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Saturday, March 12, 2005
A Cri de Coeur of a Law Review Editor:
On Letters of Marque, Heidi Bond makes an excellent point:
I've basically come to the conclusion, after three weeks, that it's bad for everyone that every single major Law Review gets something like two thousand submissions a year. It's bad for us, because we can't get our heads around all the papers, and feel swamped in guilt. It's bad for law professors, because you have to aim your articles to be selected by an audience that will give your paper a cursory look-see. It's bad for people who want to be law professors because we get so many papers that we must sort using proxies, which might discriminate. It's bad for legal scholarship, because when you're picking 15-20 articles out of a thousand, minus the ones that Yale takes first (grrr!), you look for reasons to reject papers, many of which might ignore vast fields of scholarship.
I make an effort to put extra time into papers where I know my understanding of the subject matter is lacking to counteract this effect. But, quite frankly, law professors, you cannot give a handful of 2Ls 2000 50 page articles (which, despite the article length policy, is the lower end of what we're receiving) to evaluate and then complain that you don't like their selection criteria. She then offers this suggestion worth considering:
The easiest, simplest thing the legal profession can do to improve selection criteria on law reviews is to stop paying for law professors to submit their articles to every journal under the sun. It's a prisoner's dilemma -- every individual is better off submitting to as many journals as possible, but editor's time is a scarce resource. If we had fewer articles, we could read them all carefully; we would be able to have a dialog with the author, instead of a blackbox form-letter rejection; we could take time to discuss pieces with faculty on a regular basis, instead of a quick check just before the piece went to a full read. Okay, maybe not all of those things, but some of them. On a different note, one of my pet peeves is that student-edited law reviews are justified by law professors on the grounds that working with faculty authors educates law review editors, and then, as authors, professors turn around and complain when they need to educate law review editors during the editorial process. In other words, it is OK for faculty members at other schools to educate OUR students, but highly annoying when we must educate THEIR students. (I think I could have used an student editor for the last two sentences.)
Kristof's Nighmare:
Nicholas Kristof believes the environmental movement is in "deep trouble." In today's NYT he explains:
environmental groups are too often alarmists. They have an awful track record, so they've lost credibility with the public. Some do great work, but others can be the left's equivalents of the neocons: brimming with moral clarity and ideological zeal, but empty of nuance.
What's more:
The loss of credibility is tragic because reasonable environmentalists - without alarmism or exaggerations - are urgently needed.
Given the uncertainties and trade-offs, priority should go to avoiding environmental damage that is irreversible, like extinctions, climate change and loss of wilderness. And irreversible changes are precisely what are at stake with the Bush administration's plans to drill in the Arctic wildlife refuge, to allow roads in virgin wilderness and to do essentially nothing on global warming. That's an agenda that will disgrace us before our grandchildren.
So it's critical to have a credible, nuanced, highly respected environmental movement. And right now, I'm afraid we don't have one.
Kristof's column was prompted by an essay on "The Death of Environmentalism." For environmentalist reactions to the essay, see here.
The Latest from the Right Coast:
Tom Smith writes about Peter Singer in Princeton Professor not eligible for babysitting job:
I am thinking I would not let Peter Singer babysit my kids. In this charming discussion, he allows as how killing a newborn baby is not killing a person. What I want to know is, is killing a Princeton philosophy professor who thinks it's OK to kill a new born baby, killing a person? And even if it is killing a person, technically, might it still be justified on utilitarian grounds? By killing Peter Singer we probably reduce on the margin the possibility that someday we will live in a world where you can kill new born babies but not eat fried chicken. That's a lot of utility right there. I would be willing to kill him in a humane way, or at least a not terribly tortuous way. I was thinking maybe dropping 100 tons of bullshit on him. There would be a certain poetic justice in that. In an entirely different vein, Mike Rappaport summarizes his latest op-ed with John McGinnis in Amending the Filibuster Rule: The Constitutional Option:
The Senate majority's power to modify the filibuster is strongly supported by constitutional principles. Both the text and structure of the Constitution show that only one of three possible views about the constitutionality of the judicial filibuster is correct. The first view – advocated most recently by Senate majority leader Bill Frist, R-Tenn. – is that filibustering judges is simply unconstitutional. But the Constitution expressly gives the Senate the right to fashion its own rules of procedure and nowhere requires application of majority rule to confirmations.
The second view – advocated by many Democrats – is that a majority has no right to change the filibuster rule because the Senate rules still require a two-thirds vote to end a filibuster mounted against a resolution to change the filibuster. But this Senate rule conflicts with the structure of the Constitution.
The Constitution provides only a single method – the constitutional amendment process – to entrench a rule against repeal by a majority. If Democrats were correct that rules can be insulated from majority amendment, a bare majority in each House could have passed the Bill of Rights and made it our fundamental law by declaring that only unanimous votes by both Houses could pass legislation violating its principles. The Democratic view also conflicts with a principle known since before the framing of the Constitution that one legislature cannot bind subsequent legislatures.
The third and constitutionally correct view is that the Senate can choose to retain the filibuster rule, but that a majority must be able to change it. The Senate can thereby exercise its full constitutional authority to fashion rules of procedure but past majorities of the Senate cannot put current majorities in a procedural straitjacket. Thus, a change in the filibuster rule by a majority is not a "nuclear" option but instead the constitutional option – the route contemplated by our founding document. Update: In his post, misunderstanding singer, Aaron Kithcart thinks Tom Smith has fundamentally misunderstood Peter Singer:
Singer maintains in his book that life, regardless of the species, should be treated with the same level of respect. When we apply this principle to our society, then by permitting the destruction of animals, we allow ourselves the right to end human life that has the same intellectual capacity of those animals we've slaughtered, i.e. babies that are born brain-dead, mentally retarded adults, etc. I do not know enough about Singer to know who is right, which perhaps is a reason why I should not have linked to Tom's post. But I often link to posts I find interesting or provocative regardless of whether I agree. But another reader wrote
I was disappointed that you posted the quotation from Tom Smith ridiculing Peter Singer, as I do not think it in keeping with the usual tone of the Volokh Conspiracy. Though I am politically on the left (and, incidentally, a vegetarian since the 1970s, when I read Peter Singer's Animal Liberation), and often disagree with what I read on the Volokh Conspiracy, I read it because its contributors generally post reasoned arguments, not ridicule of positions with which they disagree. Though offered as a criticism, I take this as a compliment. I think all of us on the VC do strive to adopt a measured and reasoned tone, in part, because of the wide diversity of our audience. I am glad this reader appreciates this even if he thinks I let him down on this, hopefully rare, occasion. But I do think there was more of substance to Tom's entire post--not just the acidic teaser I excerpted--assuming, of course, that he interpreted Singer's position correctly.
Further Update: Neo-Libertarian thinks Toms Smith accurately characterizes Singer's position.
For the record, the excerpt from RightCoast is correct on quoting Singer (my fingers keep typing 'Sanger' in a Freudian slip), because all the excerpt blames Singer for doing is saying that killing a newborn is not killing a person. That’s really Singer's position, so the excerpt is correct. Unlike the correcting e-mail, Singer includes normal-birth babies as well (see the second question in part III of the FAQ). Read the rest here.
CU's Academic Culture Ignored:
That's the title of my latest mediacolumn for the Rocky Mountain News. Although the media have investigated Ward Churchill extensively, they have failed to examine the dysfunctional culture of the University of Colorado's humanities departments--which protected and promoted Churchill despite numerous warning signs, and which safeguards true academic freedom only for the far left. I also look at the case of Phil Mitchell, a conservative CU instructor and an outstanding who is being forced out because of his political views, with nary a word of protest from the media and faculty.
