The Volokh Conspiracy

The NYU Journal of Legislation and Public Policy has published my article “Placing Reins on Regulations: Assessing the Proposed REINS Act” in its latest issue.  The arguments I make in this piece should be familiar to readers of this blog.  In the same issue, the NYUJLPP has also published “The REINS Act and the Struggle to Control Agency Rulemaking” by Professor Jonathan Siegel of the GW Law School.  Professor Siegel agrees with me that the REINS Act is constitutional, but thinks it would be a bad idea.  In addition, the NYUJLPP has posted a short response essay by former OIRA Adminsitrator Sally Katzen and Julian Ginos raising constitutional doubts about the proposed reform.

For those interested, my prior posts on the REINS Act can be found here.

Among the regulatory reform proposals passed by the House of Representatives this year was the “REINS Act,” a proposal to require Congressional approval before major regulations could take effect. Supporters and opponents of this bill have presented the REINS Act as a deregulatory tool. The actual effect of the REINS Act is likely to be more modest, for reasons I explain in an article forthcoming in the NYU Journal of Legislation and Public Policy (available on SSRN here). While I believe the REINS Act would significantly increase legislative accountability for regulatory policy, I doubt it would stop all that many regulatory initiatives, particularly those with significant public support.

Passage of the REINS Act has always been a long shot. Though it passed the House of Representatives, the Senate has shown little interest. This month’s election makes the REINS Act’s chance of becoming law even more remote, as the Democrats have increased their Senate majority and President Obama has said he would veto REINS were it to reach his desk. Debates over regulatory reform will continue nonetheless. So, for those interested, here’s the abstract of the paper SSRN.

Over the past several decades, the scope, reach and cost of federal regulations have increased dramatically, prompting bipartisan calls for regulatory reform. One such proposed reform is the Regulations of the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act (REINS Act). This proposal aims to restore political accountability to federal regulatory policy decisions by requiring both Houses of Congress to approve any proposed “major rule.” In effect, the REINS Act would limit the delegation of regulatory authority to federal agencies, and restore legislative control and accountability to Congress. This article seeks to assess the REINS Act and its likely effects on regulatory policy. It explains why constitutional objections to the proposal are unfounded and many policy objections overstate the REINS Act’s likely impact on the growth of federal regulation. The REINS Act is not likely to be the deregulatory blunderbuss feared by its opponents and longed for by some of its proponents. The REINS Act should be seen more as a measure to enhance accountability than to combat regulatory activity.

Yesterday, the House passed the REINS Act on an almost exclusively party-line vote, 241-184.  All the House Republicans voted for the bill, as did four Democrats.  Thought the bill passed the House, it’s not about to be enacted into law.  The Senate is unlikely to take up the bill and President Obama has promised to veto the REINS Act should it somehow reach his desk.

My posts on the REINS Act are indexed here.

Today the House of Representatives is expected to vote on the REINS Act, a bill to enhance political accountability over regulatory decisions. The bill has two essential features. First, it bars new “major” regulations (those anticipated to cost more than $100 million annually) from taking effect unless approved by both houses of Congress. Second, it creates an expedited review process that forces each house to vote on each major rule. So while requiring Congressional approval, REINS prevents members of Congress from ducking their responsibility to vote yay or nay.

REINS is a controversial bill, in part because it effectively limits the delegation of broad regulatory authority to federal agencies, but to read some critics, REINS would usher in an anti-regulatory armageddon. While I support the legislation, for reasons detailed in these posts (and summarized in this NRO piece), I recognize that there are reasonable arguments to be made on the other side. What’s so interesting watching this debate, however, is how many opponents refuse to make them, relying instead on inaccurate and fanciful characterizations of the bill. It’s telling when opponents of legislation are unable or unwilling to describe it accurately when making their case.

To take one example, US PIRG’s Ed Mierzwinski argues that the REINS Act would lead to unsafe toys on the market and emasculate the CPSC.

One bill, the REINS Act, would not only allow but require congressional meddling in the implementation of all public health and safety rules. A single member of Congress, at the behest of some powerful special interest or campaign contributor, could block the public database, block science-based lead standards for children’s products, block crib safety rules or any number of protections that provide a safer consumer marketplace.

The idea that REINS would allow a single member of Congress to block new regulations is a common claim. The Center for American Progress makes it here. It’s also false. The bill expressly limits debate, waives procedural objections, and requires a vote on the merits. Under REINS, if some members of Congress wish to block needed safety rules at the behest of a special interest, they will have to do it out in the open, and will only succeed if they can win a majority vote. How could this undermine legislative accountability? It’s true REINS requires that legislative approval occur within a set period of time, but it also ensures the vote occurs before the deadline expires.

