From an article in today's Washington Post by former Clinton Defense honchos Aston Carter and William Perry:
Should the United States allow a country openly hostile to it and armed with nuclear weapons to perfect an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of delivering nuclear weapons to U.S. soil? We believe not. The Bush administration has unwisely ballyhooed the doctrine of "preemption," which all previous presidents have sustained as an option rather than a dogma. It has applied the doctrine to Iraq, where the intelligence pointed to a threat from weapons of mass destruction that was much smaller than the risk North Korea poses. (The actual threat from Saddam Hussein was, we now know, even smaller than believed at the time of the invasion.) But intervening before mortal threats to U.S. security can develop is surely a prudent policy.Therefore, if North Korea persists in its launch preparations, the United States should immediately make clear its intention to strike and destroy the North Korean Taepodong missile before it can be launched. This could be accomplished, for example, by a cruise missile launched from a submarine carrying a high-explosive warhead. The blast would be similar to the one that killed terrorist leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq. But the effect on the Taepodong would be devastating. The multi-story, thin-skinned missile filled with high-energy fuel is itself explosive -- the U.S. airstrike would puncture the missile and probably cause it to explode. The carefully engineered test bed for North Korea's nascent nuclear missile force would be destroyed, and its attempt to retrogress to Cold War threats thwarted. There would be no damage to North Korea outside the immediate vicinity of the missile gantry.
The U.S. military has announced that it has placed some of the new missile defense interceptors deployed in Alaska and California on alert. In theory, the antiballistic missile system might succeed in smashing into the Taepodong payload as it hurtled through space after the missile booster burned out. But waiting until North Korea's ICBM is launched to interdict it is risky. First, by the time the payload was intercepted, North Korean engineers would already have obtained much of the precious flight test data they are seeking, which they could use to make a whole arsenal of missiles, hiding and protecting them from more U.S. strikes in the maze of tunnels they have dug throughout their mountainous country. Second, the U.S. defensive interceptor could reach the target only if it was flying on a test trajectory that took it into the range of the U.S. defense. Third, the U.S. system is unproven against North Korean missiles and has had an uneven record in its flight tests. A failed attempt at interception could undermine whatever deterrent value our missile defense may have.
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It will be interesting to see what people post today.
Aegis cruisers, probably carrying modified Standard missiles, are stationed off North Korea as part of the Ballistic Missile Shield.
And the Bush Administration's handling of NK has been brilliant.
You think North Korea has to attack South Korea because the US destroys a NK missile? Certainly, the N. Koreans could kill a bunch of S. Koreans if they wanted to, but it's not like we would have caused it. North Korea can make its own choices about how it fights, and it is under no obligation to go out and kill innocents. If it chooses to do so, then it's probably just waiting for a pretext to kill South Koreans anyway. One thing's for sure though. If North Korea is allowed to develop an effective nuclear ICMB, this sort of thing will be harder to prevent.
If I were calling the shots, I'd still take out the missiles. It just seems like a cheap investment, in terms of both money and manpower, in order to preempt the possibility of a problem. We launch a missile, and take out what is clearly a threat to national security. But unlike the Iraq War, this takes a single cruise missile. Cheap and easy. So North Korea declares war on South Korea. I wouldn't hold us any more responsible than when Sadaam launched Scuds at Israel during Desert Storm.
On the other hand, Kim Jong Il might gamble that the current ROK government won't be willing to counterattack, or that destroying Seoul will be sufficient to put the ROK out of commission, because there will be wreckage and refugees streaming south, preventing advance, etc. At that point, his concern would be US and Japanese forces counterattacking. There, he would have to guess US willingness to attack in force (probably just from the carrier group -- troops would mostly have to come from South Korea). Weighing against US counterattack is the possibility of Chinese retaliation, either against Japan, or against Taiwan. Hopefully we're talking with the Chinese about this, and North Korea knows the progress of those discussions.
I don't know what the outcome of this calculation would be. He might very well think he can obliterate Seoul and get away with it. Or he might just weigh the odds, decide that he doesn't want to risk his skin, and therefore do nothing. Or perhaps he'll just fire a few shells at the US base in Seoul -- something small enough that we'd probably be unwilling to counterattack in force, but big enough that he can puff himself up on the world stage.
US should have no legal problem with shooting at a missile once launched, over the ocean - seems like self-defense or reasonable defense of another. Hard to see legal objection to to sabotage or "theft" of materials, assuming no breach of the peace, against any and all WMD arsenals (self help against a nuisance). US should probably also have a standing offer to destroy its arsenal voluntarily (on a pro rata basis) as other places verifiably destroy their arsenals.