My Dartmouth Trustee Email:
Dartmouth readers--as one of the few College-approved contacts with alumni during the Trustee election, we are permitted to send 2 emails during the balloting period. This past Thursday (the 10th), you should have received an email from two candidates, one from me and one from another candidate (Ric Lewis). They should have arrived roughly at the same time in your inbox sometime between 5:00-6:00 p.m. on Thursday. I have received several isolated reports from friends who (1) received Mr. Lewis's email but (2) not mine, and I am trying to determine whether there is a problem here, and if so, the scope of the problem. Others have received both of ours. I have not yet heard from anyone who received mine but not Mr. Lewis's.
I have enabled Comments. If anyone is reading this, could you please let me know via Comments or by email whether on Thursday you received both emails, Lewis's email but not mine, or mine but not his. You can respond to tjz2@law.georgetown.edu if you don't want to leave a comment here. I am interested in hearing from those who received both emails, one or the other, or neither.
Thanks for your help.
Friday, March 11, 2005
Tim Lambert on John Lott's 2002 study.--
Tim Lambert has a new post on John Lott's 2002 study of Defensive Gun Uses. It is worth reading, as are some of Lambert's older posts on closely related issues.
Getting a Law Teaching Job IV:
Eric Goldman of Marquette has some very insightful things to say on the topic of getting a teaching job in a series of blog posts that you can access here. He and I agree about a whole lot, but there is one cliche he invokes that I resist: "Law professors," he writes, "say that we have the best job in the world and that we can't believe we get paid to do what we do." If you like to teach and publish then indeed we have do a wonderful job. I would rather be a law professor than anything else, including a judge. But being a law professor is lots of work (or it is if you do the whole job) and I fully expect to get paid for it. Especially as I am hopefully making it possible for lots of students to get paid lots of money over the course of their careers, while bringing credit to the law school with which I am affiliated which, in turn, increases the value of the degree we are imparting on students. Moreover, since you can always do more reading and writing and speaking--and the more successful you are the more opportunities you have to write and speak--in a sense a law professor-scholar is never really off the clock. So lets leave the "I would do it for nothing" rhetoric to the movie actors (who demand millions in salary).
Second, and more seriously, a junior professor from a school ranked by US News in its Tier 4 (the lowest) writes:
Thanks for making the point about affiliation and faculty quality. . . . I’d also like to second your observation about scholarship. One of the worries I had about coming here concerned whether I’d be able to place articles in journals where they’d be likely to get noticed. . . . But I’ve submitted two articles since I’ve been here, and they’ve both ended up in “top 20” journals. In fact, with this most recent article I had the experience of my dreams: three offers from very good journals within the first week of sending it out (and, I subsequently learned, I was likely to have received offers from at least a couple others if I hadn’t shut the process down). So yes – it is very possible to place things well and, I’m hoping, to get noticed as a scholar. I am pleased to hear this confirmation, but not surprised. This was not always the case, but thanks to the enlightened policies of many top law reviews, and the fact that smart intellectually-inclined law professors-scholars now teach at all tiers of legal education, it is certainly true today. Those who have the hardest time publishing well these days are scholars writing in specialized fields, or using technical methods, that law review student editors find hard to appreciate or evaluate. But that is another story.
Reflections On Guatemala:
Some reflections:
1. Guatemalans are very concerned about the future of freedom in Central America. While we tend to think that things are basically going fine, many of the countries in Central America are starting to turn back to Socialism. Great concerns in Guatemala.
2. The most recently issued license plates on cars in Guatemala are made of paper. I am told that President Portillo awarded the license-plate manufacturing contract in return for a bribe, and he and the contractor split the loot. Now they have no license plates and no money to make them. So they have paper license plates covered in plastic (it is really bizarre).
3. Guatemala's airport is nicer then Miami's. Which really an observation on what a pit Miami's airport is.
4. Francisco Marroquin has the most beautiful university campus I have ever seen, carved out of a nature preserve in the middle of Guatemala City. Absolutely gorgeous.
Just Back From Guatemala:
I just returned from a week in Guatemala at the remarkable Universidad de Francisco Marroquin in Guatemala City. A truly remarkable institution, filled with brilliant and friendly professors and extraordinarily bright and engaged students. Each student is required to take 3 semesters of study of market economics and 2 semesters of Social Philosophy, basically reading Hayek one semester and Mises the next.
I was a guest of CADEP, the public choice center at Francisco Marroquin, headed up by my old Dartmouth friend Carroll Rios, who is a professer at Marroquin. CADEP organized a city-wide program for university students on law, economics, and public choice, that had probably 150 students in attendance. The program is only in its third year, and she already has the various universities around the city pleading to host various days of the program.
Unfortunately, I had a whirlwind in-and-out trip, so didn't get to see much of the country. Did pop over to Antigua for dinner one night, which was beautiful. And brought home some great Guatemalan coffee!
Two Can Play This Game:
A number of federal judges have signalled their willingness to expand the scope of constitutional rights recognized for those held at Guantanamo Bay beyond that suggested by pre-9/11 law. The Bush Administration is now responding to this trend -- by moving detainees out of Guantanamo Bay.
Court Decision in the Apple Subpoena Case:
The court has just approved the subpoena against the service provider in the Apple v. Does case, which involves trade secrets that were leaked to and then posted on some blogs.
The judge did not deal with any possible subpoenas against the bloggers. He thus didn't decide whether bloggers are entitled to be treated the same as other journalists, but concluded that in any event the subpoena against the service provider -- which the service provider isn't contesting -- is constitutionally permissible.
The judge did, however, signal that he isn't fond of third parties posting illegally leaked trade secret, analogizing them to "fences" of stolen information. I have argued that the First Amendment bars imposing trade secret liability on third parties, such as newspapers or Web sites, see pp. 739-48 of this article, but it sounds like the judge disagrees.
Getting a Law Teaching Job III:
I received the following thoughtful email from a lawyer reader:
I have been reading with interest your and others' blogging on getting a position as a law professor. One point that I have not yet seen made, and that I think is important, is that no one should be going that route unless he has a passionate interest in his field. Choosing to go into teaching is different from choosing between litigation and corporate, or between private practice and government. Because law professors must publish, the professor with nothing to say is forced to make himself heard through unneeded articles that "shed pseudo-light on non-problems" (if I recall correctly from Lucky Jim). I tend to agree with this sentiment. You will be much happier as a law professor if you are a successful scholar, and much more successful as a scholar if you have something to say. You must love the subject you choose to specialize in and it is much better if you teach in the same subject you write about.
However, the most common result of being a professor with nothing to say is that you stop writing after tenure. I would not be surprised to learn that less then 5% of tenured law professors still write regularly. Many (but far from all) who do not write resent the attention paid to those who do. Sometimes they will claim that they care more about teaching than those who write, as if these two activities are mutually exclusive. Indeed, I think most would agree that if you are a skillful classroom teacher, you would be even better if you are also a scholar in the field in which you teach. I know I do a better job in the classroom teaching subjects I write about than those I do not, and my teaching performance skills are the same in both courses.
Another sad fact generally unnoticed by law students is that the vast majority of professors who teach the first year subjects (Contracts, Property, Tort, Criminal Law and Civil Procedure) are not scholars in these fields. This is as true, if not truer, at the more elite schools as the dominant attitude there is that "anyone" smart can teach those subjects. Little effort is made to hire laterally established scholars in those fields, or entry level candidates with genuine interests in specializing in scholarship about first year subjects. Consequently, very few students at any law school are taught in the first year by professors who are also scholars in the field. For that, students must wait until their upper class courses. (This disconnect between teaching and scholarship in the first year also explains why first-year courses have shrunk to one semester in length as those who teach them would rather teach them less, and certainly have no incentive to resist proposals for one-semester courses that are easier to staff.)
And because law professors must have students to earn a living, marginal professors help to support marginal law schools that accept students who will realize too late that they are unlikely to find jobs worth what they've paid in tuition and are even unlikely to pass a bar exam. There is a predatory aspect to the lowest stratum of law schools, just as there's a predatory aspect to the lowest stratum of lawyers. Here I disagree. Of course, there may be some unaccredited law schools that fit this description, but all law schools, even lower status ones, turn out many graduates who are excellent lawyers and professionally successful, and all law schools turn out graduates who are bad lawyers or who fail in their legal careers. Lower status law schools give students with weaker credentials the opportunity to practice law. It is an open question whether one should be forced by law to attend law school to be admitted to the bar, but assuming this is a good idea, it is a good thing that if you want to go law school badly enough there is a law school somewhere for you to attend. What you do with that opportunity after admission is up to you.
