accusing Democratic Secretary of State Jennifer Brunner is make rule changes to help Democrats. Specifically, Ohio Republicans are challenging new rules that would allow some would-be early voters to register and vote on the same day. As the WSJ reports:
In Ohio, a recently enacted state law -- the subject of the Brunner directive -- allows residents, for the first time in a general presidential election, to vote early by absentee ballot without providing a justification. Advocates for the homeless and other groups say they will direct new voters to take advantage of the overlap between early voting, which begins Sept. 30, and voter registration, which ends Oct. 6. During that window, citizens can register and vote simultaneously. The outreach efforts are expected to benefit Democrats.
The Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless, a Cleveland-based umbrella group for service providers, housing activists and others, is making plans to drive about 2,000 shelter residents to polling places during the overlap period. "This is a huge opportunity to prove to elected officials that very low-income people do vote," said Brian Davis, executive director of the group.
Republican officials are furious, charging that the one-stop process will encourage voter fraud. They argue that a state law requires Ohio residents to register at least 30 days before voting, so same-day registration and voting should be banned.
Ms. Brunner's position is that early ballots do not constitute votes until they are tabulated on Nov. 4, said Jeff Ortega, a spokesman for Ms. Brunner. In a statement about Friday's lawsuit, Ms. Brunner said, "It is unfortunate that a small, but vocal, group of Republican leaders continues to inject confusion and chaos in our elections."
A suit has been filed to stop the same-day registration and voting, and I will be curious to read the briefs and see how it comes out.
Best Courts (and Worst)?
Which are the best state high courts? It depends on what you mean by “best.” Suppose you think the best courts are those that write the most influential opinions – are cited the most by out-of-jurisdiction courts. Then the best are California, Delaware, and Montana. The worst are Missouri, the Texas criminal high court, and the Oklahoma criminal high court. (Texas and Oklahoma have separate civil and criminal high courts.)
Suppose you think the best courts are those that publish the most opinions. Then the best are Georgia, Mississippi, and Arkansas. The worst are North Carolina, Delaware, and New Mexico.
Maybe the best courts are those that are most independent (which we define to mean that partisan differences among judges have little effect on outcomes). Then the best are Rhode Island, New York, and Oregon. The worst are Connecticut, Indiana, and Michigan.
And overall? If you (arbitrarily?) give equal weighting to the three measures, the best are California, Arkansas (!?), and North Dakota. The worst are Missouri, the Oklahoma criminal court, and Michigan.
Such is what I found, with two colleagues, when we crunched the numbers taken from 1998-2000. One might compare our rankings with this one and this one. What do practitioners think? If you have practiced in front of any of these courts (or have a sense of their reputation), please let me know in the comment section what you think of these rankings. (Remember: high courts only, not the entire judicial system for a state.) Judges seem not particularly happy about them (except for these ones).
The Post Gets a Rewrite (But Doesn't Tell Its Readers):
On Friday, the Washington Post ran this story about Gov. Sarah Palin's speech before a brigade of soldiers bound for Iraq -- at least, that link is to the story that is on the Post's web page. But this is not the story as it originally appeared. As Bill Kristol notes here, the second paragraph of the story was rewritten -- and an entire sentence replaced -- to fix a gross error that dramatically distorted what Palin had said. Most egregiously, there is no indication on the web-version of the story that it was corrected, not even a note at the end of the piece. Whatever one thinks of the Post's reporting here, it should at least acknowledge that it changed the story's text to fix an error. If we bloggers are expected to disclose substantive revisions to our blog posts, shouldn't the MSM be held to the same standard?
Law Firm Campaign Contributions Increase:
The National Law Journal reports that lawyer and law firm campaign contributions to the presidential candidates increased over the summer. McCain saw a bigger increase in law-related contributions, but Obama's take was still twice as high. Related Posts (on one page): - Law Firm Campaign Contributions Increase:
- BigLaw Political Donations:
You Can Put Lipstick on a Pit Bull
but she's still an intellectual lightweight. Sarah Palin apparently has never heard the phrase "Bush Doctrine." Sure, the phrase has several potential meanings, but she doesn't seem to be familiar with any of them. Talk about the look of a deer caught in the headlights. She appears not to understand that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are not (or at least until this week were not) funded by the federal government. Before the mortgage market imploded, plenty of policy sophisticates might not have known this, but there sure has been a lot of press about those two companies this summer. She says she's against creating embryos for stem cell research, apparently not realizing that the bills supported by both Obama and McCain would allow federal funding only of research on embryos that are left over from fertilization clinics, not embryos created for research. She claims government spending can be substantially reduced merely by finding "efficiencies" in entitlements. She doesn't appear to notice any inconsistency between her claim that she said "thanks, but no thanks" regarding the bridge to nowhere and the fact that she kept the money. And, of course, the list could go on and on.
The problem with Palin on a national ticket is not her lack of experience, per se. Few governors have much, if any, direct foreign policy experience, and we elect them President quite often. Specific experience can be quite overrated, and if you blindly use it to reinforce rather than challenge your prior beliefs and prejudices it can be downright harmful. The problem is that it isn't clear that she even pays much attention to the newspapers or has had, prior to this week's airplane flight to Alaska with McCain staffers, any in-depth conversations or even in-depth thoughts about the critical issues that have faced the country over the last several years. The Palin interviews with Charlie Gibson over the past two days have provided definitive proof that she lacks the intellectual heft that she will sorely need if she ever were to find herself having to weigh and choose between competing arguments made by advisors about complicated policy questions.
She's in way over her head. Worse, if you believe what she told Gibson about her lack of hesitation when McCain offered her the position, she doesn't even know it. No matter how much you might like or admire John McCain, given McCain's age and prior health issues, you should be very frightened about casting your vote for him.
Do Voters Have a Moral Duty to Be Informed About Politics?
In a recent paper excerpted by Bryan Caplan, Brown philosopher Jason Brennan argues that the answer to this question is yes, and even suggests that poorly informed citizens have a moral obligation not to exercise the franchise:
Irresponsible individual voters ought to abstain rather than vote badly. This thesis may seem anti-democratic. Yet it is really a claim about voter responsibility and how voters can fail to meet this responsibility. On my view, voters are not obligated to vote, but if they do vote, they owe it to others and themselves to be adequately rational, unbiased, just, and informed about their political beliefs. Similarly, most of us think we are not obligated to become parents, but if we are to be parents, we ought to be responsible, good parents. We are not obligated to become surgeons, but if we do become surgeons, we ought to be responsible, good surgeons. We are not obligated to drive, but if we do drive, we ought to be responsible drivers. The same goes for voting.