The NYT worries REINS will “undermine the executive branch.” Really. Why? Because it will be too easy for a majority in either House to prevent a President from rewriting regulatory requirements. The NYT also argues REINS is “deeply undemocratic.” Got that? Requiring legislative votes on major regulations — that two or three of the most consequential regulatory decisions made by federal agencies — is “undemocratic,” whereas allowing agencies to rely upon decades-old statutes to remake industries and reconfigure whole sectors of the economy is not.

The REINS Act would dramatically alter how major rules are made, but it would do so by making sure the people’s representatives have a greater say on — and greater accountability for — the major regulatory actions our federal government takes. If the public wants greater regulation of environmental or other problems, REINS won’t stand in the way. Only if the public is skeptical of such regulations, or unconcerned by legislative vetoes of proposed rules, will REINS slow down the adoption of new rules. And perhaps that’s what the REINS Act’s opponents are truly afraid of: A regulatory process that more accurately reflects what the public wants.

UPDATE: For unhinged commentary on the REINS Act, it’s hard to do better than this piece which, among other things, claims the Act would “essentially return environmental regulation to 1890s standards – when corporations polluted with impunity.” That’s an astounding charge given that REINS a) does not have any effect whatsoever to regulations already on the books and b) would apply equally to deregulatory initiatives, such as any effort by a future President to repeal existing regulations.

I have an article in the new issue of Regulation on the REINS Act, which would prevent major regulations from taking effect without the passage of a joint resolution of approval by Congress.  The article is largely based on my Congressional testimony about the Act, and summarizes the arguments for and against the measure.  My prior posts on REINS can be found here.

Last month, University of Richmond law professor Noah Sachs published an article in The New Republic criticizing the proposed REINS Act, which would require Congressional approval before any major regulation could take effect. As with many attacks on the REINS Act, Sachs’ article misrepresents the legislation to make its case. As there is a hearing on the bill today, I thought I’d address some of the arguments he makes.  In case some find this to be redundant with my prior posts on the subject (1, 2, 3), the bulk of this post is below the fold.

Continue reading ‘REINS Act — A Response to Noah Sachs’ »

Tomorrow the House Judiciary Committee will have a second hearing on the REINS Act, a bill to increase legislative control over and accountability for federal regulatory policy. The central provisions of the REINS Act provide that new “major rules” – those regulations expected to cost over $100 million annually – may not become effective unless a joint resolution of approval passes Congress. The Act would further create an expedited review process designed to ensure that there is a prompt up-or-down vote in each house of Congress on all new “major” rules, which represent less than five percent of the 3,000-plus federal regulations promulgated each year. My prior posts on the REINS Act are here and here, and my congressional testimony is here.

The purpose of the REINS Act is to prevent the imposition of major regulatory initiatives without Congressional approval. Because of Congress’ long history of delegating broad rulemaking authority to administrative agencies, there is relatively little legislative control of, and accountability for, the regulations agencies impose on the American people. The best way to ensure greater legislative accountability is to require members of Congress to vote “yea” or “nay” on new major rules. This will prevent unpopular rules from being adopted, but also ensure that Congress is accountable for those new major rules that are imposed. If the public wants more regulatory protections in particular areas – and it may well – the REINS Act will not stand in the way. Environmentalist groups and progressive academics see the REINS Act a bit differently. See, for instance this post by the NRDC’s David Goldston or this article from The New Republic by Noah Sachs.

This post on the ACS Blog by University of Michigan law professor David Uhlmann is representative of the arguments being made against the REINS Act, but they are not particularly persuasive. Uhlmann labels the REINS Act “a cynical attempt to block further environmental, public health, and safety protections,” and yet makes few substantive arguments against it.  Throughout the post he insinuates that industry groups will be able to block regulations in in Congress the same way they block substantive bills, but Uhlmann never quite makes this claim because he can’t.  The REINS Act creates an expedited legislative procedure that prevents concentrated minority interests from blocking resolutions of approval.  It ensures a straight up-or-down vote on the floor, so industry can only block a regulation if it can command a majority in at least one house of Congress.

Uhlmann begins noting some of the most significant safety and environmental measures adopted in the past several decades. “It is unlikely that any of the health and safety gains we have enjoyed would have been possible” had the REINS Act been the law. This is a striking claim – it is “unlikely” we would have “any of the health and safety gains we have enjoyed” – and one that is readily refutable.

Continue reading ‘The REINS Act Revisited & A Response to David Uhlmann’ »

On Monday, I testified before the House Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Courts, Commercial and Administrative Law on the REINS Act. The other witnesses were former Rep. David McIntosh and Sally Katzen, who headed the White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in the Clinton Administration. Rep. McIntosh and I expressed support for the REINS Act while Katzen did not. Here are my testimony, my prior post on this hearing, and the C-Span video.