And because the baby boomers are growing old in their jobs at the more elite schools where mandatory retirement policies are now illegal, very smart law professor-scholars are teaching at law schools with all levels of status. Indeed, it is no longer the case that you can safely judge the quality of a law professor--as either a teacher or a scholar--by his or her affiliation as once you could, especially if the professor is on the younger end of the spectrum.
This is yet another reason why one should not be snobbish about where one gets a job teaching law. While there are certainly advantages to teaching at an upper-tier school, one advantage that has greatly diminished is the ability to become known and respected as a scholar while teaching at a lower-status law school. It is not only possible these days, it is quite common. And as more of the elite law journals move towards blind review--and even policies of favoring submissions by young undiscovered authors--it is becoming more feasible than ever before to be a successful scholar no matter where you teach.
Patronage Systems:
I'm not a fan of political patronage systems myself, but a few years ago my brother Sasha pointed me to this great quote from George Washington Plunkitt, a Tammany Hall political boss of the late 1800s and early 1900s; I added it as an epigraph to the patronage cases section of my First Amendment textbook:
The civil service humbug is underminin’ our institutions and if a halt ain’t called soon this great republic will tumble down like a Park-avenue house when they were buildin’ the subway, and on its ruins will rise another Russian government.
This is an awful serious proposition... Let me argue it out for you. I ain’t up on sillygisms, but I can give you some arguments that nobody can answer.
First this great and glorious country was built up by political parties; second, parties can’t hold together if their workers don’t get the offices when they win; third, if the parties go to pieces, the government they built up must go to pieces, too; fourth, then there’ll be h--- to pay...
Let me tell you that patriotism has been dying out fast for the last twenty years. Before then when a party won, its workers got everything in sight. That was somethin’ to make a man patriotic. Now, when a party wins and its men come forward and ask for their reward, their reply is, ‘Nothin’ doin’, unless you can answer a list of questions about Egyptian mummies and how many years it will take for a bird to wear out a mass of iron as big as the earth by steppin’ on it once in a century?’”
Authoritarian Cultures Clash:
Coercive egalitarianism versus traditional Islam:
Swedish home furnishings giant IKEA is guilty of sex discrimination by showing only men putting together furniture in its instruction manuals, Norway's prime minister says.
IKEA, which has more than 200 stores in 32 nations, fears it might offend Muslims by depicting women assembling everything from cupboards to beds. Its manuals show only men or cartoon figures whose sex is unclear.
Jewish "Self-Loathing":
A reader pointed me to a Web post titled "Jews and Self-Loathing," which condemns some Jewish writers' work that "promote[s] their own stereotypes," and expresses doubt that "certain forms of Jewish humor is really good for the Jews."
I'm always skeptical of these claims of "self-loathing," whether in politics or in literature or entertainment. They generally strike me as hyperbole that works to insult but not really to enlighten.
I suppose some Jews who portray Jewish characters with negative traits may actually loathe themselves, or loathe Jews (see Eric Muller's thoughts, and my response to them). I suspect that most don't.
Rather, they may want to criticize some aspects of Jewish life (whether Orthodox or secular). They may want to point out some aspects of common Jewish behavior that are funny.
Or they may just want to tell a story in which some character is Jewish, interesting, and credible. They may want to create rich characters that have good points as well as bad ones. They may want to describe characters as they or others see them: Saying that someone has a Jewish nose may indirectly bear on those very points. Or they may want to be vividly descriptive; a Jewish nose is not the same as a strong or prominent nose, for instance.
What's more, the ability to make fun of one's own group is often healthy: It helps people critically examine certain traits, and it also makes for good comedy. Conversely, judging either literature or comedy based on whether it's "good for the Jews" (or good for anyone else) tends to make for not very good literature or comedy.
There are, I'm sure, some costs in perpetuating stereotypes -- even often accurate, though naturally incomplete, stereotypes -- of Jews or of others, even in fiction. But I think there are greater costs in demanding that humor or storytelling be socially responsible. Sometimes there's a story that reflects badly on people in some group (consider movies about the Italian mafia). It's important for observers to realize (and if necessary to stress to others) that the story isn't supposed to characterize all or even most members of the group, but I don't think that authors should refrain from telling the story for fear that it will fuel wrongheaded views.
Now of course one can get only so far by talking about this in the abstract. The post points to an article that discusses Meet the Fokkers; I haven't seen the movie, so I can't speak to it. But I doubt that it truly represents self-loathing. And I suspect that asking Jewish writers to focus on whether their stories are bad for the Jews will just lead to bad Jewish writing.
Judge Issues a Probably Unconstitutional Prior Restraint
in the USA Next gay wedding photo case, at least if this blog account is accurate.
The judge issued a temporary restraining order against further airing of the ad, apparently on the theory that the ad infringes the same-sex spouses' right to control the use of their likenesses (the right of publicity or the right to block misappropriation of likeness). I argue below that the right of publicity doesn't cover the use of people's likenesses in political ads, and I remain quite confident of that. But even if the plaintiffs potentially have a good damages claim, an injunction of such political ads before a trial on the merits — based not on a final judgment that the speech is unprotected but on a mere finding of likelihood of success — is an unconstitutional prior restraint.
Mark Lemley and I give more details in this article. I should say that some lower courts have authorized such preliminary injunctions in the past, but I think they were quite mistaken as a matter of First Amendment law. I hope USA Next promptly appeals; they have a very strong claim here, both under the First Amendment and under substantive right of publicity law, which is on their side.
Thanks to David Kravitz and Jason Walta for pointers to the story about the injunction.
Fisking Eric Alterman:
Alterman has a new column in the Nation, attacking Cathy Young for criticizing his insipid defense of the British Muslim Affairs Council boycott of Holocaust memorial ceremonies. A Fisking follows (and here's Young's most recent take):
[UPDATE: Alterman is running a campaign to get the Boston Globe to fire Young as a columnist. She's a great columnist, and a frequent source of ideas for VC posts. You can write in her defense to her editor, Nick King, at n_king@globe.com.]
Young's attack on me shared some of these bizarre qualities. She seized on a brief blog item I wrote on Altercation.msnbc.com, in which I noted the insensitivity of demanding that Arabs attend Holocaust remembrance ceremonies that (of course) made no mention of what many Arabs believe to be the Holocaust's connection to what they consider their own "catastrophe"--namely, the founding of the State of Israel.
It was the British Muslim Affairs Council that boycotted the Holocaust ceremony, not "Arabs." I don't have exact figures, but it seems pretty obvious that most British Muslims are from the Indian subcontinent [UPDATE: as noted here], not Arabs. And if the Arabs (and/or Muslims) think that the founding of the State of Israel is the moral equivalent of the Holocaust, that's grounds for condemnation, not understanding. Indeed, the reason given for the boycott was Israel's "genocide" against the Palestinians was not also commemorated, which is a horrible and inaccurate calumny against Israel (which, if it actually wanted to commmit genocide against the Palestinians certainly has the capacity to do so, and instead kept even the water and electricity flowing to the West Bank and Gaza and the height of the suicide murders). Is it insensitive to point out a blood libel? Is it insensitive to ask that the victims of the Holocaust not be used to score political points against Israel? Is it insensitive to ask British Muslims to see Holocaust victims as human beings, and not representatives of the "Zionist enemy"?
Young distorted my argument to accuse me of anti-Semitism and self-hatred, using an ellipsis to make it appear as if I were describing the founding of the Jewish state as a "catastrophe" rather than attributing that view to Palestinians and their Arab supporters.
