Part 4 of excerpts from War Made New: Technology, Warfare, and the Course of History, 1500 to Today, by Max Boot:

The major theme that runs throughout War Made New is the importance of not missing out on the next big change in warfare. History is driven by many factors, but in academia’s rush to focus on economics, race, class, sexuality, geography, germs, culture, or other influences, it would be foolish and short-sighted to overlook the impact of military prowess and especially aptitude in taking advantage of major shifts in war-fighting. Of course a country’s success, or lack thereof, in harnessing change cannot be divorced from such underlying factors as its economic health, scientific sophistication, educational system, political stability, and so forth. But, contrary to Napoleon, God is not necessarily “on the side of the big battalions.” Even big and wealthy countries often lose wars and head into longterm decline through a lack of military skill.

The considerable gains of the Axis during the early years of World War II came, after all, against a coalition of Allied states that in aggregate had 40% greater GNP and 170% larger population. That the Axis ultimately lost goes to show that military skill can sometimes be trumped by greater resources if a war drags on long enough and if the side with greater resources shows sufficient wisdom in their employment. But even in a long coalition war the side with the greater resources does not always prevail. The alliance of Britain, Hanover, and Prussia was dwarfed in economic and demographic resources by its adversaries in the Seven Years' War (1756-1763)--France, Austria, Russia, Sweden, Saxony, and (near the end) Spain—but still managed to win largely because of the superlative skill of the Prussian army and the British navy. War Made New chronicles many other examples of the poorer side emerging victorious—Britain beat the Spanish Armada (1588), Sweden beat the Holy Roman Empire at Breitenfeld and Lutzen (1631-32), Prussia beat the Habsburg Empire at Königgrätz (1866), and Japan beat the Russian Empire in 1904-1905. More recent instances might be cited of the poorer power winning, such as North Vietnam’s defeat of the United States or the Afghans’ defeat of the Soviet Union.

These were not anomalies. In a statistical analysis of 20th century wars, the side with the larger GNP, population, armed forces, and defense expenditures won only a little more than half the time, making these factors about as useful in predicting military outcomes as flipping a coin. Political scientist Stephen Biddle, who analyzed these statistics, writes that “Superior numbers can be decisive or almost irrelevant depending on the two sides’ force employment. This in turn means that states’ relative economic, demographic, or industrial strength are poor indicators of real military power: gross resource advantages matter only if they can be exploited via modern-system force employment, and many states cannot do so…. How forces are used is critical.”

The ongoing proliferation of destructive technology means that the link between economic and military power is more tenuous than ever. Al Qaeda, whose entire budget would be insufficient to buy a single F-22, can inflict devastating damage on the world’s richest country. Advances in biological and cyberwar promise to put even more destructive potential into the hands of ever smaller groups—as does the continued proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Imagine the devastating consequences of a mega-terrorist attack. Not only could millions die but international travel and commerce—the lifeblood of the global economy--could be severely disrupted. Such a scenario reveals the falsity of economic determinist arguments which counsel that military strength is unimportant and that it is feasible to stint on military preparedness in order to strengthen the economy. On the contrary, there can be no long-term prosperity without security. The entire world today depends, no matter how begrudgingly or unwittingly, on the protection provided by the United States, whose armed forces keep open air and sea lanes, safeguard energy supplies, and deter most cross-border aggression.

Dreamers can convince themselves that military power no longer matters, that economic interdependence has consigned war to the dustbin of history, and that a country need only wield “soft power,” but history is likely to deliver a stark rebuke to such wishful thinking. As a matter of fact, it already has. The attacks of September 11, 2001 put an end to a decade of talk about the “end of history,” a “strategic pause,” the inexorable flow of “globalization,” and the “peace dividend.” The incidence of war may have declined for the moment, but great dangers still loom ahead. Santayana had it right: “Only the dead have seen the end of war.”

Next (and final) installment: Fighting Wildcats and Rodents