People Who Argue that the First Amendment Does Not Protect Symbolic Expression:

I was hoping I might ask our readers for some research help here -- I am looking for (1) authors, columnists, academics, politicians, or especially prominent bloggers, who (2) argue that the First Amendment protects only "speech" and "press" and therefore doesn't protect any symbolic expression, and (3) argue this outside the specific contexts of U.S. flag desecration or nude dancing.

I already have examples (including Judge Robert Bork and Senators Orrin Hatch and Dianne Feinstein) as to flagburning, and can find plenty for nude dancing. I'm looking for (A) people who make this argument as to other forms of symbolic expression, such as wearing armbands, flying other flags, and the like, or (B) people who make this argument broadly, without reference to flagburning as such.

I'm also not looking for disputes as to whether a particular form of conduct (e.g., wearing one's hair a particular way, or refusing to let military recruiters onto one's campus) is sufficiently symbolic to qualify for protection. Rather, I'm looking for arguments that sound like categorical assertions that the First Amendment protects only what is literally "speech" or "press" -- or, perhaps more broadly, that the First Amendment protects only expression in words -- and that it doesn't protect other symbolic expression. Many thanks!

erics (mail):
Isn't the rationale behind campaign finance laws exactly what you're talking about?
7.7.2008 3:14pm
This is a comment to David Kopfel's post above, entitled "Bleg on WWII English pacifism", which does not have a comments link posted.

There were indeed English pacifists of that type, and you will find source material and quotations aplenty in "The Collected Essays, Letters and Journalism" of George Orwell. One item I recall is a long poem written on that theme by Alex Comfort (best known to posterity as the postwar author of "The Joy of Sex"), to which Orwell wrote a suitable poem in reply.

The subject is closely linked to Gandhi's position during the war, which was that the British should quit India and that after being occupied by the Japanese the Indians should respond with satyagraha (passive resistance). Gandhi's virtue of honesty, however, had him quite ready to concede that this approach would cost millions of Indian casualties, before the Japanese would see the light. (George Orwell's famous essay touches on this subject and also the related subject of Gandhi's willingness, unlike most pacifists, to address the question of what would happen to European Jews if the Allies dropped out of the war. Gandhi's position was that European Jews should all commit suicide, by way of protest and awakening the conscience of the world.)
7.7.2008 3:15pm
Constructively Reasonable (www):
Mr. Volokh,

First, I am sure anyone can "find plenty for nude dancing."

Second, I would point you to look at Education Law treatises. I am sorry that I cannot access it now, but my 1L appellate advocacy case was on symbolic speech. You referenced arm bands, which makes me think of Tinker and Morse and Hazelwood. The cases and treatises interpreting those cases might have some information for you. Of course, Tinker was specifically about arm bands, but I remember finding a line of cases following Tinker/Morse/Hazelwood discussing pictures, imagery, and other forms of symbolic speech. Thus, any education-minded author/academic should have some information on symbolic speech.

If I can dig up my first drafts/notes on my 1L brief, I will give you more specific cites for secondary sources.
7.7.2008 3:33pm
Duncan Frissell (mail):
erics -

Campaign finance laws are about speech and press not protected by the First - not about unprotected symbolic speech.

I think Eugene is interested in arguments that symbolic speech or non speech and press activities are unprotected.
7.7.2008 3:50pm
Alec Egizi (mail):
Dear Prof. Volokh,

This is the first time I have posted to this site, so, if I may, please allow me to first express my admiration for your work and scholarship. This blog and many of your articles were indispensible tools in law school.

Furthermore, I want to thank you. Scalia quoted you liberally in DC v. Heller. Your work has helped garrantee me and all Americans an important right, and we are in your debt.

As for the subject of this post, I think you might want to look at the work of Professor George Anastaplo. He has recently published a book on the first amendment and likely also has several articles (he is an incredibly prolific scholar). As I recall, Anastaplo's believes that the 1st Amendment should not apply to symbolic speech, and furthermore it was only really meant to protect political speech.

I have not read Anastaplo's full argument, he simply mentioned his view in passing in our jurisprudence class last year, but I think he draws support for his interpretation from the common law of England in the 16th through 18th centuries. I recall him making reference to a speech Thomas More delivered at the opening of parliament about the importance of the king not interfearing with the parliamentarians' speech rights.