Alterman wrote in his original piece: "I'm a Jew, but I don't expect Arabs to pay tribute to my people's suffering while Jews, in the form of Israel and its supporters — and in this I include myself — are causing much of theirs." "The Palestinians have also suffered because of the Holocaust. They lost their homeland as the world—in the form of the United Nations—reacted to European crimes by awarding half of Palestine to the Zionists. They call this the “Nakba” or the “Catastrophe.” To ask Arabs to participate in a ceremony that does not recognize their own suffering but implicitly endorses the view that caused their catastrophe is morally idiotic."
Once again, Alterman confuses Arabs with Muslims. And the idea that "Israel and its supporters" are causing "much" of Arabs' suffering in a despotic, corrupt, and poor region where Saddam Hussein's dictatorship was more or less par for the course, is absolutely absurd. Not to mention--and I'm sorry to have to consistently repeat this--that the suffering of the Palestinians is largely self-inflicted, in the sense that they first refused to recognize Israel's right to exist for forty years, starting with the U.N. patition plan of 1948, and when they purported to change their collective minds, Arafat was ultimately unable to exchange the rifle for the olive branch (not to mention that the Arab states decided to use Palestinian refugees as a political tool, rather than resettling them). In any event, plenty of Jews, including me, recognize that the Palestinians have indeed suffered, self-inflicted or not. So why can't a Muslim group, as a representative of a great religious tradition, recognize one of the great horrors of world history, which, after all, happened to people? And how exactly is commemarating Holocaust victims "implicitly endors[ing]" any "view" other than that the Holocaust happened and it was a terrible tragedy? Unless Alterman wants to defend the rampant Holocaust denial in the Arab/Muslim World.
She went even further, insisting that by acknowledging that Palestinians and their supporters perhaps had reason to be less than thrilled with the creation of Israel, I was actually--I kid you not--blaming "long-dead Holocaust victims" and arguing that "every Muslim is justified in viewing every Jew as the enemy." (In fact, the item in question spoke of Arabs, not "Muslims." Neither Young nor her editor, Nick King, appears to
understand the difference.)
We've already established that its Alterman, not Young, who doesn't know the difference between Arabs and Muslims. And yes, Alterman did imply that every Muslim is justified as viewing every Jew as the enemy.
[to continue, click below]
Were it not for the fact that the approximately 474,845 people who read the daily Globe now consider me an anti-Semitic, self-hating Jew, the episode would be ridiculous. Young describes herself as a "nonobservant Jew." She sure got the nonobservant part right. A former girlfriend of Wall Street Journal right-winger John Fund--which may or may not explain everything--Young has no profile whatever in Jewish affairs, Middle East debates or discussions of anti-Semitism.
Good to know that only "observant Jews" are allowed to write about anti-Semistm. And the ad hominem about John Fund, is priceless, as we'll see below.
Your columnist, on the other hand, is not only a pretty serious Jew--bar mitzvah, educated in Israel, lights candles on Friday night, goes to shul, sends the kid to Hebrew school, contributes to the Forward, etc.--but has been writing on Israel and anti-Semitism, speaking in synagogues, minoring in Jewish studies during doctoral work, etc., since first publishing on anti-Semitism at Yale, in, um, the Boston Globe twenty years ago, when he was the paper's stringer there. (The piece was deemed so sensitive to Jewish concerns, I received a congratulatory letter from none other than Martin Peretz, who invited me to contribute to The New Republic.)
Well, if Martin Peretz praised you twenty years ago, I guess you can never write anything asinine about Jews in the future.
.....
The paper's own ombudsman, meanwhile, termed Young's column "ad hominem" and "not worthy of an opinion page where readers expect (and usually get) thoughtful analysis and insight."
Ad hominem, you mean, like mentioning a writer's ex-boyfriend as something "which may or may not explain everything"?
Whether she sought payback for what I've written in The Nation about her ex-boyfriend or merely to silence anyone who expresses sympathy for the plight of the Palestinians, the result of Young's clumsy slander is to aid the cause of anti-Semitism by revealing the political motivation of those who use the accusation as nothing more than a convenient ideological weapon.
Ah yes, I know lots of people who go on vendettas to avenge their exes. Right. [UPDATE: And, anyway, Alterman actually defended Fund from apparently false charges; not exactly the stuff of which vendettas are made.] And what was that quote about ad hominem again? As for "expressing sympathy for the plight of the Palestinians," Alterman didn't simply do that, he suggested quite strongly that if one sypathizes with the Palestinians, one shouldn't express any sympathy for Holocaust victims, because the plight of the Palestinians is their "fault"--yes, long-dead Jews should be blamed for whatever sins their co-religionists later committed against Arabs. That may or may not qualify Alterman as engaging in Jewish anti-Semitism, but it certainly is unbelievably stupid. If Alterman wants to do himself a big favor, he would at least stop calling attention to it, and, better yet, acknowledge that his initial remarks were incredibly wrongheaded.
Same-Sex Couple Sues Over the Unauthorized Political Use of their Wedding Photo:
Here's an excerpt from the press release: A $25 million lawsuit was filed today against right-wing front group USA Next and political consulting firm Mark Montini International for stealing an Oregon couple’s wedding photo and using it without permission in a high-profile gay-bashing ad designed to drum up support for social security privatization. . . .
The suit alleges that the use of the couple’s image without permission constituted an invasion of privacy, was libelous, violated their right of publicity and constituted an intentional infliction of emotional distress.
In one version of the USA Next ad disseminated widely on the Internet in February, and aired repeatedly by television news programs and newspapers nationwide, the couple’s image, superimposed with a green checkmark, is side-by-side a picture of a US soldier with a red “X” across it. Below the photos is the phrase “The REAL AARP Agenda.” This seems to be the ad:
I've read the Complaint and the case seems like a pretty clear loser: - The plaintiffs claim that the ad libeled them and placed them in a false light by "stating directly or by implication that the plaintiffs are unpatriotic American citizens who do not support the United States military while our nation is at war." But I don't think reasonable viewers would understand the ad that way.
They would understand the ad as claiming (whether accurately or not) that the AARP doesn't support the military enough. They would understand the ad as implicitly claiming that gay marriage is bad (an opinion that can't form the basis for a libel claim). But nothing in the ad suggests to reasonable viewers that the men don't support the military. So there's no false statement about the plaintiffs, and thus no libel or false light claim.
- The plaintiffs claim that the ad appropriated their likenesses in a way that benefited USA Next and Montini commercially. But political ads, even ones that help raise money for a group (or that earn the political consultant money), are treated as fully protected speech under the First Amendment, and not as the less protected "commercial speech." Such political ads are also generally not covered by the misappropriation of likeness tort, just as other fully constitutionally protected but commercial uses — news reporting, biography, fiction, and so on — are not covered. The misappropriation tort generally covers, with very few exceptions, only commercial advertising (rather than political advertising) and merchandising, such as T-shirts, action figures, and the like.
The closest case I've found to this is Battaglieri v. Mackinac Center for Public Policy, a Michigan Court of Appeals case from 2004 that involved the unauthorized use of a person's name (whether it's name or likeness doesn't matter) in a political fundraising ad. And the court held that the ad was constitutionally protected against a misappropriation tort claim, even though "it was also a clear request for charitable contributions to support [defendant's] work."
Also, though the lawsuit was filed in the District of Columbia, the general rule in misappropriation cases is that courts should apply the law of where the plaintiff lives. Here, that's Oregon, and the leading Oregon case on this — Anderson v. Fisher Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 712 P.2d 803 (Ore. 1986) — reads the misappropriation tort quite narrowly, basically applying only when the defendant "exploits a distinctive economic value of an individual's identity or image beyond that of other similar persons for purposes of associating it with a commercial product or service." I don't think that USA Next would be covered by this definition, since it's selling political ideas, not a commercial product or service.
