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Ninth Circuit Enacts Miranda-Like Code for Computer Search and Seizure:
The Ninth Circuit's new computer search and seizure decision in United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing is a truly astonishing decision. The majority opinion, by Judge Alex Kozinski, announces a laundry list of brand-new rules, introduced with no citations to any authority, that henceforth the government must follow when executing warrants for digital information. I can't recall having read anything quite like it, although it does bring to mind Miranda v. Arizona.

   Judge Kozinski helpfully sums up the new rules the Ninth Circuit has announced as follows:
When the government wishes to obtain a warrant to examine a computer hard drive or electronic storage medium in searching for certain incriminating files, or when a search for evidence could result in the seizure of a computer, see, e.g., United States v. Giberson, 527 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2008), magistrate judges must be vigilant in observing the guidance we have set out throughout our opinion, which can be summed up as follows:
1. Magistrates should insist that the government waive reliance upon the plain view doctrine in digital evidence cases. See p. 11876 supra.
2. Segregation and redaction must be either done by specialized personnel or an independent third party. See pp. 11880-81 supra. If the segregation is to be done by government computer personnel, it must agree in the warrant application that the computer personnel will not disclose to the investigators any information other than that which is the target of the warrant.
3. Warrants and subpoenas must disclose the actual risks of destruction of information as well as prior efforts to seize that information in other judicial fora. See pp. 11877-78, 11886-87 supra.
4. The government's search protocol must be designed to uncover only the information for which it has probable cause, and only that information may be examined by the case agents. See pp. 11878, 11880-81 supra.
5. The government must destroy or, if the recipient may lawfully possess it, return non-responsive data, keeping the issuing magistrate informed about when it has done so and what it has kept. See p. 11881-82 supra.
  I should add that I think these rules are being announced as Fourth Amendment rules, although at first blush that's not entirely clear: The opinion is remarkably light on the sources of its authority.

  Also, I should add that I'm not sure what most of Judge Kozinski's new requirements actually mean. To pick one example, what does it mean to "waive plain view"? Is the idea that the government promises not to rely on the Fourth Amendment's plain view doctrine to admit evidence out of the scope of the warrant? I have never seen anything like that, and I don't know if such a waiver is even enforceable.

  I'll probably blog a lot about this case over the next few days: This is the most free-wheeling, "look ma no hands" legal decision I've read in a long time, so there is a lot to digest.
GD:
So when do you get your hard drive back (or a copy)?
8.26.2009 1:53pm
CrazyTrain (mail):
Haven't read the opinion, but isn't it conceivable that these are prophylactic rules that the Court of Appeals is imposing on lower courts/magistrates within its jurisdiction (as this is an appeal from a federal court). I.e., what Paul Cassell argued that Miranda "really" was in Dickerson -- though in this case, it could actually make sense, because unlike Miranda, this is not being enforced against the states.

Would a federal court not have power to impose such rules as part of its inherent authority? (Absent congressional action to the contrary.)
8.26.2009 1:55pm
Chicago:
What do you mean no citations? The summary at the end of the opinion doesn't have citations, but that's because it's merely distilling the points addressed earlier in the decision.
8.26.2009 1:56pm
DennisN (mail):
I can see a practical basis for the rules, but will let my Elders and Betters comment on their legal authority.

With regard to waiving Plain View, let's say they are searching a computer based on a warrant for stolen credit card data. The investigators cannot click on the desktop icon that is labelled "Child Porn." Do you think that's what they are meaning?

If you walked into a house and saw child porn on the table, the Plain View exception would apply. But since you can't look inside a computer without a warrant, there is no Plain View inside the box.

Or maybe they mean you can't size the child porn on the table, when you walk in to seize the PC. I'll be lunch someone will try to interpret the ruling that way.
8.26.2009 1:56pm
JohnO (mail):
So putting these rules together, if the feds are searching for incriminating financial data on a computer and, while doing so, come across a cache of child pornography (or, say, pictures of a sadistic murder), they have to destroy the stuff they found and act like they didn't see it.

Wow.
8.26.2009 1:59pm
ba2 (mail):
I hope Kozinski isn't relying on his own personal experience with computer evidence in writing this opinion.
8.26.2009 2:03pm
Don Miller (mail) (www):
I read these tools to require the police to focus their search specifically for what the warrant says they are looking for.