Concluding that voters have a moral duty to be informed about politics doesn't require one to also believe that government should deny the franchise to the poorly informed. One can believe that all adult citizens should have a right to vote, while also holding that they have a duty to either become adequately informed or refrain from using that right. The latter obligation may not be enforceable by the government; but that doesn't mean that it doesn't exist. We have many moral duties that cannot or should not be enforced by law. Consider, for example, our moral obligations to our friends. If I betray a friend's trust, the government does not and should not punish me for it. But that doesn't mean that it's a morally acceptable thing to do.
If ignorant voters were choosing leaders and policies only for themselves, there might be no ethical problem with their being ill-informed. They would bear the full cost of their ignorance. Unfortunately, as John Stuart Mill pointed out, to vote is to wield "power over others." The politicians elected by ignorant voters will rule over all of us, knowledgeable and ignorant alike. The ethical voter therefore has a responsibility to his fellow citizens as well as to himself.
Unfortunately, the evidence suggests that the vast majority of citizens are both poorly informed about politics and often highly biased in their evaluation of the information they do know. If citizens do indeed have a duty to either become informed about politics or refrain from casting a ballot, most of them aren't living up to it. I have argued that this is perfectly rational and not a sign of voters' "stupidity." But rational conduct isn't always morally defensible conduct.
I'm not yet completely convinced that citizens have a moral duty to become informed about politics or not vote. Even if they do, it might be overriden by other moral imperatives in some cases (e.g. - if you can't become informed about this year's election because your time is taken up by other pressing moral duties, such as the need to care for a sick relative who requires round-the-clock attention). It's also difficult to determine exactly how much knowledge should be considered sufficient to meet the average voter's moral obligations to fellow citizens. However, I am sympathetic to the general outline of Brennan's argument as I understand it so far. I look forward to reading his paper in detail once I get my hands on the full version.
Friday, September 12, 2008
Palin Haiku Contest:
Here are a couple to get you started.
Right-wingers rejoice
Maybe Obama Won't Win!
Palin on ticket
Democrats panic
What strikes terror in their hearts?
Pit bull with lipstick
Pittsburgh Decision on Warrant Requirement for Historical Cell Site Records:
A few readers have e-mailed me about the Pittsburgh district court decision requiring a probable cause warrant for stored cell site records. The court affirmed a magistrate's ruling that the Stored Communications Act doesn't govern historical cell site records as a statutory matter, and thus that the Rule 41 probable cause warrant requirement applied by default. The court added that this statutory reading was bolstered by the likelihood that the Fourth Amendment also protected the information. I don't have time for a full post on this, but the Pittsburgh decision is plainly incorrect. Of course the Stored Communications Act covers this: It's a "record concerning an electronic communication service" under 18 U.S.C. 2703(c) which can be compelled with a Terry stop "specific and articulable facts" court order under 18 U.S.C. 2703(c)(2), not a warrant. Also, the notion that the Fourth Amendment protects cell-site info is just pretty clearly wrong under the Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. Maryland. A cell site signal is closely analogous to numbers dialed in Smith: It's a signal that the user sends to the phone company that is necessary for the phone company to deliver the user's calls. Some have tried to argue that cell site data is different than numbers dialed because (a) some people think that cell phones work by magic, rather than by sending communications to cell towers to let the provider know where the phone is located, and (b) location information is more private than numbers dialed information. But these arguments don't work, I think. First, it's hard to see why the Fourth Amendment should protect a user's failure to have a basic understanding of how technology works. Second, the numbers dialed from a landline phone also give location information: In fact, they tell the police that the person is inside their home, the most private of all places under the Fourth Amendment. The Smith court didn't think this was relevant, though, so under Smith I don't think it's relevant here, either. Critically, this doesn't mean that historical cell site data should receive no protection. Historical cell site data should and does receive the protection of the Stored Communications Act, which requires a court order based on a showing of specic and articulable facts to believe the information would be relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation. But under current law, a warrant shouldn't be required. Anyway, I hope the U.S. will appeal the decision; I would guess the Third Circuit will look at this differently. And for more on the Fourth Amendment issues here, you might be interested in my draft article, The Case for the Third Party Doctrine.
Briefs on Whether the Second Amendment Should Apply to the States Via the Fourteenth:
This is the "incorporation" question, and it's raised in Nordyke v. King, a case now pending before the Ninth Circuit; the pro-incorporation and the anti-incorporation briefs are now both available.
Note, though, that the issue in this case relates only to a ban on possession on government-owned nonresidential property: Alameda County banned firearms possession in county-owned "parks, recreational areas, historic sites, parking lots of public buildings (the State prohibits gun possession within the same buildings), and the County fairgrounds." The Ninth Circuit might well conclude that it need not decide whether the Second Amendment is incorporated, because even if it is incorporated it doesn't apply to the government's restrictions on the use of its own nonresidential property.
I'm not sure whether such a result would be right or wrong, but I want to flag the possibility that the Circuit will reach it. The First and Fourth Amendments often (though not always) apply differently to the government as proprietor than to the government as regulator of what happens on private property; likewise as to the right to an abortion; the circuit may well hold that the Second Amendment does so, too, and that it gives the government broad authority to control gun possession.
Note, by the way, that it's also possible that there may be a right to possess a gun in self-defense on government property, but no right to possess a gun for purpose of selling it. (The right to keep and bear arms necessarily includes the right not to have the government stop everyone from selling you such guns, just as the right to use contraceptives includes the right not to have the government stop the sales of contraceptives. But it need not include the right to buy a gun on government property, just as the right to have an abortion does not include the right to get an abortion in a county-owned hospital.)
OK for Las Cruces to Have Three Crosses on Its City Seal:
So says a Tenth Circuit opinion handed down today. (The court also upholds the use of similar imagery in some other government displays around town.)
The Supreme Court has held that government endorsement of religion usually violates the Establishment Clause, and quite a few circuit cases have applied this test to strike down the use of religious imagery in city seals. But the Tenth Circuit concludes — in my view, quite correctly — that "Las Cruces's unique history explains why the City's name translates as 'The Crosses' and, relatedly, why the City uses crosses in its symbol," and this explanation shows that reasonable observers wouldn't see the seal as an attempt to endorse Christianity.
Here's the star of the show:

Really Cool Photo Blog:
If you like old black & white photographs, you'll love the photo blog Shorpy.com. It features new photos every day, very high resolution, mostly of American life in the early 20th century (and mostly around Washington, DC). It's super-cool stuff: I started visiting it about a week ago, and it's been a treat every day. Also note that each post has a "view full size" option that expands the photo. Hat tip: Eck.