I hope this is a profitable research lead for you. I look forward to reading your treatment of the topic.

With great respect,

Alec Egizi
7.7.2008 3:55pm
Loophole1998 (mail):
Is there really anybody out there who would conclude that the First Amendment doesn't protect my right to paint a picture of Geoge W. Bush's face surrounded by a big red circle with a line through it?
7.7.2008 4:04pm
gattsuru (mail) (www):
I assume you already have Hugo Black's dissent from Tinker, which is probably the clearest example involving arm bands, although he argued it regarding curses written on a jacket as well.

I'm not aware of many other individuals that offer it.
7.7.2008 4:13pm
Seerak (mail):
Well, speaking for myself, I see "freedom of speech" to mean freedom of communication, unrestricted as to the medium used -- so armbands per se would indeed be protected.

But the catch is in whose meaning of "symbolic" is being used. The Left uses that term as cover, to package-deal actual "symbolic speech" together with assaults on private property/individual rights. Sit-ins on private property (such as Caterpillar, recently), obstructing the public right-of-way, and other examples of forcible interference are examples of what should NOT be protected, IMO.

Property rights are a big variable here -- whose flag is being burned? On whose property is the "nude dancing" occurring, and is it happening with permission? That gets more confusing when the property is public, but that is an outgrowth of the problematic notion of public property itself, not of freedom of communication itself.
7.7.2008 4:14pm
K. Dackson (mail):

Is there really anybody out there who would conclude that the First Amendment doesn't protect my right to paint a picture of Geoge W. Bush's face surrounded by a big red circle with a line through it?

Or my right to paint a picture of Obama as either the center of a target or in the crosshairs?

Certainly in bad taste, but it is political speech.

And on a more serious note: What about the "art" that Maplethorpe was known for. Certainly symbolic. And protected.
7.7.2008 4:14pm
George Will has written that the student armbands should not have been protected under the "speech" clause. This is from memory, several years ago; sorry, no cite.
7.7.2008 4:14pm
John (mail):
The phrase "symbolic speech" reminded me of Wally Blum, my tax prof many years ago, who told us early on, "you will from time to time come across the word 'constructive' in tax opinions, referring to things like 'constructive income.' If you want to know what 'constructive' means, just substitute the word 'not.'"

If symbolic speech were speech, it would not have to be called symbolic.
7.7.2008 4:15pm
Will Baude (mail):
What about Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt, 704 F. 2d 586 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (en banc):

I concur with the principal dissent in this case because I agree that, if traditional First Amendment analysis is applied to this sleeping, on the assumption that it is a fully protected form of expression, the appellants would nonetheless lose. I write separately to express my willingness to grasp the nettle which the principal dissent leaves untouched, and which the opinions supporting the court's disposition consider untouchable -- that is, flatly to deny that sleeping is or can ever be speech for First Amendment purposes. That this should seem a bold assertion is a commentary upon how far judicial and scholarly discussion of this basic constitutional guarantee has strayed from common and common-sense understanding.

I start from the premise that when the Constitution said "speech" it meant speech and not all forms of expression. Otherwise, it would have been unnecessary to address "freedom of the press" separately--or, for that matter, "freedom of assembly," which was obviously directed at facilitating expression. The effect of the speech and press guarantees is to provide special protection against all laws that impinge upon spoken or written communication (which I will, for the sake of simplicity, refer to generically as "speech") even if they do so for purposes that have nothing to do with communication, such as the suppression of noise or the elimination of litter. But to extend equivalent protection against laws that affect actions which happen to be conducted for the purpose of "making a point" is to stretch the Constitution not only beyond its meaning but beyond reason, and beyond the capacity of any legal system to accommodate.

