The Volokh Conspiracy

Saturday, September 20, 2008

More on the Financial Meltdown and the Legal Response.

1. Why do people like me and Sandy Levinson keep talking about the Nazi philosopher Carl Schmitt? Schmitt was skeptical that a parliamentary democracy can handle crises: it can only role over and let the executive act. You can read Levinson here (marred only by the pervasive tone of indignation: what exactly does he (realistically) expect?), or for a scarily timely scholarly treatment of Schmitt and our administrative state, see this paper by Adrian Vermeule.

2. The legalists in American law schools rage at the Bush administration for claiming constitutional authority to wage the war on terrorism rather than going to Congress but are indifferent when the Bush administration cites, as authority to address the current financial crisis, a statute enacted by Congress seventy years ago and a judge-made doctrine that permits agencies to interpret ambiguous statutes expansively. Is it really so difficult to see that these two cases are the same from the perspective of the rule-of-law values that the rule of law is supposed to advance: public debate and authorization of policy by a representative body for the purpose of addressing events that it is actually aware of? I say that you have to approve of both or neither.

3. Speaking of which, see the bill the Bush administration is pushing on Congress, and this analysis by David Zaring. Note the "without limitation" language and the stripping of judicial review. Whatever you think of Bush administration lawyers, one cannot deny that they've learned some lessons from the Supreme Court's reaction to their war-on-terror policies.

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Peltzman Effect Bleg:

I recall seeing a paper at some point that found a Peltzman effect for higher automobile gas mileage--i.e., when automobile gas mileage rises, people live further from work and have longer commutes, thereby dampening some of the reduction in fuel consumption that might otherwise occur. I also seem recall a finding that this increase in commute time also leads to more accidents as a result of greater driver fatigue.

Note that I am not looking for the classic Peltzman effect example about car safety and more accidents, but rather any countervailing effect related to gas mileage and the effect on fuel consumption.

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Just Like Mother Used To Make:

The Telegraph (UK) reports:

The owner of the Storchen restaurant in the exclusive Winterthur resort [in Switzerland] will improve his menu with local specialities such as meat stew and various soups and sauces containing at least 75 per cent of mother's milk.

The owner is advertising for suppliers, "who will receive just over three pounds for 14 ounces of their milk." Note that the milk "always needs to be mixed with a bit of whipped cream, in order to keep the consistency," says the owner.

Legal or not?, you might ask. The answer:

"Humans as producers of milk are simply not envisaged in the legislation.

"They are not on the list of approved species such as cows and sheep, but they are also not on the list of the banned species such as apes and primates," Rolf Etter of the Zurich food control laboratory said.

Thanks to my sister-in-law Hanah for the pointer.

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Friday, September 19, 2008

Poorly Written Headline of the Day:

Washington Post: "Investors Confident Rescue Plan May Help"

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Using Property Rights to Prevent Overfishing:

Both the Economist and the BBC have just published interesting articles on the use of property rights to prevent overfishing in various places around the world.

Coincidentally, I covered this very topic in my Property class at Penn just a few days ago. I love it when education is "relevant!"

HT: Penn Property students Ramsey Younis and Michael Bolos.

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Second-Generation Nigerian Spam:

A message I just found when clearing out my spam folder:

I am Mrs. Susan Walter, I am a US citizen, 39 years Old. I reside here in Houston Texas. My residential address is as follows. 503 Madison Ave. Apt York, Houston Texas, United State.

I am one of those that executed a contract in Nigeria years ago and they refused to pay me, I had paid over $20,000 trying to get my payment all to no avail.

So I decided to travel down to Nigeria with all my contract documents, And I was directed to meet Barrister Afam Morgan Esq, who is the member of CONTRACT AWARD COMMITTEE, and I contacted him and he explained everything to me.

He said that those contacting us through emails are fake. Then he took me to the paying bank, which is Oceanic Bank of Nigeria Plc, and I am the happiest woman on this earth because I have received my contract funds of $1.Million USD. Moreover, Barrister Afam M Esq, showed me the full information of those that have not received their payment, and I saw your name as the beneficiary, and your email address/Telephone number and your contract amount,This is what you have to do now.

You have to contact him direct on this information below....

You really have to stop your dealing with those contacting you okay, because they will dry you up until you have nothing to eat. The only money I paid was just $420 for IRS permit, which you know, So you have to take note of that.

Thank You and Be Blessed.
Mrs. Susan Walter

Well, now that that's all cleared up, my check is in the mail.

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"Teen Cited for Destroying U.S. Flag":

The Winona Daily News reports:

Police have issued a ticket this week to a 14-year-old Winona Senior High School student for desecrating a U.S. flag.

The teen, whose name is withheld because he is a juvenile, admitted he planned to desecrate it when he bought it and knew that was illegal, police said. The misdemeanor ticket carries a maximum penalty of 90 days in jail and a $1,000 fine....

[The teen told the police he] bought the flag, wrote song lyrics on it, tore it to pieces and burned it with cigarettes....

According to the Minnesota statute, it is illegal for anyone to intentionally or publicly mutilate, defile or cast contempt on the flag or to place words, marks or designs on the flag that don’t belong there....

Naturally, the student can be punished for skipping class (something he did, apparently to attend "the Rage Against the Machine concert Sept. 3 in Minneapolis during the Republican National Convention"), and if he burnt the flag with cigarettes at school, and possession of cigarettes at school is prohibited (and the prohibition would normally be enforced even against a non-flag-burner), he could be punished for that, too. But given the Supreme Court's well-known holdings striking down flag desecration laws such as this one, the prosecution of the teen appears to be legally frivolous.

Thanks to W. Edward Howard, Jr. for the pointer.

Related Posts (on one page):

  1. Prosecutors Decline To Press Charges Against Flagburner:
  2. "Teen Cited for Destroying U.S. Flag":
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Canada Ranked Ahead of the United States in Protection for Property Rights:

Various libertarian and libertarian-leaning bloggers are disappointed that Canada (7th) ranks ahead of the United States (8th) in the latest Cato/Fraser Institute economic freedom rankings. In reality, the difference between Canada's score (8.05 on a 10 point scale) and ours (8.04) is statistically insignificant. However, it probably is the case that Canada - as well as several other nations that rank ahead of us in the Cato/Fraser study - really has equalled or surpassed the United States in economic freedom, thanks to the massive expansion of government in the Bush era of "big government conservatism." As the individual country data sets in the Cato/Fraser study reveal (the US data is on pg. 177), the United States ranked 2nd in 2000 and 4th in 1995, the last two pre-Bush era rankings.

Also interesting are America's scores in specific categories of economic freedom that the Cato/Fraser study aggregates into the overall ranking. One important category where the United States (7.58) trails Canada (8.47) by a large margin is "protection of property rights." I haven't closely analyzed the methodology Cato and Fraser used to compile these numbers; so it is possible that they are the result of some sort of methodological error. However, I suspect that the two rankings are roughly accurate. Compared to the United States, Canadian authorities pay higher compensation to property owners whose land has been taken by eminent domain. In theory, the United States Constitution provides more extensive protection for property rights than Canada's does; in practice, however, property rights continue to the be the "poor relation" of constitutional law and rarely get more than a bare minimum of protection from the Supreme Court. Finally, I suspect that Canadian provincial and local governments don't condemn property for "economic development" and "blight" alleviation as often as their American equivalents. Certainly, there are few if any Canadian takings comparable in scope to cases like Poletown.