- The plaintiffs' invasion of privacy claims are just their false light claims and their appropriation claims; for historical reasons, both of these torts have often be labeled "invasion of privacy." They have no separate claim of invasion of privacy by wrongful disclosure of private facts. I think Oregon courts probably don't recognize such a claim, see Anderson; publishing a photo of people kissing in public isn't treated as such an invasion of privacy, Gill v. Hearst Pub. Co., 253 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1953); and in any case the plaintiffs aren't making such a claim.
- The plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim is also a pretty clear loser. Courts generally limit the tort to outrageous conduct, and set the outrageousness bar quite high; I doubt this would qualify as outrageous enough. Moreover, when the claim involves speech on matters of public concern, courts generally reject the claim on First Amendment grounds. (The Supreme Court has only held that statements about public figures on matters of public concern are generally immune from emotional distress liability under the First Amendment, and that decision didn't speak about statements about private figures on matters of public concern. But its logic would apply equally to such private-figure public-concern statements, and lower courts have indeed rejected emotional distress liability in such cases.)
- Curiously, the strongest claim against USA Next would be a copyright claim brought by the copyright owner, which seems to be the Portland Tribune newspaper (or perhaps the photographer, if he was a freelancer and kept the copyright). But the copyright owner isn't suing (though it suggested that it might); the maximum damages in the copyright case would be $150,000, not $25 million; and USA Next would have a decent fair use defense (though it's hard to evaluate the likely strength of the defense, given how vague the fair use doctrine is).
So my sense is that the gay couple should lose, and will lose if the case comes to court, and USA Next will and should win. I sympathize with the plaintiffs' upset here, and I think it was rude for USA Next to drag the plaintiffs' picture into a political cause that they don't support. But, at least setting aside the copyright question, USA Next was behaving within its legal and constitutional rights.
Related Posts (on one page): - Judge Issues a Probably Unconstitutional Prior Restraint
- Same-Sex Couple Sues Over the Unauthorized Political Use of their Wedding Photo:
Seismic Map of the World,
based on a seemingly very thorough database (we're talking many entries per day). Cool and scary. Thanks to Neil Reinhardt for the pointer.
Is the Israeli Military Anti-Dungeons-&-Dragons?
This story says yes:
Ynet has learned that 18-year-olds who tell recruiters they play the popular fantasy game are automatically given low security clearance.
“They're detached from reality and suscep[ti]ble to influence,” the army says.
I'm not sure how accurate the story is; for instance, a few paragraphs down it says:
"One of the tests we do, either by asking soldiers directly or through information provided us, is to ask whether they take part in the game," he says. "If a soldier answers in the affirmative, he is sent to a professional for an evaluation, usually a psychologist."
More than half of the soldiers sent for evaluation receive low security clearances, thus preventing them from serving in sensitive IDF positions, he says.
"Automatically given low security clearances" isn't the same as "more than half . . . receive low security clearances" (though it's not clear whether the denominator in the latter statistic is all people referred for evaluation, or just D&D players); and this is the sort of inconsistency that makes me uncertain about the rest of the story's claims.
Still, if the story is accurate, it seems odd. Maybe D&D circles have changed a lot, or maybe the ones I was in were unrepresentative — or maybe I'm a lousy judge of who's detached from reality and susceptible to influence. But my sense is that most D&D players are perfectly fine people. Geeks, mind you, but geek is good.
On the other hand, the Israeli military is supposed to be pretty sharp; doubtless it has the normal share of bureaucratic folly, but I'd assume that most of their judgments about soldierly quality are better than my judgments. So, who knows, maybe they're right.
Thanks to Dylan Alexander and Michael Koh for the pointer.
Getting a Law Teaching Job II:
In response to my Getting a Law Teaching Job in which I suggest that candidates aim to have published two articles before going on the market, Larry Solum posts on Legal Theory Blog:
Right on the money--except that the magic number for publications is THREE not two. "Why three?" you ask. Because the AALS form that you will need to fill out leaves room for exactly three articles & you want to have a post-graduation article for each of the three spaces. The hardest part of the process is getting past the initial screen--when members of faculty appointments committees read hundreds and hundreds of AALS forms. Increasingly, their eyes seek out the part of the form with the three publications--so you want to make your best impression right at that moment! Good advice. Another piece of advice is READ LEGAL THEORY BLOG regularly. It is a uniquely valuable way to get up to speed on current legal scholarship. It is widely read by law students with teaching aspirations.
I also neglected to mention the value of PhD's. If your academic record after law school is not sufficient on its own to land a teaching job, a PhD in economics, philosophy or history, especially from a well-respeced program will GREATLY enhance your chances no matter where you graduated from law school. Brian Leiter has long provided guidance to philosophy programs with his Philosophical Gourmet. (I cannot get the link to Philosophical Gourmet to open, but you can find a summary here.) He offers guidance to academic job seekers here.
Update: I just saw this post by the Federalist Society:
The John M. Olin Fellows in Law program will offer top young legal thinkers the opportunity to spend a year writing and developing their scholarship with the goal of entering the legal academy. Up to three fellowships will be offered for the 2005-2006 academic year.
A distinguished group of academics will select the Fellows. Criteria include:
* Dedication to teaching and scholarship
* A J.D. and extremely strong academic qualifications (such as significant clerkship or law review experience)
* Commitment to the rule of law and intellectual diversity in legal academia
* The promise of a distinguished career as a legal scholar and teacher
Benefits:
Stipends will include $50,000 plus benefits. While details will be worked out with the specific host school for the Fellow, in general the Fellow will be provided with an office and will be included in the life of the school. For application information click here. The deadline for applications is March 15!
The Pope and the President on Freedom:
That's the title of George Weigel's excellent essay detailing the similarites between Pope John Paul II's statement on Human Rights in 1995, and President Bush's second inaugeral. The Pope and the President both declared that:
1. There is a universal human nature. However different human beings are, there is, at bottom, a common humanity composed of common characteristics, longings, aspirations, and temptations.
2. There is a universal moral law inscribed in this common human nature, a moral law we can know by reflecting on those common human experiences.
3. This universal moral law teaches us the dignity of the human person, from which we can deduce certain political truths: basic human rights are inalienable; government exists to protect and advance those rights; rights imply responsibilities.
4. That moral law and those political truths set a horizon of achievement in history. The defense of freedom is a moral obligation, not simply an exercise in self-interest.
Thus, Wiegel suggests that although the Bush administration and the Vatican differed on the prudence of the Iraq War, and may well disagree again, there is basis for cooperation on many issues, "because the world’s leading political power and the world’s leading moral authority are both committed to the defense and advance of freedom in the world, over against those so-called 'realists' who insist that 'stability' is the goal in world politics."
Thursday, March 10, 2005
Steven Pinker in the New Republic on the Summers Hypothesis.--
In the New Republic, Steven Pinker (a Harvard psychologist) has a fascinating exploration of the Larry Summers affair, including a brief discussion of what Pinker sees as the possible merits of Summers's statements about women in science (tip to Tony D'Amato). (Disclosure: my wife is a Ph.D. geneticist who is a medical school professor; she has always had a greater aptitude for science than I do.)
Pinker argues:
Summers's critics have repeatedly mangled his suggestion that innate differences might be one cause of gender disparities (a suggestion that he drew partly from a literature review in my book, The Blank Slate) into the claim that they must be the only cause. And they have converted his suggestion that the statistical distributions of men's and women's abilities are not identical to the claim that all men are talented and all women are not--as if someone heard that women typically live longer than men and concluded that every woman lives longer than every man. . . .
Many of Summers's critics believe that talk of innate gender differences is a relic of Victorian pseudoscience, such as the old theory that cogitation harms women by diverting blood from their ovaries to their brains. In fact, much of the scientific literature has reported numerous statistical differences between men and women. As I noted in The Blank Slate, for instance, men are, on average, better at mental rotation and mathematical word problems; women are better at remembering locations and at mathematical calculation. Women match shapes more quickly, are better at reading faces, are better spellers, retrieve words more fluently, and have a better memory for verbal material. Men take greater risks and place a higher premium on status; women are more solicitous to their children.