It may be that Scalia is actually willing to concede that there is some protection for symbolic expression even if it is substantially less than the kind given to speech or press, so depending on the purpose for which you need this, it may not go far enough.
7.7.2008 4:17pm
Eugene Volokh (www):
Gattsuru: As I read his Tinker dissent, Justice Black made some mutterings about armbands not being protectable speech, but he had bigger fish to fry -- he wanted to argue that school authorities should have power to control even verbal and written speech by students. So his argument was basically about "whether students and teachers may use the schools at their whim as a platform for the exercise of free speech -- 'symbolic' or 'pure' -- and whether the courts will allocate to themselves the function of deciding how the pupils' school day will be spent" (his answers were "no" and "no"), not about whether symbolic speech should be treat the same as verbal speech.
7.7.2008 4:18pm
Ex-Fed (mail) (www):
Well, it's not exactly on point, but apparently no lesser legal mind than THE ULTIMATE WARRIOR asserts, through his representative, that the First Amendment does not protect "offend[ing] others' sense of morality", which would require a "liberal" interpretation of the Amendment. And I think THE ULTIMATE WARRIOR could kick the ass of anyone in the Tinker majority, possibly even if they were not, technically, dead.
7.7.2008 4:19pm
Dave N (mail):

I think your behavior is protected because it does not fall within the parameters of 18 U.S.C. 871, even if you mailed it. However add the words "Before January 20, 2009" and add a skull and crossed bones and the analysis might be different.

Of course, the federal law does require the item to be mailed. If you merely put it on your website, I suspect it is protected, though you may get a visit from the Secret Service, who are understandably not amused about threats to their protectees' lives.
7.7.2008 4:22pm
Schools are often offended by students' efforts to symbolically express themselves. T-shirt problems are common. We've had some hair examples recently; tight braids, initials/symbols sheared out of a head of hair. I remember some one had problems with adhesive tape on mortarboards at graduation. _The Chronicles of Higher Education_ probably has info for college level issues and there should be a comparable publication for pre-college schools.
7.7.2008 4:49pm
7.7.2008 4:54pm
Stephen Aslett (mail):
I'm no First Amendment expert, but in researching other topics I've come across language in old state cases in which judges sometimes draw a distinction between speech and acts when discussing freedom of speech clauses in their state constitutions. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 1838 WL 2655 (Mass. 1838) (Morton, J., dissenting) ("The legislature have the general power to define and prescribe the punishment for crimes. They may determine what acts shall be deemed crimes. And may they not determine what words shall be deemed criminal? Is liberty of action less important than liberty of speech? Is personal freedom less sacred than the freedom of the press?").

These sorts of statements are never terribly well-developed though, and I haven't come across any 18th or 19th century case in which a judge argues at length that the First Amendment protects only speech or press and and not other forms of expressive conduct. It's much more common to see 18th and 19th century judges make arguments along the lines of "even though our state constitution protects freedom X (whether speech, religion, arms, or whatever), such freedom is not absolute, and the defendant is wrong in claiming he has a constitutional right to Y (whether libeling someone else, having multiple wives, bearing a concealed weapon in violation of a statute, or whatever) because Z (whether such conduct has long been prohibited or, if allowed, would undermine the right)." See, e.g., State v. Buzzard, 1842 WL 331 (Ark. 1842) (Lacy, J.) ("[T]he rights of the Constitution are guaranteed upon this principle-that while their perfect freedom and enjoyment are secured, the Constitution utterly forbids any licentious or criminal indulgence in their exercise; for when that is the case, they can no longer be said to be the perfect and inviolable rights of the Constitution, but the unlawful and unauthorized acts of individuals. For example: The freedom of the press, the liberty of speech, and the sacred inviolability of private contracts, and free toleration in religion, are secured to all men. Still, any one or all these rights may be abused or perverted, and the true object or design of the Convention defeated. . . . [I]f in writing or speaking, or in the exercise of his religious opinions, [a person] should prejudice or injure the rights and liberties of others, then this wilful perversion or abuse of these rights becomes a criminal act, and consequently should be controlled. The liberty of speech and of the press, and the freedom of religious toleration, are utterly incompatible, in the true constitutional meaning of those terms, with their licentiousness or criminal indulgence; and these latter or improper acts are in no manner connected with the invaluable franchises out of which they flow.").