The New Obama Ad:
This new Obama ad is really going to hurt Obama among 80s retro voters. But then I have both a turntable and a Rubik's cube in my office, so maybe I am overestimating the demographic.
Sex, Drugs, and Minerals Management:
A new Interior Department Inspector General report details serious shenanigans at the Minerals Management Service office responsible for the "royalty-in-kind" program, including the acceptance of gifts from industry, cronyism, and "a culture of substance abuse and promiscuity," including illicit drug use and sexual relations with energy company representatives. (It even sounds worse than the Ohio Attorney General's office under Marc Dann.) . As the Washington Post reports: Investigators from the Interior Department's inspector general's office said more than a dozen employees, including the former director of the oil royalty program, took meals, ski trips, sports tickets and golf outings from industry representatives. The report alleges that the former director, Gregory W. Smith, also netted more than $30,000 from improper outside work. . . .
n the report released yesterday, investigators said they "discovered a culture of substance abuse and promiscuity" in which employees accepted gratuities "with prodigious frequency." The report cited one e-mail from a Shell Pipeline representative asking a woman in the royalty office to attend "tailgating festivities" at a Houston Texans football game: "You're invited . . . have you and the girls meet at my place at 6am for bubble baths and final prep. Just kidding."
Besides Shell, the energy company employees mentioned in the report worked for Chevron, Hess and Gary-Williams Energy. The social outings detailed in the report included alcohol-, cocaine- and marijuana-filled parties where certain employees of the Minerals Management Service were nicknamed the "MMS Chicks" by the energy employees. The companies paid for federal workers to attend football and baseball games, PGA Tour events, Colorado ski trips, paintball outings and "treasure hunts," investigators found. MMS officials are supposed to maintain "arms length" relationships with energy company officials yet, as the report noted, "Sexual relationships with prohibited sources cannot, by definition, be arms-length."
In response, Interior Department Dirk Kempthorne is promising reform.
Virginia Supreme Court Reverses Itself on Rehearing of First Amendment Spam Case:
In this morning's Jaynes v. Commonwealth decision, the Virginia Supreme Court unanimously struck down as overbroad a Virginia law that banned
[using] a computer or computer network with the intent to falsify or forge electronic mail transmission information or other routing information in any manner in connection with the transmission of unsolicited bulk electronic mail ....
The court concluded that the law was substantially overbroad because it covered not just commercial spam advertising (such as the material that Jaynes was distributing) but also a substantial amount of innocent anonymous and pseudonymous noncommercial e-mail: "[W]ere the Federalist Papers just being published today via e-mail, that transmission by Publius would violate the statute."
The court also rejected the state's argument that the statute should be read narrowly to cover only commercial advertising: "Nothing in the statute suggests the limited applications advanced by the Commonwealth. If we adopted the Commonwealth’s suggested construction we would be rewriting Code § 18.2-152.3:1 in a material and substantive way. Such a task lies within the province of the General Assembly, not the courts."
In late February, the same court held by a 4-3 vote that the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine applied only to federal courts, and not to state courts, a decision that struck me as quite wrong given the Supreme Court's overbreadth precedents. A petition for rehearing, however, prompted four Justices to change their minds.
Thanks to How Appealing for the pointer.
Constitutional Interpretation at "The View":
Looks like the Thirteenth Amendment Public Awareness Society has its work cut out for it.
Palin Palin:
Palin palin, palin palin Palin Palin. Palin Palin. Palin palin palin palin -- palin. (Palin: Palin)
"You are a Mother of Five
and were a homemaker for many years before entering politics. You say ... the skills you honed doing those things were the same ones you needed when you got [into politics]. How so?"
"[A:] Absolutely, and this is what I want women to know, so they recognize the value of their own path, their unique experience. I've been in politics a while, ... and this is a very rough-and-tumble.... I shouldn't say 'rough,' let me say a very challenging arena to be in. But as challenging as it is, nothing is as challenging as raising a family -- nothing. That experience forced me to be disciplined, diplomatic, focused, and successful, and I brought that discipline and focus to [my political career]. Also, having a family keeps you focused on the future, which is the biggest inspiration in politics. In order to do what it takes to succeed in politics, you have to be inspired by your constituents, the power of your ideas, and the fact that you speak on behalf of children and their future, whether you have children of your own or not. It makes all the difference in the world...."
Very interesting. (The interview quotes are from here, though I've seen the same in yesterday's edition of The Wall Street Journal's Political Diary Newsletter, which I've always found to be reliable in its quotations.)
Comedian Facing Criminal Prosecution for Insulting Religious Leader at Political Rally:
The Times (London) reports: An Italian comedienne who said that Pope Benedict XVI would go to Hell and be tormented by homosexual demons is facing a prison term of up to five years.
Addressing a Rome rally in July, Sabrina Guzzanti [said,] ... after warning everyone that within 20 years Italian teachers would be vetted and chosen by the Vatican, ... "But then, within 20 years the Pope will be where he ought to be -— in Hell, tormented by great big poofter devils, and very active ones, not passive ones." ...
She is facing prosecution for "offending the honour of the sacred and inviolable person" of Benedict XVI.
Giovanni Ferrara, the Rome prosecutor, is invoking the 1929 Lateran Treaty between Italy and the Vatican, which stipulates that an insult to the Pope carries the same penalty as an insult to the Italian President. Prosecution requires authorisation from the Ministry of Justice, for which Mr Ferrara has applied....
The July rally was called to protest against alleged interference by the Vatican and the Catholic Church in Italian affairs, from abortion to gay rights, but also to attack the Prime Minister for passing "ad personam" laws to protect his own interests and avoid prosecution on corruption allegations....
The move to prosecute her over her anti-papal remarks was praised by some on the centre Right, including Luca Volonte, a Christian Democrat, who said that "gratuitous insults must be punished".
However, many people were strongly critical. Paolo Guzzanti, Ms Guzzanti's father and a centre Right MP, said the move was "a return to the Middle Ages”....
Even certain sections of the Church are unimpressed. Father Bartolomeo Sorge, a Jesuit scholar, told La Repubblica the move to prosecute Ms Guzzanzi was incomprehensible. "We Christians put up with many insults, it is part of being a Christian, as is forgiveness. I feel sure the Pope has already forgiven those who insulted him on Piazza Navona." The article also points to this stanza from Dante, which "condemned Boniface VIII to Hell even before his death" (Henry Boyd, translator): “Shame of the Papal Chair! and art thou come,
Hollow and dismal from the fiery tomb,”
He cried -– “a later doom the Prophet told –-
But come, Seducer of the Spouse of God,
Who rul’d the christian world with iron rod,
Come! thine eternal revenues behold!”