Of course, just because men and women are different does not mean that the differences are triggered by genes. People develop their talents and personalities in response to their social milieu, which can change rapidly. So some of today's sex differences in cognition could be as culturally determined as sex differences in hair and clothing. But the belief, still popular among some academics (particularly outside the biological sciences), that children are born unisex and are molded into male and female roles by their parents and society is becoming less credible. Many sex differences are universal across cultures (the twentieth-century belief in sex-reversed tribes is as specious as the nineteenth-century belief in blood-deprived ovaries), and some are found in other primates. Men's and women's brains vary in numerous ways, including the receptors for sex hormones. Variations in these hormones, especially before birth, can exaggerate or minimize the typical male and female patterns in cognition and personality. Boys with defective genitals who are surgically feminized and raised as girls have been known to report feeling like they are trapped in the wrong body and to show characteristically male attitudes and interests. And a meta-analysis of 172 studies by psychologists Hugh Lytton and David Romney in 1991 found virtually no consistent difference in the way contemporary Americans socialize their sons and daughters. Regardless of whether it explains the gender disparity in science, the idea that some sex differences have biological roots cannot be dismissed as Neanderthal ignorance.
Since most sex differences are small and many favor women, they don't necessarily give an advantage to men in school or on the job. But Summers invoked yet another difference that may be more consequential. In many traits, men show greater variance than women, and are disproportionately found at both the low and high ends of the distribution. Boys are more likely to be learning disabled or retarded but also more likely to reach the top percentiles in assessments of mathematical ability, even though boys and girls are similar in the bulk of the bell curve. . . .
What are we to make of the breakdown of standards of intellectual discourse in this affair--the statistical innumeracy, the confusion of fairness with sameness, the refusal to glance at the scientific literature? It is not a disease of tenured radicals; comparable lapses can be found among the political right (just look at its treatment of evolution). Instead, we may be seeing the operation of a fascinating bit of human psychology.
The psychologist Philip Tetlock has argued that the mentality of taboo--the belief that certain ideas are so dangerous that it is sinful even to think them--is not a quirk of Polynesian culture or religious superstition but is ingrained into our moral sense. In 2000, he reported asking university students their opinions of unpopular but defensible proposals, such as allowing people to buy and sell organs or auctioning adoption licenses to the highest-bidding parents. He found that most of his respondents did not even try to refute the proposals but expressed shock and outrage at having been asked to entertain them. They refused to consider positive arguments for the proposals and sought to cleanse themselves by volunteering for campaigns to oppose them. Sound familiar?
The psychology of taboo is not completely irrational. In maintaining our most precious relationships, it is not enough to say and do the right thing. We have to show that our heart is in the right place and that we don't weigh the costs and benefits of selling out those who trust us. If someone offers to buy your child or your spouse or your vote, the appropriate response is not to think it over or to ask how much. The appropriate response is to refuse even to consider the possibility. Anything less emphatic would betray the awful truth that you don't understand what it means to be a genuine parent or spouse or citizen. (The logic of taboo underlies the horrific fascination of plots whose protagonists are agonized by unthinkable thoughts, such as Indecent Proposal and Sophie's Choice.) Sacred and tabooed beliefs also work as membership badges in coalitions. To believe something with a perfect faith, to be incapable of apostasy, is a sign of fidelity to the group and loyalty to the cause. Unfortunately, the psychology of taboo is incompatible with the ideal of scholarship, which is that any idea is worth thinking about, if only to determine whether it is wrong.
At some point in the history of the modern women's movement, the belief that men and women are psychologically indistinguishable became sacred. The reasons are understandable: Women really had been held back by bogus claims of essential differences. Now anyone who so much as raises the question of innate sex differences is seen as "not getting it" when it comes to equality between the sexes. The tragedy is that this mentality of taboo needlessly puts a laudable cause on a collision course with the findings of science and the spirit of free inquiry.
More from Xoxohth:
(Say, wasn't that a character I used to run when I was a Dungeons & Dragons player in high school?)
Prof. Volokh,
We were just informed about your blog post today about anti-semitism and racism on the site (your blog entry is being discussed at http://www.xoxohth.com/thread.php?thread_id=147012&forum_id=2).
We think your assessment was accurate: those threads are a very small fraction of the site, and even in those threads the overwhelming majority of posters are responding to the racists harshly. However, there are some additional points we'd like to make:
1) The site is clearly divided into on-topic and off-topic filters. We are very strong believers in the freedom of expression and the marketplace of ideas. This is why we allow off-topic discussion and almost never censor content, no matter how abhorrent it may be.
However, we understand that not everyone wants to be exposed to such discussions. Some might simply want to browse the site for threads directly relating to law school, employment, etc. Go figure. Hence the on-topic/off-topic filters – the default option is on-topic mode, and in order to see the offensive material in question, one has to pro-actively enter off-topic ("expert") mode. If an individual does not want to be exposed to discussion of politics, sports, or racism, all that individual has to do to avoid 99+% of that content is stay in school-related mode.
2) That said, some posts do slip through the cracks. We trust our users to classify threads as school-related or off-topic, and although the overwhelming majority classifies their threads appropriately, on a daily basis you can expect at least one or two threads to slip through the cracks. This is usually not a big deal, but over a period of months it can add up, as you can see by the number of threads that appear in school-related mode when you search for racist terms. However, keep in mind that typical users are not going to see a flood of those threads when they go to the site. The only time you'll see twenty or so racist threads on the site is if you proactively search for them, which is what your colleague took upon himself to do when he used the search box to search the entire site specifically for those various racist terms he came up with.
3) The very reason our student-run community has been so much more phenomenally successful than all of its competitors, in its single year of existence, is that it respects the merits of the free, uninhibited exchange of ideas. In fact, one finds overall a much deeper and much more mature level of insight in a community where the ugliest depths of human opinion are confronted, rather than ignored. And the majority of the school-related content on the site speaks to that fact. That is our community; take it or leave it.
4) This community, which for the above reasons has been the object of ongoing controversy, has given birth to some truly noteworthy academic studies. Just today, one of the administrators, Anthony Ciolli, released a working paper on the determinants of law school national employment placement at elite firms (available at http://www.autoadmit.com/studies/ciolli). Another respected member of the community, Aaron Chalfin, this past November published a study on how law schools are ranked by current and prospective law students, which received much attention across the law school admissions community (available at http://www.autoadmit.com/studies/chalfin). There is no other admissions discussion board on the Internet whose members possess such a collective body of knowledge and wisdom, and we attribute that to the hands-off moderating philosophy we have discussed in this letter.
Anthony Ciolli, Jarret Cohen
Administrators
Naturally, I can't speak to the merits of the site (though Xoxohth was quite a guy, 18/00 dexterity, 16 intelligence, . . . — or am I confusing him with Fafhrd), but I thought I'd post the operators' response.
UPDATE: Two correspondents have admonished me that only strength could be 18/00, not dexterity. That's not how I remember playing it (and recall that the rules of D&D were always flexible), but a quick google search reveals many more strength 18/00s than anything else 18/00. Naturally, this is very important for understanding the proper social response to racism and anti-Semitism on law student discussion sites.
Guess Who's Against Swearing Now:
From a Reuters story:
Former [Sex] Pistols bassist Glen Matlock has called for swearing on British television to be curbed . . . .
As a teenager, Matlock co-wrote some of the Pistols' most enduring anthems like God Save The Queen and Anarchy In The UK. He left the group early in 1977 and was replaced by Sid Vicious.
Sid Vicious could not be reached for comment.
(OK, I made that last sentence up, but it's true!) Thanks to reader Michael Greenspan for the pointer. Note: No need for e-mails that start with "Never mind the Volokhs . . ." -- Greenspan has preempted you.
Departmental Breakdown of Politcal Correctness at CU:
Last week, I blogged on the infamous petition of 199 University of Colorado professors who demanded the termination of the Regents' investigation of Ward Churchill--notwithstanding extensive evidence of academic fraud by Churchill, and of Churchill's active promotion of domestic terrorism, in violation of his legally-required oath to uphold the Constitutions of the United States and of Colorado. The fine Denver weblog "View from a Height" has
posted the full text of the petition, and a list of the signers.