I have not studied Canadian property rights law and policy in detail, so these tentative conclusions are based on limited knowledge. I welcome correction from Canadian property scholars and others with relevant expertise. Also, it's worth noting that there is wide variation between American states in the degree to which they protect property owners; the best American states are probably well ahead of the Canadian average. Subject to these important caveats, however, I fear that our oft-maligned neighbor to the North really does do a better job of protecting property rights than we in the US of A. The True North isn't always "strong and free." But its property owners may enjoy stronger legal protection and greater freedom than ours do.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST WATCH: I suppose I should mention that I am a Cato Institute adjunct scholar (an unpaid, purely honorary, position). I didn't have any role in writing Economic Freedom in the World.

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An Odd Definition of "Partisan":

Let me get this straight: if the only prominent American politician to attend a rally against Iran is Hillary Clinton, the rally is a neutral, nonpartisan event. If Hillary Clinton AND Sarah Palin attend, then the rally becomes a partisan political event, and Clinton couldn't possibly agree to appear. Very, very strange.

UPDATE: A reader comments: What's the difference between [Malcolm] Hoenlein [who invited Palin, and then disinvited her under pressure from Democratic activists] and Ahmadinejad?

Ahmadinejad isn't intimidated by the Democrats.

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An Important Announcement: Over at Concurring Opinions, Dave Hoffman announces:
Concurring Opinions, like A.I.G. and Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac before it, is now too big too fail. We expect that should our blogging rate slow, or the general market conditions to lead to a run on our host, the Feds will step in ensure market stability.
  Ditto for the Volokh Conspiracy: So many blogs rely on this blog that our problems are really everyone's problems. So yeah, looking back on it, maybe all those crazy parties and trips to Vegas to blow our advertising revenue weren't a good idea. But hey, it's too late for that: We need to think about the public interest now, and the public interest is obviously in government-backed law blogs.
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Why Candidates and the Media Exploit Political Ignorance:

Widely respected columnist Stuart Taylor writes:

[O]ne reason that candidates get away with dishonest campaign ads and speeches may be that it is so hard for undecided voters like me to discern which charges are true, which are exaggerated, and which are false. Most people can't spend hours every day cross-checking diverse sources of information to verify the accuracy of slanted stories and broadcasts.

In other words, political candidates and media outlets often get away with deceptive campaign tactics and inaccurate charges because voters don't know the truth and don't have sufficient incentive to rectify that ignorance through investigation. Taylor goes on to blame the media for this state of affairs, suggesting that more accurate reporting would increase our knowledge. Here, I partly disagree with Taylor. The media is indeed flawed in many ways. But its failures are not the only, or even the principal, cause of widespread political ignorance. Surveys show that most citizens are ignorant of many very basic facts about politics - such as the very existence of major programs (e.g. - Bush's massive prescription drug benefit, the largest new government program since the 1960s, which 70% of the public was not aware of). These basic facts are widely and accurately reported in the media, yet most people still don't know them.

Moreover, the media are not completely autonomous; if they want to stay in business, they have to give viewers and readers what they want. If the public wanted unbiased and accurate coverage and was willing to reject outlets that turned out to be biased and inaccurate, the media would have strong incentives to comply. Newspapers and TV news stations that continued to be biased or inaccurate would lose market share.

In reality, of course, most people either don't follow political news at all, or prefer outlets that are biased in favor of their own preferred party or ideology. Thus, the demand for Fox News, the New York Times, and many other media outlets that are strongly biased towards one party or the other. Social science research going back to the 1940s shows that Republicans tend to prefer Republican-leaning media and Democrats the opposite.

Ultimately, the root of the problem is the insignificance of the individual vote to electoral outcomes. For people whose only motive for acquiring political information is to be a better voter, it turns out that there is little incentive to acquire political knowledge at all. They are "rationally ignorant." Some people, of course, seek out political knowledge for reasons unrelated to voting. For example, they find politics entertaining or they enjoy rooting for their preferred party or ideology - much as sports fans enjoy rooting for their favorite team, even though they know they have little chance of affecting the outcome of games. For this latter group, however, there is little incentive to analyze the information they acquire in an unbiased way or even to check up on its accuracy. To the contrary, listening to pundits and reporters who have the same biases as you do while heaping abuse on the opposition, is part of the fun of being a fan. Political fans often avoid opposing points of view for much the same reasons that most of my fellow Red Sox fans prefer to listen to pro-Red Sox sports radio rather than pro-Yankees shows. That's the main reason why left and right-leaning blogs usually have similarly inclined readers. People also tend to discount political information that goes against their prior views and overvalue anything that seems to reinforce them. Economist Bryan Caplan calls this phenomenon "rational irrationality."

I discuss both rational ignorance and rational irrationality in more detail in this article, as well as provide citations to some of the social science literature documenting the finding that most people evaluate political information in a highly biased way and prefer media outlets that favor their preexisting views.

Knowing that most of the public is rationally ignorant, highly biased in its evaluation of political information or both, candidates take these realities into account. They can see that lies, deception, and unfair charges will often increase their chances of winning, and act accordingly. Indeed, even an altruistic, public-spirited candidate might adopt such tactics, so long as he genuinely believes that his victory will benefit the nation. After all, abjuring them would likely ensure the victory of his more unscrupulous opponents whose policies - the principled candidate believes - would be worse for the country than his own. Media outlets face similar incentives. Those who don't cater to the prejudices of one or another side of the political spectrum are at a competitive disadvantage relative to their rivals. The same goes for those who emphasize in-depth news analysis at the expense of entertainment value.

It's easy to blame unscrupulous politicians and reporters for the flaws in our political discourse. But the root of the problem lies elsewhere - in the structural weaknesses of democracy itself.

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"Legalized same-sex marriage almost certainly benefits those same-sex couples who choose to marry, as well as the children being raised in those homes":

That's the claim made today by Andrew Sullivan Jonathan Rauch David Blankenhorn in an op-ed in the L.A. Times.

It's not a new claim, of course. Same-sex marriage advocates have been making it for years. Nor should it be a controversial one since it's very hard to see how gay marriage would have no effect on gay families and even harder to see how it would hurt them.

What's significant about it is that Blankenhorn is one of the leading public intellectuals opposed to same-sex marriage in this country (and in fact his op-ed goes on to explain why he still opposes it despite the good it will do). While supporters of gay marriage must constantly parry claims of harm, opponents of gay marriage almost never acknowledge the existence of gay families, much less their needs and the ways marriage might help them. The focus has been entirely on the potential cost to heterosexual families, an understandably important -- though not exclusive --consideration in the debate. Blankenhorn here accepts that forbidding gay marriage itself entails some cost. (In fact, Blankenhorn has previously endorsed civil unions for gay couples, minus marital rights to child-raising.) It's a small breath of fresh air in a debate that has become pretty stale.

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Stuart Taylor on the Media and the Campaign:

Taylor, who has always struck me as eminently fair and nonpartisan, writes: "We still have many great journalists, but I no longer trust the major newspapers or television networks to provide consistently accurate and fair reporting and analysis of all the charges and countercharges." For the rest of the column, which provides many details in support (and criticizies McCain as well as Obama and the media), see here.

