what's wrong with calling it good old fashioned hypocrisy?

or in a phrase: where-you-stand-depends-on-where-you-sit

How about flip-flopping? :P

OT slightly but in considering the typical occasion for said flip-flopping, why not make up the word "excumbent" for the former office-holder and thus say she/he was "excumbenting"? Sort of a two-fer. Course that would mean the new person was "incumbenting", wouldn't it?

ChrisM,

I had totally forgotten about John Holbo's post: Yes, I remember it now. I agree, "poetic justice as fairness" is pretty hilarious, and apt.

The Freaky Friday effect?

The Magnetic-North-Shifts-To-The-Southern-Hemisphere effect?

The "Global Flip-Flop"?

A "System-wide Partisan Principles Realignment Event"?

SPPRE is to be pronounced "spree."

Well, Professor, there's always "circling the drain" -- as in, "With the change of leadership in Washington, both parties are switching their positions on the propriety of minority party deference. This is known as 'circling the drain,' under the theory that the parties take up and abandon the same positions with circular perfection, until at last all their sincerity slips down the drain."

There is an English word, fillip, that means a snapping of the fingers, or a quick propelling of something with a finger flick, or a little added something that excites.

Trading on the meaning of fillip as the snapping of one's fingers as a very quick motion, perhaps we could coin a new term

fillop

that would mean a reversal of position (flip-flop) that is as fast as the snapping of one's fingers (fillip) with the attendant decrying of the inconsistency of their opponents while overlooking their own inconsistency, etc.

The noun would, of course, be fillop: "His fillop was unsurprising."

And the verb would likewise be fillop: "He filloped on the issue sooner than I expected."

Just a possibility.

Projectionism

contravariant-adjointivitis

Has anyone suggested kerrying? As in "I was for it before I was against it."

symmetric hypocrisy in a word?

recipocrisy?

One of the beauties of the English language is its ever-expanding vocabulary, so, borrowing from the Russian лицемерие:

Litsemary.

Is Dahlia Lithwick still relevant?

Seems to me that "petarding" works on several levels.

First, it has to be one word, not a phrase.

Second, the essence of the act is when a group essentially adopts the opposition's reasoning to achieve their goal, in a sense taking advantage of the "hoist by your own petard" sense of fairness. Holbo's post is well-taken in this sense, when he notes how a conservative's argument in favor of affirmative action for conservative teachers in the humanities reaches the goal the conservative seeks (more jobs for fellow conservatives and a dilution of leftist strength) while using the same arguments for affirmative action that the conservative already rejects on principle.

Third, the word carries an echo of "retard," which will remind everyone that it's stupid to do this, even if you are gaining some advantage over your opponents by doing it.

The thing about petarding is that it cannot be a mere rhetorical device -- it has to be an honest argument. A conservative who argues, "Well, if you are in favor of affirmative action for minorities, why not affirmative action for conservatives in the humanities?" is not per se petarding. Taking any argument to its utmost extreme is a valid way of critiquing that position. But when you change your argument to suit your circumstance, like Lithwick did, then that would be petarding.

How about "Hypocriswapping"?

I agree, "poetic justice as fairness" is pretty hilarious, and apt.

That's close, but doesn't perfectly describe what's going on here. The example given in the coining of "poetic justice as fairness" is of a university humanities department that engages in affirmative action in the name of "diversity." A conservative will complaint that, if diversity were the real goal, they'd have a quota for conservatives.

The conservative is asking that the humanities department apply its principles consistently as long as it is applying them in part. The conservative does not adopt the principle of affirmative action, or abandon his opposition to it. If the conservative took over the humanities department, he would not develop a new respect for affirmative action for his buddies.

Let's flip the parties! Suppose a Republican says "we should prosecute people under the sodomy laws," and proceeds to prosecute only homosexuals. A Democrat would not be hypocritical in demanding that the prosecutions extend to heterosexuals who engage in sodomy, even though the Democrat believes that no one should be prosecuted for sodomy.

rick.felt: Precisely. There is a difference between "you have to apply your own position even when it favors me," which is really an example of taking an opponent's argument to its logical extreme, and actually adopting the other side's argument, or rejecting your own prior argument, wholesale.

Lithwick's post is emblematic of what happens when a minority party becomes the majority. Suddenly, all of the arguments in favor of minority obstructionism that Lithwick used to champion are now being used by the new minority. Lithwick, now in the majority, hates those arguments from her new perch, and is now using the arguments that the former majority used to decry the minority's obstructionism. She has adopted the reasoning of the opposition wholesale. That's petarding.

However, I suppose that petarding is rather rare on an ideological level, even as it is exceedingly common on a political level.

The majority of the comments to the Lithwick column appear to take her to task for precisely this double standard. Given the usually party-line slate readers readership, this is encouraging.

DiversityHire,

/concur

I'd like a word to describe the Lithwick article; a situation where the essay provides a perfect example of that which the essay puports to be attacking. "Self-referential" doesn't fully capture the unconscious irony, lack of insight, and dogma-induced inanity displayed in this kind of political writing.

Inanity is the right word for Lithwick's piece; even were this whole hypocrisyish line of reasoning valid, it doesn't make sense as she applies it. To show hypocrisy, you have to show that someone has taken contradictory positions. If someone says, "I think judicial nominations should never be filibustered," and then filibusters one, you've done that.

But if someone says, "I think nominee X is unqualified," and then at a later date votes for nominee Y for a different office entirely, you haven't shown any inconsistency at all, let alone full-blown hypocrisy. And yet that's what Lithwick's piece is full of.

What's sad is that Lithwick's writing can be very good when she isn't playing partisan hack. This paragraph, from a few weeks ago, is classic:

It's the kind of no guaranteed to rouse the Sleeping Hamlet in Kennedy, who all but splutters: "But our whole system is designed to ensure confidence in our judgments. … Litigants have an entitlement to that under the Due Process Clause." Come to think of it, this is Justice Kennedy's dream case. There's a huge problem. (Judicial elections are undermining judicial integrity.) There is virtually no precedent or statutory guidance. Someone will have to make some shit up. The court appears split 4-4. And it's all about appearances. Start the presses! The "sweet mystery of judicial integrity" passage practically writes itself!

In recognition of our current state of affairs, why not call it a credible default swap?

How about wryneckery?

Illustration

I propose quadrille. In Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 (1953), Justice Jackson wrote

We granted certiorari, and in this Court the parties changed positions as nimbly as if dancing a quadrille. The Government here admits that the petitioner is entitled to duties generally within a doctor's field and says that he now has been assigned to such. The petitioner denies that he yet has duties that fully satisfy that requirement. Notwithstanding his position before the trial court, he further says that anyway he must be commissioned and wants this Court to order him commissioned or discharged.

I've always liked that passage. Full disclosure: William Domnarski, in his book The Great Justices, 1941-54, singles out this passage as an example of Jackson's flourish.

adler:

You could start here

Your post has seven links. I decided to start with your claim that Lithwick's articles are "filled with … misrepresetations [sic]" (and typos, too, no doubt). To support that particular claim, you link to Dyer, who claims that Lithwick is "a liar" because she said this:

[Judge John Roberts] doesn't appear to be crusading for a wholesale national retreat to the good old days of executing miscreant 'tweens (although he seemingly finds arresting them for French-fry possession to be a cornerstone in good parent-child relations).

I think Beldar knows that her statement is "snark, satire, sarcasm, exaggeration" (as one of his commenters did a nice job of explaining here and here). Why do I think he knows? Because he puts those words at the very beginning of his argument. And another relevant word is 'hyperbole.'

Do you think Lithwick's statement is proof that she's "a liar?" And if you don't, why did you link approvingly to someone who made that claim? And do you even think it's fair to call her statement a 'misrepresentation?' Keep in mind that Roberts said this:

The correction of straying youth is an undisputed state interest and one different from enforcing the law against adults. Because parents and guardians play an essential role in that rehabilitative process, it is reasonable for the District to seek to ensure their participation, and the method chosen — detention until the parent is notified and retrieves the child — certainly does that, in a way issuing a citation might not.

Roberts explicitly argued that the police action should be viewed in the context of "parent-child relations."

And there is great irony in Dyer's use of the term "liar," as I have documented in excruciating detail here, here, here, here, here, here, here and here.

Are your other claims about Lithwick as solidly documented as the "misrepresetations" claim? I'm inclined to assume the answer is yes.

I hesitate to distract from the central topic, which is quite interesting and entertaining, but polonius asked a relevant question, and I see reason to be skeptical about your answer.

And if the obvious hyperbole in Lithwick's statement makes her "a liar," then you're a liar too, because you said her columns are "filled with outrageous caricatures (along with misrepresetations, distortions, and inaccuracies)."

Are you prepared to proved that her columns are full of "outrageous caricatures (along with misrepresetations, distortions, and inaccuracies)?" That is, they contain nothing else?

Which brings us back to original topic. As someone said above:

a situation where the essay provides a perfect example of that which the essay puports to be attacking

And there is great irony in Dyer's use of the term "liar," as I have documented in excruciating detail here, here, here, here, here, here, here and here.

The only thing truthful about that statement is the word "excruciating."

Nieporent's proximately cited writer expressed errantly with "excruciating", since only the errant and ignorant describe their own writing as "torturous"; instead the writer should've used "exquisite" if the writer desired to express "dilligent, accurate, careful in inquiry". Cicero, model for orators and exquisite in expression" used the word consequently:

cum de eo crimine accurate et exquisite disputavisset

Pursuant to the legal dictum "de minimis non curat lex" the literate shouldn't dispute the merits of ignorant writers.

Does anyone have a good list on what the poetic justice as fairness topics are? My initial list would be

Budget Deficits
Filibusters
Judicial Nomination procedures
Gerrymandering
Voting Fraud

David Welker:

Hypocrisy is no vice!