Forensic computer tools are very good. They don't even have to boot the OS of the hard drive, because the OS can help hide the tools.

If you are looking for evidence of financial data misdealings, then you use the tools designed for analyzing financial data.

The tools to identify child porn are different and unless you can articulate a reason to run the tools, you don't have the right to run them anymore unless the warrant says that is what you are looking for.

If the Officer walking up to the computer screen sees Child Porn on the Screen or clearly labeled on the desktop, it was not in Plain View.

Computer Seizures should not be fishing expeditions and this decision clearly outlines rules so that they are not anymore.
8.26.2009 2:05pm
Don Miller (mail) (www):

If the Officer walking up to the computer screen sees Child Porn on the Screen or clearly labeled on the desktop, it was not in Plain View.


This is wrong, I meant to say "Unless the Officer walking up to the computer screen sees Child Porn on the Screen or clearly labeled on the desktop, it was not in Plain View."
8.26.2009 2:06pm
Bill reynolds (mail):
It's "enforceable" if the court enforces it. Till the Supremes decide otherwise.
8.26.2009 2:09pm
David Schwartz (mail):
Suppose the government has probable cause to search for A. Suppose further the government can search for A two different ways. It can look in the place where A is, or it can look everywhere, including places certain not to contain A, in the hopes that this will produce other evidence (for which the government does not have probable cause) into plain view.

Now, suppose the government argues that the first method is difficult to do and that it would prefer to do the second method. Is it unreasonable to argue that a magistrate should still insist on scope limits?
8.26.2009 2:11pm
martinned (mail) (www):
What??? Is America a Common Law country or not? English courts have responded to new technology in this way for centuries. If it's good enough for the Brits, surely it must be good enough for the US?
8.26.2009 2:11pm
OrinKerr:
If it's good enough for the Brits, surely it must be good enough for the US?

Tell that to the folks who signed the Declaration of Independence.
8.26.2009 2:15pm
SuperSkeptic (mail):
First of all, there is no need to discuss "plain-view" now, despite the merits or lackthereof in the opinion. Warrants will just be issued to search for the smallest files possible, thereby encompassing the entire computer - just like drug search warrants include "small plastecine baggies" so that they can look everywhere.

Secondly, I doubt whether this is the kind of Supreme Court composition that will allow such a Miranda-like usurpation - even if it IS a good idea. ( I think Miranda was)
8.26.2009 2:15pm
_quodlibet_:
Orin, what do you think of the "risk that every warrant for electronic information will become, in effect, a general warrant, rendering the Fourth Amendment irrelevant" mentioned on page 25?
8.26.2009 2:16pm
Anderson (mail):
I hope Kozinski isn't relying on his own personal experience with computer evidence in writing this opinion.

That will be a lot of people's first thought, I bet.
8.26.2009 2:19pm
JohnO (mail):

If you are looking for evidence of financial data misdealings, then you use the tools designed for analyzing financial data.


Fair enough. Let's change the hypothetical to the feds are looking for child porn and find a snuff film (solely involving adults, and including the owner of the computer).

I read the 9th Circuit's rules as saying the feds have to destroy that video and not use it as evidence.
8.26.2009 2:22pm
Houston Lawyer:
So if I put all of my spreadsheets into a file marked "Kiddie Porn" or "Butt Sex", the police can't search that file if they are investigating me for financial fraud?
8.26.2009 2:25pm
martinned (mail) (www):
@Orin Kerr: That's exactly what's so double about the role of the Courts in the US. On the one hand, there's the Declaration of Independence and the fact that both in Britain and in the US the Common Law is becoming ever rarer, since statute law is taking over. On the other hand, everybody and their brother seems to be making arguments based on Blackstone and even older English material, which is something that even the English don't do anymore.

(In English law there are a few old statutes that still apply, like the Statute of Frauds, and a few old cases, but in actual argument it is extremely rare to find something cited that is older than, say, 150 years.)

Which is why my remark was only partly in jest.
8.26.2009 2:26pm
OrinKerr:
Orin, what do you think of the "risk that every warrant for electronic information will become, in effect, a general warrant, rendering the Fourth Amendment irrelevant" mentioned on page 25?

