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Libertarian Theories of War:
In my post below I describe the libertarian take on war to be undertheorized. Two VC readers independently pointed me to two different articles by libertarians in a symposium on "War and Liberty," published in The Reason Papers. Though quite different from each other, both offer the type of effort I was calling for. I have only had a chance to read each paper very quickly, but I found them both to be very thoughtful and I wanted to get links to them up here promptly.

The first, War and Liberty, by Aeon Skoble makes many of the same arguments about sovereignty that I made in my post but goes beyond that to present a modified theory of soveriegnty. Here is a bit:
The problem is that the notion of state sovereignty in the modern era leads to a view of the moral equivalence of all states—Communist China is then no different from Republican Switzerland—and this is detrimental to human rights, because it means that a tyrannical state is immune from outside pressures to liberalize. Michael Walzer goes some of the way in this direction, but not to the ultimate conclusion. The argument is that sovereignty needs to be based in service to people, that is, protecting their rights, so illegitimate regimes don't have sovereignty at all. There's a Lockean component here also: If rights are conceptually prior to the state, then state sovereignty must derive from a theory of legitimacy which is based on protection of rights rather than from a theory of moral equality of all states.

The rights component gets lost when we adopt a "realist" model of legitimacy, such as actually holding power or being "recognized" by the UN. Now, what are the causes which might count as "just cause"? Least controversial is defense against aggression. The right to respond to force with force seems fairly straightforward, although in a moment I will indicate why it might not be for some. A bit less obvious is defense of another. If B is invaded by A, B might have the right to repel the invasion, but utterly lack the power to do so. C's assistance would be justified on the grounds that B was unjustified in aggressing against A in the first place. C's right to use force against A follows from B's right. More controversial still are interventions; for example, taking sides in a civil war or preventing a genocide or removing a tyrant. It might seem as though only in this last case does it even matter what model of legitimacy we adopt. If A is attacked, isn't A's right of selfdefense absolute regardless of whether it is attacked by a republic or a tyranny? Traditional just war theory would answer yes, but I think it actually does matter. Since tyrannical states have no legitimacy, if they are attacked by free states, they cannot claim that their sovereignty is being violated. In other words, intervening to protect rights against a tyrant is not a violation of sovereignty—at least not any kind of sovereignty worth defending. (Nevertheless, the attack would have to satisfy other justice conditions, e.g., it would have to be intended to liberate oppressed people or prevent a genocide rather than to seize raw materials or to acquire territory.)

Some will argue that a free society has no business interfering in other societies' internal politics. But this is, ironically, or paradoxically, a holdover from the old monarchist mindset. The old order on which traditional just war theory is based, and on which sovereignty is the paramount value in international relations, depends on a moral equivalence between states which is derived from a statist view, not an individualist view. On a non-statist, individualist view, individuals, not states, have rights. States may have powers, but the just powers derive from the consent of the governed. The putative right of any state to sovereignty thus is a function of its protection of the rights of the people in its domain. So a free society may very well have some business "interfering" in tyrannical or genocidal states—namely, the business of protecting life and liberty. The very language—that this is "interference" in a state's own affairs--implies that the state has some right of action which is presumptively respected, and again, this can only be justified by old-order thinking, not by liberal thinking. (I am not here arguing that they are obliged to do so, only that they are permitted to do so, or that they do no wrong by doing so.)
The second The Justice and Prudence of War: Toward A Libertarian Analysis is by Rod Long. Here is how it starts:
The morality of warfare is an issue that has long divided libertarians. The spectrum of libertarian opinion on the subject ranges all the way from Leonard Peikoff, who defends the use of nuclear weapons against civilian targets, to Robert LeFevre, who denied the legitimacy of all violence, even in self-defense.

Needless to say, most libertarians fall at various points between these two extremes — though the divisions have become sharper since the 9/11 attacks. (One of the more ironic manifestations of these divisions is that French libertarians are far more likely to support current US foreign policy than American libertarians are; perhaps anti-government thinkers tend to be more attracted to whatever position their own government opposes.)

What view of warfare is most consistent with libertarian principles? Here I shall distinguish between libertarianism as a normative ethical theory — a theory of justice — and libertarianism as a descriptive social theory. Libertarians disagree with one another as to the extent of the former's dependence on the latter; utilitarian libertarians profess to believe the dependence total, while natural-rights libertarians profess to believe it nonexistent, but in practice both groups tend to treat the dependence as partial, and so will I.