Amended and extended remarks:

"Hypocrisy in the defence of extremism is no vice, and consistency in the defence of moderation is no virtue."

Cheers,

David Drake:

BTW--David N: please don't assist Juke Box Grad in hijackiing yet another thread.

Oh? Is dissent from the mass collected wisdom of the commentors and dispute as to facts now "thread [] hijacking"? Home on the range, indeed.

Cheers,

David Drake: sorry about that; sometimes I can't resist taking his bait.

Oh? Is dissent from the mass collected wisdom of the commentors and dispute as to facts now "thread [] hijacking"? Home on the range, indeed.

No. Putting up eight separate links to "prove" that a commenter who isn't even a participant in this thread is a "liar" about irrelevant topics like Sarah Palin is hijacking the thread.

Politics

David Nieporent:

No. Putting up eight separate links to "prove" that a commenter who isn't even a participant in this thread is a "liar" about irrelevant topics like Sarah Palin is hijacking the thread.

I don't really want to dig through all the links (and no one forced you to, either), but it seems that Jonathan Adler introduced Dyer (at least so says JBG) through Adler's links as at least part of the attack on Lithwick (which, after all, is the subject matter here). JBG introduced his links as "character impeachment", saying that at least some of Adler's supporting evidence (in an article he wrote concerning the same Lithwick article in question) is of suspect quality.

Cheers,

As far as the Holbo post goes, if you want to eliminate all the "Rawls cleverness" (which I will not get until I have some more caffeine), the proper phrase is plainly:
"Turnabout is fair play."

Perhaps I'm missing something - why is that not the answer?

Hypocroswitch.

Endorse "flipocracy" as suggested by others. Except spelled "flypocrisy." "Flypocritical."

I suggest transmuting.

Nick

I have no suggestion; I just want to report my distress at realizing that I recall five year-old blog posts.

I vote for "petard" with the stipulation that it be a reflexive verb.

Ex: "In opposition for the first time since the rise of the Interblogs, the rightroots manage to petard themselves on a regular basis, suggesting that their newborn institutions may be due for a memory expansion."

Dave N.,

Thanks for the yeoman's work you've been doing recently - much appreciated.

Zuch,

We're not the strawmen you're looking for, and you couldn't carry JBG's jockstrap on your best good day. He's quite capable of defending himself, thanks.

Perhaps another forum would provide more fertile trolling ground for you?

Taking lessons from JBG, are you? You forgot to highlight the relevant part of that sentence: with respect to Sarah Palin.

David Nieporent:

Taking lessons from JBG, are you? You forgot to highlight the relevant part of that sentence: with respect to Sarah Palin.

You can highlight what you want; I'll highlight what I want. The full text is there to read. Whether Dyer is generally a reliable source is material here, as Adler chose to link to Dyer as part of his 'argument'. I will agree that a specific refutation of the argument that Dyer made (as linked to by Adler) might be more compelling, but even courts allow for impugning a deponent's character for honesty. And this is the InterToobz, without a FRE.

Cheers,

JohnG

Or -- credibility default swap.

(Tat-for-Tat??)

Does anyone have a good list on what the poetic justice as fairness topics are?

International trade

I thought JBG was banned? Can that be fixed?

He "disapproved of what was done" so strongly that he was perfectly capable of explaining how the arrest could be "rationally" seen as serving "the legitimate goal of promoting parental awareness and involvement with children who commit delinquent acts." Lithwick's characterization of that view ("he seemingly finds arresting them for French-fry possession to be a cornerstone in good parent-child relations") is perfectly legitimate sarcasm.

And the job of the appellate court is to, what? I thought it was to apply Supreme Court precedent to cases. Was I wrong and that it was to overturn convictions where one was unhappy about how things transpired regardless of precedent?

"Quadrille," whether as a verb or noun, is erudite and apt; well done.

Another possibility would be a form of "expediency," perhaps "to expediate" or "expediation." As in "The speed of the senator's turnabout on the judicial filibuster once his party won the White House demonstrated a willingness to expediate that would embarrass a plaintiff attorney."

How about contraposturing?

The English language needs a word for when advocates on both sides of an ongoing debate switch rhetorical positions, and yet they insist on decrying the inconsistency of their opponents while overlooking their own inconsistency.

There is a French term fourberies.

Fourberies are the acts which fourbes (liars and cheats) say and do.

If roughly translated fourberies means, "the liars words, or a liars tricky/sly statements."

When used in a sentence: In order to remain in office, most unscrupulous politicians knowingly stake their reputations on series of fourberies.

I suppose if you wanted to Americanize the word, you could call it forberrying.

As in, "Senator X is forberrying again."

The arrest took place because of the policy. Rationalizing the policy is tantamount to rationalizing the arrest. You're splitting a hair that isn't even there. This reminds me of the time that you claimed a post about the "Israel lobby" wasn't "about Israel."

In a way, sure, those are similar: you really have trouble, because so much of your argument is about pattern matching. You don't think or read what people say; you just google for a phrase and try to play "gotcha" because that phrase was used, regardless of what it actually meant in context. Therefore, you mistakenly thought you could claim that a post about grammar was "about Israel" merely because the word "Israel" was in the post. The issue before the court was the constitutionality of the policy. If the policy was constitutional, the arrest a fortiori was constitutional under Atwater; the court did not get to decide whether the arrest itself was reasonable, once it found the policy to be.

But that's not all. He also suggested that this goal ("ensure that parents are notified when their children break the law") could be "rationally" seen as a legitimate reason to arrest a 12-year old for eating a fry. In my opinion, this indicates a lack of common sense.

Your opinion is flat out wrong, because you don't understand the legal issue. He said that the goal was rationally seen as a legitimate reason to arrest a 12-year old for breaking the law. That was the question he was addressing. The fact that this specific instance of lawbreaking involved eating a french fry was irrelevant to the legal issue. He did not have the option to say that the policy was constitutional generally, but not when involving a french fry.

Dyer's credibility has nothing to do with Lithwick's

Unless Adler is suggesting that we should accept Dyer's claims regarding Lithwick. And that's what Adler did.

Wrong on all points. Adler is not saying that (and using the weasel word "suggested" doesn't make your claim any less false). The cool thing about the web is that one can link to original sources, so one can decide for oneself rather than "accepting" other people's claims. (I realize that this seems odd to you, because the things you link to actually never do support your claims, and you simply hope people won't go and check.) And even if Adler were "suggesting" that, it still wouldn't have anything to do with the issue. Adler is saying that here is an example of Lithwick saying something false. Whether Lithwick's statement was true or false is independent of Bill Dyer. It's not a swearing contest between Dyer and Lithwick; it's a factual issue: did Lithwick accurately report the "french fry case"? The answer to that question cannot be found in any post of Dyer's, especially ones other than the one Adler linked to.

It's a pathetic attempt at an ad hominem, but worse, it's simply a pathetic attempt at distraction. Unable to defend Lithwick on the merits, you try to change the subject to someone else.

I read well enough to be able to notice that certain things that seem "very clear" to you don't make a whole lot of sense.

...to a partisan hack when those things don't support his partisan hackery.

nieporent:

you just google for a phrase and try to play "gotcha" because that phrase was used

English translation: I actually pay attention to what people say, and show proof that they said it, and hold them accountable for doing so. As compared with, say, adopting a fantasy of what someone ostensibly meant, and then using that fantasy as a basis for making claims. I know of some people who do that.

you mistakenly thought you could claim that a post about grammar was "about Israel" merely because the word "Israel" was in the post

You mistakenly thought you could claim that a post about "the Israel lobby" was not "about Israel" merely because the word "lobby" was in the post. And speaking of surprising claims, there are a bunch of others (like these) that have never been explained.

the court did not get to decide whether the arrest itself was reasonable, once it found the policy to be.

This is getting confusing. Earlier you said this:

Roberts made very clear that he disapproved of what was done in this particular case

If "the court did not get to decide whether the arrest itself was reasonable," then what was the point of Roberts (supposedly) making it "very clear that he disapproved of what was done in this particular case?" If you are going to jump back and forth between two separate arguments, it would be better if you picked ones that are not incongruent with each other. This part of our exchange is basically summarized as follows:

niep: Roberts clearly expressed disapproval
juke: here's some proof that Roberts didn't clearly express disapproval
niep: Roberts didn't clearly express disapproval because "the court did not get to decide whether the arrest itself was reasonable"

Nice!

He did not have the option to say that the policy was constitutional generally, but not when involving a french fry.

Nice job with the straw man. I have said explicitly, twice, that I am not expecting Roberts to say that the policy was unconstitutional "when involving a french fry." However, I am expecting him to say that the policy was bad. Any policy which leads to the arrest of a 12-year old for eating a French fry is almost certainly bad. That's simply a matter of common sense. And he did indeed "have the option to say that the policy was" bad. And you claimed he said this ("Roberts made very clear that he disapproved of what was done in this particular case"). Trouble is, he didn't.

Adler is saying that here is an example of Lithwick saying something false. Whether Lithwick's statement was true or false is independent of Bill Dyer.

If Adler was simply saying "here is an example of Lithwick saying something false," then Adler could have and should have just linked to "an example of Lithwick saying something false." But that's not what Adler did. Instead, he linked to an example of Dyer alleging that Lithwick said something false. Therefore Adler's claims about Lithwick (or at least this particular claim) are not "independent of Bill Dyer." Adler is encouraging readers to accept Dyer's claim (because everyone knows that only a very small percentage of readers will do what I did, which is carefully analyze Dyer's claim, as compared with simply accepting it at face value). Trouble is, Dyer's track record shows that accepting his claims, and promoting his claims, is generally not a good idea.

It's a pathetic attempt at an ad hominem

If you can show where I made a claim about Dyer (or anyone else) that is not supported by evidence, I hope you'll do that. So far you haven't. But a good example of "a pathetic attempt at an ad hominem" is you calling me a "partisan hack." One important difference between me and you is that I refrain from calling someone a "partisan hack" until after I'm in a position to back my claim with evidence.