I wrote an article on that risk, and how courts should or should not respond to it: Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 531 (2005).
8.26.2009 2:31pm
Don Miller (mail) (www):

Fair enough. Let's change the hypothetical to the feds are looking for child porn and find a snuff film (solely involving adults, and including the owner of the computer).

I read the 9th Circuit's rules as saying the feds have to destroy that video and not use it as evidence.


Reasonable question because I believe the tools to identify the snuff film would be similar to the tools to find child porn.

If the tool turned up the snuff film mixed into a variety of other illegal pornography including the child porn that the warrant specified, the Government might be able to argue plain view and get it admitted with the rest of the case.

However, if the search for child porn just resulted in the one illegal porn (ie snuff film) file, the computer expert might only be able to tell the investigator that "no files covered by your warrant were found"
8.26.2009 2:33pm
Bob from Ohio (mail):
A baseball case. Perfect opporttunity for CJ Roberts to be an umpire.
8.26.2009 2:34pm
SuperSkeptic (mail):
the fact that both in Britain and in the US the Common Law is becoming ever rarer, since statute law is taking over.

Except in Constitutional Law.
8.26.2009 2:34pm
Don Miller (mail) (www):

So if I put all of my spreadsheets into a file marked "Kiddie Porn" or "Butt Sex", the police can't search that file if they are investigating me for financial fraud?


computer search tools are sophisticated enough to search the contents of the files without ever seeing what the name of the file is.

They would do a search for financial records, find your spreadsheets because of their content and be able to turn them over to the investigator.
8.26.2009 2:36pm
martinned (mail) (www):
@SuperSkeptic: In Britain, there is hardly any constitutional law that isn't statute law, at least not the kind of law that might come before the courts. In the US, constitutional law is one of the most obvious places where the common law method still reigns. The point is that the common law method doesn't only mean careful, gradual development based on precedent. Sometimes, it means that the court - faced with a problem for which the law has no solution yet - fashions one itself.

In the US, there are a dozen or so Courts of Appeals, and one of them has now made a bold proposal for a solution to this problem. Hopefully, other Courts of Appeals and District Courts (,State Supreme Courts, etc.) will take up the challenge and follow this proposal or discuss it and reject it, and ultimately it will come before the Supreme Court, and they will have the last say. The Common Law implies a great amount of autonomy for the Courts, including the power to take bold steps. (Brown v Board of Education, Donoghue v Stevenson, Hadley v Baxendale, etc.)

If that's not the kind of Common Law you want, rewrite the constitution to strike a different balance. In English law, all constitutional rulings can be overruled by simple Act of Parliament. In the Netherlands, the courts are forbidden to review the constitutionality of statutes, as they are in France (almost). But ever since Marbury v Madison, this is the way the system works in the US.
8.26.2009 2:47pm
byomtov (mail):
As a non-lawyer, I'm puzzled by why computer searches differ so much from pre-computer searches of offices, say. Suppose, in those days, the police had a warrant to search my office for evidence of fraud. Well, they would have to look at the actual contents of file drawers and folders, wouldn't they? Just relying on the labels would be pretty stupid.

So what happens when they find evidence of other crimes in those papers? Isn't that exactly analogous to the computer search? Nothing in my file drawer is in plain view, as I (perhaps incorrectly) understand it. Neither is anything in a file on my computer.
8.26.2009 2:49pm
PeteP:
"If you walked into a house and saw child porn on the table, the Plain View exception would apply. But since you can't look inside a computer without a warrant, there is no Plain View inside the box. "

If you have a warrant to search the closet for a gun, and you find a pound of coke, that's admissable, right ? same would apply to child porn on a puter when you're searching it for identity theft.
8.26.2009 3:31pm
martinned (mail) (www):
@PeteP: Absolutely, which is why the 9th circuit is suggesting the plain view exception should be waived. That wouldn't be necessary unless it were applicable in the first place.

The idea is that when searching a computer, you have to "look" at everything, no matter what the warrant says. The real world analogy isn't that you search for a gun and find a pound of coke, but that you search for a gun and find a grain of coke, stuck in the carpet.
8.26.2009 3:37pm
Don Miller (mail) (www):

As a non-lawyer, I'm puzzled by why computer searches differ so much from pre-computer searches of offices, say. Suppose, in those days, the police had a warrant to search my office for evidence of fraud. Well, they would have to look at the actual contents of file drawers and folders, wouldn't they? Just relying on the labels would be pretty stupid.

