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Criminal Liability and Civil Liability:

A first-year law student asked me about the relationship of criminal liability and civil liability, and I thought it might be worth discussing more broadly. Let me begin with one part of the relationship: When an act can lead both to criminal and civil liability, how does a judgment in one system affect the possibility of a judgment in another?

1. It's certainly possible to be held liable both criminally and civilly, if your conduct is both a crime and a tort (or otherwise civilly actionable). The Double Jeopardy Clause provides that "nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb," but that refers only to criminal jeopardy, not civil jeopardy. (There is something of an academic debate about whether the Clause was originally understood as covering crimes generally, as the Court has held, or only very serious ones, but I don't know of any indication that the Clause has ever been understood as applying beyond crimes. Note also that the Double Jeopardy Clause doesn't bar prosecutions by multiple sovereigns, such as the state government and the federal government, but that's a separate matter.)

Thus, a rapist could be prosecuted for rape and sued civilly (likely under the tort of battery). In practice, this doesn't often happen, since most criminal defendants have little money, especially after they're done with the criminal litigation; but it certainly happens sometimes.

2. If you get criminally convicted, then this conviction will usually make a civil plaintiff's case against you much easier. Under the doctrine of "collateral estoppel" (sometimes called "issue preclusion"), if a fact has been decided against a party in one judicial proceeding, then that fact is generally binding against the same party in future proceedings (with an important limitation that I'll mention below) even in other jurisdictions and other court systems.

So if a jury -- or, in a bench trial, a judge -- has found beyond a reasonable doubt that you're guilty of committing certain acts, then that's binding against you in a future civil case based on the same acts. The plaintiff might still have to prove other elements required by the tort (e.g., the amount of damages), but whatever facts were necessarily found in the earlier criminal trial don't have to be proven again in the civil trial. If O.J. Simpson had been convicted of intentionally killing Ron Goldman, Fred Goldman wouldn't have had to prove in a civil case that Simpson indeed intentionally killed Ron Goldman; he could just take advantage of the earlier criminal verdict against Simpson.

3. What if you get acquitted, and still get sued (which is what happened with O.J. Simpson)? You can't take advantage of the criminal verdict in the civil case, for two reasons. First, the criminal verdict simply shows that there was at least reasonable doubt about whether you were guilty. That doesn't stop the plaintiff from proving your guilt by a preponderance of the evidence (the standard usually required for civil liability) or even by clear and convincing evidence (the standard generally required for punitive damages in civil cases).

To give an oversimplified mathematical model, say that there's evidence that shows an 85% chance that you were guilty, and say that proof beyond a reasonable doubt requires a 95% chance, proof by clear and convincing evidence requires a 75% chance, and proof by a preponderance of the evidence requires only 51%. In that situation, an acquittal simply means that there isn't a 95% chance that you were guilty; that's quite consistent with there being a 51% or 75% chance that you were guilty (and in the hypothetical, both those thresholds are satisfied).

There's also a second reason why the defendant's criminal acquittal can't be used against the civil plaintiff: Generally speaking, every litigant is entitled to have a chance to prove his case in court once, and this plaintiff didn't have that chance at the criminal trial (since the parties at the criminal trial were the government and the defendant, not the victim and the defendant). If the defendant had lost at the criminal trial (see #2 above), he would have had his chance to prove that he wasn't guilty by a reasonable doubt (or, to be precise, his chance to have a jury reject the prosecution's attempts to prove its case), which is why that conviction could be used against the defendant in a future civil case. But a defendant's acquittal can't be used against a plaintiff in a future case, because the plaintiff wasn't involved in the earlier trial.

4. Now let's change the order: Say you're found liable in a civil trial, and are then prosecuted criminally. Can the prosecution use the verdict against you as proof that you're guilty (at least to the factual elements that are shared between the definition of the tort and of the crime)? No, for two reasons. First, the civil verdict merely reflects that the factfinder thought your liability was shown by a preponderance of the evidence or, in most punitive damages cases, by clear and convincing evidence; that's not enough in a criminal case, where a factfinder must find you liable beyond a reasonable doubt.

Second, the Jury Trial Clause is generally understood as securing to all criminal defendants (at least in cases where the crime was punishable by more than six months' imprisoment) a right to have a criminal jury find their guilt. This means that the prosecution must prove the facts to the satisfaction of that criminal jury, and not of an earlier judge or civil jury.