===================
desiderius:

consistently diversionary and defamatory tactics

I hope you'll explain what's "diversionary" about questioning the accusations against Lithwick in a thread that began with an accusation against Lithwick.

And truth is a defense against an allegation of 'defamation.' So I hope you'll show where I made an untrue claim about someone. "Defamatory tactics" is a good way of describing what both you and nieporent are doing. And like him, you also have reasons to be "diversionary."

JBG,

"Defamatory tactics" is a good way of describing what both you and nieporent are doing. And like him, you also have reasons to be "diversionary."

Good that you can properly recognize such tactics in others. You'll note how often we employ them, when you are not the topic.

Now consider your own.

Orin, I sincerely appreciate being complimented by you. And I appreciate that it's not the first time.

I should add that I think JBG's points are usually very good, and I think of him as a valuable commenter. Indeed, I'm not sure why he gets so many people upset.

He makes people upset because he is so effective at exposing hot air for what it is. He has the sharpest mind I've seen on this blog.

OK and Mattski,

"I should add that I think JBG's points are usually very good, and I think of him as a valuable commenter."

As I've made clear before, I don't disagree with this statement. Hence my past defense of his presence. His points might stand better on their own, bereft of the character attacks that oddly enough fall fall short of his usual quality.

"Indeed, I'm not sure why he gets so many people upset. But then I don't follow the comment threads as closely as you all do."

When JBG gets it in his head to impugn your character, I can assure you that its an experience like no other. Thankfully, in your case, he seems to share my estimation of your merits, so you'll likely be spared.

As for my own contributions, if in your estimation they fall short of that which you would hope for your comment sections, in one word they will stop.

Juxtapocrisy

Presumably everyone (including Roberts) agrees that it's "good" and "wise" and "appropriate" and "admirable" to "[promote] parental awareness and involvement with children who commit delinquent acts." Roberts explicitly said that "the local law and policies being challenged" are "rationally related" to that "legitimate goal." This is more than sufficient to support the view that Roberts saw something "good … in the local law and policies being challenged." If I claim that a certain policy is related to a "legitimate goal," then it's definitely fair to observe that I see something "good" in that policy.

Are you a lawyer? My guess is no, because this is tendentious nonsense that stems from a simple confusion on your part. All Roberts was saying is that the law passes rational basis review. The fact that a law passes rational basis review does not mean that a judge is endorsing it as "good" as a matter of policy.

Think about it this way: the fact that a policy is constitutional does not mean that the policy is in fact a good idea. It's like the difference between agreeing with what you say and upholding your right to say it. The latter does not entail the former. When a judge finds that a law passes rational basis review (i.e., that a law is "rationally related to a legitimate state interest"), it does not imply agreement with the law so upheld -- merely that there is some conceivable rationale (whether the judge agrees with it or not is immaterial) for the law.

That said, Roberts does in fact express disapproval of the policy in question. Citing the district court, he writes:

"The district court described the policies that led to her arrest as "foolish," and indeed the policies were changed after those responsible endured the sort of publicity reserved for adults who make young girls cry."

And again, questioning the wisdom of the policy:

"The district court had and we too may have thoughts on the wisdom of this policy choice — it is far from clear that the gains in certainty of notification are worth the youthful trauma and tears — but it is not our place to second-guess such legislative judgments."

Having implied that the law was a bad idea, he then states that it is nevertheless not within the judge's remit to decide legal questions on grounds of policy ("The question before us, however, is not whether these policies were a bad idea").

In short, claiming that a certain policy is rationally related to a "legitimate goal" is not the same as saying that there is "something good" in that policy. All it means is that the policy has a rationale which is related to a state interest that is legitimate -- not that the policy itself is "good." I think we can all imagine state interests that are legitimate (such as combating climate change) and policies related to that legitimate interest that are nonetheless bad (e.g., a complete ban on fossil fuels). A law's rationale may thus be connected to a legit state interest and yet be bad.

Public health, to take another example, is an area of legitimate state interest, and suicide has long been regarded as a public health problem (see Washington v. Glucksberg). A state ban on assisted suicide is thus "rationally related" to public health, the protection of which is a legitimate state interest. That the state may provide a rationale that is connected to a legitimate subject of state regulation does not make the ban wise or "good." A judge may find a legislative ban on assisted suicide a terrible idea as a matter of policy; even find its proferred rationale tenuous -- but he must nonetheless uphold that ban given the rationale's relation to public health. This, needless to say, does not constitute an endorsement on the policy merits.

You misstate the meaning of Roberts' opinion in an obscenely tendentious way and give it a gloss no reasonable person who has taken a 1L conlaw class would. I guess that's what happens when you mindlessly parse statements without even a rudimentary understanding of the underlying legal concepts involved.

JBG,

"It might be generally bad, on balance. But if it is truly "connected to a legit state interest," then it cannot be wholly and unequivocally bad. By definition."

So say one proposed, to further the legitimate state interest in protecting its citizens from potential terrorist attacks, to, say, torture certain detainees to obtain information to that end. Would you argue that such torture is not wholly bad? By definition? Or that it was unconnected? Perhaps the interest was illegitimate?

Valuing rationality - considering it "good" - does not therefore make the two categories identical. I think this might be an "excluded middle" problem, but my logic is shaky.

You've said that several times.

And I'll say it several more times, if necessary.

A vaguely critical statement ("no one is very happy about the events that led to this litigation") is anything but "very clear."

Wrong. In the context of a judicial opinion, that's not "vaguely critical," but extremely critical. And if someone is extremely critical, then it's very clear that he or she disapproves. You also missed the part about making little girls cry, which makes it even more clear.

Dyer wrote that Lithwick's statement ("he seemingly finds arresting them for French-fry possession to be a cornerstone in good parent-child relations") is "an outright lie." Is Dyer correct?

Yes. Unless you believe that Roberts actually believes that arresting 12-year old girls for eating french fries is a "cornerstone in good parent-child relations."

Simple question: where in Roberts' opinion did he expressly condemn the local law and policies as "foolish" or worse? Dyer didn't bother presenting an answer to this question (Dyer, like you, provided essentially no quotes from the opinion). Will you?

The first section of Roberts' opinion. You should read it. Of course, first you might need to go to law school, so you'd understand that this is not merely "vaguely" critical.

Presumably everyone (including Roberts) agrees that it's "good" and "wise" and "appropriate" and "admirable" to "[promote] parental awareness and involvement with children who commit delinquent acts." Roberts explicitly said that "the local law and policies being challenged" are "rationally related" to that "legitimate goal." This is more than sufficient to support the view that Roberts saw something "good … in the local law and policies being challenged." If I claim that a certain policy is related to a "legitimate goal," then it's definitely fair to observe that I see something "good" in that policy.

This is where you show your true hackery. You routinely attack every commenter whose political views you disagree with who don't quote exactly word-for-word the original source, who dare to draw any inferences or make any assumptions or who use quotes around a paraphrase.

And yet on your own behalf, you allow yourself to do all those things. Did Roberts say that he saw "something good" in it? No, he didn't. He said that it met the rational basis test. You decided to pretend that the two are equal -- something you refuse to let any other commenter do. And no, it is not "definitely fair" to observe that upholding a law under the rational basis test is "seeing something good in it." One can think a law is asinine and still uphold it under the rational basis test; all one has to "see" is that it isn't utterly and completely irrational.

You are implying that I introduced Dyer's dismal record as a way to avoid refuting his claim about Lithwick.

No, I am not implying that. I am asserting it directly.

Trouble is, that's not what I did. I introduced Dyer's dismal record, and also refuted his claim about Lithwick.

Trouble is: that's false. You never refuted anything, and your claims about his so-called "dismal record" were irrelevant.

What's particularly illuminating, however, is that neither of the links to Beldar commenters that you provide in this comment actually work; they're based on an outdated URL. Which means that you actually go around saving up links in an attempt to pounce on commenters years later. Which is even more pathetic than the notion that you google up these links at the time of your posts.

I visited this thread to say one thing:
reciprocricy.

But then I read that JBG believes that torture is -A- : ineffective and counterproductive. Must... respond.

In a vain effort to keep this comment remotely related to the thread topic, I'll announce that my observation has to do with people using uneven standards when evaluating statements from people with motives to be dishonest. Hypocresty? Honesticricy?

My main point is that all arguments in JBG's category -A- are actually -C- arguments (No by moral imperative), -B- aguments (Limited by moral concerns), or arguments tainted by hypocresty (or reciprocricy, perhaps, if someone is clever enough to trace it all back).

Truth is, torture falls into the neds vs morals vs rights spectrum (category -B-), much like most other legal issues. It's only the extremists and the obfuscationists (did I just make up another word?) who try to recategorize it.

To develop this thought, I must first address part of -A-. Torture is ineffective and counterproductive... wholly or mostly because it makes the world mad at the torturers.

Yet US torture is at least as popular (and thus as 'effective' or 'productive') on the world stage as say, support for Isreal. But many parties on both sides of the Isreal issue, for example, fall down on either side of the argument with the conviction more resembling JBG's reason -C-: their choice is a moral imperative. Even if the torture issue isn't governed by -C-, and even if JBG doesn't believe torture is -C-, the underlying reason for much of that 'ineffective' or unproductive' talk (if we're referring to international reaction) resides in -C- and not -A-. The US participates in very unpopular ('unproductive') foreign policy, either if the -C- reasons are right, or if the -A- benefits outwiegh the costs. So if JBG supposes that torture should be abondoned simply because the foreign reaction is so unproductive, then he has a high standard to meet. And let's not forget that a lot of these US torture detractors are actually thug-huggers, folks who don't think torture is so bad or unproductive... so long as the US doesn't do it. Whatever JBG believes about -A-, -A- cerainly isn't a limiting factor for entities who aren't the US.