I think suggesting, even humorously, that your ideological enemies ought to be sexually abused is in pretty poor taste. But it seems to me that a democracy should allow even such speech, especially when it comes to important religious and political leaders.
Even if in theory public discourse wouldn't lose much from insults such as this, I think the U.S. Supreme Court was right in saying that the line between fair criticism and "outrageous" criticism can't be reliably drawn by legal institutions. And this is especially so when the judgment of the decisionmakers can easily be colored by their ideological sympathy with or antipathy to the target of the speech. Plus, of course, allowing prosecutions such as this will also encourage censorship envy on the part of those who want to suppress alleged blasphemy against their own religion and criticism of their own religious leaders; and it will make it harder to resist calls for such further censorship.
Thanks to Prof. Howard Friedman (Religion Clause) for the pointer.
The Most Powerful Americans Over Age 80:
Slate has an interesting list. My thinking: Placing Justice Stevens at #1 reflects a common overestimation of the importance of the Supreme Court; though I'm no expert at all on business, my sense is that many of the top businesspeople on the list are easily much more powerful than Justice Stevens, if you define power as the ability to affect many people's lives in an important way. But I might be wrong; check out the list for yourselves.
Thursday, September 11, 2008
Charlie Gibson’s Big Mistake.
One thing I learned tonight is that neither Charlie Gibson nor anyone on his staff reads the Volokh Conspiracy (or Hot Air for that matter).
Outrageously, in his interview Gibson claimed that Sarah Palin had called the Iraq War “a task . . . from God.”
No she didn’t. She prayed that it was a task from God. As I said a few days ago:
I find it hard to believe that Anderson Cooper [and now, Charlie Gibson] does not understand the difference between praying for something you hope is true and stating that it is true.
Is praying for peace throughout the world the same as saying that there is peace throughout the world?
If I had prayed for the press to be fair to Sarah Palin that would not be the same as stating that the press is being fair to Sarah Palin.
Here was the exchange between Palin and Gibson tonight:
GIBSON: You said recently, in your old church, “Our national leaders are sending U.S. soldiers on a task that is from God.” Are we fighting a holy war?
PALIN: You know, I don’t know if that was my exact quote.
GIBSON: Exact words.
PALIN: But the reference there is a repeat of Abraham Lincoln’s words when he said — first, he suggested never presume to know what God’s will is, and I would never presume to know God’s will or to speak God’s words.
But what Abraham Lincoln had said, and that’s a repeat in my comments, was let us not pray that God is on our side in a war or any other time, but let us pray that we are on God’s side.
That’s what that comment was all about, Charlie. . . .
GIBSON: But you went on and said, “There is a plan and it is God’s plan.”
No, Charlie, she prayed that that was true.
The more I look at this, the more it looks intentional. How could Gibson and the staff have blown both quotes (not just one as Anderson Cooper did on CNN)?
Clearly, not enough is being done to debunk the myths that the press is spreading, and these debunkings are not being spread widely enough if the staff of ABC hasn’t learned that what they are saying is not true.
Again, rather than relying on competence and fairness to solve the problem, newsrooms need to be integrated politically.
Political segregation and lack of ideological diversity just doesn’t work, no matter how careful or how fair a newsroom tries to be. And this time, I am struggling to believe ABC was even trying to be fair.
Here was most of my earlier post, which includes a transcript of Palin's actual remarks in her former church:
DID PALIN ACTUALLY SAY THAT IRAQ IS "A TASK . . . FROM GOD"?
While searching for CNN's story on Troopergate, I came across a surprising statement of Palin's quoted by Anderson Cooper: that the war in Iraq was "a task that is from God":
[Palin] also talked to church members about “being saved” at the Assembly of God and suggested to them that the war in Iraq is a mission from God. Palin said, “our national leaders are sending them out on a task that is from God. That’s what we have to make sure that we are praying for, that there is a plan and that that plan is God’s plan.”
Wow! CNN caught Palin saying on tape that Iraq was a task from God. Ouch!
But then I listended to the clip. Palin actually said:
“Pray for our military. He's [Palin's son Trask] going to be deployed in September to Iraq. Pray for our military men and women who are striving to do also what is right for this country – that our leaders, our national leaders are sending them out on a task that is from God. That’s what we have to make sure we are praying for, that there is a plan and that that plan is God’s plan.” . . .
I'm an atheist, but I'm not so old or out of touch that I don't know that Palin was doing what Christians often do: praying that what the country was doing was God's will. It's not strange for a Christian to hope that what you want to do or think is right is indeed God's will. . . .
Gibson Interviews Palin:
Read excerpts from the transcript here.
Does 18 U.S.C. § 242 Permit the Death Penalty for Child Rape?:
After reading about the Supreme Court's order seeking briefing on rehearing in Kennedy v. Louisiana, a reader e-mails in with a question: Is 18 U.S.C. § 242 another federal law that also permits the death penalty for child rape? I did some quick research into the matter. To my surprise, my tentative answer is "yes." [UPDATE: Ah, the beauty of tentative answers is how easy they are to change! In the comment thread, Kent Scheidegger points out 18 U.S.C.A. § 3591, a statute that (as I presently understand it) appears to trump the language § 242. Under § 3591, the death penalty cannot be charged unless death results in a federal criminal case even if the statute itself appears to authorize it. So as I understand things, § 242 on its face appears to authorize the death penalty for crimes including child rape, for the reasons explored below, but such a prosecution could not be brought under § 3591. I apologize for the confusion, and thank Kent for the comment. ]
18 U.S.C. § 242 is a criminal statute that applies to government employees and others acting on behalf of the government. It makes it a crime for a government official acting in the course of their official duties to willfully deprive a person of their civil rights. The penalty provision of the statute provides for the death penalty in some egregious circumstances: if death results from the acts committed in violation of this section or if such acts include kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, [the defendant] shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both, or may be sentenced to death. The language permitting the death penalty in the statute was added in 1994, when Congress passed the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub.L. 103-322. This was the massive Clinton-era law that expanded the federal death penalty, enacted the assault weapons ban, and enacted the Violence Against Women Act. (According to the Wikipedia page on the law, it is sometimes known as the Biden Crime law, as it was pushed by Delaware Senator and current VP nominee Joe Biden.) The term "aggravated sexual abuse" in 18 U.S.C. § 242 is not specifically defined, but courts have quite reasonably concluded that it refers to the federal crime of aggravated sexual abuse found in 18 U.S.C. § 2241. See United States v. Holly, 488 F.3d 1298, 130102 (10th Cir. 2007) ("Because aggravated sexual abuse is not defined in § 242, the statute necessarily requires reference to 18 U.S.C. § 2241 , the federal aggravated sexual abuse statute. . . . Thus, although [the defendant's] convictions on the challenged counts were pursuant to § 242, these convictions turn on whether his acts violated the substantive provisions of § 2241.") Section 2241 is a federal rape crime statute; it mostly applies on federal land such as park land and military bases. 