Deontological Considerations

The non-consequentialist core of libertarian ethical theory is an egalitarian commitment; specifically, a commitment not to socioeconomic equality but to equality in authority. Indeed, libertarians' lack of enthusiasm for enforced socioeconomic equality stems precisely from their concern that it can be achieved only at the cost of this for libertarians more fundamental form of equality.

The libertarian "non-aggression principle" expresses the conviction that forcibly to subordinate the person or property of another to one's own aims is to assume an unjustifiable inequality in authority between oneself and the other. And it is because this equality in authority likewise holds between private citizens and public officials that governments are forbidden to exercise any powers not available to people generally; libertarianism requires not just equality before the law but equality with the law.

It follows that a consistent libertarian theory of warfare must apply the same prohibitions and permissions to governments and private individuals alike. In this respect it will be radically different from nonlibertarian theories, which typically grant government actors more latitude in the use of violence than private actors; a libertarian theory must be equally permissive — or equally restrictive — with both. A consistent libertarian cannot, for example, accept a mere apology as sufficient recompense when the US military accidentally bombs the wrong target and kills fifteen children in Afghanistan[5]unless she is prepared to be equally tolerant when Uncle Zeke's backyard bazooka target practice accidentally takes out a passing school bus. It can make no difference whether the perpetrator is or is not an agent of the government; nor can it make any difference whether the victims are or are not citizens of that government.
I really need to subscribe to The Reason Papers, which are edited by Aeon Skoble.
T. Gracchus (mail):
The excerpt from Ron Long gets to the core of the problem I ad with the OpEd piece and your posts below - the explanation for a possible justification for interventionist war seems disconnected from the principles giving rise to the libertarian theory(ies).
7.20.2007 10:55am
loki13 (mail):
This is interesting, but it reminds me of the Trotskyist/Stalinist split.
Or perhaps the Bolshevik/Menshevik split.

This is why libertarianism, as an ideal, has been attractive to me, but as an in ideology I shy away from it. When you start with your a priori beliefs, and then have to make the inconvenient facts of life fit them, the results are not so pretty. The entire idea of a libertarian 'preemptive war' based on the dislike of another nation-state's internal affairs is both abhorrent and suspect. While Skoble's waffling at the end, "I am not here arguing that they are obliged to do so, only that they are permitted to do so, or that they do no wrong by doing so. . ." can quickly become an imperative to do so, and then we have what?

A worldwide libertarian revolution? The libertarian IWW? One country (the USA, presumably) using force to make sure that other countries have free markets? Can we preemptively invade Sweden because they have nationalized health care? On the flip side, could another, more human rights friendly country preemptively invade us because of Gitmo?

*sigh*

All this to make the Iraq War justifications okay from a libertarian perspective? The mind, truly, boggles.
7.20.2007 11:02am
Justin (mail):
loki13, remember Randy Barnett's goalpost-moving. This isn't "about" "the Iraq war." Whether this is "about" "liberterians feeling good about their support of the Republican party" is a different matter entirely.
7.20.2007 11:07am
Aeon J. Skoble (mail):
I appreciate the linkage! By way of a "preemptive strike" against the massive flaming I'm sure I'm about to get, let me clarify that while I (a) stand by the arguments I made in that essay and (b) was in favor of the war initially, I have been opposed since Nov 04, as I explained in my blogpost of 11/10/04: http://hnn.us/blogs/entries/8462.html. So while I agree with Randy in general, and have been defending him over at http://www.libertyandpower.org, I do now think US involvement in Iraq should end. That doesn't invalidate anything in my original essay, nor in Randy's current thesis. (I tried to make those live links, but it wouldn't take, so you'll have to cut and paste, sorry.)
7.20.2007 11:13am
Aeon J. Skoble (mail):
BTW, no definite article in the title of the journal -- it's simply Reason Papers. (www.reasonpapers.com)
7.20.2007 11:38am
Salixquercus (mail):
Wow that's a lot of words. I'll sum it up as I see it.

Libertarians, like me, are fools, and some Libertarians are more foolish than others.
7.20.2007 12:07pm
FredR (mail):
Seems to me that Mr. Skoble is going backward, not forward. The "Westphalian system" came about to end the most destructive conflict in European history -- the Thirty Year's War, which was called into being by the Reformation. States and principalities intervened in the affairs of their neighbors (and sometimes invaded them) to protect the religious rights of minorities (a sort of religious intervention). Unfortunately, this touched off a series of very nasty wars since in effect any state's business was that of its neighbors, at least as far as religion went.