Besides, there is no use using the cost/benefit notions of reason -A-, if the people you are dealing with are fueled by the moral fires of -C-. So for the sake of this -A- limited argument, we must silence the screeching of the international community.

Now, by way of the scenic route, I approach my point. -A- reasons for opposing US torture fall into two categories: weasel reasons, and reasons that can be evaluated by the 'effective' and 'productive' criteria that JBG mentions. I discard most international screeching as 'weasel reasons,' then toss most of the rest into bin -C-.

All that's really left are the talkng-points repeat-o-bots who heard some guy say that torture isn't effective, so it must be true. JBG, I hope this doens't include you, because... dang. Common sense says that torture is a very effective interrogation tool, limited only by our humanity and creativity.

"But if you hurt someone bad enough, they'll say anything you want them to." These are the same people who believe the International Red Cross Guantanimo reports that concluded torture occurred... based upon detainee testimonies. "Mister Islamist America-Hating suspect with nothing to lose: were you tortured?" "Yes." "There you have it!"

As it turns out, effective interogation is more complicated than that. People believe the IRC torture report becasue there are ways of verifying stories, or at least checking for consistency. So if you can do that with a cup of soup and a clipboard and a frowny face, then why can't you do that with a ball peen hammer?

Most people who argue -A- suffer from hypocresty. The full spectrum of evaluation and interrogation and analysis is open when they imagine their acceptible methods, yet those obvious tactics and their trust mysteriously vanish when addressing torture.

Truth is, the very reasons that torture is effective rest on the very reasons that people believe that torture occurred at Guantanimo in the first place.

It strikes me as queer, the vehemence of David M. Nieporent's style combined with his reluctance to cite specific evidence. jukeboxgrad on the other hand takes the trouble to show us the evidence for his claims and his tone, while sarcastic at times, is moderate in comparison.

When the facts don't support you, bang the table?

Anyway, jukebox, do you ever check your yahoo e-mail?

It's "critical" of whom, exactly? Let's say that I beat my wife because she does a poor job of detailing my car. After she gets home from the hospital, I say "no one is very happy about the events that led to" her hospital visit. Is that a clear way of me taking responsibility for injuring her, or is it a way for me to blame her for provoking me? It is the former only in nieporent-world.

See what I mean about how pattern-matching is not the same thing as thinking? The exact same words can have different meanings in different contexts. I did not say that if one did something wrong, saying those words would be extremely critical. I said "in the context of a judicial opinion."

Are you suggesting that Roberts claimed that any policy which has the effect of "making little girls cry" is a bad policy?

No. Once again, talking is not pattern-matching. Context always matters. I said that Roberts saying those words meant that he was saying that this was a bad policy.

Yes [Dyer is correct]. Unless you believe that Roberts actually believes that arresting 12-year old girls for eating french fries is a "cornerstone in good parent-child relations."

OK, I get it. Now you're suddenly a fan of hyperliteralism. Which means you also must think Adler is a liar. After all, he said Lithwick's columns are "filled with outrageous caricatures (along with misrepresetations, distortions, and inaccuracies)." So either you think Adler is a liar, or you think that Lithwick's columns truly contain nothing other than "outrageous caricatures (along with misrepresetations, distortions, and inaccuracies)." Which is it?

Neither. Your dichotomy is false. I am not a "fan of hyperliteralism," and so "filled with" does not mean "contains nothing other than." It's just that the attempted defense that Lithwick-didn't-really-mean-it makes no sense. Roberts was being attacked by his opponents for that decision, and Lithwick is no fan of his, and anybody who reads the Lithwick column with knowledge of the background would understand that. A supporter of Roberts might sarcastically say something like what Lithwick said in order to mock Roberts' opponents as hysterically inventing strawmen with which to attack Roberts.

But a critic of Roberts can’t say something like that sarcastically, because what message exactly would such a critic be trying to send? That Roberts doesn't really want to lock girls up for eating french fries? But how is that a criticism? Now, a critic of Roberts could use hyperbole to humorously suggest that Roberts is an extremist ("Roberts supports the death penalty for minors? He probably also supports the death penalty for kids who don't do their homework.") But that doesn't make any sense here, because the only way for that to be critical is to start with an opponent's unreasonable position and extend it even further to suggest that the original position is unreasonable. (i.e., "Yeah, he doesn't want to go that far, but look how far he does want to go.") But Lithwick isn't extending an unreasonable position further; she's suggesting that the position itself is unreasonable.

The funny thing is, you try to have your cake and eat it too. You try to argue both that Lithwick didn't mean to be taken seriously and to argue that what she said about Roberts was accurate.

And I have no problem with people "who dare to draw any inferences or make any assumptions." However, I do have a problem with people who take their inferences and assumptions and present them as if they're proven facts.

You mean kind of like how you claim that Roberts sees something good in this policy?

By the way, when in law school or anywhere else did someone teach you that it's permissible to use "quotes around a paraphrase," or to treat the words "quote" and "paraphrase" as interchangeable (something you've done)? There's a simple word for that: fraud.

Actually, no, there isn't. Fraud is a knowing misrepresentation which is intended to, and in fact does, induce reasonable reliance for the purpose of gaining property from another. Perhaps you meant something other than fraud, such as "academic fraud." The problem is that this isn't a classroom, but casual conversation, so that wouldn't apply either.

Did Roberts say that he saw "something good" in it? No, he didn't. He said that it met the rational basis test.

Roberts said that the policy provides "gains in certainty of notification." And that is indeed "something good." Are you claiming that "gains in certainty of notification" is not "something good?"

He did not say that (although he did imply it), and what I'm actually claiming is that your definition of seeing something good is ludicrous.

However, a big part of the problem is that, because you pursue every question as a semantic game, you don't understand the legal issues here. What you don't realize is that there is no "the policy," but several policies, which only when combined led to this situation. Three policies, to be specific. The first one makes it unlawful to eat on the Metro. (Nobody argues that there's anything wrong with that, and that wasn't challenged in this lawsuit.) The second created a "zero tolerance" policy, requiring police to pursue every violation of that ordinance, no matter how trivial. The third required police to arrest minors rather than give them citations whenever they broke the law. What Roberts was saying was that one might conclude that the third policy provided gains in certainty of parental notification, although even there it's questionable as to whether it's worth it. But Lithwick claimed not that Roberts thought that was good, but that Roberts thought that the application to a girl eating a french fry -- in other words, all three policies combined -- was good. Roberts never said or implied anything like that.

One can think a law is asinine and still uphold it under the rational basis test; all one has to "see" is that it isn't utterly and completely irrational.

If a law "isn't utterly and completely irrational," that means there's something good about it. By definition.

That "definition" exists only in your mind. No rational person would equate, "I think that's really really stupid, but it's not delusional" with "I see something good in what you say."

I know his permalink feature works properly in Firefox (both Windows and Mac). Likewise for IE7. I also know it doesn't work properly in Safari. So I have a feeling you're using Safari. But even in Safari you can scroll (by hand) to the proper comment. And the thread only has 15 comments, so it's not that hard to skim them and find (even by just guessing) the ones I'm attempting to link to.

I knew which ones you linked to, because I was able to repair the URLs, and I see that you're correct that in browsers other than Safari they do work directly. However, the rest of my statement stands: the URLs are outdated. You linked to "beldar.org," but his blog is now at "beldar.blogs.com." The former does redirect to the latter, so one can find the links, but if one googles for the posts in question, one gets the current URL, not the old one. Which means you didn't google for them, but actually had them saved up to try to use against him if his name ever came up. Which is really pathetic.

You also mistakenly claimed that the commenter ("James Shearer") "explained" that Dyer was wrong, but he didn't. He just speculated. I would, however, direct you to Shearer's comment: "Also I think if a statement has several possible interpretations it is uncharitable to immediately assume the worst."

And regarding torture:

One can believe (A) and still uphold it under the rational basis test because the issue is not whether you as a judge believe that torture is ineffective and counterproductive, but whether a legislator could rationally believe that it was effective.

If I believe that torture is incontrovertibly ineffective, then I cannot rationally believe that "a legislator could rationally believe that it was effective."

Your statement is both incorrect and a misrepresentation of what I said. I didn't use the word "incontrovertibly." I said that one can believe it to be ineffective, and yet also believe that someone else might find it to be effective. The fact that you don't understand this says a lot about why you throw around the word "liar" so much: you think that because you're convinced of something, nobody else could believe otherwise, and therefore they must be lying when they say so.

saying that a policy is not beyond the bounds of rationality is not finding "something good" about it.

Please explain how a policy could be within "the bounds of rationality" while also having no redeeming qualities whatsoever, i.e., nothing good about it. What would be an example of such a policy? Saying that a policy is "beyond the bounds of rationality" is indistinguishable from saying that there is nothing good about it.

Only in your mind. Everyone agrees that traffic congestion is bad. One could observe that genocide might reduce traffic. No rational person would treat that observation as a claim that "I see something good in genocide."

If I say that torture may be effective but is totally immoral, that does not in any way mean that I believe that it "is not wholly bad."

I think most people would claim that anything which can lead to a good result "is not wholly bad." It might be 99.9% bad, or even worse than that, but that's not "wholly" bad.

A utilitarian might make such a claim, perhaps, but not all people are utilitarians. Some people do not believe that something "can lead to a good result" refutes the claim that it's "wholly bad." It can be wholly bad -- 100% -- even if it "can" lead to a good result. (More importantly, of course, while a faulty-AI program might mistakenly think that distinguishing between 99.9% bad and 100% bad in saying, "I see nothing good about it" is valid, no reasonable human being would do so.)

Lithwick did not address "the policy." She addressed the application of the policy to eating french fries. She claimed that he saw good in that, and nothing in his opinion could possibly lead one to believe that.