An argument that freedom of speech is subject to reasonable regulation makes it unnecessary to determine the exact scope of freedom of speech vis a vis speaking versus symbolic conduct, which is perhaps one reason I've never seen any 18th or 19th century commentator make the First Amendment argument you're looking for. See, e.g., Respublica v. Montgomery, 1795 WL 709 (Pa. 1795) (court more concerned with possible criminality of raising a freedom pole than whether raising a freedom pole is speech); see also Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (1833), sections 1874-86 (discussing the freedoms of speech and press in terms of speaking, writing, and printing, but not clearly drawing a distinction between speech and expressive conduct and instead focusing on the point that such rights are not absolute).
7.7.2008 5:26pm
Perseus (mail):
Walter F. Berns:

But the First Amendment protects freedom of speech, not expression, and, whereas all speech may be expression of a sort, not all expression is speech, and there is good reason why the framers of the First Amendment protected the one and not the other. A person can express himself in isolation, or (and it amounts to the same thing) by burning the flag or a draft card, by denouncing Catholics, or by marching through a Jewish neighborhood brandishing swastikas. But speech implies a listener—one speaks to someone—and, as well, the willingness to be a listener in return. In a word, speech implies conversation and, in the political realm especially, deliberation. It is a means of arriving at a decision, of bringing people together, which requires civility and mutual respect; and in a polity consisting of blacks and whites, Jews, Muslims, and Christians, liberals and conservatives, and peoples from every part of the globe, civility and mutual respect are a necessity. So understood, speech is good, which is why the Constitution protects it.
7.7.2008 5:31pm
Eugene Volokh (www):
Will Baude: I think Justice Scalia's dissent there does leave open room for protecting symbolic expression, when the government is restricting it precisely because of what it expresses; and his later votes on the Supreme Court -- in the flagburning cases, the crossburning cases, and most expressly in his nude dancing concurrence -- echo this. Here's a relevant passage from CCNV v. Watt:
The cases find within the First Amendment some protection for "expressive conduct" apart from spoken and written thought. The nature and effect of that protection, however, is quite different from the guarantee of freedom of speech narrowly speaking. It involves a significantly different balancing of private rights and public interests, and does not always call for the detailed "First Amendment analysis" characteristic of the speech cases and applied by the majority opinions here. Specifically, what might be termed the more generalized guarantee of freedom of expression makes the communicative nature of conduct an inadequate basis for singling out that conduct for proscription. A law directed at the communicative nature of conduct must, like a law directed at speech itself, be justified by the substantial showing of need that the First Amendment requires. But a law proscribing conduct for a reason having nothing to do with its communicative character need only meet the ordinary minimal requirements of the equal protection clause. In other words, the only "First Amendment analysis" applicable to laws that do not directly or indirectly impede speech is the threshold inquiry of whether the purpose of the law is to suppress communication. If not, that is the end of the matter so far as First Amendment guarantees are concerned; if so, the court then proceeds to determine whether there is substantial justification for the proscription, just as it does in free-speech cases....

It is only such cases as Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 51 S.Ct. 532, 75 L.Ed. 1117 (1931) (flying of a red flag), Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 86 S.Ct. 719, 15 L.Ed.2d 637 (1966) (silent sit-in), United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968) (burning of a draft card), Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969) (black arm-bands), and Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 94 S.Ct. 2727, 41 L.Ed.2d 842 (1974) (defacing the United States flag), that clearly present situations in which speech -- that is, the spoken or written word -- is not necessarily involved. The holdings of all these cases support the analysis set forth above. Every proscription of expressive conduct struck down by the Supreme Court was aimed precisely at the communicative effect of the conduct. The only reason to ban the flying of a red flag (Stromberg) was the revolutionary sentiment that symbol expressed. The only reason for applying the "breach of the peace" statute to the silent presence of black protestors in the library in Brown was the effect which the communicative content of that presence had upon onlookers. The only reason for singling out black armbands for a dress proscription (Tinker) was precisely their expressive content, allegedly causing classroom disruption. The only reason to prevent the attachment of symbols to the United States flag (Spence) was related to the communicative content of the flag.
7.7.2008 5:39pm
Eugene Volokh (www):
Oren: It seems to me that George Will's column takes a view similar to Justice Black's -- schools should have broad authority to constrain both verbal speech and symbolic speech by their students.
7.7.2008 5:51pm
George Weiss (mail) (www):
ive never understood why Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 35 (1931), has become the starting point for symbolic speech. it seems after this case the idea was never judicially questioned that symbolic speech was covered-only what actions are symbolic enough.

