A reader asked me whether true reputation-injuring statements are categorically immune from defamation liability. (Let's set aside for now invasion of privacy and other torts.) His state statute, he noticed, provided that such statements are protected only if they are said with "good motives" and for "justifiable ends."
Historically, many state statutes indeed so limited the truth defense. Today, I expect that such limitations would be unconstitutional: Defamation liability is said to be constitutional because "there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact," a rationale that doesn't apply to true statements. As to statements on "public issues," the Court has expressly rejected the good motives/justifiable ends limitation. But my sense is that such a limitation would be rejected as to private-concern statements, too; and I know of no modern cases that continue to apply the limitation.
Except, that is, for the remarkable case of Johnson v. Johnson, 654 A.2d 1212 (R.I. 1995). The facts:
On the evening of August 29, 1986, plaintiff entered Twin Oaks Restaurant in Cranston and proceeded to walk to the podium. While at the podium, plaintiff [ex-wife] saw defendant [her ex-husband] approach and ask her how her “[epithet] lawyer Fishbein” was. The defendant then drew nearer plaintiff who was standing with her then boyfriend-now husband Philip Caliri. At a distance of about four feet, in a loud voice, defendant screamed, “Phil, you are a * * * [epithet]. You could have prevented this case.” The defendant then pointed his finger in the face of plaintiff, while talking to Philip Caliri but screaming for all to hear, “You and that [obscenity] whore are costing me a lot of money.” ...
The ex-wife sued, claiming that the ex-husband slandered her by calling her a "whore," which in context appeared to mean someone who was unfaithful, not someone who was a prostitute. The court concluded the charges were true: "The findings of fact made by the trial justice are clear and unequivocal that the plaintiff fit the definition of the defamatory term applied to her." Yet the court went on to rule that, while "[i]n this case some spite and ill will might be understandable," "the trial justice was [not] clearly wrong when he confirmed the probable finding of the jury (although no special interrogatories had been submitted) that defendant acted out of spite and ill will."
Result: The compensatory damages award was upheld, on the theory that reputation-injuring but true statements on matters of private concern could still be actionable if said out of "malicious motives." The punitive damages award, however, was rejected, because in this case "defendant was the victim of a long course of reprehensible behavior committed against him by plaintiff."
I think this is an outlier case, which is inconsistent with the Court's false statement of fact jurisprudence, and which most American courts would not follow. Yet there it is, from the Rhode Island Supreme Court in 1995.
Don't know if it's in the original or your typo, but there appears to be some ambiguity as to who "defendant" and "plaintiff" are; no big deal but it makes the story a little hard to follow.
it's RHODE ISLAND
dershowitz had it right
whore: a woman who will sleep with anyone
lesbian: a woman who will sleep with anyone but you
Although, I did recently hear a stand-up comic call his wife a whore for failing to warn him that their vacation to warmer climes would include a visit to a very cold tourist attraction. They're still married, as far as I know, despite his habit of verbally abusing her in his comedy routines.
Vukdog: What you describe is a different matter -- the principle there is that there is a false statement of fact, but strongly implied rather than expressly stated. Saying "I saw X running away from the dead body, with a bloody knife is his hand" may well be libelous if the speaker knows (but doesn't say) that X was running after the killer (who was running off to kill someone else) rather than being the killer himself.
Don't know if the case was real or not, but here's the Affirmative Defense.
I love you lawyers: This could have come from a Kingley Amis novel.
If you have an interest in this, take a peek at German law. Personal insults are taken quite seriously, and one can incur a hefty fine for blasting-off against someone in public. (I think this comes under the Right to Human Dignity in the Basic Law. But I haven't been there in a long time, so best to check before, say, calling a meter-maid a 'pig in a skirt' or something like that.)
I think the point was that she wasn't cheating on her spouse and, not having done so, was justifiably upset at being called a whore.
I believe the answer would be yes. Furthermore, by publicizing the statement you would also be guilty of slander or libel. There might be some causation issues regarding the extent of the liability of the initial speaker. I think you could only give the tape or otherwise reveal the slanderous statement to the person who was slandered to avoid a potential action against yourself.
Then the defendant in the primary slander action would also have a claim against you for the illegal wiretapping, and damages might be easier to establish given a prior judgment against the plaintiff himself. Of course the wiretapping itself may or may not be actionable depending on what state you find yourself in.
A 1922 American law dictionary, for example, contains an entry for the word slut, the sole purpose of which is to announce that the word means an “untidy woman” and therefore is not to be considered slanderous.
The slut doctrine, as I like to call it, came from an 1888 Illinois case that was not officially overruled by the Illinois Supreme Court until 1996.