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Cleveland Municipal Code Doesn't Authorize Civil Forfeitures of Unregistered Guns:

A mildly interesting opinion from the Ohio Court of Appeals, in City of Cleveland v. Fulton (handed down yesterday).

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A Modest Proposal to Deal With the Financial Crisis:

Underlying the financial crisis is bad mortgages. There are bad mortgages because housing prices have plunged, especially in South Florida, California, Arizona, and Nevada, and Rust Belt cities.

My thinking is that instead of simply spending taxpayer resources to bail out the financial industry, let's find a way to move a long-term liability off the books at the same time.

One major federal liability is having to pay for damage from floods. The government is spending billions to reconstruct New Orleans and other Gulf areas, and the money will just have to spent again when a Category 5 storm hits, as it will eventually. And it seems like every decade or so, the Mississippi floods and the government winds up paying for that, too. Not to mention the homeowners with beach houses all along the hurricane-prone East Coast.

So the government could use the money it would otherwise use to bail out the financial industry instead to pay people to abandon their flood-prone communities. The condition would be that they have to buy a new house in one of the markets noted above. The taxpayers get off the long-term hook for New Orleans and the like, the newfound demand props up the housing market, and the government doesn't get any more involved in the financial market than writing checks to migrants from flood-prone areas.

I'm sure that Obama and McCain will jump on this proposal immediately.

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President Bush Declares War on Financial Crisis: Worried about Wall Street? No need, as it turns out: George W. Bush will solve everything through massive market intervention. Think of it as a domestic "surge."
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AIG, the War on Terror, and Executive Power.

Whether the Fed (and/or the Treasury) acted unlawfully depends on whether the transaction with AIG falls within the statute that authorizes the Fed to make loans to non-banks during emergencies. It is clear that the transaction mixes elements of debt and equity. The Fed probably will get the residual value of AIG—everything if its assets appreciate less than 8.5%, and 80% of the balance if they appreciate more than 8.5%. The Fed probably has almost complete control as well: it kicked out the old CEO and replaced it with a new CEO and although the Fed has not yet exercised its equity warrants, clearly this new CEO knows that the Fed can, whereupon its control will become de jure as well as de facto. Still, we don’t know for sure, I suppose; in particular, I can’t tell whether some condition must be met before the Fed can exercise its warrants or whether they are limited in some other way. But if, as some have argued, AIG was worth nothing at all, then it would be pretty crazy for the Fed to accept anything less than full ownership in the substantive sense, and we can reconcile ourselves to the fact that somehow the AIG shareholders were left with an ownership stake with the comforting thought that their shares have (almost) no value. (As long as AIG is on life support, there is a non-zero probability that its value will appreciate to the point that shareholders get some return.)

What is more interesting is the strong parallel—which I hinted at before—between the current situation and the situation post-9/11. No one expects Congress to act in any meaningful sense. The executive has nearly unlimited discretion, relies on mostly secret information, and therefore its actions cannot be evaluated by outsiders. We can only trust that executive officials know what they are doing. People say, at least, we can trust Henry Paulson and Ben Bernanke. They seem competent and have the country’s interests at heart. But that’s what people used to say about Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld. We really have no idea whether Paulson and Bernanke are making wise decisions, dumb decisions, or even politically motivated decisions—say, bailing out firms in which political allies have interests and not otherwise, or firms with lots of workers in politically important swing states. Sometime in the future, we may be able to evaluate their decisions, at which point our sole means of expressing our displeasure if those decisions were bad ones would be by voting against the person chiefly responsible for their appointments, George Bush—um, never mind.

Meanwhile, right now niceties of statutory construction must be ignored because the people who drafted the statutes did not anticipate the nature of this emergency though of course they knew that emergencies could happen. Back in 1932 (the most recent amendment was in 1991), Congress apparently believed that the Fed could respond to a financial crises solely by making loans so there was no need to give it the power to purchase businesses, a power that could be abused. Turns out this belief might have been wrong. Some loans may not be wise unless the lender can more or less control the borrower and can earn a portion of the upside, which just means that the Fed should have the power to purchase equity as well as debt. Going forward, all that Congress can do is provide even greater statutory discretion by expanding old authorities, so that next time round there will be no doubts about legality, and hope that the Fed does not abuse this discretion. There is, and can be, no serious debate about the best way to respond to the emergency in advance of it, and no time to have a debate during it. So Congress proves itself again an utterly helpless institution. It can whine today, hold oversight hearings tomorrow, and dutifully hand over more authority to the Fed on the next day. In the meantime, bad decisions by our government during this financial crisis, and future ones as well, will harm Americans and people around the world just as much as bad war-on-terror decisions do. Sorry, my libertarian friends; this is the world we live in. And there is no conceivable alternative.

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Updated Article on Subprime Lending:

I've posted an updated version of my article on the "Law and Economics of Subprime Lending" which is forthcoming in the University of Colorado Law Review. The way things are going, I'll probably have to update it again this weekend. Then next weekend. Then...

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Thursday, September 18, 2008

Keith Olbermann:

I happend to catch the very beginning of "Countdown" with Keith Olbermann. His lead story was on John McCain's statement that if he were President he would "fire" Chris Cox as Chairman of the SEC, explaining that the Chairman of the SEC is appointed by and serves at the will of the President.

Olbermann sarcastically commented that McCain needs to learn about constitutional law and that it would be "unconstitutional" to try to fire the head of the SEC. He says that MSNBC's legal advisor (I missed his first name and I don't really watch NBC or MSNBC but I think it is somebody named Williams) told him this, referring to a "1935 case where the Supreme Court held that it would be unconstitutional to fire a member of an independent agency."

Well, no. Actually, he's not even close.

First, of course, the case he is referring to is Humphrey's Executor v. United States, which was triggered when FDR tried to remove a sitting member of the FTC. The Supreme Court did not hold that removing a Commissioner was unconstitutional; it held that Congress could provide for limitations on the President's removal power over members of independent agencies. So this is just intellectual confusion on Olbermann's part. I had a quote from Humphrey's Executor as my screensaver when I was at the FTC (how's that for nerdy?).

Second, there is a more practical confusion. Olbermann, and perhaps Williams too, are confused as to what McCain said and what the President can do. True, the President cannot fire a member of an independent agency. But the Chairman does serve as Chairman at the discretion of the President. The President can designate any of the 5 members of the Commission as Chairman. Or change the designation. Confirmation to be a Commissioner requires Senate confirmation; confirmation to be Chair does not. The Chairmanship of independent agencies does not operate the same way as the Supreme Court. For the Supreme Court, a sitting Justice who is elevated to Chief must be reconfirmed for the new post. But a sitting Commissioner who is designated Chair does not need a separate confirmation. Thus, the President can "fire" Cox by removing him as Chair but cannot fire him as a Commissioner.

So, for instance, when Bill Kovacic was elevated to Chairman of the FTC this spring, he became Chairman, not Acting Chairman. Because he was already confirmed as a Commissioner. Similarly, Janet Steiger was Chairman of the FTC under Bush I. When Clinton was elected, he appointed Bob Pitofsky to the Commission and made him Chair. Steiger stayed on as a non-Chairman Commissioner.

A quick search of the history of the SEC rules and regs indicates that the President was given the power to name the Chairman from the group of confirmed Commissioners in a set of regulations adopted during the Truman Administration.