its true Stromberg dealt with the criminalization of the display of a red flag, and that the defendant argued that it violated the first amendment. but the case was decided on vagueness and jury instructions grounds, not first amendment that decision should have been dicta.

there was also the case of Board of Education v. Barnette 319 U.S. 624, (1943), which dealt with a refusal by children to salute the flag. That case seemed to take it for granted that symbolic speech was affected.

of course by the time Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969) and United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), came around, everyone took for granted that symbolic speech could be speech, and it quotes Stromberg as authority.

interesting-it seems that nobody ever made the argument before the supreme court that symbolic speech didn't count.
7.7.2008 6:17pm
Jonathan Foreigner:
"I'm looking for ...symbolic expression, such as wearing armbands, flying other flags, and the like,"

There's a case in Canada right now where it seems Manitoba's child and family services agency seized a woman's child because of a swastika drawn on the child's. See...

Mom fighting for children defends her 'white pride'

July 5, 2008
7.7.2008 6:31pm
Jonathan Foreigner:
the child's arm!
7.7.2008 6:34pm
This is not a fantastic response and might not be what you're looking for, but in Posner's recent How Judges Think book, in discussing Scalia's use of his vote in the flag-burning case as an example of his Originalism/textualism taking him someplace he would not go as a matter of policy, Posner mentions that there is nothing obvious, original, or textual about the First Amendment covering symbolic speech at all. (Though this is different than Posner's ultimate conclusion, which would no doubt rest on his view of the consequences and utility all around.)
7.7.2008 6:42pm
Katl L (mail):
So performances without words, the late marcel marceau and and sign languages are not covered?
7.7.2008 6:44pm
Katl L (mail):

this is the opinion of the Supreme court of an authoritarian government.In spanish
7.7.2008 6:49pm
Katl L (mail):
7.7.2008 6:51pm
Gene Hoffman (mail) (www):
Though it isn't over, Alameda County is certainly claiming that having guns at guns shows are not covered speech. They claim to think that it is enough to have pictures of the guns at gunshows. The case is Nordyke v. King and I believe you have Don Kilmer's contact information for that.
7.7.2008 7:38pm
While this example is Canadian, currently in Manitoba, Child Protective Services removed a seven year from her white pride mother, when she sent her child to a school with a swastika drawn in black marker on the child's arm. Both the seven year old child and infant were taken. Perhaps the arguments being advanced in Canadian editorial pages might be of use to you. Check out Margaret Wente in the Globe and Mail.
7.8.2008 12:55am
Eric Elerath:
First, to answer your question, you might write to this guy:

He is a big fan of historic preservation and seems to be rabidly opposed to the idea of symbols having FA recognition. Actually, I think he's more like "unclear on the concept." He supports the idea of artistic preservation but doesn't seem to grasp the concept of artistic freedom - at least he won't admit to it. He had some very pointed comments on his site and has removed them; I'll leave it at that.


Second, I was shocked to discover that symbolic speech did not already have some sort of FA recognition and surprised that anyone would have to consider the necessity. The fact that this was not established at some point after WW II has me blown away.

Obviously, some sort of general FA recognition for symbolic speech is necessary to prevent the nightmare of a fascist, totalitarian state. Aesthetic regulations, for example, can't be challenged in court but can be selectively enforced for any reason at all against anyone at all. This subverts the entire concept of the rule of law.

Symbols have no universal meanings and whatever meanings they have change over time and place. This allows people to control, subjugate and discredit others based on some meaning or interpretation claimed by the observer or listener rather than that claimed by the subject or expressive speaker.

Does this really need elaboration?

"You - a fine for wearing a blue shirt."
"But his shirt is blue - and so is hers. And blue is the symbol of truth!"
"No, his shirt is aqua and hers is navy, and blue is the symbol of the lying terrorists. Besides, those people have good jobs and would know better than to wear blue shirts, wouldn't they?"

Mr. and Ms. Aqua-Navy avert their eyes and ignore you on their way to work.

Now, are you going to try to claim that you have some sort of "right" to wear a blue shirt? Or maybe you would fall into the trap of trying to argue that your shirt is a recognized work of art by a famous artist and is protected on that ground?