5. And to complete the list, say you're found not liable in a civil trial, and are then prosecuted criminally. The earlier civil jury concluded that you're not liable even by a preponderance of the evidence, which is to say that you're no more than 50% likely to be guilty. Shouldn't that prevent a criminal jury from finding you guilty beyond a reasonable doubt?

No, for the second reason given in item 3 above: The government as prosecutor isn't bound by the earlier verdict because it wasn't a party in the case. Maybe the plaintiff did a lousy job of presenting the case. Maybe the plaintiff even deliberately took it easy on defendant (not much of an incentive for that now, but there might be if a civil verdict of nonliability could preclude a future criminal prosecution). The government as prosecutor is entitled to its own chance at proving the defendant guilty, even if the earlier civil plaintiff had failed.

Related Posts (on one page):

  1. Criminal Liability or Civil Liability?
  2. Criminal Liability and Civil Liability:
Bill Poser (mail) (www):
As a detail of (5), if the government sues civilly and loses, that presumably does estop the same sovereign from prosecuting criminally on the same facts, right?

If so, why is it possible for the government civilly to seize property as proceeds of crime and then to prosecute the owner criminally? Is there a legal fiction that the civil suit and the criminal prosecution are not on the same facts?
9.4.2008 2:53pm
Bill Poser (mail) (www):
Never mind the second part of my previous post. It's a non sequitur. I will go get more coffee.
9.4.2008 2:55pm
Bored Lawyer:

In practice, this doesn't often happen, since most criminal defendants have little money, especially after they're done with the criminal litigation; but it certainly happens sometimes.


In white collar cases, it happens very often. If a corporate executive is accused of, say, securities fraud, he may face criminal prosecution by the U.S. Attorney, civil action by the SEC and private claims by investors, often as class action suits. (This is not even counting state govt. agencies getting into the act.)
9.4.2008 3:01pm
byomtov (mail):
I don't understand, Eugene. What does this have to do with Sarah Palin?
9.4.2008 3:02pm
BruceM (mail) (www):
About 2 years ago, I was second chair on a murder case, which we did not win (which is a great story in and of itself... the ultimate example of how "opening the door" to 404(b) evidence works). About 6 months thereafter, the family of the murder victim filed a wrongful death suit based on the murder, and sought summary judgment with the judgment of conviction as their summary judgment evidence, which they felt was conclusive. This was their attempt to use the doctrine of "offensive collateral estoppel."

I represented the murderer (he was at that point legally a murderer, no "alleged" anymore) in the civil case, and responded to the summary judgment, and I got the judge to summarily deny it. The system simply does not work this way. The standards of proof are different, and a "guilty" verdict is a general verdict. Moreover, because it was a self-defense case, even though the jury implicitly rejected the defendant's claim of self-defense, it does not mean the victim did not pull a gun first. It is quite possible that the jury believed the victim first pulled a gun on the defendant, but that the defenant used more deadly force than was reasonably justified under the circumstances, thus precluding application of self-defense as an affirmative defense to the criminal charges. If that were the case, civil liability would not stand (at least not under TX law). As such, the conviction does not fully and fairly establish civil liability and offensive collateral estoppel could not be used. To be sure, civil cases for wrongful death resulting from a murder typically go to trial. Filing a summmary judgment with one exhibit, the judgment of conviction, stapled to the back is not enough to establish liability as a matter of law. Nor should it be. There are different issues in a criminal trial from a civil one, and different causes of action. The nuances of the penal code are not taken into account in a wrongful death cause of action.

Offensive collatteral estoppel could be used in such a case to establish the defendant was in the jurisdiction and at the scene where the murder occurred, because in his murder trial he admitted as much, saying he shot in self-defense. But it cannot be used to establish liability. Also, civil affirmative defenses, such as "assumption of risk" do not apply in a criminal case. I certainly plead assumption of risk in the civil case as an affirmative defense, and the criminal judgment of conviction speaks nothing of that. How could it?

Anyway, I easily won the MSJ and the case was set for trial, however I left for another job before that occurred and I never found out what happened (may have settled, though the defendant/murderer had no money left due to paying our legal fees in the criminal case).
9.4.2008 3:07pm
Bored Lawyer:
BruceM: What your post illustrates is that to apply collateral estoppel (or issue preclusion) you have to examine the record in the prior case closely to determine what was actually and necessarily decided by the verdict (or civil decision, for that matter), and then compare that carefully to what the legal issues are in the second case.