Our Independence Institute interns looked up the affiliations of most of the signers. Below is a Department-level breakout of the signers. These figures should be considered an approximate first draft, in part because some professors have cross-departmental appointments. As Derrida would have pointed out, some of these categories are subject to contestation. Even so, the figures give a rough guide to the areas of the school where Churchill's support is strongest. Of course some departments are much larger than other departments, and these are raw figures, not "rates" for departments. In some cases, related departments or units are grouped together.
Language Arts. English/Writing: 30 signers. Communication: 2. French & Italian: 9. German: 2. Linguistics: 1. East Asian languages: 5. Spanish/Portuguese: 1.
Hard Sciences and Math. Biology/Physiology/Ecology: 16. Math: 8. Chemistry: 4. Geology: 2. Psychology: 3. Speech/hearing: 3.
Humanities and Social Sciences. Theatre: 5. Film: 4. History: 9. Art/Art History: 6. Classics: 2. Geography: 5. Anthropology: 3. Philosophy: 5. Religious Studies: 1. Political Science: 2. Economics: 1. Sociology: 4.
Professional Training. Education: 15. Journalism: 9. Business: 1. Law: zero!
Don't read too much into these figures; the English Department is certainly dominated by post-modernists, but the fact that no Law professors signed the petition doesn't mean than the Law faculty does not, on the whole, tilt very strongly left. Rather, the explanation may be that Law professors had a better understanding than did, say, the French professors, how foolish it was for the petition to claim that the investigation itself was a violation of Churchill's First Amendment rights.
Lost in Transcription:
A reader writes, apropos my comment about tell LEXIS and WESTLAW erors:
Look at 42 C.F.R. 441.303(f)(1), on LEXIS:
The annual average per capita expenditure estimate of the cost of home and community-based and other Medicaid services under the waiver must not exceed the estimated annual average per capita expenditures of the cost of services in the absence of a waiver. The estimates are to be based on the following equation:
D+D minutes > G+G minutes .
The symbol ">" means that the result of the left side of the equation must be less than or equal to the result of the right side of the equation.
D = the estimated annual average per capita Medicaid cost for home and community-based services for individuals in the waiver program.
D minutes = the estimated annual average per capita Medicaid cost for all other services provided to individuals in the waiver program.
G = the estimated annual average per capita Medicaid cost for hospital, NF, or ICF/MR care that would be incurred for individuals served in the waiver, were the waiver not granted.
G minutes = the estimated annual average per capita Medicaid costs for all services other than those included in factor G for individuals served in the waiver, were the waiver not granted.
First, notice that this inequality is called an equation, but let's let that pass. [EV: The word "equation" is in the CFR, not in the LEXIS version.]
Second, see how the greater than symbol is defined, for those readers who don't know math, to mean less than or equal to.
Third, why are two of the quantities called "D minutes" and "G minutes"? The definitions are similar to D and G, respectively, so that "D + D minutes" and "G + G minutes" are both total costs of something. So I figured out that they must be primes, which the translation to LEXIS must have converted into "minutes."
You can check the text of the regulation [here] and you'll see that, indeed, it is a less than or equal sign, and primes. [EV: I had trouble pulling up the PDF, but I trust my correspondent, and the text version
Finally, check the regulation on Westlaw (where I've often found there are fewer mistakes), and you'll see that they have it exactly right.
I'm pleased to say that my correspondent assures me that he is indeed reporting this to LEXIS. But let this be a warning to us all . . . . (And, yes, I do rely on LEXIS and WESTLAW versions of many documents myself, and count on cite-checkers to check them against the print versions, unless something strikes me as really wrong or the matter is extremely important. I try to be careful, but there are limits.)
Errors We Make in Our Ignorance:
Max Boot's column about Iwo Jima made me think of the Marine Corps, and reminded me of an incident a few years ago. I was having dinner with a think-tanker in D.C., and I noticed a pin he was wearing. He noticed me noticing, and asked me if I knew what it was.
The pin, which was small and had no legible writing, most obviously contained a two-dimensionable representation of the globe, with an eagle above it. But then I noticed that behind the globe was an anchor. "Is it related to the Navy?," I asked, entirely innocently. (Like many in my circle, I've had very little exposure to the military.)
Being an honest fellow, he had to admit that it was, in a sense -- but the way he bristled made it clear that he thought the relationship was something that was very minor, and that obscured much more than it revealed. Then I realized my error.
"Rethinking the Iwo Jima Myth":
Max Boot, who has written on military history, has an op-ed on this subject, which struck me as interesting, both for its historical substance and its conclusion:
No [criticism of the decision to take Iwo Jima] was heard at the time, in part because of the rah-rah tone of World War II press coverage but also because Americans back then had a greater appreciation for the ugly, unpredictable nature of combat. They even coined a word for it: snafu (in polite language: "situation normal, all fouled up"). It's a shame that so many sentimental tributes to the veterans of the Good War elide this unpleasant reality, leaving us a bit less intellectually and emotionally prepared for the trauma of modern war.
Passive Voice:
"Avoid the passive voice!," writers are often told. That's good advice — but it shouldn't, I think, be taken to extremes.
Passive voice is bad for three reasons: (1) It tends to be less engaging, (2) it usually adds a few more words and some extra grammatical complexity, and (3) it tends to obscure who's actually doing something. "The dog was bitten by the man" is an example of passive voice bringing less verve, and requiring more words, than the active. "Mistakes were made" is the cliche example of passive voice as obfuscation or barrier to analysis.
But sometimes passive voice is just fine, especially when you want to focus on the object of the action rather than on the actor. Here's an example I ran across a while back: A draft said:
Neither we nor the government need sit idle when evil ideas are spread.
Someone suggested that it be changed (more or less) to:
Neither we nor the government need sit idle when people or groups spread evil ideas.
The original was in the active voice, but the "when" clause was in the passive. The replacement is entirely in the active.
But is the new version really better? It's actually a bit longer and more complex, because it adds a reference to the actor. The addition isn't just a single word, but the phrase "people or groups." The new phrase is relatively bloodless, and I suspect somewhat less vivid than "evil ideas."
More importantly, the new phrase needlessly shifts the reader's focus from the substantively important noun phrase — the "evil ideas," which are the reason that we must act rather than sitting idle — to the less significant "people or groups" that spread the ideas.
Now maybe there's some other value to the edit that I'm missing. But I do think that the partly passive original is more effective than the wholly active replacement.
UPDATE: An interesting item on passive voice in technical documentation.
More About Online Racism and Anti-Semitism:
I had an exchange with another lawprof that I thought might be worth airing, since it deals with the genuinely difficult question of the proper private, nongovernmental response to evil speech (which as it happens is the broadest version of the subject of my forthcoming law review article on "Deterring Speech: When Is It "McCarthyism"? When Is It Proper?). The lawprof wrote to me:
I read with some horror, and admiration for Eugene's forthrightness, the exchange with the NeoNazis who began "counting Jews" on the UCLA law faculty. These fringe nuts are a bit scary, but I must confess I find the following even scarier, since it involves the kids who are or may be our students:
http://www.xoxohth.com/main.php?forum_id=2&hid=0&qu=jews
Click on a few of the threads that are called up, and you'll see what I mean.
This purports to be a prelaw discussion site, and it appears a large number of applicants and current law students post there. If the appalling anti-semitism isn't enough, then try the racism:
http://www.xoxohth.com/main.php?forum_id=2&hid=0&qu=nigger
or more here:
http://www.xoxohth.com/main.php?forum_id=2&hid=0&qu=blacks
Perhaps if you called attention to this, the site's managers might "clean up" the content a bit? And perhaps students might be encouraged to move to the more mature and civil prelaw sites, such as www.lawschooldiscussion.org.