The Peace of Westphalia ended this by holding that 1) the population take the religion of the prince and 2) the internal affairs of any state were its own business.

As some of the other commenters have already mentioned, if you allow intervention and even legitimacy to be determined by ill-defined rights, you get into a hall of mirrors. No one can agree on exactly what "universal" rights are, so in effect any state's business would once again be the business of its neighbors.

You certainly have examples of states intervening the protect "rights" in other times. One example would be Hitler engineering the collapse of the Czechoslovakian state, using the rights of the Sudaten Germans as a pretext.
7.20.2007 12:17pm
Robert Lutton:
Aeon,
Thanks for joining the discussion.

One question comes to mind. Let us say it is 1950 or so, and there is an African superpower. Am I correct in assuming that you are saying that those Arificans would be justified in attacking the US to gain rights for African Americans who were being denied their democratic rights?

I hope you don't take this as flaming. I just am trying to make more concrete your A vs B vs C thing.
7.20.2007 12:18pm
Aeon J. Skoble (mail):
Robert-
Not sure about America ca. 1950, but in 1850, definitely. This was obviated by the Union Army of course. In the 1950 case, it's not clear. Certainly in localized incidents, the National Guard was doing what I allude to -- trumping the ostensible "state sovereignty" of Alabama or Arkansas or whatever and making sure that the black kids could get into their schools. Since the US armed forces were addressing the problem, a foreign intervention probably wouldn't have been justified.
7.20.2007 1:11pm
bigchris1313 (mail):
I find foreign policy to be the biggest problem with libertariianism. For domestic issues, I find libertarianism the most compelling argument, while for international relations, I cannot fathom any system other than calculated realism.

Unfortunately, this leaves me ideologically inconsistent. That being said, I don't have a problem with it. As much as I would enjoy an international system full of libertarian states, the idea of hamstringing the state's ability to conduct foreign policy is preposterous, given the realist beliefs regarding the world order. This brings me to my main point.

Why bother having a libertarian foreign policy? The idea of not acting as a realist seems foolish, given that other states are not going to act in the same fashion. In a game without rules, handicapping yourself is irrational. So why not forgo this idea of libertiarn war doctrine and focus on the issues that the nation-state can effectively solve in a libertarian fashion (ie: domestic issues)?
7.20.2007 1:27pm
JWB (mail):
What you seem to be arguing for here isn't a "libertarian theory of war," but rather a libertarian theory to justify deposing regimes hostile to human rights. (Is there any libertarian who wouldn't allow war merely for self-defense?)

It strikes me that the hole in both of these "libertarian" theories is a failure to recognize a basic principle of politics, which I'll credit to Francois Furet but which has been stated by many: No regime can govern without the consent of the people.

Hitler, Stalin, Mao, they all had the consent of their populaces, even as they were slaughtering them. The consent can be explained by fear, by the difficulty of opposition or simply by inertia, but it was present. Counter-examples are obvious: The Jacobins could not maintain power because they lacked consent. The Articles of Confederacy might be a similar example, if in an entirely different vein.

If you depose a dictator (such as Saddam), where do you suppose consent for the incoming government will come from? What is becoming obvious in Iraq is that the new government, installed by the United States, lacks the consent of the people and hence is permanently foundering. The eventual government in Iraq is almost surely to be a reconstituted despotism, created by illiberal forces who manage to co-opt consent of a significant portion of Iraqi society and then terrorize the rest into submission. This is hardly a libertarian outcome.

Moreover, this line of posts is arguing for a type of warfare utterly absent from the historical tradition. Wars of aggression to claim land, peoples, or client-states are prolific throughout history. Wars of self-defense against aggressive nations are similarly common. Before US foreign policy in the last half of the 20th century, when were there wars in which a country sought to depose a regime and then withdraw to allow the local populace to create their own regime from scratch? Why would a libertarian expect this to work?
7.20.2007 1:28pm
Salixquercus (mail):
It's just another excuse for power-mongering. Circa 1700, it was ok to kill the natives because we were bringing them Christianity. Now it's ok because we're spreading human rights.
7.20.2007 2:28pm
Sigivald (mail):
JWB: "Consent" by fear of aggressive action is not "consent" in a moral (or libertarian theoretical) sense, so thus only a practical objection (as you seem to have noticed, but it's probably best to make it explicit, since the term normally has a moral connotation).