As to the first point, my guess is that the error is probably Olbermann's in misunderstanding what the network legal correspondent was saying. As for the second, it seems quite plausible that the legal correspondent was simply unaware of how a Chairman of an independent agency is appointed. But then again, that's a good reason to be a little more humble and a bit less sarcastic in challenging someone else's knowledge. Regardless, both of these errors are pretty inexcusable, it seems to me.

Update:

Here's McCain's comment:

The chairman of the SEC serves at the appointment of the president and, in my view, has betrayed the public's trust," McCain told a rally in this battleground state. "If I were president today, I would fire him."

Update:

The clip from Countdown is here (it is #5 on the Countdown). "Maybe you can brief the Senator on constitutional law while you are at it." Olbermann says that the person he talked to is Pete Williams and he is a political correspondent, not a legal correspondent.

Update:

Steve Bainbridge has more, including some of the caselaw and commentary.

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Why Laws Treating Public Property Differently from Private Property are Not Irrational, and Often Completely Justified:

Senior Conspirator Eugene Volokh has done an excellent good job of taking apart three Ohio Supreme Court justices' opinions that claim that claim that state law has no "rational basis" for allowing private owners but not government to ban the carrying of concealed firearms on their land. But, as a property professor, I can't resist the urge to pile on.

In addition to Eugene's well-taken points, there are two other important and relevant distinctions between private and public property. First, most private properties that are accessible to the general public are subject to the constraints of market competition. Privately owned stores, recreation facilities, bars, parks, and the like compete with each other to attract customers. As such, there are likely to be different stores that cater to customers with divergent preferences. If many Ohioans prefer to go to a gun-free bar, it is likely that there will be establishments that are happy to accommodate them. Those who prefer to bring their guns with them when they drink can go to other bars that cater to their preferences.

By contrast, many government buildings carry out functions over which government has a monopoly, or something close to it. Consider court buildings, the registry of motor vehicles, welfare offices, and so on. People who seek to use these public services often have no choice but to go to the government buildings in question, regardless of whether the policies there fit their preferences or not. Basic economic theory suggests that it is often necessary to regulate the policies of a monopolist more tightly than those of participants in competitive markets.

Second, and closely related, market competition gives private owners a stronger incentive to accommodate consumer preferences than government owners have. If a private business allows too many guns on its premises, rendering them unsafe, that will tend to drive customers away and reduce the business' profits. The same thing is likely to happen if the business adopts overly restrictive policies and thereby alienates gun-owners who want to be able to take their concealed firearms with them. Businesses have strong incentives to weigh these considerations against each other and come up with a policy that satisfies the most customers at the least cost. On the other hand, a government office that adopts flawed policies won't lose money as a result. Indeed, the bureaucrats in question might actually benefit from reducing the number of people who seek out their services. They will continue to collect the same pay, while having to do less work.

To be sure, really egregious errors by bureaucrats might eventually be punished at the polls; perhaps the voters will pick new state legislators who might cut the offending bureaucrats' budgets or otherwise force them to change their ways. However, the "rational ignorance" of the electorate ensures that all but the grossest and most highly visible bureaucratic mistakes are likely to pass unnoticed by the public.

Obviously, there are some exceptions to these generalizations. A few private businesses are monopolists, and a few government offices are subject to more rigorous market competition than that generally faced by public sector entities. Nevertheless, these points are valid as a general rule. And that should be more than enough to satisfy the loose standards of the "rational basis" test that, as Eugene explained in his post, applies to this case. Indeed, I think it should be enough to satisfy even significantly more exacting judicial scrutiny. Overall, there are many good reasons to regulate government officials' use of public property more strictly than private owners' use of their own land.

Related Posts (on one page):

  1. Why Laws Treating Public Property Differently from Private Property are Not Irrational, and Often Completely Justified:
  2. Arbitrary and Irrational to Distinguish Private Property from Public Property?
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Should Ladies' Nights in Bars Be Outlawed Because they Discriminate Against Men?

Columnist Steven Chapman has an interesting column arguing against claims that ladies night's in bars should be banned because they discriminate against men:

When it comes to relations between the sexes, a little common sense goes a long way. It's not sex discrimination to bar men from women's locker rooms. It's not sex discrimination to let only females audition for the role of Juliet. It's not sex discrimination to roughly balance males and females in an entering college class. And it should not be sex discrimination to offer favors to one sex in order to benefit people of both sexes.

Why, after all, would a bar offer discounts to women? Not because the owner harbors a deep-seated hostility toward men, perpetuating centuries of oppression. People who run such establishments understand that a lot of men patronize taverns partly to meet women, and that they will come more often and stay longer if women are abundant than if they are scarce.

Since females are generally less attracted to the bar scene, discounts may be needed to draw them out in respectable numbers. The owner of the Coastline Restaurant and Bar in Cherry Hill, the target of the complaint, said after the ruling came down that his male customers are unhappy "because they're wondering, 'Are the girls going to show up?'" ....

Offering a discount for women, to George Washington University law professor John Banzhaf, is no more defensible than charging whites less than blacks. "Sex discrimination is wrong, no matter whose ox is being gored," he declares.

But context is crucial, and relations between the sexes are different from relations between the races. We don't accept racially segregated restrooms, but we do accept sexually segregated restrooms. All-white colleges would be offensive, but all-female schools are not.

Charging whites less than blacks would suggest a desire to drive away black customers because of racial animus. Charging women less than men suggests nothing comparable.

I blogged about some of the legal issues involved in the ladies' night litigation in this series of posts last year. I argued that ladies' nights don't violate the 14th Amendment and that the anti-ladies' night plaintiffs should not be allowed to proceed with a class action case under which they get to be class representatives for male bar patrons as a group; quite obviously, they would be poor representatives of this class because most male bar patrons actually benefit from ladies' nights and would be harmed by the lawsuits' success. I'm far less certain that ladies' nights are legal under the public accommodations provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. If they are not, however, that is a weakness in the law, not a virtue.

UPDATE: I had foolishly forgotten that Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 only bans discrimination in places of public accommodation on "the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin." It doesn't forbid sex discrimination. Therefore, ladies nights in bars are perfectly legal, at least so far as Title II is concerned.

UPDATE #2: It turns out that Tim Sandefur of the libertarian Pacific Legal Foundation has recently filed an amicus brief in a California ladies' night case making arguments similar to some of those advanced in my posts on the subject. The brief is available here.

UPDATE #3: Some commenters argue that Chapman's argument can also be used to justify affirmative action. To some extent, this is true. However, my view is that private sector affirmative action programs should be legal. Therefore, there is no contradiction between my positions on the two issues.

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Making it Up:

The New York Times "clarifies" a quote:

Editors’ Note An earlier version of this article cited two sources who were said to have been briefed on a conversation in which John J. Mack, chief executive of Morgan Stanley, had told Vikrim S. Pandit, Citigroup’s chief executive, that “we need a merger partner or we’re not going to make it.” On Thursday, Morgan Stanley vigorously denied that Mr. Mack had made the comment, as did Citigroup, which had declined to comment on Wednesday.

The Times’s two sources have since clarified their comments, saying that because they were not present during the discussions, they could not confirm that Mr. Mack had in fact made the statement. The Times should have asked Morgan Stanley for comment and should not have used the quotation without doing more to verify the sources’ version of events.