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c) is the statutory rape section. It provides: Whoever crosses a State line with intent to engage in a sexual act with a person who has not attained the age of 12 years, or in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States or in a Federal prison, or in any prison, institution, or facility in which persons are held in custody by direction of or pursuant to a contract or agreement with the Attorney General, knowingly engages in a sexual act with another person who has not attained the age of 12 years, or knowingly engages in a sexual act under the circumstances described in subsections (a) and (b) with another person who has attained the age of 12 years but has not attained the age of 16 years (and is at least 4 years younger than the person so engaging), or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title and imprisoned for not less than 30 years or for life. If the defendant has previously been convicted of another Federal offense under this subsection, or of a State offense that would have been an offense under either such provision had the offense occurred in a Federal prison, unless the death penalty is imposed, the defendant shall be sentenced to life in prison. Putting Section 242 and Section 2241 together, it looks to me like Congress added the death penalty in 1994 for statutory rape of a minor under the age of 12 when the offense was committed by a government official acting under color of law. So, for example, if the state court judge in United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997), had committed statutory rape of a minor under the age of 12 instead of committing sexual assaults on adults, he would have been eligible for the federal death penalty for child rape. If I'm right about this, I think it provides an even better argument for rethinking Kennedy v. Louisiana than the existence of the 2006 military rape statute that was discovered earlier. The legal question in Kennedy concerns how the enactment of law reflects "evolving standards of decency." As I explained in an earlier post, it's not clear that a military statute is particularly relevant to this. On the other hand, the 1994 Act was a very big deal. It was very high profile legislation expanding the scope of federal criminal law, not some kind of military law tucked into some other legislation that no one noticed. This post is long enough, but let me note one of the more interesting counterarguments. The counterargument is this: This law isn't relevant to evolving standards of decency because it's not entirely clear Congress intentionally added the death penalty for child rape. I don't have in mind the technical point that legislatures don't actually have "intents," although I think that is generally true. Rather, my quick look into the history of the language suggests the possibility that the death penalty for child rape may have been an accidental product of two different statutory amendments. If that's correct, then it at least raises the argument that the law is less relevant from the standpoint of determining "evolving standards of decency." Let me explain. Before 1994, the aggravated penalty provision in Section 242 was much less severe. It stated just that "if death results, [the defendant] shall be subject to imprisonment for any term of years or for life." That is, it allowed a life sentence when death resulted. When Congress enacted the 1994 Act, it amended this language in two different sections of the Act: § 60006(b) and § 320103(b). The first section, § 60006(b), entitled "DEATH PENALTY FOR CIVIL RIGHTS MURDERS," added the death penalty: Section 242 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by striking the period at the end of the last sentence and inserting `, or may be sentenced to death.'. This change alone would amend the last phrase of the statute to the following: if death results, [the defendant] shall be subject to imprisonment for any term of years or for life, or may be sentenced to death. The second section, § 320103(b), "INCREASED PENALTIES FOR CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATIONS," added what seems to be a life sentence for certain types of crimes in which death did not necessarily result: (3) by inserting `from the acts committed in violation of this section or if such acts include kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, shall be fined under this title, or' after `death results'; (4) by striking `shall be subject to imprisonment' and inserting `imprisoned'; and (5) by inserting `, or both' after `life'. If you imagine that this second change had been the only change to the statute, that last phrase would have read as follows: if death results from the acts committed in violation of this section or if such acts include kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, shall be fined under this title, [the defendant] shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life or both. I haven't spent enough time with the statute to be sure, but I wonder if anyone on the Hill realized that these two different sections went into law at the same time. The 1994 Act was incredibly long; it has hundreds of sections. It's at least possible that one noticed the two different sections amending the same penalty provision: one added the death penalty, the other added more predicate offenses. I wonder, did anyone realize that the combined effect of the two sections was to create a statutory death penalty for rape, and through 2241(c), specifically for child rape? And if that's what happened, does that matter for purposes of the evolving standards of decency inquiry? Presumably only the Supreme Court can answer that, and only if the Supreme Court grants the petition for rehearing. Anyway, I should stress that my legal conclusions here are tentative. It's absolutely possible that I'm just missing something, and that I'm wrong about this. But it seemed like an important point if it's accurate. Thanks to reader Edmund Unnneland for the question.
Saved by the Militia:
I though some might appreciate a link to my September 18th, 2001 Guest Comment on National Review Online entitled, Saved by the Militia: Arming an army against terrorism. Here is how it began: A well-regulated militia being essential to the security of a free state. . . ." The next time someone tells you that the militia referred to in the Second Amendment has been "superceded" by the National Guard, ask them who it was that prevented United Airlines Flight 93 from reaching its target. The National Guard? The regular Army? The D.C. Police Department? None of these had a presence on Flight 93 because, in a free society, professional law-enforcement and military personnel cannot be everywhere. Terrorists and criminals are well aware of this — indeed, they count on it. Who is everywhere? The people the Founders referred to as the "general militia." Cell-phone calls from the plane have now revealed that it was members of the general militia, not organized law enforcement, who successfully prevented Flight 93 from reaching its intended target at the cost of their own lives.
The characterization of these heroes as members of the militia is not just the opinion of one law professor. It is clearly stated in Federal statutes. Perhaps you will not believe me unless I quote Section 311 of US Code Title 10, entitled, "Militia: composition and classes" in its entirety (with emphases added):"(a) The militia of the United States consists of all able-bodied males at least 17 years of age and, except as provided in section 313 of title 32, under 45 years of age who are, or who have made a declaration of intention to become, citizens of the United States and of female citizens of the United States who are members of the National Guard.