Note also that before the 18th century, Republican government hadn't been practiced since the fall of the Roman republic, and the new form being tried in the US was radically more represenative; why would anyone have expected it to work?

Similarly, slavery was a nearly universal practice for the majority of humanity's history. Why would anyone have expected it to ever end?

I don't think that "this is a new thing, how could it be expected to work?" is a strong argument against a plan of action. "It won't work because [inevitable or very likely practical flaw] or [inherent logical flaw]" is going to be a much more effective tack.

(And haven't we already deposed dictators and managed to replace them with new governments governed by actual consent, in Germany and Japan* in the years following 1945?

* Not technically dictatorship, but hardly government by-and-of the people, as Japan was effectively under military rule from 1932 onward (and a legal one-party state from 1940).

And still an example of a serious change of governmental form and function from outside, in any case.)

Mightn't a libertarian be willing to try, in any case, as there's no overwhelming reason to assume failure, and the gains are so great, in terms of both future peace (given that actually representative governments rarely - if ever - seem to fight each-other) and moral rectitude?
7.20.2007 2:59pm
Thorley Winston (mail) (www):
What is becoming obvious in Iraq is that the new government, installed by the United States, lacks the consent of the people and hence is permanently foundering.


You may want to share that insight with the 76% percent of registered Iraqi voters who voted for their government in the 2005 elections.
7.20.2007 3:11pm
Thorley Winston (mail) (www):
I find foreign policy to be the biggest problem with libertariianism. For domestic issues, I find libertarianism the most compelling argument, while for international relations, I cannot fathom any system other than calculated realism.


I generally agree that libertarianism has very little usefulness on matters of foreign policy but I'm not sure what you mean by "realism." IMO saying one's foreign policy is based in "realism" is like referring to oneself as a "moderate" -- the term itself is meaningless and it's only function seems to be to enable one to triangulate by suggesting that by claiming the title of "realist" (or "moderate") one's opponents are therefore "unrealistic" (or "extremist"). It's a rhetorical tool rather than a useful way of describing policy preferences.
7.20.2007 3:18pm
bigchris1313 (mail):

It's a rhetorical tool rather than a useful way of describing policy preferences.


That's understandable. But there are actually realist schools of thought, which are based upon various suppositions. Here are what I believe to be the most important:

1) There is no real international order.
2) States act in their own best interests.
3) The status quo (stability) is always ok.

Realism is more a way to evaulate policies, and a general way to craft policy, rather than specific guidelines for policy. Realism says that states should do whatever they can to further their interests in the international realm, based upon the calculation of those interests and the cost-benefit analysis thereof. Realists policy makers for country A would determine national interests X,Y, and Z, analyze how much each would cost, and then determine a course of action. Above all, realists hold that stability is a concurrent goal international relations. Although a state wants to further its interets, it wants to do so while preserving stability, the loss of which results in war, chaos, and a big mess. If nothing else, upsetting current stability and relative peace is bad for the delicate order of the system. Realists enjoy policies that are cheap, have a high probability of return, and are generally moderate.

Realism neither advocates Hawkish or Dovish stances. If you can spend relatively little money buying off a dictatorship, it is preferable to an expensive military action. If a country refuses to respond to your demands and it threatens your interests elsewhere, if the cost of military action is less than the effects of undesirable policy, take military action. If the effects of the other state's policies are bad, but not as costly as military action, do not act. Realism strives to take smaller, more precise actions with small, reasonable, and above all, attainable, goals. These actions can be military, diplomatic, or somewhere in between.

But in terms of this argument, the most important facet of realism is that it relieves the state of any moral handicap. Certainly, the state must abide by its own rules (read: the constitution, statutory law, treaties), but it may break so-called international law if necessary. That being said, realist states do not often break international law because the IR game is one of multiple iterations. Repeated transaction is the only way to build trust without a common power enforcing law, which is certainly something an anarcho-capitalist can understand.

Realism does away with illusions of America as "the shining city on the hill" or an "axis of evil." It relieves us of the idea that because a state practices libertarian ideals in domestic policy, it must act in a similiarly moral fashion in IR. Realism claims to be absolved of morality, based on the basic Hobbesian idea that, "Covenants, without the sword, are but words." A realist libertarian would take Mr. Barnett's claims, call them an interesting PR piece, and continue plotting whatever war, covert operation, or diplomatic strongarm he had judged to be precise, effective, and above all, useful.
7.20.2007 3:58pm
William D. Tanksley, Jr:
"A consistent libertarian cannot, for example, accept a mere apology as sufficient recompense when the US military accidentally bombs the wrong target and kills fifteen children in Afghanistan[5]unless she is prepared to be equally tolerant when Uncle Zeke's backyard bazooka target practice accidentally takes out a passing school bus."