Here's a slightly cleaned up portion of my response, which I sent to the lawprof by e-mail:
Thanks very much for the kind words, and for the pointer — these are pretty appalling posts. But my sense from just a casual look was that (1) these threads are actually a small fraction of what is posted on the site (or so it seems from a quick look at http://xoxohth.com/main.php?forum_id=2 to see the most recent posts), and (2) in the few threads that I've seen, others are responding to the neo-Nazis, quite aptly and harshly. This is probably to the good, since (A) maybe a few of the idiots will be shaken out of their idiocy — not very likely, but it happens sometimes, and it's ultimately the only way of effectively fighting the problem, it seems to me — (B) and since decent readers will realize that these opinions are out there, and that it's important to respond to them.
So it doesn't seem to me to be particularly wrong for the site managers people to maintain this as an unmoderated discussion board (I assume that it is).
I should stress again that I find these questions of what is the proper private response to be quite difficult, and my views on the subject are generally much more tentative than my views on many First Amendment questions. Nongovernmental entities may and often should do things that the government may not; and their ethical rights and obligations are often more complex and context-sensitive than what we'd expect from the law.
Also, if the discussion board decided to filter out rude statements in order to make the discussions more valuable, or even to filter out evil ideas because they don't want their property used to promulgate such ideas, I wouldn't object: I think they're ethically entitled to do this, and there's no reason to condemn them for it.
But I don't think they're ethically obligated to engage in such filtering, for the reasons in the start of my quote: Providing a forum for these posts, in a context where they can be quickly responded to, may actually be something of a public service.
UPDATE: My former student Raffi Melkonian writes: I'm a long time user of the xoxo board. Your response to the lawprof . . . .is quite right. Sure, there are a wide range of stupid, racist, and otherwise unpleasant posts on the board. But it also provides a valuable service for law school applicants, facilitated by the higher traffic such openness (even to evil speech) provides. . . . I suspect most racists would have little love for Mr. Melkonian (as you can tell from his name, he's of Armenian extraction), and he for them.
University of Colorado will make Ward Churchill a rich man:
According to KHOW-AM talk radio host Peter Boyles, a very reliable media source has informed him that Ward Churchill's attorney, David Lane, has stated that CU will offer Ward Churchill a buy-out so generous that Churchill will never have to work another day in his life. Numerous other media sources in Colorado, including the daily newspapers, have confirmed that CU is negotiating a buy-out with Churchill. If these reports are accurate, CU President Betsy Hoffman's decision earlier this week to resign was well-timed, because the Churchill buy-out, which may be announced on Monday, would have ignited a firestorm of demands for her resignation.
The Churchill buy-out may be remembered at the single most self-destructive decision ever made by CU administrators. It will be a disaster for the University's fund-raising, and will significantly weaken the University's support in the state legislature. The state legislature is currently working to create a November 2005 ballot referendum to raise Colorado taxes by billions of dollars, primarily to support to higher education. It will be very difficult to convince voters that an institution which has enough money to give Ward Churchill millions of dollars desparately needs to take more money out of the pockets of families trying to balance their own budgets every month.
The tragedy of the buy-out is that, if CU administrators had the nerve, there is an overwhelmingly strong case for firing Churchill based on academic fraud, as I detailed in a previous post.
Churchill's responses to the academic fraud evidence have been entirely unconvincing. On of his tactics is to cite various far-left professors, such as Noam Chomsky, who praise his work. That Churchill is admired, in general, by some extremist professors is hardly a refutation of the specific evidence of Churchill's fraud which has been brought forward by Professors LaVelle and Brown.
Second, Churchill attempts to obfuscate the topic by pointing to irrelevant historical data. For example, as LaVelle has detailed, Churchill lied over and over by claiming that the 19th-century federal General Allotment Act gave property rights only to Indians who could prove a certain quantum of Indian blood. Churchill does not directly attempt to defend this false statement, because it would be impossible; anyone can read the Act, and see that the Act said nothing about blood quantum, but rather left the decision about who would receive Reservation land to the Indian tribes in charge of the various Reservations. So instead, Churchill points to various 20th-century federal Indian laws which did involve a blood quantum.
It seems extremely doubtful that any jury or judge would buy Churchill's implausible defense. If you falsely write "Queen Victoria flew to the moon in a spaceship in 1887", you can't defend the falsehood by pointing out that somebody else did fly to the moon in the subsequent century.
The ultimate responsibility for CU's problems is borne by the elected Board of Regents. Preliminary indications suggest that the Regents, in their search for a new CU President, will not hire a reformer--such as former U.S. Senator Hank Brown, who did an excellent job promoting reform when he served as President of the University of Northern Colorado. Instead, the Regents will look for another apparatchik who will attempt to defend the miserable, ultra-p.c., anti-intellectual-diversity status quo in CU's humanities departments.
What Really Happened With the B-School "Hack"?:
I have been getting lots of mail from techie friends and VC readers about the recent hacking incidents by applicants to a number of top business schools. I first posted about the incident here. Harvard and MIT took the matter sufficiently seriously that they decided to deny the applications of those involved. The odd thing is, it increasingly seems like the applicants may have done nothing wrong. The alleged "hack" may be no hack at all. I have looked for a good technical explanation of how the alleged intrusion occurred, and the best I have come up with is a post at Philip Greenspun's blog. According to Philip, this is what happened: The ApplyYourself code had a bug such that editing the URL in the "Address" or "Location" field of a Web browser window would result in an applicant being able to find out his admissions status several weeks before the official notification date. This would be equivalent to a 7-year-old being offered a URL of the form http://philip.greenspun.com/images/20030817-utah-air-to-air/ and editing it down to http://philip.greenspun.com/images/ to see what else of interest might be on the server. Someone figured this out and posted the URL editing idea on the BusinessWeek discussion forum, where all B-school hopefuls hang out and a bunch of curious applicants tried it out. If this explanation is accurate — and several correspondents have suggested to me that it probably is — it means that the applicants didn't actually do anything that could reasonably be described as "hacking in" to a computer. As I understand it, the ApplyYourself computer had effectively posted everyone's admission decision on the web, just without broadcasting the URL. The applicants then followed the advice posted on the BusinessWeek discussion forum on how to find the public webpage that listed (or would eventually list) their admission decision. No one hacked into anything. The applicants just visited a public website. This raises two questions: First, was visiting the website in this way a crime? And second, were the business schools justified in rejecting people who had done it? On the legal question, I think the answer is "no." The basic crime here is unauthorized access to a computer; the federal government and all 50 states have such laws. It just so happens that I recently wrote a 70-odd page law review article on how to interpret these statutes. To make a long story short, the cases interpreting these statutes are all over the map, but I am fairly confident that no court would hold defendants criminally liable under them for visiting a public site in the way they did. As for whether the business schools were right, their response certainly seems like an overreaction to me. My guess is that the admissions people read the press reports and believed that the conduct was quite different from what it now seems to have been. If my technical understanding is right — still just an assumption at this point — automatically rejecting a candidate for admission seems too harsh. It seems rather odd to deny someone a spot at Harvard Business School for visiting a public web page. UPDATE: Reader Michael Kwun sends on a link to a more detailed technical explanation. Meanwhile, Michigan law student Heidi Bond is so eager to see next year's academic schedule that she "hacked in" to the law school's computer to find it.
"U.S. Withdraws From ICJ Jurisdiction Over Consular Relations Claims":
I confess that I haven't been following this closely, so I have no independent opinion on this; but Julian Ku (Opinion Juris), who specializes in international law, is on top of it. A brief summary:
I noted rumors/reports of this below, and now the New York Times confirms that the U.S. has withdrawn from the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. The Optional Protocol is the provision granting the International Court of Justice compulsory jurisdiction over disputes under the consular relations treaty and the basis for Mexico's (and Germany's) applications to the ICJ. If the U.S. has indeed legally withdrawn from the Optional Protocol, then the ICJ can no longer hear future cases brought by other countries with foreign nationals similarly situated to Mexico's nationals.
For Julian's observations, go here.
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