It was a rather short hearing, but the questioning was fairly aggressive, particularly from the Democrats on the subcommittee, including Rep. John Conyers, who attended as the ranking minority member of the committee even though he is not on the subcommittee. During the hearing I was struck by how many of the questions from members were premised on a misunderstanding (or misrepresentation) of the bill, both structurally and substantively. I recognize members of the minority may not have had the most time to prepare for a Monday hearing for which there had only been several days official notice. Nonetheless, I was surprised how unprepared  (or unwilling) some of the committee seemed to be to address the bill on its own terms.  Perhaps I’ve just lived in Ohio too long.

Several members of the subcommittee suggested the REINS Act imposed unconstitutional constraints on executive power, particularly the executive’s responsibility to faithfully execute and enforce federal laws.  Therefore, they suggested, the REINS Act could conflict with Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution.  Set aside the curiosity of House Democrats, including Rep. Conyers, defending executive power.  This objection is based on a fundamental confusion about the nature of executive power. The power to “enforce” the laws – that is, the power to take action to see that legal rules are complied with – is distinct from the power to make the rules pursuant to a delegation of authority from Congress. So, for instance, the EPA’s power to impose fines or other sanctions on companies that violate emission limitations is distinct from the EPA’s power to set the emission limits. A requirement that federal regulatory agencies obtain Congressional approval before major rules may take effect requires Congressional assent for the latter, but has no effect on the former.

Sally Katzen raised a more nuanced separation of powers concern, but one that I also find unconvincing, and for largely the same reasons. She noted that under Morrison v. Olson, “a statute is suspect if it ‘involves an attempt by Congress to increase its own powers at the expense of the executive branch,’” and it is reasonable to see the REINS Act as an effort to constrain the executive. Just look at the bill’s full title and findings. The problem with her argument is that it ignores the distinction between executive and legislative functions.

The powers to investigate and prosecute are core executive functions. Any effort by Congress to limit such powers and aggrandize its own is problematic.  This point was made not only in Morrison v. Olson (in which the Court upheld the statute in question, despite its intrusion on executive power), but in other cases as well.  The executive power is distinct from the power to adopt legislative-type rules, however.  The latter is not a core executive function. Rather it is a quasi-legislative power that must be delegated by Congress. As the Supreme Court has stressed time and again (and as I noted in my testimony), federal agencies have no authority to promulgate regulations beyond that which has been given by Congress. And what Congress has given, it may take back. Restraining the exercise of such authority, whether by adopting rules for the exercise of regulatory authority (as under the Administrative Procedure Act or the Congressional Review Act) or limiting the scope of such authority is perfectly acceptable, so long as other Constitutional requirements (such as bicameralism and presentment) are satisfied. As the REINS Act satisfies such requirements, there is no problem. The REINS Act does not curtail executive power so much as it places limits on the legislative-like power delegated by Congress.

For more recent comments on the REINS Act, see David Zaring’s posts here and here.  I’ll have more to say on the Act, and the arguments for and against it, in the days to come.

Tomorrow afternoon (back willing) I will be in Washington, D.C. to testify before the House Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Courts, Commercial and Administrative Law on the Regulations from the Executive In Need of Scrutiny (REINS) Act.  This bill would require congressional approval before  new “major” regulations – those regulations expected to cost in excess of $100 million per year — could take effect.  It also creates an expedited process for consideration of new regulations, much like that which has been used in conjunction with “fast track” trade negotiation authority, to ensure that both Houses of Congress take up-or-down votes within a short time frame.  For more detail on the bill, here is a brief white paper I wrote for the Federalist Society on the REINS Act’s central provisions.

The primary purpose of the Act is to ensure greater political accountability for major regulatory initiatives.  Federal regulatory agencies only have that power delegated them by Congress, but regulatory agencies are not always particularly responsive to Congressional concerns.  Nor are members of Congress always willing to take responsibility for how the power they have delegated gets exercised.  Requiring a straight up-or-down vote on new major regulations is a way to address both problems and the expedited procedures ensure that traditional legislative logjams and special interest obstruction won’t prevent consideration of significant regulatory initiatives.  This is why I believe the REINS Act is more about transparency and political accountability than anything else.

I have no idea whether the REINS Act has much hope of passage.  The bill was part of the Republican leadership’s “Pledge to America” and was just introduced in the House, where I would think its prospects are good.  The Senate presents a more significant challenge, as does the White House.  At present, most support for the REINS Act appears to come from those who believe federal regulation is out of control and needs to be restrained.  Given that the REINS Act does not offer a mechanism to bottle up regulations with holds, filibusters or other roadblocks, supporters have adopted the implicit assumption that federal agencies are engaged in more aggressive regulation than the public supports.  From what I’ve seen of the other side (and I have not seen much as of yet), some opposed to the REINS Act likewise assume that regulatory initiatives they would support could not command majorities in Congress.  I don’t know whether this assumption is accurate, but it would say something if there were to be widespread agreement that federal agencies are regulating in a manner the American people do not support.

Additional posts on this legislation, my testimony and the hearing will follow.

UPDATE: My testimony is available here.