Self-defense rights only go so far, even in a nuclear age. Killing people on the ground in NK might make sense based on reasonable fear of nuclear attack on the US or some third country, but no reasonable arbitrators could say now that the US has a reasonable fear of probable nuclear attack. There is no probable cause for the destruction and loss of life suggested.
A hypothetical 1% chance is not a reasonable fear, with all due respect to the VP. How can we know this? Because the US or Russia or Israel or Pakistan or India has a 1% chance of unleashing a nuke attack, depending on assumptions used, and the US would not agree that those countries should be preemptively attacked.
Some nightmares need to be dealt with with diplomacy and economic measures, including the hypothetical 1% chance that NK (or Israel, Pakistan, India, France, Britain, Russia, etc.) will lob a nuke at the US or Japan or some other country.
Looks a bit like the Cuban Missile crises - but less missiles, and not in our hemisphere. US couls consider a blockade of NK ports, assuming SK, Japan, Russia and China agree. What evidence exists that the reasonable diplomatic and economic alternatives have been exhausted?
Actually, you'd probably want to use a volley of missiles because you really shouldn't count on secondary explosions to take out the test facility. Also, a bit of overkill is necessary because cruise missiles can miss the target, fail in flight, or be shot down by NK air defenses. And maybe you need a few strikes to suppress some of those air defenses and create a corridor...
A missile launched in the general direction of the US or its ally is another story.
N.K. has proven capable of irrational behavior, and their response to a strike on their soil is unpredictable. What if NK decides to detonate a nuclear truck bomb in Seoul, to prove their national strength and punish the annoyingly prosperous Yankee puppets?
All possible consequences must be considered before deciding to act.
Actually the indisputable evidence is this is nothing but a test of a missile, not a weapon. We have no right to tell any sovereign nation they can't have a space program and even less right to blow up their missiles on the launch pad.
Cfw, the Kantian approach is interesting but meaningless in international politics. In a society united under a "common power," as Hobbes would assert, such an approach would be appropriate in making laws and so forth.
Unfortunately, the world is not united under any common power. The UN is not a world government: "Where there is no common power, there is now law. Where there is no law, no injustice." International law does not exist. Countries do not need justification for their actions in order to act. We do unto others and they do unto us, and we take recourse for such actions. The realist merely weighs the national interest against the cost required. Interest: elimintate possible national security threat. Cost: minimal. Action: advisable.
Of course, the immediate counter-argument will be to assert that countries will become angry with the US for breaking supposed international agreements. So? As the only superpower, the US has an even greater ability to do as it pleases, even to the dismay of the international community, without any real reprisal. As an added bonus, the international community doesn't have anything positive to say about North Korea.
Law, justice, and all their ilk cannot exist without a common power. International law, much like human rights, is a great misnomer.
"And the Bush Administration's handling of NK has been brilliant."
It is sad that this has become the state of politics in America, where the only defence of one party/administration's actions is to say that the other one's sucks.
Guys, you're both right. Clinton's policy, what little there was of it, sucked; so does Bush's.
And what's even sadder, is that the "best" candidates the parties continue to put forward, still carry the names of "Clinton" and "Bush."
I seriously doubt that we would be having this conversation if it was New York that was within artillery range of North Korea. In fact, I seriously doubt we'd be having this conversation if it was London or Paris or within artillery range. The people of South Korea are entitled to the same level of respect that we would show for any other ally, and that means (at an absolute minimum) not taking a chance with their basic survival.
And incidentally, the first stage of an actual war with North Korea would be competely devastating for the South Koreans (as well as the Americans stationed in South Korea), who are hugely outnumbered by the 1 million+ North Korean army.
The Norks are already dying in large numbers from starvation. Should we value the lives of South Koreans more?
Why would you think this? It's no more an "absolute certainty" that they would do so than it's an "absolute certainly" we would retaliate by bombing North Korea into rubble, and hunt down Kim Jong Il and kill him.
What there is is a risk that he would do so. A certain probability (1%, 5%, 10%, 50%?) that he would decide he is willing to risk it. We can say that risk is unacceptable -- I happen to agree. Any nontrivial risk that Seoul gets shelled is unacceptable to me. But that it's an "absolute certainty?" Pah!
Please try to understand the part of the world that you are talking about here. This is from a Center for Nonproliferation Studies assessment of the possibility of a tactical strike against North Korea:
Read the whole thing here:
http://cns.miis.edu/research/korea/dprkmil.htm
There are no military options here, we know it and the North Koreans know it. That's why North Korea is able to act so aggressively.