Heh. I recognize the meaning of the example, but must protest the choice of terms... A consistent Libertarian who permits violence could accept an apology from one but not from the other if the circumstances were different.

One would have to inquire about the purpose of the action, the means used to target it, the procedures used to ensure that the action had the desired results, and the competence of the people performing the action and procedures. It's possible that either Uncle Zeke or the Army would be allowed to get away with a mere apology (neither scenario gives any information to enable a decision).
7.20.2007 4:37pm
TDPerkins (mail):
And in response to your essay, we have this. Yet more proof, if it were needed, that the good people of LewRockwell.com have removed their brains and pickled them in a vat of Ayn Rand's spittle.

Yours, TDP, ml, msl, &pfpp
7.20.2007 4:48pm
John Kunze:
JWB asserted that "No regime can govern without the consent of the people." Hitler and Mao certainly seemed to have had enthusiastic support from large blocks of people. Nevertheless, the proposition is false. Dictatorial regimes often govern without the consent of the governed.

Saddam is a counter example. He ruled by brutal repression, with large blocks against him who were afraid to do anything. Brutality, not consent, made his government was very stable.

After Saddam Iraq is unstable, but it would be perverse to say that Saddam had the consent of the governed but Maliki does not.

Saddam was largely unchallenged as a leader, but Maliki has some meaningful consent, though not enough. Saddam in his last few years had little consent but great power. Equating consent with power makes no sense.

Dictatorial regimes often govern without the consent of the governed.
7.20.2007 6:50pm
David M. Nieporent (www):
FredR: your argument that the Westphalian system is beneficial is right if our primary concern is "How do we avoid wars?", but not if it's "How do we maximize liberty?" Libertarians do agree on which rights are universal -- the right not to have force initiated against oneself.
7.21.2007 2:21am
markm (mail):
"No regime can govern without the consent of the people." Ask a Southerner about Reconstruction.
7.21.2007 9:20am
a knight (mail) (www):
To contemplate libertarianism without citing Murray Rothbard is akin to discussing Original Intent without mentioning James Madison. In the early to mid eighties, when I was active within the LP, I would volunteer time at petition booths to enable ballot access. I would also at times find myself amongst persons, who could eloquently speak of personal liberty, it meanings and implications when held as an axiomatic core of a political party. Invariably, the conversation always contained references to Murray Rothbard. He is the gold standard for libertarian theory in America, but he would be an insurmountable barrier for any who desire to take libertarianism down into the mud of the war parties.

There is only one case for just war, and that as an act of self-defense, which exists a direct one-step causal jig away to a directly engaged foe. Also, it cannot in anyway impair the liberties of anyone who is not an active party in the harm being defended against.

Obviously, this does not include war rationalised using the oxymoronic concept, promulgated by the hot-to-trotskyite other peoples' children into an unjust war, the evidence notwithstanding; equivocators of America's soul: "preemptive self-defense". That's a semantical Orwellian collar used as a tool by neoconnivers to pull conservatism farther down from the event horizon into the dark miasmal well of relativism. A Conservative American President has placed America's imprimatur upon premeditated acts of human torture, has reneged on the Geneva Conventions in clear violation of the US Constitution Article VI; Clause 2. The President does not lawfully exist without the strictures of the only document that scepters legitimacy to his official acts. What part of "The Supreme Law of The Land", is so gray and hazy, it needs ponderous pontificators in black satin robes to augur the Constitution's entrails, using arcane and esoteric divination rituals to properly discover its original meaning?

Here are links to two Rothbard essays regarding war, and a link to Rothbard articles hosted at lewrockwell dot com. Apologies if this offends some. I am acutely aware, because of a predilection to chase the tangential, that within just a few short hops along threads emanating from some of the site's published authors exists sites I find personally reprehensible. Stick to the Rothbard archives, or pay attention if you begin to flit around, and do not complain about mysteriously ending up at stormfront to me if it happens. The first; "The Right to Self-defense" is a primary Rothbard document, and is notable for a reason other than defining what constitutes self-defense, because the fourth paragraph references a libertarian concept that is often ignored by present day pretenders: the right to organise, strike and boycott. The second: "And Now Afghanistan", was considered a radical and error-ridden essay by mainstream society when it was penned in 1980.

