Citizenship is a tough subject to address as an academic or otherwise. The popular ivory-tower conception of academics notwithstanding, most have nationality and are proud of it (liberals and conservatives alike). Most academics addressing American citizenship as an institution are themselves American. That makes it tough to have the sort of dispassionate discussion one might be able to have with respect to, say, copyright law. Everyone’s got something invested in citizenship. Nobody’s “against” it, in contrast to the related but distinct issue of immigration policy; it’s a consensus institution.
Which says a lot about its continuing vitality, and about the continuing vitality of American citizenship and national community in particular. Citizenship will be around in some form for a long time to come. There’s a lot of which to be proud in America’s history. The nation-state is a massive, perhaps unparalleled, achievement in the span of human history. And the United States surely marks its highpoint.
But that doesn’t necessarily make it for all time. There’s a natural tendency on the part of humans (and especially academics) to believe that they live in interesting times (even at the same time that it’s held out as a curse). But even discounting for that tendency, we may be witnessing watershed developments that point away from the state and towards other forms of association. It seems to me that academics can add some value by looking beyond immediate policy horizons to grappling with the shift and its many implications.
So what lies beyond citizenship in the state? One thing’s clear: it won’t be some sort of happy-go-lucky world citizenship. Community is inherent to our existence but community isn’t possible without difference. People will continue to distinguish themselves from each other on a group basis, and groups will find themselves in conflict. You can think of the Westphalian system as a sort of multiculturalism on a global scale, with sovereignty as a shield for protecting group difference. The new order we may be moving towards might be a more familiar sort of multiculturalism, beyond the confines of the state.
Can the lessons of citizenship in the state translate to new forms of association (or old ones, like religion) whose importance is rising relative to states? Even if we aren’t moving towards one-world government on the model of the state, how can citizenship translate to newly consequential supranational institutions? I close with some thoughts on that in Beyond Citizenship, and that’s where I’ll close here.
I’ve enjoyed blogging this week at VC, and thanks to commenters (excepting those who accused me of treason!) and to Eugene for hosting me here.
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So if I take you at your word, nations are breaking down and people will cling to identities defined by race, ethnicity, and/or religion. Simultaneously, however, there is no "world community" citizenship in the offing.
The obvious implication is that citizenship based on voluntary allegiance to a spacially-defined and limited polity will give way to what is essentially global tribalism, of the sort seen in in the Middle East, Africa, and (the largest tribe of all) Han-dominated China.
Except for the fact that tribalism is simply incompatible with liberal democracy, and exceedingly prone to absolutist fervors. In other words, this is not a feature. It is a bug.
The obvious implication is that citizenship based on voluntary allegiance to a spacially-defined and limited polity will give way to what is essentially global tribalism, of the sort seen in in the Middle East, Africa, and (the largest tribe of all) Han-dominated China.
For the most part, that's how I've been reading Mr. Spiro's series too. And for the most part, I concur with Spiro, albeit for reasons somewhat different from the ones he brought up. But I also think that culture will eventually become so diffuse in this new environment that even tribes as we know them today will have a hard time holding together culturally.
In other words, this is not a feature. It is a bug.
As Spiro alluded to above, this isn't a question of whether/how long liberal democracy or the nation-state model will remain desirable; it's a question of whether/how long they will remain viable.
Think of it like petroleum-fueled vehicles (cars, trucks, jetliners, etc.) and the mobility they provide. There's no question that we're all much better off with that mobility than without it. But that's not going to matter when the oil starts running out. If we can't adapt by finding suitable alternative fuels before that happens, we might as well break out the horses and buggies, and kiss our mobile society goodbye.
Likewise, there's no question that Americans are better off with a world order based on strong nation-states, with the U.S. the strongest of the bunch, than with a more chaotic world order based on tribalism. But that's not going to matter unless the U.S. can somehow roll back the breakdown of nations, or at least firewall its own society off from the effects of that breakdown. Needless to say, I am not optimistic on either front. The former would require intervention in dozens of failed nation-states at once, making Operation Iraqi Freedom look like child's play. The latter would require nothing less than completely extricating the U.S. from the very global economy and media environment that it played a large part in creating in the first place. The self-inflicted economic damage that entails alone would be staggering. It would also mean bye-bye World Wide Web, hello Nation Wide Web, insulated from the tribes of the outside world by an American version of the "Great Firewall of China". Other global-scale media (satellite TV networks, cell phone services, etc.) would also have to be curtailed for the same purpose.
Not going to happen, you say? Well, I agree. Which is precisely why I concur with Spiro that America's future as a nation-state is murky at best. I've heard it said that the true measure of a nation's strength is its ability to adapt to changing times. Well, if Spiro and I are right, ours is about to be measured once more, but this time there's a very real possibility that we will come up short.
On that cheery note, have a great Memorial Day weekend and remember all those who have given their lives so that America could last as long as it has. This is one of those times when I hope Spiro and I are wrong.
To exploit your analogy, then - is it because we're "running out" of citizenship? Or are certain political groups cutting off access to known supplies because they don't fit into the grander utopian scheme?
If large swaths of the world have sunk back into tribalism and barbarism and resembles the burning banlieus of France from not too long ago, why would we need trade and communications with them? There will be no one left to talk to or trade with.
As long as we make sure that citizenship remains a privilege and a responsbility, not a right, and keep pursuing our "Moneyball" strategy (i.e. pick up the people and skills and talents the rest of the world has no place for instead of pursuing the fads that everyone else does), we'll do OK. Great nations never die, save by suicide. So long as this nation has people with the courage to keep us safe while we re-learn those truths the founders held to be self-evident, as we've had to do many times before, we'll do just fine. Happy Memorial Day to all.
Nationality has been around for a long time, but there is no quarantee that it is the way thing will always be.
Regards -- Cliff
Lost in Lowell
Well, we *may* be witnessing the decline of citizenship, but I see no reason to think so. Of course, it is easy to point to incoherence or unsustainability in today's ideas about citizenship, but it is equally easy (perhaps easier) to point to incoherence or unsustainabiliuty in ideas about citizenship held 50, 100 or 150 years ago.
Also, I see little evidence to support the idea that
community isn’t possible without difference.
If one examines nations which are very ethnically, religiously and culturally homogenous, one tends to see high levels of social cooperation, even when the nations are quite large, and not facing any immediate external threat - Japan comes to mind.
Finally, think your analysis misses quite a bit in focusing on formal, statutory rights and duties. Social pressures and ideological commitments are extremely important (though difficult for lawyers to get a handle on). An important topic, and I enjoyed your posts, but I think more thought is still needed.
Here in the US, the federal government was originally set up to perform only a few limited functions, with a correspondingly limited scope of powers. The remaining powers were reserved to the many smaller states within the federal system. The central government has long since trampled its Constitutional bounds. It would be worthwhile to consider re-establishing those bounds. One of the advantages then would be the relatively easy opportunity for individuals to choose among many states in which to live, and this competition would serve to constrain the impositions of state governments on individual liberty.
Another definition of "citizenship" is that it refers to a person's character as a member of society. It doesn't necessarily have anything to do with allegiance or the state.
Or do we all hold hands and sing Kumbaya? How does that work?
I think he was saying that communities define themselves by their difference to what is outside them, not that they themselves require difference internally.