Unless one actually reads his opinion. Roberts defended the policy.That's both false and wrong. He did not "defend" it. You've gone from (a) the ludicrous claim that saying that something is wrong but not delusional is seeing "something good" about it to (b) the obviously false conclusion that saying that something is wrong but not delusional is "defending" it.

But it's wrong even aside from that, for the reasons I explain above -- there were multiple policies that had to interact to produce this result. At most, he said that the mandatory arrest policy for minors led to that gain. He did not claim any benefit from the zero-tolerance policy, which was where the real idiocy was in this situation.

He claimed it could lead to "gains in certainty of notification." That's a benefit. And he didn't claim this benefit would evaporate in cases that involved "eating french fries." On the contrary. He made it clear that this benefit would be present even in such a case (although he admitted that the benefit might not be "worth the youthful trauma and tears"). According to Roberts, "the application of the policy to eating french fries" does indeed embody a benefit: "gains in certainty of notification."

Utterly false. He did not address the application of "the policy" to eating french fries at any point in his legal analysis, let alone claiming that the benefit was present in this case; he explained that Atwater forbid him from doing so.

Oh, and you asked for an example of you misattributing quotes in your commenting; you did so right here:

According to Roberts, "the application of the policy to eating french fries" does indeed embody a benefit: "gains in certainty of notification."

But I used the phrase "the application of the policy to eating french fries," not Roberts. Saying, "According to Roberts, 'quote'" is saying that Roberts said what's in the quotes. An honest way to write it would be to say According to Roberts, the application of the policy to eating french fries does indeed embody a benefit: "gains in certainty of notification." (Well, not honest, because it's false; Roberts never said anything in his legal analysis about the application of the policy.)

jukebox:

But Dyer didn't put the goalposts where you're putting them.

I'm not talking about Dyer, nor did I mention him. I'm talking about your claim that Roberts saw "something good" in the district's policy, when he has said otherwise -- expressly as well as implicitly.

A) Roberts generally endorsed the law as good policy, on balance.

Your straw-man argument implies that someone (like Lithwick, or me) had claimed A.

Really? So who was it who claimed that Roberts' finding that "the arrest even could be 'rationally related' to a 'legitimate goal of promoting parental awareness and involvement with children who commit delinquent acts' is definitely a 'way' of endorsing 'that view'"? Oh wait, you did.

You can't endorse that view ("the policy of arresting children rather than citing them") unless you generally agree with it, "on balance." So either you're contradicting yourself now, or you were contradicting yourself then. Either way, you're incoherent.

But no one has claimed A.

False. As I've demonstrated, you did. Lithwick "claim[s] A" too. She claimed that Roberts "seemingly finds arresting them for French-fry possession to be a cornerstone in good parent-child relations." This is false in two ways. First, Roberts never said it was "good" for "parent-child relations" -- that's you and Lithwick slipping in a value judgment Roberts never made, and falsely attributing it to him.

Second, she is indeed claiming that Roberts views the law as good policy, on balance. For the policy to be (in Roberts' view) a "cornerstone" of "good parent-child relations" entails Roberts "generally endors[ing] the law as good policy, on balance." Otherwise it wouldn't be a "cornerstone" -- a foundational basis for pursuing "good parent-child relations."

And if you want to evade that difficulty by claiming that Roberts only saw some incidental good in the policy, then you repudiate Lithwick, who claims that Roberts saw the policy as a "cornerstone" and as fundamentally indispensable -- and therefore not merely "good" in some trivial aspect, or in some non-significant way. It can't be on balance "bad" in his view and at the same time a "cornerstone" of his policy preference.

You've cornered yourself.

B) Roberts sees something good about the policy (that it can be seen as enhancing "parent-child relations"). What has been claimed is B, and B is true

Except Lithwick claims A, and B is incoherent insofar as you now claim to be claiming B. That a policy can be seen as "enhancing parent-child relations" from the district's perspective does not imply that Roberts himself sees it as such, or that he sees it as "something good." You're conflating plausibility ("can") with a value judgment ("something good").

It's plausible that the extinction of humankind will increase the earth's biodiversity. That doesn't mean that I think there's "something good" about the extinction of homo sapiens. I could have no opinion at all on the value of biodiversity, I could even think that there's nothing intrinsically valuable about it. That doesn't stop me from acknowledging that it can be seen as "something good" from the viewpoint of someone who values biodiversity. It does not imply that I see it that way as well.

There must be something good about the law if it's even possible to see it as rationally related to a legitimate state interest.

So you keep saying, but fail to prove. The mere possibility of an argument in favor of a policy rationally relates it to a state interest. But it does not follow that there is "something good" about that policy just because it so relates. Roberts could have no opinion at all on the value of the state interest in question. He could even find valueless the legislative goal of "promoting parental awareness and involvement with children who commit delinquent acts." That doesn't stop him from finding that a policy has a rational relation to an end he may find valueless (but which the state may find worthwhile). It is thus entirely possible that he finds "nothing good" in the law, because he doesn't find the legitimate state interest of value to begin with.

Let's say I was an apologist for 9/11. Let's say I told you that "no one is very happy about the events" of 9/11 (borrowing some of Roberts' words), but that I nevertheless could see, hypothetically, that knocking down buildings could be "rationally related" to AQ's "legitimate" interest in opposing US policies.

There's a crucial difference. You are making a value judgment that al Qaeda has a "legitimate" interest in violently opposing U.S. policies. There's no legal principle nor authority for that proposition, so you substitute your own. But that means that you can be fairly mocked for your political views. By contrast, Roberts does not make such a judgment. He cites the undisputed consensus that the "goal of promoting parental awareness and involvement with children who commit delinquent acts" is a legitimate state interest -- legitimate not because it's "good," but because it falls within the scope of the states' police powers ("The correction of straying youth is an undisputed state interest").

This is an undisputed general proposition of law. See Maryland v. Craig ("the State [has a] traditional and transcendent interest in protecting the welfare of children"); Prince v. Massachusetts ("Acting to guard the general interest in youth's wellbeing, the state, as parens patriae, may restrict the parent's control by requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child's labor, and in many other ways."); Ginsberg v. New York ("the State has an interest 'to protect the welfare of children'"); Dallas v. Stanglin (a state's municipal authorities have an "interest in ensuring the safety and welfare of children.").

That a state interest is legitimate because it properly falls within a state's legislative authority does not mean that it is "good." Nor does Roberts make the claim that a state interest that is legitimate is "good." That's something that exists only in your imagination.

Your hypothetical also fails for at least two additional reasons. First, you conflate the legal meaning of "legitimate" (i.e., falling within the scope of a state's police powers) with "legitimate" in an extralegal sense. What does "legitimate" even mean in the context of al Qaeda? Certainly not what it means in the context of U.S. municipal law. So you're confusing two distinct notions besides confusing yourself.

Second, 9/11 (if one were to treat al Qaeda as a "state" and the attacks as state legislation) overwhelmingly targeted a suspect class -- Americans, by virtue of nationality. That triggers strict scrutiny rather than rational basis review, and your analogy collapses for want of relevance.

And if the policy is wholly bad (i.e., I can't think of anything good to say about it), then it will not pass rational basis review. Because if a policy can be rationally related to a legitimate state interest, then it is not wholly bad. By definition.

Says who? And according to whose definition? You're begging the question. You'll have to do better than conveniently assuming what is to be proved. "Rationally related" is not a synonym for "good." "Legitimate" in the context of "state interest" isn't a synonym for "good" either.

When you uphold my right to speak, you can do so while simultaneously claiming that my speech is wholly bad, with no redeeming qualities whatsoever, and with only abhorrent qualities.

But according to your own prior reasoning, you may not. The fact that your speech is upheld means that the judge sees something good about your speech. If it were really true that the judge saw nothing good about your speech, then your right to speak would not have been upheld. Because to uphold that right, your speech must have the quality of conforming to time, place, and manner restrictions; must not be so provocative as to induce imminent lawless action; must not be commercial speech that is deceptive, fraudulent, or misleading; must not be libelous or defamatory; must remain within the metes, bounds and intended purposes of a limited public forum; must not constitute fighting words; and must not be child pornography, inter alia.

Thus all upheld speech must have some "redeeming qualities." But this you deny, because you're incoherent and inconsistent: the reasoning you find unpalatable here is unselfconsciously applied with great vigor elsewhere, on targets you happen to find disagreeable.

Roberts is simply mentioning that another court thought the policy was "foolish."

He was citing it with approval. A cite, without more, is an affirmation of the proposition contained therein. You are bending over backwards in an extremely tendentious manner to avoid reading him reasonably, let alone charitably. Roberts also aligns himself with the district court when he says that "[t]he district court had and we too may have thoughts on the wisdom of this policy choice." And what were the thoughts of the district court in questioning the wisdom of the policy choice? That it was "foolish."

A charitable and reasonable reading of the opinion yields the conclusion that Roberts disapproves of the district's policy (or aggregate policies). This is so, in light of his remarks that "it is far from clear that the gains in certainty of notification are worth the youthful trauma and tears." His statements on the wisdom of the policy, both implicitly and expressly, have been negative. Only a tendentious reader can construe his rhetorical restraint as implying the opposite.

If he has "thoughts on the wisdom of this policy choice," why doesn't he just tell us what they are?

He did. He cited the district court for the proposition that the policy was "foolish," snd followed that with an affirmative "indeed," noting that the policies were "indeed" changed as a consequence of being "foolish":

"The district court described the policies that led to her arrest as 'foolish,' and indeed the policies were changed after those responsible endured the sort of publicity reserved for adults who make young girls cry."

He then aligned his thoughts with that of the lower court's: "The district court had and we too may have thoughts on the wisdom of this policy choice — it is far from clear that the gains in certainty of notification are worth the youthful trauma and tears." And yet you strain to construe otherwise. Why truncate the quote, leaving out the first part that mentions "[t]he district court"?