As I understand what you are saying, the law in Texas is that murder does not equal wrongful death (one can be guilty of the former but not liable for the latter). That may be true -- but it does not negate the broader point that collateral estoppel could be used from a criminal to a civil case.

Someone convicted of criminal securities fraud is going to have a very hard time avoiding civil liability in a private damages suit for the same fraud.
9.4.2008 3:13pm
C Miller (mail) (www):
"Thus, a rapist could be prosecuted for rape and sued civilly (likely under the tort of battery)."

In this situation, I would refer to the civil trial as a "quasi-criminal" proceeding because a judgment rendered against the civil defendant necessitates a finding that the party committed a particular act that was also punishable under criminal law.
9.4.2008 3:14pm
Bored Lawyer:
On a (somewhat) related issue, an interesting question:

Is it double jeopardy for a civil jury to award punitive damages against a defendant who was convicted and punished (by jail, fines or both) for the same action?

Does it make a difference if the plaintiff is a private individual, a class in a class action, or a government agency (e.g. the SEC)?
9.4.2008 3:18pm
Philistine (mail):
On the issue of pursuing a damage remedy for a criminal act--the federal government and most (if not all) states--generally grants restitution on most convictions.

This works best on straight out property damage/theft/white collar cases where the amount of damages are certain than in a rape/murder/assault case.
9.4.2008 3:26pm
Mhoram:
What about in situations where the Defendant has a probation revocation hearing, and then a trial on the same transactions?

At least in Georgia, the Probation Revocation is on a Preponderance of Evidence standard - while the jury trial is, of course, Beyond a Reasonable Doubt. Even so, if a defendant wins a PR hearing, he cannot successfully claim collateral estoppel at the jury trial.

Are there any jurisdictions where you can successfully claim collateral estoppel or res judicata in this type of situation?
9.4.2008 3:28pm
zippypinhead:
In practice, this doesn't often happen, since most criminal defendants have little money, especially after they're done with the criminal litigation; but it certainly happens sometimes.
I think it happens more than you might think, even outside the securities law instances noted above:

1. Follow-on asset forfeiture proceedings. Depending on the jurisdiction and the offense at issue, these can be quasi-criminal or purely civil actions. Standard in narcotics cases and other offenses where the defendant has managed to accumulate property or assets as the result of his criminal behavior.

2. Parallel civil proceedings by the victims in many regulatory crime areas such as antitrust, environmental, product safety, etc., especially where the defendant is either a corporation or wealthy individual with assets that survived the prosecution. These might either be individual actions or class actions, depending on the circumstances. For most regulatory offenses, as opposed to traditional malum in se crimes with analogous torts (such as murder/wrongful death) the elements of the offense tend to be the same, with standing (were you a victim?) and damages (how much were you injured?) remaining as the only triable issues.

3. Civil equitable actions, such as permanent restraining orders running in favor of victims after assault, domestic violence, etc. cases. This area is also where your rapist hypothetical might come up, especially where the defendant and victim are acquaintances or family members.

There are probably other types of parallel civil proceedings, but my pinhead brain is still hurting after your cruel and unusual political anagram competition.
9.4.2008 3:40pm
Melancton Smith:
IANAL, but would Younger v. Harris prevent a civil case from proceeding until after any criminal cases are decided?

I guess only with respect to Federal courts and Civil Rights torts...
9.4.2008 4:47pm
darelf:

Note also that the Double Jeopardy Clause doesn't bar prosecutions by multiple sovereigns, such as the state government and the federal government, but that's a separate matter.


What? So you can be tried for murder twice both at the state level and the federal level? Or do you mean something else.... ( IANAL )
9.4.2008 4:48pm
Sk (mail):
Interesting post that brings up a different, though related, confusion I have always had.

What does it mean to be '51%' likely to be guilty (or any other percentage, for that matter)? I understand the analogy: "guilty beyond reasonable doubt" = 100%, or say, 95% likelihood of guilt, and "proof by preponderance of evidence" = 51%.