This is almost as bad as when the Times quoted from a parody website and treated it as authentic.

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Congressional Irrelevance:

One interesting aspect of the recent government bailouts has been the complete irrelevance of Congress. The operation and decision-making seems to be run almost entirely by the Secretary of Treasury and Federal Reserve. Congress appears to lack the ability, the will, and the decisiveness to play any role except spectator, as a handful of senior executive branch officials have nationalized major portions of Wall Street.

What is further interesting is that Congress is not missed in the slightest. No one is clamoring for a greater role for our elected representatives in dealing with these problems. I haven't heard anyone saying, "We really need to get Congress more involved in this. They'll know what to do."

The other day, I offered my view that Congress today is fundamentally a silly place stocked with silly people. This latest situation illustrates the principle. I don't know whether Paulson and Bernanke are doing the right thing (I tend to think not). But I know for certain that I'd rather that they be making these decisions than Congress.

Moreover, this problem has become systemic. A recent Wall Street Journal article noted that the current Congress has enacted less legislation than any Congress in recent history--and that includes its many symbolic pieces of legislation such as renaming Post Offices. The output of administrative agencies dwarfs that of Congress. The Senate's behavior on judicial nominations is preposterous.

I sense a vicious cycle at work here. As Congress has become more dysfunctional and unable to address matters of public importance, the Executive Branch has stepped in to fill the gap. In turn, this allows Congress to behave in an even less-serious manner, which in turn necessitates further action by the Executive Branch. If the Executive waited for Congress to do anything, nothing would get done. So Congress essentially spends its time bloviating and posturing, while the unelected beavers in the bowels of the bureaucracy crank out federal regulations.

Put more generally, Congress's ridiculousness has increasingly caused it to forfeit its status a co-equal branch of government. 40 or 50 years ago it might have been plausible to imagine Congress addressing important public policy issues like entitlement reform or health care reform (I'm not saying they would have done it, but it seems like it was more plausible then). Serious people were in the Senate then--Taft, Johnson, etc. Today, however, the idea that serious solutions to pressing social problems might originate in Congress is hard to suggest with a straight face.

In the abstract, I am no fan of the administrative state and see the theoretical value of political accountability. But if I have to choose who I'd trust to deal with the big decisions, it is hard to make the case that Congress as it actually exists is who we want in charge. Over the past few years, the Executive and Courts have increasingly filled the gap that they perceive as existing because of Congress's incompetence. One would like to say that if the Executive or Judiciary won't step in Congress will step up. But that doesn't seem like a realistic scenario to me. It is a vicious cycle and it is hard to see how that cycle can be broken.

But I'm sure that there will be much ballyhooed Congressional hearings in a few months to "get to the bottom of this." Congress's last effort on this was Sarbanes-Oxley, and a lot of good that seemed to do (see Larry Ribstein).

As I said last week, John McCain has seemed to remain a serious person despite his service in the Senate, not because of it. And that it is not clear on Barack Obama. On Joe Biden it seems reasonably obvious that he long ago succumbed to Senator-itis. I think that this latest episode, and Congress's irrelevance in it, nicely illustrates my points.

88 Comments

Did Eliot Spitzer Contribute to AIG's Demise?

The New York Sun thinks so in "Bring Back Greenberg":

As America was racing toward the nationalization of what is left of American International Group, we couldn't help think of Eliot Spitzer. Among all his mistakes, it's hard to think of one more catastrophic than his decision to force Maurice "Hank" Greenberg out of the leadership of AIG. The picture since then has not been a pretty one. As Mr. Greenberg put it yesterday in a letter, "In a little over a year, I, and other shareholders, have watched the company that I helped build over 35 years into the largest and most successful insurance company in history and one of the strongest and one of the most profitable companies in the world lose over 90% of its value."

It would have been another matter had Mr. Spitzer — or anyone else — found any wrong-doing by Mr. Greenberg. But they didn't. Instead, Mr. Spitzer's raid on AIG resulted in the installation of new management that, one can say at this point, just wasn't up to the job. As Mr. Greenberg put it in his letter yesterday to AIG's chief executive, Robert Willumstad: "Despite repeated assurances from management and the company that everything was under control, it is now clear that nothing was under control."

Client Number 9 seems to be weathering the financial storm much better than AIG's shareholders:

"When he was attorney general he was on a witch hunt, he'd go after anyone he could to get headlines," said Senate Majority Leader Dean Skelos. "I look at the pattern form when Hank Greenberg went out, not just the crisis now, and the stock plummeted. It cost taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars in our pension system."

Spitzer, silent since his resignation March 17 after being implicated in a federal prostitution investigation, has also been blamed for contributing to a state budget crisis this year. Now, Spitzer is working for his millionaire father in Manhattan real estate while the prostitution probe continues. It was just two years ago he carried a historic margin of victory over Republican John Faso.

As news commentators have noted, maybe AIG would have capsized even with Greenberg at the helm. Some former employees have said that AIG was doing credit swaps while Greenberg was still around. But his removal certainly doesn't seem to have helped. In retrospect it seems like a major mistake to have driven Greenberg from AIG. But it is not just in retrospect--Spitzer's obsession with this case at the time was roundly criticized (he went after Greenberg for issues unrelated to AIG and it has been reported that he strong-armed AIG to throw Greenberg under the bus even though he couldn't prove anything).

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Where Dennis Kucinich and I Agree:

I don't often find myself agreeing with Dennis Kucinich. But I have to commend him for his opposition the the massive state and federal subsidies for the construction of the new Yankee Stadium:

A congressional panel has taken tough swings at the New York Yankees and New York City government over a new stadium for the Yankees. But neither the team nor the city budged from their positions on the $1.3 billion structure.

Rep. Dennis Kucinich said Thursday he found "waste and abuse of public dollars" in the financing of the new stadium under construction in the South Bronx.

Kucinich is an Ohio Democrat who heads a House Oversight and Government Reform subcommittee. He charged that city officials misrepresented to the IRS the value of the property, helping them to get special tax deals from the federal government and in effect dumping the cost of construction onto taxpayers.....

"In the case of the new Yankee Stadium, not only have we found waste and abuse of public dollars subsidizing a project that is for the exclusive benefit of a private entity, the Yankees, but also we have discovered serious questions about the accuracy of certain representations made by the City of New York to the federal government," Kucinich said.

The panel's investigation found "substantial evidence of improprieties and possible fraud by the financial architects of the new Yankee Stadium," he added.

The criticism highlights tensions felt nationwide as governments increasingly support stadiums for profitable pro sports teams with multimillion dollar payrolls.

As I discussed in this post, construction of the new Yankee Stadium is being subsidized with up to $450 million in public funds, plus an additional $941 million in government-backed tax-exempt bonds. This is the largest government subsidy for stadium construction in the history of the United States, and there is no good justification for it.

I first criticized the Yankee Stadium deal in this 2006 post, where I summarized the extensive evidence that there is no public benefit justifying subsidies for sports stadium construction. In fairness, what the Yankees have done is similar to what many other pro sports teams have gotten away over the last several decades. The Yankee Stadium situation is unusual primarily because of its massive size. Hopefully, Kucinich's hearing and others like it will succeed in exposing this kind of sports stadium socialism to public scrutiny and eventually put an end to it. But I am not optimistic.