And this statement itself (that the policy provides "gains in certainty of notification") is proof that Roberts saw some good in the policy.

Except it isn't. The "gains in certainty of notification" is with respect to the district's goal of "promoting parental awareness," and are therefore "gains" only from their perspective, not Roberts'. Roberts himself did not express agreement with the state interest at issue, nor did he say that it was "good."

You are conceding that Roberts' condemnation of the law was, at best, only "implied." Trouble is, that's not what Dyer claimed. The words "implied" and "expressly" are mutually exclusive.

Except Roberts expressed disapproval twice: the first in express terms, the second in implicit terms. The words would be "mutually exclusive" if applied to one statement. But I quoted two. Enlighten yourself.

Sorry, but I'm not smart enough to grasp that.

I agree.

And if someone truly believed there was nothing good about such a ban, that probably means they think there is no legitimate state interest in combating climate change. Or they believe that "a complete ban on fossil fuels" will simply do nothing to combat climate change.

This is gibberish. Why would thinking that there is nothing good about a complete ban on fossil fuels mean that combating climate change is not a legitimate state interest? The fact that a judge thinks that there is nothing good about such a ban has no bearing on whether combating climate change is a subject of legit state interest. The scope of the police power is extremely broad, and can encompass legislation in the realm of public health, morals, or the general welfare -- a realm of socially-determined mores that the judge may not even share. A judge fundamentally opposed to the prevailing morality or social mores of the day -- including what constitutes the general "welfare" -- must nevertheless view morals or welfare legislation as within the scope of state power. These are areas of "legitimate state interest," whether or not he agrees that they are "good."

So your analogy about climate change doesn't help you. And the same exact analysis applies to your analogy regarding assisted suicide.

Nor does your incoherent response. It doesn't even begin to "appl[y]" to my example of assisted suicide.

By the way, one can completely agree with every aspect of Roberts' analysis, while also seeing that Lithwick's comment was sarcasm, and not "an outright lie."

Certainly that's possible. But Lithwick's comment was neither heedful of the law nor an accurate description of Roberts' views. Which makes her either sloppy, or less than candid. Take your pick.

nieporent:

See what I mean about how pattern-matching is not the same thing as thinking?

No. What you call "pattern-matching" I call 'reading.' Which means paying attention to what people have actually said.

The exact same words can have different meanings in different contexts. I did not say that if one did something wrong, saying those words would be extremely critical. I said "in the context of a judicial opinion."

Roberts' vague statement ("no one is very happy about the events that led to this litigation") does not magically become something other than a vague statement simply because we have found it "in the context of a judicial opinion." And here's what his statement is not: a condemnation of the no-citation policy. And here's what it's definitely not: a "very clear" condemnation of the no-citation policy. Trouble is, you claimed that Roberts made his disapproval "very clear." And you still haven't shown us where he did that. But I know where he did that: in your imagination.

Roberts saying those words ["the policies were changed after those responsible endured the sort of publicity reserved for adults who make young girls cry"] meant that he was saying that this was a bad policy.

We realize you're making this claim. You just haven't bothered to explain how the words he actually said get translated into what you claim he "meant." Because what you claim he meant is not what he actually said. And you said he made his disapproval "very clear." But it's only "very clear" to someone like you, who has a vivid imagination.

"filled with" does not mean "contains nothing other than."

Really? Filled means "to put into (a container, for example) as much as can be held." And Adler said Lithwick's columns are "filled with outrageous caricatures (along with misrepresetations, distortions, and inaccuracies)." And you used a very similar formulation ("full of"). If I put into a column as much of those things (caricatures etc) as "can be held" by the column, then how can there be possibly any room left for anything else?

Welcome to nieporent-world, where you get to decide what words mean, despite what's in the dictionary, and where hyperbole is innocent only when it's used by Republicans.

a critic of Roberts can’t say something like that sarcastically, because what message exactly would such a critic be trying to send?

The purpose of Lithwick's sarcastic remark was to call attention to the fact that Roberts found something good to say (that it provides "gains in certainty of [parental] notification") about a policy that led to the arrest of a 12 year-old for eating a French fry.

This "message" that Lithwick was "trying to send" happens to be both simple and true. And I don't understand why you don't understand why "a critic of Roberts" would be interested in sending this message.

But Lithwick isn't extending an unreasonable position further; she's suggesting that the position itself is unreasonable

She is doing both. For example, her use of the word "cornerstone" is obvious hyperbole. Her use of that word is indeed "extending an unreasonable position further."

The funny thing is, you try to have your cake and eat it too. You try to argue both that Lithwick didn't mean to be taken seriously and to argue that what she said about Roberts was accurate.

It's not that she didn't expect to be taken "seriously." I haven't said it that way (although I cited Shearer, who did). A better way to say it is that she didn't expect to be taken literally. Her literal meaning (such as her use of the word "cornerstone") is obviously not "accurate." But her underlying meaning (that Roberts found something good to say about the policy) is indeed "accurate."

And I have no problem with people "who dare to draw any inferences or make any assumptions." However, I do have a problem with people who take their inferences and assumptions and present them as if they're proven facts.

You mean kind of like how you claim that Roberts sees something good in this policy?

No. That's not just a "claim." It's a fact that I've proven, with evidence. Roberts said the policy provides "gains in certainty of [parental] notification." That's "something good."

Fraud is a knowing misrepresentation which is intended to, and in fact does, induce reasonable reliance for the purpose of gaining property from another.

There you go again, inventing your own definitions. Fraud does not have to involve "gaining property from another." It can simply mean "a deception deliberately practiced in order to secure unfair or unlawful gain." That 'unfair gain' could be winning an argument. It doesn't need to involve property.

Roberts said that the policy provides "gains in certainty of notification." And that is indeed "something good." Are you claiming that "gains in certainty of notification" is not "something good?"

He did not say that (although he did imply it), and what I'm actually claiming is that your definition of seeing something good is ludicrous.

What is it that you are claiming he "did not say?" Because he did indeed say this:

we too may have thoughts on the wisdom of this policy choice — it is far from clear that the gains in certainty of notification are worth the youthful trauma and tears

In those words, he is saying (among other things) that "this policy choice [provides] gains in certainty of [parental] notification."

Are you claiming that there's some other way to interpret his very simple words? Or are you claiming that "gains in certainty of [parental] notification" are not "something good?" Which would be odd, since we would then have to consult the special nieporent-dictionary to come up with a new definition for the word "gains."

And Roberts also said this:

We conclude that the no-citation policy for minors is rationally related to the legitimate goal of promoting parental awareness and involvement with children who commit delinquent acts.

Which is another way that we know that he saw something good about the no-citation policy.

The third [policy] required police to arrest minors rather than give them citations whenever they broke the law.

That's what is referred to as the 'no-citation' policy. And when we say 'the policy,' I think it's already very clear that this is what we're talking about.

What Roberts was saying was that one might conclude that the third policy provided gains in certainty of parental notification, although even there it's questionable as to whether it's worth it.

True.

But Lithwick claimed not that Roberts thought that was good, but that Roberts thought that the application to a girl eating a french fry -- in other words, all three policies combined -- was good. Roberts never said or implied anything like that.

We've already been down this road. Roberts said the third policy provided "gains," and he said that in the context of a case about "a girl eating a french fry," and he certainly said nothing to suggest that those "gains" did not apply in a situation of "a girl eating a french fry." On the contrary. That's what the case was about.

You're suggesting that Roberts was talking about "gains" that might take place in some other situation, but not in the situation at the heart of the case. Even though he said nothing whatsoever to indicate this. Yet another instance of you pulling meaning directly from your imagination.

And let's note again what Dyer said:

[Lithwick should] substantiate [her] statement with even a single paragraph from the opinion itself which even "seemingly" supports the view that Judge Roberts saw anything "good" (or wise or appropriate or admirable) in the local law and policies being challenged

Dyer's challenge is with regard to "the local law and policies." This obviously includes the no-citation policy (what you called the "third" policy). And you have now conceded that according to Roberts, that policy "provided gains."

All you have to do now is show that "gains" are not "good." Get out that magic dictionary! Because if you don't, you have admitted that Dyer's challenge is bogus.

One can think a law is asinine and still uphold it under the rational basis test; all one has to "see" is that it isn't utterly and completely irrational.

If a law "isn't utterly and completely irrational," that means there's something good about it. By definition.

That "definition" exists only in your mind. No rational person would equate, "I think that's really really stupid, but it's not delusional" with "I see something good in what you say."

You're trying to muddy the waters by gratuitously introducing new words like "stupid" and "delusional." Trouble is, you're making it too obvious that you're simply dodging the question. Which is this: what's the difference between saying that something is at least slightly rational (i.e., "isn't utterly and completely irrational") and that there's at least something good about it?

if one googles for the posts in question, one gets the current URL, not the old one. Which means you didn't google for them, but actually had them saved up to try to use against him if his name ever came up.

You go through the same routine over and over again. And it's not just that you make unwarranted assumptions, which lead you to false conclusions. It's that you then announce your conclusions with great confidence, as if they are proven facts, even though they're not.

This is exactly what you did regarding Obama's case note. And, oddly enough, Dyer did the same thing. That story is documented here. And you're doing it again now, over and over again. In your zeal to make a false accusation, you're stumbling from one technical blunder to another.

A key part of your problem is that you seemingly don't understand the difference between an ordinary URL and a URL that contains a number sign. The former opens a page. The latter opens a page and scrolls to a designated location on the page, what's called a 'named element.' (This latter kind of URL is technically known as a bookmark. But that term is confusing, since many people use that term to describe an ordinary URL.)

Now let's go back to the beginning. You had a problem with two URLs I included here (in the passage "as one of his commenters did a nice job of explaining here and here"). The problem is that the URLs were intended to scroll to a specific comment, and they didn't (on your machine). In other words, they behaved like ordinary URLs, even though they contained number signs.