But he threatens all the time. He's implicitly threatened to attack Japan too (by firing missiles at Japan), and that just because he was piqued that we were ignoring him.
As to the "oh my god " chorus... Can you please just move to DPRK or China, where your cheques are being signed. I bet you were part of Peace Now and have a Russian or East German case number somewhere. There truly are elements of the left that are beyond paroduy or the most extravagant paranoid fantasies of us hawks.
No one would be as stupid as to build up such a dense city within regular artillery range of the enemy, as the ROK have done. Dan28 should perhaps look into his history of warfare. In it he would find that there was a period a few decades ago when major European cities were threatened by and hit with mass quantities of artillery and other munitions. None of the players changed their game because of that basic threat. C'est la guerre. In a contemporaneous example, Taiwanese citizens are well aware of a monstrous threat from the ChiComs should they ever declare independence but still have about a plurality in favour. Israelis are hit by hundreds of artillery shots every month, and the EU and the Democrats blame them for it (I know, they're evil Jooos/Likudniks and have no right to life, but still).
I call treason and aiding and abetting the enemy on Dan and his ilk. I also demand that they have any credits in logic or game theory revoked, as they obviously are incapable of making any sort of decisions with a hostile counter party. I desperately hope that no one is relying on Dan28 for any sort of negotiation advice! This is vicious ad hominem, but I can't think of a more appropriate response to such a hysterical, nonsensical, illogical, and defeatist opinion.
Yeah, exactly. I doubt he would launch an all out invasion of South Korea, but I'm sure he would escalate the conflict if attacked by the United States. Let's face it, there is no way the U.S. would really declare a true war with North Korea, given the size of the North Korean military, the nearly impossible terrain, the current U.S. military commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the huge number of casualties to both the U.S. and ROK involved. So he could retaliate against ROK or Japan with virtual impunity, and dare us to escalate further.
This arrogant imperialist attitude that assumes the United States military is powerful enough to coerce any concession from any government, or remove any government from power at will, needs to be exocrized from the American political consciousness. We can't fight this battle. We have to negotiate. There are no other options, and there have never been other options. That's what Clinton realized in 1994, and that's the reality Bush has been ignoring since 2002.
Our own 37,000 troops: now that's something worth considering. If there's a North Korean retaliation threat to our forces in South Korea, which would outweigh the threat of a North Korean ICBM program, then, of course, I would be unable to endorse the attack.
Although whether or not a dictator like Kim Jong Il would be willing to be the first to use nuclear weapons post WWII is an interesting question.
Uh, OMG!
That's a ridiculous proposition, and I hope you are joking.
First, consider how long it will take for the missiles to reach North Korea. I'm guess at least a few hours, no? We haven't got launch sites over there, that I know, and would be launching from nuclear subs, if anything. Meanwhile, it takes what, about a minute, at most, for shells from North Korea's 11,000 pieces of heavy artillery to smash into the heart of a metropolis larger than New York. And that's not even counting missiles with chemical and probably biological weapons loaded onto them.
Furthermore, if we want to put North Korea's artillery out of commission, we're going to be bombing right along the border, so yes, fallout will fall on Seoul. Almost directly, in fact.
Seoul has been the capital of Korea for about six hundred years, possibly even more (I forget whether the Yi's chose a new capital or not).
Uh, yes they did. Are you saying the shelling of Paris in the Great War, the Blitz in London in WWII, or the shelling of Vienna (I think it was) by the Bonaparte had no effect?
In the extreme example, the Roman Empire didn't just change policy when Constantinople was hit with the Ottoman mega-cannon -- it ceased to exist. Which is pretty much what will happen to South Korea if the North shells Seoul. 20 million people live in Seoul and the surrounding areas. That's half the population of the ROK.
Anyone who seriously says that North Korea has a space program and that this intercontinental ballistic missile is not a weapon is a fool or worse.
North Korea can threaten to attack South Korea if Brett Favre retires so that isn't a particularly useful statement.
As to South Korea, we should insist that they vote on whether the US stays, and that we leave if more than 1-20% want us to leave. If they want to buddy-up to NoK, we shouldn't interfere, even if the likely result is that they end up eating grass.
What gives you any reason to beleive that there exists a negotiated settlement? As you point out, Clinton negotiated in 1994, and the threat has increased since that point. Bush has consistently attempted to reach a multilateral negotiated settlment, also to no avail.