NOTE: As a Red Sox fan, I'm obviously unhappy about government subsidies to the rival Yankees. However, I would oppose similar deals for any team, including Boston teams. For example, I was against various proposals that have come up over the years to build a new government-subsidized stadium for the Red Sox. I love the Red Sox, but I could not love them half as much loved I not liberty more.

41 Comments

Foreign Courts Cite U.S. Supreme Court Less Often: Adam Liptak has the scoop in the NYT. Over at Balkinization, Michael Stokes Paulsen responds: "It is nice to read -- finally! -- some good news in the New York Times."

  If the trend continues, we may see less U.S. Supreme Court citation of foreign law, as well: If we're citing them so they'll cite us, and they're not citing us, well heck, maybe we won't cite them. So there.
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Arbitrary and Irrational to Distinguish Private Property from Public Property?

So conclude three of the seven Justices of the Ohio Supreme Court in Ohioans for Concealed Carry, Inc. v. City of Clyde, decided yesterday. Fortunately, the four-Justice majority takes a different view, but the view of the three dissenters still seems to me noteworthy, because it denies the legitimacy of what strikes me as an utterly fundamental and proper distinction.

First, some background: Ohio is one of the 40 or so states that allows pretty much any law-abiding adult to get a license to carry a concealed gun (the exact number depends on how you classify the laws in some states). Ohio law provides that a licensed person "may carry a concealed handgun anywhere in this state," with some exceptions, including (among other things) private property when the private property owner forbids such carrying. So a licensed person may carry on his own property, private property where carrying is allowed, an most government-owned property.

The City of Clyde, despite this, banned carrying concealed guns in city parks. Ohioans for Concealed Carry challenged this, on the grounds that the state law trumps the city ordinance. The Ohio Constitution does give cities considerable powers to enact "local police, sanitary and other similar regulations" but only when they "are not in conflict with general laws," so the question is whether the concealed carry law is a "general law." To be a "general law," according to Ohio precedents, "a statute must (1) be part of a statewide and comprehensive legislative enactment, (2) apply to all parts of the state alike and operate uniformly throughout the state, (3) set forth police, sanitary, or similar regulations, rather than purport only to grant or limit legislative power of a municipal corporation to set forth police, sanitary, or similar regulations, and (4) prescribe a rule of conduct upon citizens generally." The majority concludes that the concealed carry permit law is such a general law.

Here's where the dissenters' arguments come in: Two of the dissenters (Chief Justice Moyer, joined by Justice Lanzinger) conclude that the law isn't a general law because it provides an "exception for private property owners." The dissenters of course acknowledge that a law can be general though it has exceptions (nearly all laws have exceptions of some sort), "so long as the classification is not 'arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious.'" But the dissenters conclude that the "different treatment of public and private property is patently arbitrary and unreasonable."

This strikes me as shockingly wrong. Of course private property can be reasonably seen as quite different from government-owned property. Private property owners have historically had very broad control over their own property; they could restrict behavior on the property for any reason or no reason at all, simply because of their property rights. Such rights have been limited in various ways, but they are still the rule and the limitations the exception — and in any event, it is quite reasonable to preserve or even expand such rights.

Government property, on the other hand, is owned by the government, which bought it with other people's money, and holds it in some measure in trust for the people generally. It thus makes perfect sense for the government to be more restricted in its use of its property. The U.S. Constitution of course takes this view, since it applies the First Amendment and other constitutional provisions to government property (at least in some measure) and not to private property. The same goes for the Ohio Constitution, see, e.g., Eastwood Mall, Inc. v. Slanco, 626 N.E.2d 59 (Ohio 1994). It may well be reasonable — within the constraints of the state and federal constitutions — to give local governments property rights that are comparable in force to private property owners' property rights. But it's also reasonable to take the opposite view, and to have state law limit what the government may do as to public property.

Thus, the dissenters hypothetical that supposedly proves their case just doesn't make sense. Here's what the Moyer dissent says:

Suppose that there are two parks in Clyde on opposite sides of the street; Park A is owned by the city, and Park B is owned by a private corporation. At Park A, a person with the requisite license could carry a concealed handgun at the park, as the statute does not prohibit the carrying of a concealed handgun in public parks. The city is powerless to change this fact; concealed handguns must be allowed in the park, unless one of the limited exceptions applies .... At Park B, ... [t]he owner of the park can decide to forbid concealed handguns for any reason or no reason ....

The single fact that Park A is publicly owned and Park B is privately owned changes the rules for whether concealed handguns will be allowed in the parks. The statute completely regulates public property while having essentially no effect on most forms of private property ....

This different treatment of public and private property is patently arbitrary and unreasonable; it affects one class of land solely on the basis of ownership, which has little to do with the relative safety of allowing concealed handguns on a particular type of property.

But the different treatment between Park A and Park B merely mirrors the different treatment of the parks under the First Amendment and under other constitutional guarantees. Public Park A generally can't eject patrons because of their speech; private Park B can. The distinction is simply that the second park is private property, and subject to the private owner's private property rights. The first park is government property, and subject to the constraints imposed on the government by the U.S. Constitution, by the Ohio Constitution, and by the general laws of the state of Ohio.

The dissent goes further in footnote 2, arguing:

Although not a reason under our case law for concluding that R.C. 2923.126(A) violates the Ohio Constitution, one can only speculate about, indeed wonder, what statewide interest is served by a statute that nullifies and prohibits a reasoned conclusion by the elected representatives of local government that the presence of any number of handguns in a city park may be a threat to the security and safety of those using the park. Implementation of the state statute strikes a severe blow to the underlying principles of local self-government.

It is unfortunate that the passion of those who believe in the right of virtually any adult to carry a concealed weapon (subject to the statutory exceptions) has pushed aside the fundamental belief in Ohio that matters that directly affect the safety of a community may be determined by local government, where the voices of those citizens most directly affected may be heard and considered. No one outside the city of Clyde, or perhaps the county of Sandusky, has any legitimate interest in the regulations placed upon the use of a city park in the municipality of Clyde. We can only hope that those who believe that dogs should run unleashed in city parks or those who believe that alcohol should be consumed in city parks are not able to convince a majority of the General Assembly of the merits of their cause.

I should have thought the "statewide interest" would be clear: Many people believe that there's a human right to possess the weapons needed for self-defense, when and where such self-defense is necessary — though, like many such rights (including free speech, religious worship, and the like), the right doesn't extend to action on the private property of others.

The Ohio Bill of Rights echoes this, by saying that "The people have the right to bear arms for their defence and security"; the Ohio Supreme Court has rightly interpreted this language as securing an individual right to have guns for self-defense, though alongside other bill of rights provision it wouldn't extend onto objecting owners' private property. The provision has been interpreted as not securing a general constitutional right to carry concealed weapons, but the Ohio legislature has decided to go beyond the state constitution's mandates, and protect people's right to bear arms for their defense even more. This human right, the Ohio legislature concluded, trumps contrary judgments of local governments, just as many other human rights trump contrary judgments even when those judgments are made "by the elected representatives of local government." It's one thing to disagree with the legislature's judgment — but it strikes me as quite blindered to feel "one can only speculate about, indeed wonder, what statewide interest" the legislature think it's serving here.