I think most people would have posted a polite question, reporting the problem. But you didn't do that. Instead, you assumed that your problem was caused by "an outdated URL." And you leaped to the conclusion that this means that I "actually go around saving up links in an attempt to pounce on commenters years later." Which is completely absurd. First of all, how would I know that a comment posted on Dyer's blog in 2005 would be useful to me in 2009? And more importantly, what would be the point of "saving up links" on my own computer? I already have available to me a method of "saving up links." It's called 'the internet.' I also have available a method of finding those links. It's called "google." In other words, there would no point in saving links on my own machine. Even if I thought, in 2005, that a certain item would be useful to me later, I would simply expect to find it later via google. And if I couldn't find it later via google, that would probably mean it no longer exists. And if it no longer exists, any link I saved privately would have no usefulness.

Nevertheless, you still made this absurd accusation, based on essentially no proof. Then I pointed out to you that your theory about the problem was completely wrong. The incorrect behavior on your machine was not caused by "an outdated URL." And it had nothing to do with me "saving up links." You had a problem simply because you're using Safari, which has a minor incompatibility with the software on Dyer's blog. And the minor incompatibility is that URLs containing a number sign behave like ordinary URLs. And you admitted I was correct ("I see that you're correct that in browsers other than Safari they do work directly").

But did you then apologize for making a false accusation, based on your technical blunder (i.e., your failure to correctly understand the nature of the problem)? Nope. Instead, you decided to repeat the false accusation, but this time based on a different technical blunder. What fun!

In your second technical blunder, you started by correctly observing that the URLs I provided point to the domain "beldar.org." You also correctly observed that Dyer's current domain name is different: it's "beldar.blogs.com." And then you leaped, again, to the conclusion that I "actually had them saved up to try to use against him if his name ever came up. Which is really pathetic. "

You are assuming, incorrectly, that since I am using URLs that contain Dyer's old domain, that this proves that I harvested those URLs a long time ago. Trouble is, you are, as usual, wrong. Please perform the following exercise. Open Dyer's post. Scroll to any comment. In the header of the comment, look for the word "Permalink." Now make sure your browser's status bar is visible, and point to the word "Permalink." In your browser's status bar, you will see the URL associated with the work "Permalink." That URL is a link to this particular comment. It contains a number sign, which means that it not only opens this page, but scrolls to the correct comment on this page.

Do you notice the domain in that URL? It is not Dyer's current domain ("beldar.blogs.com"). It is Dyer's old domain ("beldar.org"). Hopefully by now you realize that I provided URLs containing Dyer's old domain not because I "actually had them saved up." Rather, I provided URLs containing Dyer's old domain because those URLs are currently part of Dyer's site. And they work perfectly (if you're not using Safari).

You linked to "beldar.org," but his blog is now at "beldar.blogs.com." The former does redirect to the latter, so one can find the links, but if one googles for the posts in question, one gets the current URL, not the old one. Which means you didn't google for them, but actually had them saved up to try to use against him if his name ever came up. Which is really pathetic.

This is where you reveal that you don't understand the difference between an ordinary URL, and a URL that contains a number sign. That is, you don't understand the difference between a URL to Dyer's post, as compared with a URL to a specific comment that is attached to Dyer's post. It's true that "if one googles for the posts in question, one gets the current URL, not the old one." That's because that URL is identifying Dyer's post. But one does not get the URL for a specific comment by googling for it. One gets the URL for a specific comment by scrolling to that comment, and then grabbing the URL from the "Permalink." So you are correct that I "didn't google for them," but you are too ignorant to understand the method I actually did use to get them. So instead you leaped to the same conclusion. Again. And made the same false accusation. Again. "Which is really pathetic." And you should apologize.

you asked for an example of you misattributing quotes in your commenting; you did so right here

Wrong. I asked for an example of where I put "quotes around a paraphrase." You made that accusation here. And here I challenged you to substantiate that accusation. Why haven't you? And you still need to do so.

So your first bit of trickery is to pretend that I asked a question other than the one I actually asked. And your second bit of trickery is to pretend that you can predict the future. Because the example you are citing here was taken from my post here. And I posted that comment after you made your accusation.

Finally, your claim that I am guilty of "misattributing quotes" is nonsense. As you noted, the words I put in quote marks ("the application of the policy to eating french fries") are yours. And not just that: that is obvious to any reader, because I also put these words of yours in a blockquote about ten lines above the point where I put quote marks around them. In other words, I made it obvious where the words came from. And any reader who has such a short attention span (that they can't recall what was said ten lines ago) should not be reading VC threads. They should be reading The Pet Goat.

advisory:

definitely a 'way' of endorsing 'that view'

Consider these two statements:

A) I endorse the policy generally, on balance
B) I endorse the policy in some limited way, which means I see something good in it, even though the good is possibly or probably outweighed by the bad.

I did not claim that Roberts said A. I claimed that he said B.

You can't endorse that view ("the policy of arresting children rather than citing them") unless you generally agree with it, "on balance." So either you're contradicting yourself now, or you were contradicting yourself then. Either way, you're incoherent.

No, it's not that I'm being incoherent. It's that you're being obtuse. A and B are not the same.

Roberts never said it was "good" for "parent-child relations"

Roberts said the no-citation policy provided "gains in certainty of [parental] notification." Now all you need to do is get together with nieporent and use the magic dictionary to show that "gains" are not "good." And that parental notification has nothing to do with "parent-child relations."

For the policy to be (in Roberts' view) a "cornerstone" of "good parent-child relations" entails Roberts "generally endors[ing] the law as good policy, on balance." Otherwise it wouldn't be a "cornerstone" -- a foundational basis for pursuing "good parent-child relations."

As I pointed out to nieporent, the word "cornerstone" is obvious hyperbole. Are you really claiming that hyperbole is now forbidden? I've already explained why you're going to have to discuss that with people like Adler.

That doesn't stop me from acknowledging that it can be seen as "something good" from the viewpoint of someone who values biodiversity. It does not imply that I see it that way as well.

Pay attention to what Roberts actually said:

The district court had and we too may have thoughts on the wisdom of this policy choice — it is far from clear that the gains in certainty of notification are worth the youthful trauma and tears — but it is not our place to second-guess such legislative judgments.

He is not saying 'I don't think there are gains, but I could imagine that someone else might.' The way he wrote it seems to indicate that no one (including himself) could doubt that there are gains. There seems to be no question regarding the existence of gains. It's simply a question of whether the gains are worth the cost.

The fact that your speech is upheld means that the judge sees something good about your speech. If it were really true that the judge saw nothing good about your speech, then your right to speak would not have been upheld.

Wrong. You have pointed out correctly that certain kinds of speech are so abhorrent that they are forbidden. But this does not mean that all permitted speech contains something "good." It simply means that all permitted speech omits the most extremely abhorrent elements. But an item of permitted speech can still consist of nothing but abhorrent elements, as long as these abhorrent elements are not from the most extreme category. Just because an item embodies an absence of the most extreme negative elements, that does not mean that the item embodies any positive elements whatsover.

This is fundamentally different from rational basis review. Rational basis review does not depend on the absence of negative elements. It depends on the presence of something at least slightly positive. If there is no presence of something positive, then there is no basis for claiming a rational connection to a legitimate state interest.

Roberts also aligns himself with the district court when he says that "[t]he district court had and we too may have thoughts on the wisdom of this policy choice." And what were the thoughts of the district court in questioning the wisdom of the policy choice? That it was "foolish."

It would have been simple enough for him to say something like this: 'this court also considers the policy foolish.' But he didn't. You call this "his rhetorical restraint." I call this him hedging his bets.

He cited the district court for the proposition that the policy was "foolish," snd followed that with an affirmative "indeed," noting that the policies were "indeed" changed as a consequence of being "foolish"

It's not clear that he thinks the policies were changed because they were foolish (although I agree that his "indeed" seems to draw some kind of a connection). A plainer reading is that he's observing that the policies were changed because they generated negative publicity. And that's not the same thing. I think that Roberts and lots of other people would agree that certain perfectly good policies generate negative publicity.

Why truncate the quote, leaving out the first part that mentions "[t]he district court"?

Because it doesn't matter. Saying that both he and the other court "may have thoughts" is not the same thing as saying those thoughts are the same. The idea that "he then aligned his thoughts with that of the lower court" is in your imagination, and not in the words he wrote.

Roberts himself did not express agreement with the state interest at issue

Of course he did. He said that "promoting parental awareness and involvement with children who commit delinquent acts" was a "legitimate goal." If he doesn't agree with the goal, or if he disapproves of the goal, or if he sees no good in the goal, it makes no sense for him to characterize it as "legitimate."

Except Roberts expressed disapproval twice: the first in express terms

I see where you claim that Roberts "expressed disapproval" in "express terms," but I don't see where you show proof to support that claim. I see you admitting that he used "rhetorical restraint," which generally means he was avoiding "express terms."

Why would thinking that there is nothing good about a complete ban on fossil fuels mean that combating climate change is not a legitimate state interest?

I didn't say that. You've got it backwards. I said that a belief that "combating climate change is not a legitimate state interest" could be a reason for someone to believe that "there is nothing good about a complete ban on fossil fuels."

And the statement you made which are you still neglecting to explain is this:

claiming that a certain policy is rationally related to a "legitimate goal" is not the same as saying that there is "something good" in that policy.

Pursuing legitimate goals is "good." If a policy is rationally related to a legitimate goal, that means the policy can be seen as helping us achieve that goal. Something that helps us achieve our goals can't be all bad. In other words, your statement makes no sense.

Lithwick's comment was neither heedful of the law nor an accurate description of Roberts' views.

Lithwick's comment did indeed accurately portray one key aspect of Robert's views: that he believed that the same policy which led to the arrest of a 12 year-old for eating a French fry "is rationally related to the legitimate goal of promoting parental awareness and involvement with children who commit delinquent acts." And that it had the potential to provide "gains in certainty of [parental] notification."