But I've never been sure that that analogy really means anything, or that it is really translatable into a decision process as a jurist. I can imagine reviewing evidence, and believing a guy is guilty (aside from outlandish hypotheticals: what if he's a sleepwalker, what if the car spontaneously combusted, whatever). I can also imagine reviewing evidence, and believing a guy is innocent. And finally, I can imagine reviewing evidence, and not knowing one way or the other.

But I'm not sure if I 'get' what it means to review evidence and think a guy is 51% likely to be guilty, and for it to mean anything other than a justification for intuition.

Let's say a murderer is accused, and he is clearly guilty (outside of outlandish hypotheticals). Got it, he's guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Now, add the fact that one of his accusers is a drug addict who the accused once turned in for drug dealing. I understand the case is weaker now. I understand that, depending on the strength of the rest of the case, he may or may not be guilty 'beyond reasonable doubt.' But I don't get what it would mean to think he's '51% likely to be guilty,' or 'more likely to be guilty than not.' Instead, I would put the case in the third category from above: "not knowing one way or the other."

Sk
9.4.2008 4:53pm
George Weiss (mail) (www):

Bored Lawyer:
On a (somewhat) related issue, an interesting question:

Is it double jeopardy for a civil jury to award punitive damages against a defendant who was convicted and punished (by jail, fines or both) for the same action?

Does it make a difference if the plaintiff is a private individual, a class in a class action, or a government agency (e.g. the SEC)?




very interesting indeed.

The rule for determining whether a civil penalty (non compensatory/punitive damages) resulted in the US constitutional double jeopardy clause baring future prosecutions (or whehter prior criminal prosecutions barred those same civil penalties under the same clause), has been dealt with by the Supreme Court at least 3 times, and the answer has changed each time with only minor factual changes (i.e. the SCOTUS has overruled and overruled itself multiple times on the issue).

In 1980 the court decided in United States v. Ward, 448 US 242 (1980) that the defendant must clearly establish the civil penalty as grossly disproportionate, based on several factors (including, if applicable, legislative intent)

In 1989, the Court reversed itself in United States v. Halper 490 US 435 (1989), and held that if the 'civil' penalty is focused on traditional criminal law goals (deterrence retribution incapacitation etc.) than it is double jeopardy.

In 1997, the Court reversed itself again, in Hudson v. United States 522 U.S. 93 (1997), finding the Halper per rule untenable and reaffirming Ward.

An interesting concurrence by Scalia in Hudson forwards the theory that constitutional double jeopardy does not even bar double punishment at all, and only double prosecutions (i.e. successive attempts to prove guilt after acquittal or other event attaching jeopardy). This is an elegant theory and highly efficient to administrate (no need ot try to pick apart whether a 'civil' penalty was intended as punitive or compensatory, yet it would seem to destroy the criminal merger doctrine altogether (a person who possessed 20 grams of coke could constitutionally be punished for the maximum for 5 grams, then also the maximum grams etc...

(obviously), state rules of merger or double jepordy could always be more lenient than the federal rules-(as long as they aren't more strict than what the SCOTUS says is constitutionally required to protect individual rights than its an issue of state law).
9.4.2008 4:55pm
C Miller (mail) (www):
Actually, the "not knowing one way or the other" is the conditional relevance standard, under which certain evidence is admitted if the judge determines that a reasonable jury could find the conditional fact by a preponderance of the evidence.
9.4.2008 4:57pm
Duffy Pratt (mail):
A nice wrinkle on this is that if you can get the civil case rolling first, you might be able to get the defendant to take the Fifth. This can be used against the defendant in the civil case, and it tends to hurt the defendant badly.
9.4.2008 5:27pm
George Weiss (mail) (www):

Mhoram:
What about in situations where the Defendant has a probation revocation hearing, and then a trial on the same transactions?

At least in Georgia, the Probation Revocation is on a Preponderance of Evidence standard - while the jury trial is, of course, Beyond a Reasonable Doubt. Even so, if a defendant wins a PR hearing, he cannot successfully claim collateral estoppel at the jury trial.