So what happens when they find evidence of other crimes in those papers? Isn't that exactly analogous to the computer search? Nothing in my file drawer is in plain view, as I (perhaps incorrectly) understand it. Neither is anything in a file on my computer.


I think the analogy breaks down because of the sheer mass of information on computers and the fact that the Police were seizing the computers and data and taking them off site.

The Court based its decision on the same reasoning from an earlier case United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591
(9th Cir. 1982). In that case, the police seized the contents of the file cabinet, paper records, and took them offsite for sorting. Back then the 9th said that a non-investigator should do the search and only provide the investigators the information covered by the warrant. The police were then required to return the rest of the files in a reasonable amount of time.

They just extended the same logic to computer searches. I believe they came down particularly hard because of the Governments abuse of the previous procedure.

Here is a case were the Government was searching a 3rd parties files for evidence of wrong doing by 10 specific individuals. The company offered to print out the records of those 10 people, but the Government seized all of their records, looked at the results of hundreds of other people and then claimed "plain view". They weren't plain view. They weren't on someones desk, the files weren't open, they were only in "Plain View" because the Government seized far more records than they needed to have the information that the warrant asked for.

Using the Government logic in this case, it would be easy to imagine a search warrant to Google for the contents of a specific persons email account and having the Government seize all of Googles data, pawing through it because "someone might be trying to hide it from them" and then building cases against thousands of other people that had nothing to do with their original case because the evidence was in "plain view".
8.26.2009 3:38pm
uhoh (mail):
Computers contain staggeringly vast amounts of information. By necessity, the tools used for searching them are "targeted." Manually inspecting every data fragment is prohibitive. Restrictive discovery orders have been very common in commercial litigation. The federal courts understand "search terms" and have been approving/restricting computer searches for quite some time. In computers we know if something "fits in a container" much better than in the physical world. This decision clearly upholds the spirit of the Fourth Amendment.
8.26.2009 3:58pm
PatHMV (mail) (www):
Don Miller... unless the criminal was using steganography or some unusual, non-standard data format.

There's a surprising number of people who seem to get all bent out of shape at the prospect of police uncovering the pornography stashes of drug dealers or white collar criminals hiding financial records.
8.26.2009 4:13pm
Anderson (mail):
There's a surprising number of people who seem to get all bent out of shape at the prospect of police uncovering the pornography stashes of drug dealers or white collar criminals hiding financial records.

The problem with this kind of thinking is that it leads to "hey, why not let the cops search your house without a warrant -- you haven't got anything to hide, have you?"

Searches are intrinsically humiliating. No one wants the cops rifling through their underwear drawer, learning what you take medications for, discovering your taste in (perfectly legal) pornography.

... A particular hazard re: computers is how easy it is for the cops to make illegal copies of your files without your being any the wiser, until they show up on the internet.
8.26.2009 4:24pm
pintler:
If I understand the facts correctly, the warrant was to search a third party's computer for evidence relating to certain targeted people, but in the course of that search evidence was found implicating other people. Is that an important distinction from the more common case where an individual's computer is searched for evidence against him?

If I think Mr. Big is hiding evidence in Google's cloud, and get a warrant to search all google owned computers for evidence against Mr. B, and in the course of that search I find evidence against thousands of people in unrelated cases, is that all admissible?

You can argue that these cases weren't unrelated; the counterargument would be that the search uncovered evidence of others in the same profession committing the same crime. If my warrant alleges an accountant is cooking the books, does that rope in all the other crooked accountants out there in the cloud?
8.26.2009 4:24pm
Don Miller (mail) (www):
PatHMV

Don Miller... unless the criminal was using steganography or some unusual, non-standard data format.


so bring me the probable cause that this particular defendent is using steganography and how your expert is going to uncover that.

If he uncovers the data your warrant asks for, you get it. If he doesn't recover the data your warrant asks for, you get nothing.

I don't have a problem with this rule.
8.26.2009 4:31pm
Bruce Hayden (mail):
I think this is about time. Not directly applicable, but I am reminded of how the Scientologists abused the civil equivalent a decade or so ago. They would routinely get ex parte writs of search and seizure for computers, take the computers (or, at least what was on them), and search the email there to find the next leads in their quests to shut down distribution of their "sacred texts". Back then, there was a lot less computer sophistication on the part of the court system, and they got away with this much too often.
8.26.2009 4:44pm
Dave N (mail):
Three thoughts:

1) I suspect this case has a better than even chance that certiorari will be granted, should the government seek it.