(b) The classes of the militia are —
(1) the organized militia, which consists of the National Guard and the Naval Militia; and
(2) the unorganized militia, which consists of the members of the militia who are not members of the National Guard or the Naval Militia." This is not to score political points at a moment of great tragedy, though had the murderers on these four airplanes been armed with guns rather than knives, reminders of this fact would never end. Rather, that it was militia members who saved whatever was the terrorists' target — whether the White House or the Capitol — at the cost of their lives points in the direction of practical steps — in some cases the only practical steps — to reduce the damage cause by any future attacks. Here is how it ended: A well-regulated militia does not require a draft or any compulsory training. Nor, as Alexander Hamilton recognized, need training be universal. "To attempt such a thing which would abridge the mass of labor and industry to so considerable extent, would be unwise," he wrote in Federalist 29, "and the experiment, if made, could not succeed, because it would not long be endured." But Congress has the constitutional power to create training programs in effective self-defense including training in small arms — marksmanship, tactics, and gun safety — for any American citizen who volunteers. Any guess how many millions would take weapons training at government expense or even for a modest fee if generally offered? [snip]
Rather than make war on the American people and their liberties, however, Congress should be looking for ways to empower them to protect themselves when warranted. The Founders knew — and put in the form of a written guarantee — the proposition that the individual right to keep and bear arms was the principal means of preserving a militia that was "essential," in a free state, to provide personal and collective self-defense against criminals of all stripes, both domestic and foreign.
A renewed commitment to a well-regulated militia would not be a panacea for crime and terrorism, but neither will any other course of action now being recommended or adopted. We have long been told that, in a modern world, the militia is obsolete. Put aside the fact that the importance of the militia to a "the security of a free state" is hardwired into the text of the Constitution. The events of this week have shown that the militia is far from obsolete in a world where war is waged by cells as well as states. It is long past time we heeded the words of the Founders and end the systematic effort to disarm Americans. Now is also the time to consider what it would take in practical terms to well-regulate the now-unorganized militia, so no criminal will feel completely secure when confronting one or more of its members.
9/11 and War of the Worlds:
My 9/11 story is not as dramatic as some of those recounted in Orin's thread. But it may say something about the perils of reading too much social science research.
I was clerking for a Fifth Circuit judge in Houston at the time, and was driving to work, listening to a top 40 station that never had any news reports. The regularly scheduled programming was interrupted by a breathless announcer who said that there were reports that multiple planes had hit the World Trade Center. I was skeptical. Why? Because I was familiar with the famous Orson Welles "War of the Worlds" incident in 1938, when a radio station broadcast fictional reports of an invasion by aliens from Mars, sparking a minor panic (the public reaction is recounted in Hadley Cantril's classic book, which I had read in grad school). For some reason, I decided it was possible that the top 40 station was trying to boost ratings by repeating a version of Welles' stunt. The scenario of multiple airliners crashing into the World Trade Center seemed almost as implausible as an alien invasion. And this station had never broadcast any other news during the weeks I had been listening to it. I decided to withhold judgment until I could check the news on the internet when I got to the office. When I arrived and found that CNN.com couldn't be accessed, I realized that the reports were true. Related Posts (on one page): - 9/11 and War of the Worlds:
- Where Were You on 9/11/01?:
Crystal Morning:
In honor of those who lost their lives on September 11, here's Evan Maloney's powerful video Crystal Morning (which I posted last year as well).
Removing Old Posts That Mention People's Minor Misconduct?
Here's something that I've run into twice myself -- once with this blog and once with a discussion list I run -- and that I imagine will happen even more often to bloggers and other Web site operators. I was wondering what people thought was the right answer here. (This is an ethical issue, not a legal one; it's clear that under these facts the blogger has the discretion to make the choice.)
Say a blogger posts an accurate story -- perhaps based on a news report or a court decision -- that discusses some minor misconduct by some person. The post names that person.
Several years later, the person asks the blogger to remove the post, or to remove the person's name from the post. The person is not a government official or other important figure (at least at that point; one never knows what will happen in the future). The past misconduct was pretty minor, and doesn't suggest that the person will be a serious menace to his friends, neighbors, or others. But it's embarrassing, and the person doesn't like this story coming up whenever the person's name is Googled.
The person asks the blogger, as a favor and not as a legal demand -- which you can assume would be groundless in any event -- to help out. "I've suffered enough for my minor misbehavior," the person says or implies; "please help me start afresh with my new friends, acquaintances, and business partners." (In practice, in many such situations the person or the person's representative might not be quite so forthright, and might throw in some empty legal bluster, but let's set that aside for now.)
Should the blogger delete the post, or edit out the name? Should the blogger insist on keeping the post (again, assume that it's accurate), on the theory that people shouldn't be able to rewrite history, even the history of an online publication? Is there some sensible in-between position? For instance, say the blogger can change the post so that the name is visible to readers but not findable when Google reindexes the page (I assume that Google will at some point do that), perhaps by rewriting the name using some special characters or other computer tricks. Should the blogger do that?
Again, let me stress that I'm not looking for a First Amendment analysis or other legal analysis. We can assume (in my view, with great confidence) that the blogger would be legally free to make any of these decisions. Let me also set aside the separate question of what a blogger should do if the request comes from an entirely innocent named person, for instance someone who was the victim of a crime, or an innocent bystander. And let me set aside the question of what a blogger should do if the blogger believes the reported misconduct was quite serious, and that the person is a continuing threat of some sort to others. The question is what a decent blogger ought to do when someone wants this sort of help in lowering the public profile of the person's past minor misconduct.
Where Were You on 9/11/01?:
I was teaching a morning class, in my first semester as a professor. There was no Internet access in class yet, so we found out about the attacks immediately after the class ended. Where were you? Related Posts (on one page): - 9/11 and War of the Worlds:
- Where Were You on 9/11/01?:
We're Still Here!!
As you probably heard, they switched on the Large Hadron Collider yesterday deep in the ground under the France-Switzerland border, and notwithstanding some predictions, no black hole was created, and the universe, as far as we can tell, continues to exist. [The Telegraph lists 10 other days when the world was supposed to end but didn't here]
In a slightly more serious vein, check out the absolutely stunning photos of the LHC posted here. It looks like something out of a wild sci-fi fantasy movie . . . just what you'd want the world's largest machine to look like.
Iranian Legal Scholar Scheduled to be a Visiting Professor at Penn Law School Detained by Iranian Regime:
Iranian legal scholar Medhi Zakerian, who was scheduled to be a visiting professor at the University of Pennsylvania Law School this fall, has been arrested by the Iranian authorities and detained without charges for the last three weeks. Since I am serving as a visiting professor at Penn myself this semester, I thought I would make note of this egregious behavior by the Iranian regime. Apparently, Zakerian has been targeted because of his criticism of the regime's human rights abuses, and perhaps because the government feared that his visit at Penn would make it possible for him to reach a broader audience for his views. This website provides a bit more information about Zakerian and states that he is being held by the Ministry of Intelligence.
I don't know much more than this about Zakerian or his work. So I can only say I hope that he will be released soon, and urge my fellow legal scholars, among others, to pressure the Iranian government towards that end.
Defending Obama for Sending his Daughters to Private School.