Her short comment did not purport to convey every nuance expressed in his opinion, but it used sarcasm and hyperbole to call attention to that one key aspect.

In which I was quoting you

Let's review. You said this:

claiming that a certain policy is rationally related to a "legitimate goal" is not the same as saying that there is "something good" in that policy.

I then raised the following question: who were you quoting when you put those words ("something good") in quotes? Now you are claiming that you were quoting me, and you are pointing to a passage where I said this:

This is more than sufficient to support the view that Roberts saw something "good … in the local law and policies being challenged." If I claim that a certain policy is related to a "legitimate goal," then it's definitely fair to observe that I see something "good" in that policy.

Is your problem that you don't notice the punctuation, or are you claiming that the punctuation has no meaning? Because I can't think of any other possibilities. Consider these two formulations:

A) something "good"
B) "something good"

Do you detect a slight difference?

Why is this significant? Because nieporent said this:

Did Roberts say that he saw "something good" in it? No, he didn't.

nieporent was being characteristically vague, but he seemed to be accusing me of falsely attributing that exact phrase to Roberts. Trouble is, I never did so. In fact, I never attributed that exact phrase to anyone. It was your idea to put that phrase in quotes. And you think you were quoting me, but you were not doing so accurately. Unless you think there's no difference between A and B.

And I think your sloppy quoting led to nieporent becoming confused, which led to him falsely accusing me of "[using] quotes around a paraphrase." And I am waiting for him to apologize for that false accusation. But maybe he deserves an apology from you, because of what you did to confuse him.

If you have to lie about something that you did say, you've pretty much lost the argument

If you can't tell the difference between me telling a lie and you making a sloppy mistake, then I think you and nieporent will get along fine.

===============
desid:

do you contend that what Roberts is unhappy about is the girl being so bold as to violate this unimpeachable law?

Do you contend that Roberts couldn't possibly see the girl's behavior as a contributing factor? Did Roberts say something to support your implied contention that he did not see the girl's behavior as a contributing factor?

Roberts admirable penchant for understatement

One man's "admirable penchant for understatement" is another man's unimpressive penchant for self-serving ambiguity.

a rational connection does not imply "good."

You're leaving out some important words (which you also leave out when you say "rational does not equal good"). It's not a matter of a "rational connection" (whatever that means). It's a matter of a rational connection to a legitimate goal. And I'm still waiting for someone to explain how claiming that something has a rational connection to a legitimate goal is not essentially the same thing as claiming that there is something good about that something. Because on most of the normal planets I know about, things that help us reach our goals are good.

the extent to which one could imagine another mind, of, say, a legislator, reasoning from the agreed good, the legitimate goal, to the measure in question, even if one's own reasoning would conclude that the measure is without merit, due to the difference in value assumptions between one's own mind and that of the other

This argument has been raised, and I think I've addressed it. You're essentially putting the following words in Roberts' mouth: 'I don't think it's good, but I could imagine how a lawmaker might think it's good.'

The first problem is that Roberts didn't say 'I don't think it's good.' At least not very emphatically, or clearly. I see where he inserted some purported criticism, but it's muted and ambiguous.

The second problem is that if I am firm and emphatic in my belief that there is no good whatsoever in something, then I cannot rationally claim that a lawmaker can see good in that thing. Since I know the Earth is round, I cannot rationally believe that a rational lawmaker can see the Earth as flat. So as soon as I take the position that a rational lawmaker can see good in the thing, I am admitting that I see some good myself. Even if perhaps I see a smaller good, I am admitting that I see at least some good. I am inevitably providing at least some support for the lawmaker who sees good in the thing.

he doesn't perceive his role to be dictating the purported good (or bad) of a policy

This is something else that has already been addressed. The statement you are making is too broad. It's true that his role is not to determine if the policy is generally good, on balance. But it is indeed his role to determine if the policy embodies any good whatsoever. Because if the policy embodies no good whatsoever, then it cannot be rationally related to a legitimate state interest.

Hence we're left to read the tea leaves to discern what he really thinks vis a vis the "goodness" of the policy

Really? I think you need to work that out with Dyer. Because he claimed that Roberts "expressly condemned the local law and policies."

But maybe you simply agree with me when I point out that Dyer can't be trusted. Which is essentially the point I started with.

The fascinating thing is that if I accept your argument that to see a policy as rationally related to a state interest is to see some good in it, for example I may see some good in the bombing of Hiroshima, in that it led to the end of the war, even if on the whole I would be against dropping the bomb and therefore contest a claim that the policy itself was good, then it would follow that I would still be open game for critics to claim that I saw bombing cities full of innocent civilians as a cornerstone of sound policy, would I not?

So you've conveniently constructed an argument that would damn Roberts if he did, or damn him if he didn't. All he could legitimately do is the bidding of Lithwick and JBG. Have you ever considered the possibility that a chief justice overly deferential to the legislative branch might be just the thing with a progressive Congress longing to pass a New New Deal?

JBG,

"You're repeating an error I've already pointed out. You're leaving out an important word: legitimate. One of the many questions that certain people are failing to answer is how I can call something a legitimate state interest without simultaneously admitting that there's something good about it."

This is the point where you start to fail the Turing Test.

(a) it has not been established that this as an error on my part as opposed to a philosophical difference, an error on yours, or perhaps willful oblviousness to a crucial chink in the armor of your argument that you hope to avoid merely by pretending it away.

(b)I didn't leave out legitimate - I made sure to point out up thread that we agreed that the legitimate goal was where the agreed good inhered. The question is whether the rational connection itself is inherently good (being rational - no one is contesting that it is rational) or I suppose whether some goodness inevitably leaks from a legitimate (and thus agreed to be good) goal along any rational connection to whatever policy is thus connected.

Roberts' (and Berlin's, and my) philosophy claims that the rational is not inherently good, and thus it is possible to defer to the legislature on the question of a policy's goodness, while at the same time carrying out the proper judicial role of analyzing the existence of any rational connection. It is your burden to show why this philosophy is mistaken, that the rational is inherently in some sense good, in order to get to where you wish to go - i.e. to back up Lithwick, and even then only so far as to show that she had some grounds for what seems to me ill-judged hyperbole.

Roberts was understated because he believes it is not the place of the judge to say more. What evidence have you that this stance serves himself rather than his country?

JBG,

"What I meant is that you were making an error in restating or understanding my argument. And it's better to not even call that an error, but rather to just say that I think you don't understand my argument.

I also now notice some places where I could have been clearer in expressing my argument, so if you didn't understand something I said, it's probably my fault."

Much obliged. I fear for what the Volokh archives contain that would chronicle my own record of misunderstandings, which may explain some of my at times intemperate treatment of those inclined to plumb them.

"Which means that Roberts ends up getting credit for taking a certain position even though he didn't really stick his neck out very far, one way or the other."

I suspect that Roberts would rather do without such credit, given his philosophy, but as a fellow midwestern white boy, I'll admit my bias there. This strikes me as well as another misapplication of two-valued logic - he didn't expressly condemn the policy, therefore he supports it, and all its ramifications - instead of considering the possibility that he intentionally sidestepped the question altogether, as his judicial philosophy would dictate.

As far as Dyer goes, I have no reason to mistrust him, never having heard of him until this thread. I hope you'll excuse my reluctance to grant much credit to your appeals against his character. You're lousy at character attacks. I consider that a compliment.

On the other hand, from what I have seen of Dyer's argument here, I'd be satisfied if a deserted island could be found on which he and Lithwick and their like could re-enact the Taming of the Shrew until the end of their days, leaving the floor open to men such as Obama and our hosts here to advance a more affirmative vision.

Finally, as Obama noted during the campaign, a less active and more deferential judiciary might be just the thing for a progressive renaissance. Already the success of the netroots, as chronicled by your statistics regarding the ideological affiliation of the rising generation, shows that many of the leading progressive lights have recognized the importance of rolling up their sleeves and doing the hard work of changing the hearts and minds of the people, rather than merely their platonic guardians on the bench. Indeed, even your presence here bears witness to the importance that you evidently place on this strategy, which seems by all lights to be now bearing fruit.

As we're off the front page, perhaps this would be a good place to stop. I do hope you will investigate the Berlin, if you can stomach the long sentences.

jukebox:

I then raised the following question: who were you quoting when you put those words ("something good") in quotes?

Where? Weren't you addressing that question to Nieporent, not me?

Do you detect a slight difference?

Yes. Very slight. So slight as to be de mininis. Which is why it was immaterial to the question of "[t]he first time that phrase appeared in this thread." A phrase is "a sequence of words intended to have meaning." And punctuation marks are not "words." Ergo, the first time that sequence of words appeared in this thread was in a post by you. You falsely claimed otherwise.

I repeat: If you have to lie about something that you did say, you've pretty much lost the argument.

nieporent, you made a number of unsubstantiated accusations in this thread, and you should either prove them or withdraw them.

For example, here you accused me of using "quotes around a paraphrase." That accusation is false. Why did you make it? My hunch is that you became confused as a result of 'advisory opinion' misquoting me in a sloppy manner (as I explained here). But obviously that's no excuse.

Also, here you accused me of "saving up links in an attempt to pounce on commenters years later." And you repeated that accusation here ("[you] actually had them saved up"). As I explained here, your accusation reveals at least two separate technical misunderstandings on your part. So that's another accusation you should withdraw.

When you make accusations which you refuse to either substantiate or withdraw, even after you have been challenged to do so, and even after it has been shown that your accusations are based on faulty assumptions, this tends to create the impression of a lack of good faith on your part.

It's been more than three days since you stopped posting in this thread. In that time, you've been posting comments elsewhere at VC (example, example, example, example, example, example, example, example, example, example, example, example, example, example, example). Which means you haven't been too busy to take responsibility for the false accusations you made in this thread.