"I've never heard of that artist. He's not famous like Picasso. Picasso would be OK, even if it were blue, because art is protected speech, but your shirt isn't art. We decide what art is, not you. Maybe after you're in jail one of 'our' famous artistic painters will produce a blue shirt exactly like yours. Now that would be great art!"

If the response is, "Oh, that's alarmist, that would never happen," my response is, "In some places, right here in the US it's already a reality. It just isn't yours - at least not yet."

In North Korea, the government regulates the type of music that citizens can listen to and can put you in jail if you listen to or sing the wrong songs. What's wrong with that?

In the US, the right of the government to regulate property aesthetics has already been established as a settled matter of law. Check your law encyclopedias. In some locales, people need to get permission for the color they paint their house. If your neighbors decide that the decorative symbols on the exterior of your house "speak to history", they can make you pay to preserve them, even if you hate the symbols. One poor guy in Los Angeles has to display a giant symbol of Felix the Cat on his property, in perpetuity. Why? Some authoritarian bureaucrat thinks it looks cool. A landmark or some something. It's regulated as a use of land, even though it would be speech if it were on TV, and, as a commercial sign, it could be taken down if it wasn't Felix the Cat. Want to tear down your energy-wasting 15 bedroom mansion and replace it with a compact solar-powered number? Hey, we can't tear down a great work of art, symbol of the southern slave-owner, can we? You'll have to pay to fix it up and preserve it for posterity. And the top architects in this country are, in a manner of speaking, all too busy fighting over whose colors and homes "look best" or "convey the best message" - deciding whose songs should be sung, in effect - not denouncing the fact that the laws exist.

Thanks to Eugene for pursuing this one. I think it should be a sort of legal Manhattan project, because it is a very, very big deal...

BTW, I notice that nearly all comments make the distinction between speech and expressive conduct, but the relationship between expression and property seems to be absent. Anyone ever thrown a clay pot? Assume that you're allowed to engage in the commercial or personal conduct of safely throwing a clay pot, glazing it and firing it in the oven. Would you argue that you should not have any right to decide what shape the curved pot should take or what color to glaze it? Why not?
7.8.2008 1:34am
Grant Colvin (www):
Permit me to second the suggestions for considering the work of George Anastaplo and Walter Berns. In particular Anastaplo published a book, The Constitutionalist, Notes on the First Amendment (Southern Methodist University Press, 1971), arguing (I radically summarize) that (a) the protection of "speech" and "press" provided by the First Amendment is absolute, but that (b) "speech" and "press" are limited to political discourse; thus, "expression," whether symbolic or otherwise, is not included, nor does the First Amendment provide general protection for obscene or pornographic material. Walter Berns makes similar arguments. Many years ago I was at a lecture by Berns on this very subject: he began by saying that he wished to state at the very outset state that he favored censorship.
7.8.2008 9:53am
Your correspondent (mail):
This blog recently quoted A Scalia's opinion in Giles v California, with approval. The quote, amended to apply to the current question:

"It is not the role of courts to extrapolate from the words of the [First] Amendment to the values behind it, and then to enforce its guarantees only to the extent they serve (in the courts' views) those underlying values. The [First] Amendment seeks [to protect expression] indeed -- but seeks it through very specific means (one of which is [speech and another of which is the press])... ."
7.9.2008 1:06pm
nobody (mail):
Wasn't a lot of the discussion around the ban on encryption export in the 90's centered around its use as symbolic speech? I think the code-as-speech thing comes up fairly frequently under different circumstances.
7.9.2008 2:44pm
Nobody 2:
Nobody - Computer code also has utility value. The arrangement of 1's and 0's into patterns, when placed on a disk, allow certain functions to occur. Squares and circles are also symbols but, when applied to a wheel, one functions and the other doesn't. One of the interesting thing about the MS antitrust case was that the government lawyers did not seem to be able to figure out that software is a set of services, not a set of products.

I attended a lecture by a FA scholar whose shirt was not tucked in and his wardrobe was not coordinated. The slides were crooked on the screen, and the text colors were less than beautiful. But if his presentation could be regulated or stopped on those grounds, could he not be prevented from speaking at all?
7.10.2008 2:52pm