Finally, Justice Pfeifer's solo dissent is even more striking: He concludes that the distinction between private property and public property — again, the same distinction correctly drawn by the caselaw interpreting the state and federal constitutions' bills of rights — itself "violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the Ohio and United States Constitutions," because

There is no rational basis to distinguish between private and public property owners in regard to their statutory ability to prevent persons from carrying firearms onto their propertyproperty. Clyde owns its municipal park. Is there any reason why the owner of this property, where families gather and children play, should be forced to allow people with guns to enter, while the private owner of a public space such as a shopping mall can bar from entry any gun-carrying citizens?

How about the notion that private individuals, as property owners, have rights that the government does not possess — is that really so irrational?

(Thanks to Dan Gifford for the pointer.)

Related Posts (on one page):

  1. Why Laws Treating Public Property Differently from Private Property are Not Irrational, and Often Completely Justified:
  2. Arbitrary and Irrational to Distinguish Private Property from Public Property?
42 Comments

Researching and Cite-Checking Pre-1900s English and American Law and Legal Commentaries:

I've had to do this for a couple of articles I've written recently, and I thought I'd pass along pointers to some useful databases. They are generally for-pay databases, but my sense is that most universities have subscriptions to them. If you're on a law review editorial board, you might want to make sure that your cite-checkers know about these, since they can save the cite-checkers a good deal of effort. All of the databases are full-text searchable and at the same time provide images of the original pages, so you can be sure that you're not falling victim to a transcription error.

1. Pre-1700 English books (not just on law): Chadwyck-Healey's Early English Books Online (EEBO).

2. 1700s English books (not just on law, plus some from outside England): Gale's Eighteenth Century Collections Online.

3. 1700s and 1800s American books and pamphlets (not just on law), plus newspapers (which sometimes reported otherwise unreported legal decisions, jury charges, and the like): Readex's Archive of Americana.

4. 1800s and early 1900s English and American legal treatises and other law books: Gale's Making of Modern Law (if you have a subscription, it should be available through your library Web site).

5. More 1800s and early 1900s American legal treatises and other law books: HeinOnline's Legal Classics database.

6. Some reports of English and American trials and other legal documents from the 1600s to the early 1900s: Galenet's Making of Modern Law - Trials.

7. English reported court cases from 1220-1865 (whether cited to Eng. Rep. or to the individual reporters): HeinOnline's English Reports database.

8. Some other pre-mid-1600s English cases (for instance, from Star Chamber): John Rushworth, Historical Collections of Private Passages of State, Weighty Matters in Law, Remarkable Proceedings in Five Parliaments 59-60 (London, Robert Boulter 1680), available on Early English Books Online (see 1 above).

9. Some early books: Google Books. [Thanks to commenter cd for reminding me about this item, which I have used in my research but neglected to include in this post at first.]

10. Of course, Westlaw and Lexis, which contain nearly all published American court cases.

11. Your library bookshelves, which likely contain a few volumes with cases that aren't on Westlaw and Lexis (such as the New York City-Hall Record, Wright's Ohio Reports, and the like.

12. Your library's online catalog, which may give you online access to many old sources, either through your own library or other cooperating libraries.

If you have other suggestions, please post them in the comments.

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The Party of the Lawyer Candidates vs. The Party of the Non-Lawyer Candidates:

John Peralta counts Democratic and Republican Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates since 1980, and sees how many lawyers there were:

[Democratic] Attorneys (10 out of 12 total - 83%)
Obama
Biden
Kerry
Edwards
Lieberman
Clinton
Dukakis
Bentsen
Mondale
Ferarro
[Possibly Gore, who never graduated — if he's included, the percentage is 92%]
Carter was the only non-lawyer, non-law school attendee.

[Republican] Attorneys (2 out of 9 total - 22%)
Dole
Quayle

Non-lawyers - McCain, Palin, Bush 43, Cheney, Kemp, Bush 41 and Reagan

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More on the (Absence of) Legal Authority for the AIG deal --

Whether or not the Fed has the authority to buy/lend to AIG, the story does not end there. In order to lend/buy, the Fed needs to come up with $85 billion, which is conveniently being supplied by the Treasury Department, which is in turn borrowing it from whoever will lend money to the U.S. government, to be paid back by us or our descendants, unless the AIG deal miraculously turns out to be profitable. On what statutory authority does Treasury Act? Unlike the Fed, the Treasury does not bother to explain where its authority comes from in its press release and I have found no other sources with this information. Does anyone know? A U.S. Code section would be a nice place to start.

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Obama leads in 4 of 5 recent polls.

Barack Obama has a slight lead in 4 of the 5 most recent polls.

The likeliest reasons for the shift toward Obama are:

(1) The Republican convention bounce naturally expired.

(2) The press's direct attack on Sarah Palin is working.

(3) The Wall Street collapse and the bailouts are turning voters toward Obama/Biden.

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Charles Whitebread: Via ATL, I learn that Professor Charles Whitebread, a criminal procedure professor at USC School of Law, has passed away. Professor Whitebread was famous for being a highly entertaining bar review lecturer: I still remember his distinctive voice and sense of humor over a decade later. He was also the author (among other things) of a treatise in Criminal Procedure (with Christopher Slobogin). He will be missed.
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To What Extent Would Service Under Obama be Mandatory?

Ilya Somin points to a recent Wall Street Journal op-ed by Shikha Dalmia about McCain's and Obama's service proposals. The main differences appear to be their scope and the mandatory nature of some of Obama's.

I should note that the tone of Barack Obama's recent comments on service at the NYC Service Nation forum couldn't have been more different from his December and July major addresses on the subject. There are several indications in his remarks that Obama (or his staffers) had read my criticisms. And Obama sought to present his views in the least offensive terms possible (eg, two mentions of service for high school, but not a word about middle school; no promises to require all middle and high schools to adopt service programs by denying schools federal funding if they refuse).

One question that has arisen in discussions is the extent to which his "Universal Voluntary Service Plan" is nonetheless mandatory.

Because Obama calls his plan voluntary, it’s important to understand exactly what he says and doesn’t say. In the first two of his main speeches on national service – on July 2, 2008 and on December 5, 2007 – Barack Obama set his goal of 50 hours of service a year, promised that “We'll reach this goal,” and explained how he would do so for middle and high school children:

So when I'm President, I will set a goal for all American middle and high school students to perform 50 hours of service a year, and for all college students to perform 100 hours of service a year. This means that by the time you graduate college, you'll have done 17 weeks of service.

We'll reach this goal in several ways. At the middle and high school level, we'll make federal assistance conditional on school districts developing service programs, and give schools resources to offer new service opportunities.

So one hurdle that Obama’s plan must vault is the U.S. Constitution, which limits the federal government to enumerated powers. Lacking the power to mandate universal community service directly, Obama candidly discloses his strategy: making federal funds contingent on schools having service programs that meet federal standards.

If Obama hadn’t promised that “We’ll reach this goal” of 50 hours a year of service, one might read his proposal as indicating that he would require schools to have service programs, but that these programs might not require 50 hours of service. Yet the only way that almost every 11-year old public school student in the country would serve 50 hours a year – i.e., the only way that Obama could reach his goal – is by doing what he seems to indicate he’s going to do: setting a federal goal of 50 hours a year for each middle school student and reaching that goal by making federal funds contingent on middle schools requiring their students to serve those 50 hours.