Are there any jurisdictions where you can successfully claim collateral estoppel or res judicata in this type of situation?



i don't know if any jurisdictions have a rule barring criminal prosecution over an incident where a probationer has won a revocation hearing over the same incident. ( i doubt it)

but the reason constitutional double jepordy doesn't apply, is that, even though the first proceding (the revocation proceeding) has a lower standard of proof for the gov (preponderance) and the criminal proceeding has a higher one (BRD standard) that would only bar successive prosecutions if jeopardy has attached

its similar to a probably cause hearing. suppose a federal prosecutor arrests someone for a felony (which, besides judicially found probable cause-also requires an indictment-a finding by a grad jury of probable cause in order to go to trial). suppose the grand jury returns a 'no true bill' (refusing to indict. the prosecutor is allowed to represent it to the grand jury-as far as i know-as many times as he wants. suppose on the second time the prosecutor gets indicted. the defendant could not then successfully argue collateral estopple, either by challenging the second indictment or by asserting collateral estopple at trial. the reason, double jeopardy has not yet attached.

in the case of a probationer, the revocation hearing is sort of like his detention or probable cause hearing-the gov can loose as many times as it wants-and still go to trial. only after jeopardy attaches is there a problem
9.4.2008 5:34pm
Dilan Esper (mail) (www):
One curiosity I have is how often scenario 5 takes place and a guilty verdict is returned. Because despite Prof. Volokh's completely legally and logically sound point about the identity of the parties to the two actions, it would certainly look weird to the public if you had court actions finding that someone is not "guilty" by a preponderance of the evidence yet "guilty" beyond a reasonable doubt.
9.4.2008 5:37pm
byomtov (mail):
What does it mean to be '51%' likely to be guilty (or any other percentage, for that matter)? I understand the analogy: "guilty beyond reasonable doubt" = 100%, or say, 95% likelihood of guilt, and "proof by preponderance of evidence" = 51%.

Your suspicions are correct. Technically it's meaningless to say that there's an X% probability the defendant is guilty. He's either guilty or not. There is no probability associated with it. My idea is that the real question is "how likely are we to observe this evidence if the guy is innocent?" If that's less than some number, say 5% or 2%, you have proof "beyond reasonable doubt."

I suspect this question has been well-explored someplace or other.
9.4.2008 5:41pm
Philistine (mail):

One curiosity I have is how often scenario 5 takes place and a guilty verdict is returned. Because despite Prof. Volokh's completely legally and logically sound point about the identity of the parties to the two actions, it would certainly look weird to the public if you had court actions finding that someone is not "guilty" by a preponderance of the evidence yet "guilty" beyond a reasonable doubt.



It's fairly rare to get a civil determination first, and then a criminal determination for a number of reasons.

If they start at the same time, criminal cases are generally (though not always) quicker than civil cases, so the criminal case will likely get done first. Compounding that--there's an incentive to stall the civil case so the Defendant doesn't have to give a deposition--which would then be admissible in the criminal case.

Also, addressing your issue, assuming the civil case does go first--it would probably be a pretty gutsy prosecutor to go ahead with a criminal case after a defense verdict in a civil case without having some different evidence.
9.4.2008 6:07pm
Joshua:
Differing standards of guilt or no, does it strike anyone else as rather inefficient to hold multiple court cases around the same incident with the same set of facts and evidence? What I'm getting at here is, how legally, constitutionally and practically feasible would it be to "piggyback" criminal and civil cases with, say, three possible verdicts:

a) Criminally liable (i.e. guilty beyond reasonable doubt),
b) Civilly but not criminally liable (i.e. guilty by preponderance of evidence), or
c) Not liable?

Are there any jurisdictions within or outside the U.S. that do this, or have experimented with it? Seems to me that would significantly cut down on the case load of courts and save taxpayers, and possibly litigants, a lot of money.
9.4.2008 7:48pm
George Weiss (mail) (www):
joushua-

im not sure that's practical becuase of the diffrent rules of evidence for a criminal and civil trial

evidence suppressed in a criminal trial could easily make its way civilly-and even vice versa

even if you had two separate juries and take one out for some stuff and vice versa.

the civil jury would inevitably know the guy is currently being criminally prosecuted for the incident, which would bias them into thinking "well if they are going to the trouble to prosecute then hes probably guilty"-which is a sorta ok in criminal trials becuase of the beyond a reasonable doubt instructions-but would be devastating to a civil defendant
9.4.2008 8:21pm
whit:

Differing standards of guilt or no, does it strike anyone else as rather inefficient to hold multiple court cases around the same incident with the same set of facts and evidence? What I'm getting at here is, how legally, constitutionally and practically feasible would it be to "piggyback" criminal and civil cases with, say, three possible verdicts:

a) Criminally liable (i.e. guilty beyond reasonable doubt),
b) Civilly but not criminally liable (i.e. guilty by preponderance of evidence), or
c) Not liable?


different standards of guilt is only a small part of it. there's also different rules of evidence. also, in a civil trial you don't have a right to remain silent, and unlike a criminal trial - silence can be used against you.

due to the different evidence rules, LOTS of stuff that is admissible in a civil trial wouldn't be admissible in a criminal trial.

iirc, for example, a defendant admission that might get excluded in a criminal trial (let's say they thought he should have been mirandized and wasn't) is much more likely to be admitted in a civil trial.

etc.
9.4.2008 8:38pm
Joshua:
OK, so much for my idea, at least in the U.S. I figured the different sets of laws would complicate things, but if the two proceedings don't necessarily use the same set of evidence (and by extension, perhaps even the same set of facts, if inadmissible evidence means some fact(s) can't be proven), that would most definitely be a show-stopper. Thank you George and whit.
9.4.2008 9:16pm
Bill Poser (mail) (www):
Joshua,

Traditional Chinese law (the system in use until 1911) did not distinguish between criminal and civil matters. The only thing that distinguished a criminal prosecution from a civil suit was that a criminal prosecution was initiated by the district magistrate whereas a civil suit was initiated by a private complainant. It was not uncommon for the court to decide that conduct brought out in a civil suit deserved criminal punishment, and on the other hand, in a criminal case the court might award compensation to the victim.
9.4.2008 9:45pm
BruceM (mail) (www):
Bored Lawyer: precisely. You have to look at the record, the underlying issues, the questions of law and the questions of fact the jury answered. But a lot of people seem to think a criminal conviction automatically proves up a civil liability (offensive collateral estoppel). It does not, nor should it.

Fortunately the judge law it my way and denied their MSJ.
9.4.2008 11:08pm
Steve2:
Bill Poser,

That bit about Imperial Chinese law raises a question in my mind. Why is the state, rather than the victim, the other party in a criminal proceeding?
9.4.2008 11:11pm
Bill Poser (mail) (www):
Steve2,


Why is the state, rather than the victim, the other party in a criminal proceeding?


Leaving aside the obvious cases in which the victim is the state or someone closely associated with it, I think that the reason for the state rather than the victim undertaking the prosecution is that it is felt that even seemingly private offenses have an indirect impact on the state. This is explicit in traditional Chinese philosophy of government, where harmony must be maintained and it is the state's responsibility to do this. If Farmer Wang kills Farmer Li in a dispute over the boundaries of their fields, the immediate impact is on the family of Farmer Li but the act creates disorder that not only affects other families but ultimately also the state, if, for example, the dispute spreads or the killings reduce tax income.

I think that the same idea was at work in the evolution of English criminal law. Crimes are said "to breach the King's peace", which I think embodies the same idea as in Chinese law. Unfortunately, I'm an amateur in this area and don't know what historians of law have to say about the evolution of the division between private and state interests.

I do note that the evolution in English law is not uniformly in the direction of state responsibility. In certain areas, the state has abandoned its interest, e.g. adultery, where what used to be a criminal matter is now purely civil.
9.5.2008 2:14pm
byomtov (mail):
Why is the state, rather than the victim, the other party in a criminal proceeding?

It strikes me that one practical reson is that some, even many, crime victims might not have the resources to pursue the case effectively. Should the murder of a homeless man go unpunished?

Maybe this is just a version of "equal protection of the laws," using that phrase in a general sense.
9.5.2008 2:46pm
Dilan Esper (mail) (www):
One other reason the state rather than the victim is the party is because of something that not everyone accepts, which is that even though criminal justice has a retributive function, it isn't the same as private vengeance. It's supposed to be more civilized then what a victim or his or her family might want to do to a criminal, it's supposed to vindicate the community's interest and not just the individual's, etc.

Indeed, there are very deep questions about what the rights of victims in criminal proceedings are. Without resolving those debates, however, it is clear that the victim and the state at least sometimes stand in very different positions.
9.5.2008 5:04pm
Steve2:
Hmm, that makes sense, byomtov.
9.6.2008 3:29pm