My colleague Craig Lerner writes with the following question:
Can people please point me to cases in which the Supreme Court let a circuit split "percolate" (that is, fester) for years and years, before it bothered to address the issue? A recent example would be the 2005 case Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo, where the circuits were split for nearly a decade on the meaning of "loss causation" in securities cases.
If you can point to any such cases, please post them in the Comments or contact Craig directly.
Of course, the one case is in the criminal context, and the other in the immigration context, but it's the exact same statute, and I don't think anyone has suggested that there is a basis to have the same statute mean different things in the different contexts.
A whole bunch of aspects in Copyright law on which the 2nd and 9th Circuits differ, and have for decades.
Since the Hatch-Waxman Act, the 6th, 11th, and 2nd Circuits each have their own antitrust approach to reverse-payment settlements in ANDA infringement litigation, though I'm not quite sure how long this has been percolating, but I definitely agree with the 2nd Circuit approach.
Standards for dismissal seem applied differently if not stated differently.
In 2002, seemingly in direct response to Emerson, the Ninth Circuit came down with Silveira v Lockyer, holding, also in a very long opinion, that the Second Amendment does not guarantee an individual right to keep and bear arms. In fact, the Ninth Circuit specifically disagreed with Emerson in its opinion.
This will no doubt percolate for quite some time before the Supreme Court addresses it if it ever does.
Dan