Thus, it would be the public schools that would impose federal standards of coerced service on each child as part of their requirements for graduation. For students, service would be involuntary. Even for the public schools, their participation would be only nominally voluntary – for how many public schools can survive without federal assistance?

Lest there be any remaining doubt that Barack Obama’s “voluntary” universal service plan contemplates mandatory service for children, his Service Plan praises mandatory service in the sentence that immediately precedes his call for 50 hours of service: “Schools that require service as part of the educational experience create improved learning environments and serve as resources for their communities.” Moreover, in his Plan, he promises to “develop national guidelines for service-learning and community service programs,” thus not leaving the content of service programs to the states.

I suspect that Obama describes his mandatory plan as voluntary for good reasons: (1) part of his plan – i.e., participating in his many new “Corps” – is indeed voluntary, and (2) people bristle at the word “mandatory.” In the movement for national service, it is common to describe mandatory plans as voluntary. For example, Representative Charles Rangel’s National Service Act, which is languishing before Congress, provides for a universal draft with two years of service for virtually all persons ages 18-42, with no deferment for college. This explicitly mandatory service is described in the bill as “Voluntary Service” because “A person subject to induction . . . may volunteer to perform national service in lieu of being inducted.”

Nonetheless, there still remain some ambiguities in Obama’s Service Plan. Does Obama intend to force states to include private and parochial school students within his scheme? Obama does not say whether private middle and high schools would also be required to impose 50 hours a year. I assume that would depend on whether they rely on federal grants.

Also, how will students who defy their high schools or the state be punished? Will they be prosecuted, placed in re-education programs, or merely flunked? Obama’s proposal never says.

74 Comments

Wednesday, September 17, 2008

Palin's Yahoo E-mail Account Hacked, Contents Posted Online: Fox News reports:
  In the latest of a series of invasions into Sarah Palin’s personal life, hackers have broken into the Republican vice presidential candidate’s private e-mail account, and a widely read Web site has published screen grabs from it.
  An article Wednesday in Gawker.com posts family photos and snapshots of e-mail exchanges the Alaska governor had with colleagues. Gawker says the-email account has since been shut down, but it will leave the images up on its site for all to see.
  "Here are the screenshots of the emails saved before the account went dark, along with the contact list. It’s newsworthy and we will not be taking it down!" the site declares.
Gawker has posted the contents in several individual posts; here is the most recent.

  UPDATE: The FBI and Secret Service are conducting a joint investigation. The easiest crime to prove here is 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(2)(C), accessing a protected computer without authorization to obtain information, with the possibility of felony liability under 18 U.S.C. 1030(c)(2)(B)(ii)-(iii) and also the possibility of felony liability under 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(4). As with most computer crime cases, the real trick will be finding the bad guy rather than finding a charge.

  ANOTHER UPDATE: In the comment thread, J. Aldridge writes:
Since Gawker is fully aware this information was obtained illegally they are looking at some serious charges.
  Well, it's a free country, so anyone can look. But I don't think Gawker is criminally liable for posting the information. While it's unseemly and perhaps rather nasty to post it, it's normally not a crime to post evidence that was obtained as a fruit of crime. There is no claim that the information was obtained in violation of the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. 2511, which might trigger a prohibition on disclosing illegally intercepted materials. The contents here were stored, not in transit, and thus the Wiretap Act's disclosure limitations don't apply. See, e.g., United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039 (11th Cir. 2003). Further, even if a statute did prohibit such a disclosure — and again, I don't know of such a statute — publishing it is likely protected by the First Amendment under Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001), assuming that Gawker was not involved in the hack.
185 Comments

Was Tony Rezko Obama's First Donor? It Depends.

I listened to David Freddoso’s appearance on a WGN radio show hosted by U. of Chicago Sociologist Milt Rosenberg, where Freddoso debated Dan Johnson Weinberger, an Illinois lawyer supporting Obama. Both sides overstated their positions – pro and con Obama - but I didn’t hear much that would justify the Obama campaign's response.

The most heated exchange was over whether Tony Rezko was Obama’s first donor when he first ran for the Illinois Senate in 1995-96. Freddoso said he was; Weinberger said he wasn’t. Freddoso then partially backed down and said that perhaps Rezko was the second donor.

If one limits the analysis to donations, Freddoso was correct the first time: Rezko tied for Obama’s first donor. If one includes loans as well as donations, then Rezko ties for the second donor to Obama’s campaign, though even that earlier loan came from someone who has ties to Rezko.

What the early donation patterns show is that Rezko (and people Rezko has had business ties to) were the primary people launching Obama’s finances in his first campaign. By a few months later, others had donated, including prominent liberals, lawyers from his firm, real estate developers, and the ACORN-linked union, SEIU.

Obama’s fundraising started in July 1995. Before mid-September 1995, he had one loan and three donations:

7/13/1995 LOAN: $5,000 Al Johnson (a Cadillac dealer, “who was trying to get a casino license along with Tony Rezko” at some point)

7/31/1995 DONATION: $1,000 Rezko Foods

7/31/1995 DONATION: $1,000 Lakefront Refreshments (a Rezko company)

7/31/1995 DONATION: $300 Barry Mcnamara (also a Cadillac dealer)

So Barack Obama’s first three actual donations were from two Rezko companies (contributing $2,000) and an individual (contributing $300), though there was an earlier loan from a man who was seeking a casino license with Rezko.

Obama’s first donations from outside Illinois were from a New York individual (Fatema Chandoo, who shares a last name with one of Obama's college buddies) and from the SEIU Local 880 Politcal Fund, 1024 Elysian Field Av, New Orleans, LA 70117-8402, one of the many infamous ACORN-associated organizations.

More here, here, here, here, and here.

21 Comments

The Power of the Federal Reserve:

Apropos of the issue of where the Federal Reserve gets the power to "take over" AIG, here's something I find disturbing. As regular readers know, I've been following the housing/credit bubbles since well before it was widely acknowledged that these bubbles existed (though, of course, I was far from the only one to notice). At the height of the bubbles, in 2004-05, there were plenty of people arguing that the Federal Reserve should crack down on the lax mortgage lending practices that led to the current troubles. The Fed's consistent response was, "most of these mortgages are initiated by non-bank mortgage companies, and we only have authority over federally regulated banks, not over mortgage companies."

I assume that that's true. But, in the wake of the current emergency, the Fed has sought and received authority to do all sorts of things it couldn't do before, and has even done things that it's not at all clear it has the statutory authority to do, as with AIG. If only the Fed had been even a fraction as aggressive when the crisis was building!

Much of the blame, of course, lies with Alan Greenspan, who, having served as Fed Chairman during one obvious bubble involving tech, continued to insist during the second obvious bubble (as measured by a comparison to historic housing prices on a variety of measures, as well as the historic laxity of credit standards) that it's impossible to know if wild, unprecedented, asset inflation is the product of a bubble--even though both bubbles had an obvious "Austrian" cause, the Fed's easy money policy, first after the LTCM/Russian bond fiasco in 1998, and then after 9/11.

Greenspan is an odd sort of free market fundamentalist: he used his awesome (government) power at the Fed to artificially lower the cost of credit, but then insisted that the untoward consequences were likely just the natural consequences of the free market at work. Apparently, governmen