*The Right to Self-Defense
*And Now Afghanistan - Originally published in the January-February 1980 issue of The Libertarian Forum.
*Murray Rothbard Archive at lewRockwell dot com

I believe the Iraq War is immoral from any true libertarian point of view. Maybe there should a different angle attendant to this seine net fishing, that seems to have caught far too many libertarian equivocators, instead of the real deal. There should be comparisons made between paleocons and contemporary conservatism. Barry Goldwater's 1964 GOP presidential nomination acceptance speech offers an appropriate pull quote:
"Now those who seek absolute power, even though they seek it to do what they regard as good, are simply demanding the right to enforce their own version of heaven on earth, and let me remind you they are the very ones who always create the most hellish tyranny."

My personal muse is that no real conservative would ground their positivist defense of an overreaching president in the acts, words, or legacy of Franklin Delano Roosevelt.

Andrew Bacevich offers some good middle ground, but his analysis is not well-suited for quick quoting.

Taki Theodoracopulos, a person I have often found myself in disagreement with in the past, stated his antiwar and disgust for the bipolar polity in a manner that resonates deeply inside me:
What are Right and Left any more? Who is a liberal and who is a conservative? When Madeleine Albright proudly announces that the deaths of 500,000 Iraqi children via the sanctions on Iraq were worth it, even God becomes suspect. Which liberal or conservative can explain to me the difference between an Iraqi insurgent's roadside bomb that kills civilian passersby and a U.S. bombing raid that also causes the deaths of innocent women and children? Both are acts of savagery: in both cases one knows in advance that civilians will most certainly be killed. Bush and Americans in general claim the moral high ground, but both are terribly wrong. War is a barbaric business. Only defensive wars are justified.
When this journal began four years ago, a bum by the name of David Frum accused us of being unpatriotic Americans-this from a man who has never seen war up close and would never send his son or daughter to serve their country. But we were proved right. Iraq is the greatest American foreign-policy failure, bigger than Vietnam, but the neocons have yet to apologize. To the contrary. The Murdoch-owned Weekly Standard's William Kristol, a sofa samurai par excellence, is urging Uncle Sam to stop dithering and to engage in more pre-emptive wars. Kristol calls himself a conservative. Could I possibly call myself the same? Not on your life.

All governments are monopolies of organized force, inherently unjustifiable. And once accepted, they are bound to get out of control sooner or later. No, there is no longer a Right or a Left. Bush's mammoth expansion of government power and spending makes LBJ look like Robert Taft, the last true conservative-and peace lover, I might add.

Labels are for fools.

Taki Theodoracopulos, "What's Right? What's Left? Does it Matter?", American Conservative, August 28, 2006
7.21.2007 1:36pm
SIG357:
TDPerkins

At the bottom of the linked article, there is this;

Max Raskin [send him mail] goes to high school in New Jersey.

I've always felt libertarianism was the ideology of choice for high-school students.
7.21.2007 1:37pm
Sheldon Richman (mail) (www):
"Some will argue that a free society has no business interfering in other societies' internal politics. But this is, ironically, or paradoxically, a holdover from the old monarchist mindset."

There is no irony or paradox if a libertarian makes this argument because it is not based on state sovereignty. Rather, it is based on the consideration that adopting such a rule would help to keep states from clashing. Since innocents get killed when states class, this is a highly sensible rule. National sovereignty has nothing to do with it.
7.22.2007 5:43pm
Aeon J. Skoble (mail):
Innocents also get killed when states don't clash. Ask a Rwandan.
7.23.2007 1:14pm
Walter Block (mail):
suggested reading:

Rothbard, Murray N. 1963. "War, Peace, and the State." The Standard, April, pp. 2 5; 15 16. http://www.mises.org/rothbard/warpeace.asp

Block, Walter. 2007. "Randy Barnett: Pro War Libertarian?" July 23;
http://www.lewrockwell.com/block/block79.html
7.23.2007 9:12pm
Walter Block (mail):
more suggested reading:

Rothbard, Murray N. 1984. "Eric Mack and the Anarchist Case for War." The Libertarian Forum. Vol. 18, No. 5-6, pp. 3-7; http://www.mises.org/journals/lf/1984/1984_05-06.pdf

this challenges Roderick's view that govts and individuals should be treated analogously
7.23.2007 9:15pm