2) In the event cert. is either denied or not sought, unscrupulous federal agents will do "joint investigations" with their state counterparts and get state warrants, since the 9th Circuit has no authority over state courts.

3) If the gambit in my second thought is tried, and the feds seek a federal prosecution based on a state warrant, will this rule then be found applicable to state search warrants as well? As a follow up question, will THAT analysis change if it is primarily a state investigation turned over to the feds for prosecution for one reason or another?
8.26.2009 5:13pm
PatHMV (mail) (www):
The only actual difference anybody has so far suggested between a computer full of files and a filing cabinet full of files is that the computer can, potentially, hold a great deal more information than a filing cabinet. That's it. No other difference has been identified. I fail to see how that makes any constitutional difference whatsoever.

Let's suppose that the police have probable cause and obtain a warrant to search a business, say an insurance company, which has thousands upon thousands of files in it. Physical, old-fashioned filing cabinets with lots of files. It is not at all controversial, in 4th Amendment law, that the police, with a warrant, can look in all of those files to determine whether they contain the particular incriminating document being sought and, if the police stumble upon child porn in the process, they can use that evidence against the individual as well.

Now suppose the same business, but instead of maintaining paper files, they scan documents into the computer and delete the originals. So they have a couple of hard drives full of the same data which would otherwise take up 100 filing cabinets. The folks advocating for a heightened standard for searching a computer are saying that a different rule should apply, just because that business chooses to store its data on computer rather than in paper files. That makes no sense at all.

Look at #5 of the court's "rules." The government must destroy non-responsive data or, if it is not contraband, return it to the owner. In other words, if the government DOES find kiddie porn in the computer, indavertently or otherwise, they must destroy it, and they can't use any of it against the criminal. Why?

If our primary concern is keeping the government from snooping into our lawful affairs, that interest is not going to be protected by some exclusionary rule. If the cops want to just get their jollies looking at the homemade porn of you and your girlfriend or wife last night, they're not going to care about whether it's excluded from evidence or not.

Moreover, plenty of police departments still aren't terribly sophisticated with computer searches. Even those that are usually tend to be quite short-staffed, with the computer techs overworked. This rule will be exceedingly burdensome on them, as they can't just look at the computer, but will have to work with computer techs to design specific search criteria which is broad enough to find the criminal data being sought but not so broad as to pull in whatever files you folks are so quite certain couldn't possibly contain any criminal data at all.

Can the police look in TIFF files? Those are image files, but it's a commonly used format for saving scans of multi-page documents (a bit archaic now, but still used by some programs). How about PDF files? Most people don't keep porn in those, I suspect, but they do keep documents and spreadsheets in that format for sharing with other people. Can the police look in those files?

This is really ridiculous.
8.26.2009 5:25pm
Ken Arromdee:
PatHMV: Then how do you prevent the police claiming to be interested in a few files and then searching the entire computer on the grounds that as long as they're looking for those few files, everything on the computer is in plain view? (Which is what actually happened.)

(And as Don points out, there is an analogous precedent involving file cabinets.)
8.26.2009 5:57pm
Don Miller (mail) (www):
Pat,

Under existing 9th Circuit Tamura procedures, the Police can't search your 100 file cabinets.

They can get a warrant and a non-investigator can go through the file cabinets and provide the investigators the information covered by the warrant. Thereby protecting the privacy of all the other records in your file cabinet.

The decision tries to extend this analogy to computers. Tamura procedures have been in place in the 9th Circuit since 1982. I don't know what the procedures are in other circuits.
8.26.2009 5:58pm
Boukus:
I do forensic computer analysis in civil litigation.