On the NY Times blogs, Sandra Tsing Loh is depressed to discover that Barack Obama sends his kids to private school, the University of Chicago Laboratory Schools (tip to Tim Blair). She asks: Why can't he send his daughters to public school?
Personally, I compliment the Obamas for not using their children as political pawns to get elected or to reform society two children at a time. In my opinion, that makes the Obamas good parents.
By the way, Sarah Palin sent her kids to Iditarod Elementary School.
Ms. Loh at the Times blog:
I do not know why Barack and Michelle Obama cannot send their children to a nice public school in Hyde Park. You understand that I am a bit unstable this election season (I voted for Hillary) and I do my research by erratically Googling from home. And all I know about Hyde Park — and, readers, I’d love to be corrected if I’m wrong — is that even though real estate prices seem high, the brave little public schools in its ZIP code seem to be flailing. Their scores on www.greatschools.net are largely 2’s and 4’s (on a scale of 1 to 10, 10 being the best). When you read the tea leaves as manically as I do, those low numbers suggest that few children of educated, middle-class children are attending the local schools. Rather, they’ve withdrawn, with nary a ripple, into their whispery private enclaves.
Let us not even touch the term “community organizer,” so buffeted about, by both sides, like a balloon at a rock concert. Let us just say that if Mr. and Mrs. Obama — a dynamic, Harvard-educated couple — had chosen public over private school, they could have lifted up not just their one local public school, but a family of schools. First, given the social pressure (or the social persuasion of wanting to belong to the cool club), more educated, affluent families would tip back into the public school fold. And second, the presence of educated type-A parents with too much time on their hands ensures that schools are held, daily, to high standards. . . .
So it is with huge grief-filled disappointment that I discovered that the Obamas send their children to the University of Chicago Laboratory School (by 5th grade, tuition equals $20,286 a year). The school’s Web site quotes all that ridiculous John Dewey nonsense about developing character while, of course, isolating your children from the poor. A pox on them and, while we’re at it, a pox on John Dewey! I’m sick to death of those inspirational Dewey quotes littering the Web sites of $20,000-plus-a-year private schools, all those gentle duo-tone-photographed murmurings about “building critical thinking and fostering democratic citizenship” in their cherished students, living large on their $20,000-a-year island.
Meanwhile, Joseph Biden, the Amtrak senator, standing up boldly for the right to be a Roman Catholic, appears to have sent all three children to the lovely looking Archmere Academy in Delaware. Archmere’s Web site notes some public school districts allow Archmere students to use public school buses. Well, isn’t that great — your tax dollars at work in the great state of Delaware because with $18,000 a year in tuition, they can’t afford their own buses.
Then again, a spot of happy news for the Democrats: not only did John McCain’s four children attend elite private schools in Arizona, but collective donations to their children’s private schools between 2001 and 2006, totaled $500,000.
And yes, I know I appear to be ranting on like a pit bull without lipstick, which brings me to the final nail in the coffin in this sorry election year. As a Democrat I am horrified that Sarah Palin is the one who snagged the deeply profound — and absolutely ignored by professional smart people — emotional real estate of “P.T.A. mother.” I too am, in fact, not just “my kids’ mom” but their Title I Los Angeles public school P.T.A. secretary. This unheard female howl is, for better or worse, what Ms. Palin has set out to tap into; it is real, and I am sick that we’ve let the Republicans charge this ground.
Sarah Palin’s children went to what looks like a humble little public school: Iditarod Elementary on Wasilla Fishhook Road. The school’s score on www.greatschools.net is a 4. That’s a lot of street cred, for a gun-totin’, snow-mobilin’ creationist-lovin’ lady.
Oh, I’m such a depressed, Democrat P.T.A. mother.
First, the UC Lab Schools should be forgiven for quoting John Dewey. It was his school; it was his “laboratory”; he founded it.
Second, one of the things I admired about Bill Clinton when he became President in 1993 is that he refused to give in to the pressure to send Chelsea to a mediocre public school, sending her instead to a good private one. A president might have to miss a lot of important events in his daughter’s life, but at least he needn’t use her as a political pawn to the detriment of her education.
I went to public schools in Rockford, Illinois until I went to Yale College. If the public schools are good, why not? If they are poor, then send your kids to a private school. If they are close in quality, I would lean toward public schools.
Third, I should disclose that i sent my daughter to the Lab School from nursery school through high school. Academically, it was excellent. It was, however, a bit cliquish and very left wing.
Fourth, why does Ms. Loh consider it a bad thing for the McCains to be generous with charitable donations to private schools?
When Asserting Your Constitutional Rights is Cause for Suspicion:
I just came across a Fourth Amendment case, Cady v. Sheahan, 467 F.3d 1057 (7th Cir. 2006), that isn't new but has annoyed me enough to blog about it anyway. It's a case that I'm sure the Seventh Circuit panel found silly — you can listen to the argument here — but I actually think may have a lot of merit. At the very least it's an example of how courts often don't take the Fourth Amendment rules governing Terry stops as seriously as they should. Here are the facts. Cady had filed a civil suit against a police officer, and he showed up at a Cook County courthouse in Bridgeview, Illinois sometime between 6:15 and 6:30 a.m on August 22, 2001, to serve process on the officer during an early morning shift-change. He was carrying a briefcase, and his clothes were dirty and wrinkled. He stood outside the courthouse by the sidewalk and waited for the shift change so he could serve process. An officer approached Cady to see what he was doing, but Cady apparently declined to answer the officer's question. The officer alerted another officer, Lucio, and Lucio decided to investigate. Lucio approached Cady and asked what he was doing; Cady responded that he was "a federal process server." Officer Lucio asked for Cady's ID. Instead of giving the officer an ID, Cady engaged in a legal discussion with the officer of whether was any law requiring him to have identification with him. In fact, there wasn't. The facts aren't totally clear, but it seems that Cady had chosen not carry an ID that morning because he had researched the law and knew he was not required to do so. After a few minutes, Cady asked to speak with Lucio's supervisor. Sargeant Barbat arrived on the scene and asked Cady why he was there and asked to see his ID. Cady stated that he would not reveal his identity "unless he was assured that it would not be used against him in a future criminal prosecution." (This is the Fifth Amendment standard, in case you're wondering.) He also asked Barbat whether "Barbat was making a Terry stop, and if so, what crime he suspected Cady was committing, was about to commit, or had committed," tracking the language of the Illinois Terry stop statute. Cady bolstered his many legal questions and discussion points with supporting legal documents, including a law dictionary and a copy of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that he retrieved from a briefcase he was carrying. Now we get to the interesting part from a Fourth Amendment standpoint. One of the officers present took the briefcase from Cady and placed it on the hood of a squad car. Then two officers searched the contents of the briefcase. They found a Sullivan's Law Directory, a Bible, an address book, and a pen. No weapons were found. The officers started looking through the books for a name so they could figure out who Cady was. Inside the Bible, they found a name. The officers then closed the briefcase and placed it in their squad car. Cady was also personally frisked at this time, but no weapons were discovered. The officers then ran the name that appeared in Cady's Bible through their squad car computer: Finding that a name was not enough to identify Cady, the officers pressed Cady for more information. Officer Margalus stated that if Cady did not comply, he could be arrested for obstructing a police officer. Officer Jacoby took out his handcuffs and told Cady to put his hands behind his back[.] Faced with the threat of arrest for refusing to disclose more information, Cady told the officers his name and date of birth. The officers ran that through the computer and found there was no warrant out for his arrest. They then gave him back his briefcase and sent him on his way. The entire incident lasted "between twenty and thirty minutes."