In a typical case, I am given the discovery questions, or other instructions as to what is being sought. Then I examine the ENTIRE drive looking for anything responsive. I see all kinds of crap from illegal gambling, porn, embezzlement, tax fraud, insurance fraud...you name it. But if it is not responsive to the discovery, I do not report it to counsel or the court. As strange as it may seem, I take the privacy of the miscreants very seriously. Civil discovery is critical to justice, and if it is improperly exploited, it will be curtailed or evaded in ways that will negatively impact justice and fairness. So I protect privacy, in order to protect the proper use of discovery -- as an aid to justice.
8.26.2009 10:56pm
SuperSkeptic (mail):
@ Martinned,

I apologize for the ambiguity, I meant merely to reference the U.S. in my comment in response to the italicized quote. I don't presume to know enough to comment on the law in Britain, except a bit historically - and even then mostly how it has affected the U.S. :) Thanks for the info.
8.26.2009 11:21pm
bender:

The only actual difference anybody has so far suggested between a computer full of files and a filing cabinet full of files is that the computer can, potentially, hold a great deal more information than a filing cabinet.


Not really because the technology allows you to search for anything you want instantaneously--like superman looking through walls. Everything's in plain view if you can see through walls.


If our primary concern is keeping the government from snooping into our lawful affairs, that interest is not going to be protected by some exclusionary rule.


I think the better way to frame this would be to say the great concern is about governmental overreach and the amount of power and hence potential for abuse that entails. There is plenty of legal information that if accessible can destroy businesses or political candidacies. So I view the 4th amendment as based less on the concern for individual rights, although that's certainly where the rubber hits the road, but more as a protection against overreach that can potentially threaten our fundamental societal structure-(capitalism, democracy). Technology has given the government unprecedented power, and I hope to hell that some of the older judges and legislators understand that. Seems pretty clear that some of the enlightened voices on this thread do not.
8.27.2009 1:44am
bender:
An added point—I think it's an interesting question as to whether having a third-party rather than the government make decisions regarding admissibility (another 'veto point,' if you will)is all that helpful. True, the constitution is a limit on government, but I would be also concerned about abuses of power from the third party, as well. Such danger is evident from Boukos' comment above.

Would Nixon ever have lost an election if he could keyword search anybody's info? Should the court be mandating restrictions on the computer technology directly?
8.27.2009 1:58am
David Schwartz (mail):
The only actual difference anybody has so far suggested between a computer full of files and a filing cabinet full of files is that the computer can, potentially, hold a great deal more information than a filing cabinet. That's it. No other difference has been identified. I fail to see how that makes any constitutional difference whatsoever.
The difference is that in the computer realm, it's very easy for the government to do the equivalent of strip-searching everyone in the building (any time the warrant can be argued to cover evidence that might potentially be hidden in a body cavity) and then arresting everyone with drugs (even prescription medication that is unlabeled or not prescribed to them) on their person.

In the physical realm, they have to expend effort to do this. And they generally can't keep private information they don't have probable cause to seize on the spot. When the searches turn up nothing, the scope of the search is generally well-known and available to public scrutiny. In the electronic realm, they can trivially seize everything and retain it indefinitely. There is no practical way anyone else can know the scope of the search.
8.27.2009 2:05am
Flucky (mail):
Finally a good decision from the federal courts.
8.27.2009 4:41am
Dr. Egon Spengler (mail):
When allowed to search for something, if they find nothing, they shouldn't be able to use anything.

Defending Constitutional Rights is about having something to protect, not having something to hide.
8.27.2009 12:49pm
A. Zarkov (mail):
While this question might be somewhat tangential, does anyone know current law on encrypted disks and files. Can the owner or custodian be forced to reveal the password or pass phrase?
8.27.2009 1:12pm
David Schwartz (mail):
Zarkov: That's unsettled. Presumably, the answer is sometimes yes, sometimes no. The government's position will be that providing the password is no different from unlocking a safe. The contrary position is that it's the government's job to analyze and interpret evidence and they can't ask the Defendant what, say, his written notes "really mean". For the best we've got so far, see In re Boucher.
8.27.2009 3:10pm
A. Zarkov (mail):
David Schwartz:

Thanks very much-- that's helpful.

Think about this. Suppose your system used long pass phrases and suppose you used an incriminating one. Could we argue that handing over the phrase amounts to giving testimony? Just a thought.
8.27.2009 3:29pm
David Schwartz (mail):
Zarkov: The government will then simply ask you to enter the password or passphrase into a computer in a way that they cannot ever determine what it is, just like they did to Boucher. They will also promise not to use the act of production itself. They just want the decrypted contents.
8.28.2009 12:50am

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