Cady then filed a pro se lawsuit against the officers for violating his Fourth Amendment rights in seizing him, searching his briefcase, and then frisking him. The district court granted summary judgment to the officers on the ground that the Fourth Amendment was not violated, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed in a decision by Judge Kanne (joined by Judges Ripple and Williams). First, the Seventh Circuit held that there was reasonable suspicion that justified stopping Cady and frisking him for weapons. According to the court, "an officer is entitled to conduct a limited stop and related protective search for weapons of an individual who is lurking amongst the bushes outside a courthouse two hours before it opens, is shabbily dressed, carrying a briefcase, claims to be a federal process server, refuses to provide identification upon request, and is evasive in response to police questioning." Searching the briefcase and frisking Cady was justified because the officers could reasonably believe their safety was in danger: In the course of a Terry stop, an officer may conduct a protective search for weapons of an individual's person, and area within his control, if "a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger." [Terry v. Ohio] The officers in this case were faced with an individual who was lurking outside a courthouse well before it opened to the public, was shabbily dressed, had not showered, carried a briefcase, and claimed to be serving federal process on a Sheriff's officer. Cady was evasive in response to the officers' questions, and repeatedly reached into his briefcase. Under the circumstances, a reasonably prudent officer would be concerned for the safety of the officers and civilians in the area, as well as for Cady himself. Cady also argued the the Terry stop had gone on too long and went too far, including holding his briefcase away from him even after it was clear it contained no weapons. The Seventh Circuit disagreed on the theory that any delay was Cady's own fault: Cady’s refusal to provide identification aside, he engaged the officers in a dialog concerning the legal significance of Supreme Court precedents and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, asked to speak with a supervisor, failed to correct the officers’ obvious belief that he was claiming to be a federal agent, and threatened to sue the officers. The total length of the stop was between twenty and thirty minutes. The officers worked diligently to resolve the situation, and released Cady as soon as they determined that he was not a threat to safety at the courthouse. The permissible scope and duration of the investigative stop were not exceeded. It's not surprising at all that Cady lost his lawsuit. He is a repeat pro se litigant in the Seventh Circuit — what the Seventh Circuit called "an extremely experienced pro se litigant." And he was acting strangely at a courthouse, a building that judges are particularly inclined to protect zealously. He was also reufusing to go along with the officers' questions. Still, as a matter of law, the court's explanation strikes me as incredibly lame. I can perhaps see the case for detaining Cady temporarily in light of the strangeness of his appearance and the unusual time and place. But what facts justified frisking Cady, rummaging through his briefcase, and finally taking away his briefcase for the duration of the questioning? What was the threat to officer safety? Invoking your constitutional rights doesn't pose a threat to officer safety. Nor does asking an officer to clarify if he has seized under the Fourth Amendment you pose a threat. Acting like a lawyer doesn't mean you have a gun or a knife. Plus, frisks are only permitted under Terry if the search is for weapons. As far as I can tell, there was no reason to think that there was a gun in the briefcase. In their deposition, the officers made what strikes me as a highly unpersuasive claim that they were worried that after pulling out Black's Law dictionary and the Fed R. Civ. Pro., Cady might also have a gun in there that might come out next. Yeah, sure. Any ideas why they looked through the Bible, opening it up to the cover page where a name might be? What, did they think Cady had a very thin gun tucked in the cover page? It seems obvious that the officers searched the brief case because they wanted to know who Cady was. It was a search for ID, not guns. Now, maybe that's an understandable human reaction. But Terry just doesn't allow it, and Terry is the law. Anyway, the oral argument and the opinion suggest that the panel was just inclined to give court security officers the benefit of the doubt here. For example, at one point in the oral argument, Judge Williams says that we now live in a dangerous world, and that "perhaps if we were in a pre-9/11 world, we would have a different case." But I think this case deserved a lot more careful analysis than the panel gave it: Cady may be a homeless guy and a repeat litigant, but his Fourth Amendment rights count as much as anyone else's.
Wednesday, September 10, 2008
Biden to Help Pick Judges?:
Jeff Rosen writes in the New Republic that if Obama wins, "Biden's instincts will help guide the selection of judges and the challenging task of reconstructing civil liberties after the assault of the last eight years." Even if one accepted Rosen's underlying ideological (and pro-Biden) premises--which I don't (isn't Biden the one who attacked Bork for not believing in unenumerated rights, and then attacked Thomas a few years later for exactly the opposite reason?)--this seems to be wishful thinking on Rosen's part. I'm happy to be corrected if I'm wrong, but the Vice-President has no obvious constitutional or political role to play in selecting judges, and I don't recall the Vice-President ever, in fact, playing a significant role (or any role) in selecting federal judges. It's not clear to me why Biden would be the first. Sure, he has tons of relevant experience, but it's not like Obama, a former law school lecturer, can't figure out how to run the judicial selection process without bringing his V.P in.
Hat tip: Instapundit.
UPDATE: Just to be clear, it's not completely outside the realm of possibility that Obama would give Biden some significant role in judicial selection. However, it would be against historical practice, and I haven't seen any evidence, including from Rosen, that Obama would in fact do so. Rosen may (or may not) be right that it would a good idea for Obama to consult Biden, but that's very different from suggesting that such consultation is a foregone conclusion.
FURTHER UPDATE: A reader points out that Dick Cheney was apparently intimately involved in choosing Chief Justice Rehnquist's successor.
BigLaw Political Donations:
It might not be a surprise that major law firm donations largely mirror those of law professors, and are weighted heavily toward Barack Obama (albeit not as heavily as lawprof donations), as Bruce Batista summarizes here. Why is this? Batista has his own ideas, and I'd be curious about others.
How Much Do Supreme Court Opinions Borrow from the Br |