The arrogant transnationalist attitude that assumes every conflict can be peacefully negotiated away needs to be exprcised from the American political consciousness.
Which is not to say that I think this situation warrants a military strike on North Korean soil. I don't think the cost-benefit ratio works out. But I see no basis whatsoever for assuming that there exists a negotiated solution, or even a good faith partner with whom to attempt negotiations.
Obviously this is part of a weapons program. But this test is of an unarmed missile. I merely meant that we cannot prevent NK from developing long range missiles unless of course they have agreed not to. But even then I doubt blowing it up on the launch pad is the remedy for a breach.
Are you familiar with the concept of trolling?
1) What are the pressures towards attacking? I don't know the internal politics at all, but it's conceivable that NK's hereditary dictator thinks that his own people will soon pull him down, unless he manages some show of strength - demonstrating a working ICBM would be ideal, but demolishing Seoul might be a substitute. (Such things as actually feeding the country seem to be quite beyond his reach.)
2) If he is overthrown by an internal coup or an uprising, chances are he'll be killed on the spot. (Which he quite well deserves, but the possibility doesn't improve the chances of rational thinking.) If he's overthrown by a US invasion, he'll skip across the border to China and likely be supported in style for the rest of his life as a "government in exile".
3) Or he might expect the Chinese to send their army in and restore him to the throne in case of an invasion.
On the other hand, I cannot see any reason to expect the situation in NK to ever improve without some drastic intervention.
"So? As the only superpower, the US has an even greater ability to do as it pleases, even to the dismay of the international community, without any real reprisal."
This idea of "superpower" needs study. Power comes from land, population, materials and equipment. US is behind China and India in population, and is not dominant over Asia in land. Materials and equipment - US has a large share, but no monopoly. A coalition of 1 billion Muslims, reasonably equipped and supplied, could quite possibly defeat the US, for example. This assumes, as we must, that we fight wars without nukes.
The Chaney approach - treat 1% risk of nuke attack as certainty - looks too much like "it is ok to throw a baby in a furnace to save 100 who would otherwise die" - the old critique of Utilitarianism.
The Chaney/Perry/ACarter approach looks unethical and it ignores the fact that one attack may not be enough. Missiles are of course not the only way of delivering nukes to third countries. What would keep NK from smuggling the nuke into the Port of LA and wasting LA?
Since the early 90's, I'd thought North Korea had nuclear weapons already -- the South Korean intelligence services apparently thought so, and I had got that impression from some of my family, who were in the government (Kim Young Sam's) at that time. I think the Japanese had also reached the same conclusion by then. So we gave them nuclear technology (KEDO's light water reactors), food aid, and fuel, and in exchange, got a promise to refrain from doing something they had already done.
Oh, very clever. Absolutely stunning diplomacy.
What I think Clinton should have pushed for is verifiable drawdown of some proportion of the artillery targeted on Seoul. I suppose I would think that though, since I've got family over there. Perhaps the situation looks different to an American man, concerned with American interests, rather than Korean lives. I suppose it must, since Bush looks set to do the exact same thing.
Sorry, this is a somewhat emotional subject for me. Makes me mad.
Anyhow, as I was saying, I don't think the threat is much different, except that their missile technology has improved somewhat since then, and they've made clear that Tokyo is within range. This doesn't actually change the calculus all that much, since they could hit Tokyo easily enough with a container bomb, even if they didn't have a ballistic missile to make it quick. And there's no indication (I have seen) that they've successfully miniaturised their nukes for mounting on their missiles. Last I heard they were trying to get that technology from Pakistan.
We absolutely do have the right. The North Koreans are the ones that needlessly brought the South Koreans into this issue. To indicate that the US is morally cupable for that is ludicrous.
"I seriously doubt that we would be having this conversation if it was New York that was within artillery range of North Korea."
Actually, we are having this coversation because Los Angeles is (or will be) within missile range.
"The people of South Korea are entitled to the same level of respect that we would show for any other ally, and that means (at an absolute minimum) not taking a chance with their basic survival."
I agree in principle. However, if North Korea starts actively threatening the US, the US should not be allowed itself to be blackmailed by threats to it or to South Korea. That might mean taking a chance. The US cannot be bound by threats to third parties. That sets an extremely bad precedent.
However, it is worth pointing out that, if North Korea was to attack South Korea, the US would be legally bound to defend its ally. If there was no alliance between the US and South Korea, then the US would have no such obligation.
I never claimed or assumed that diplomatic negotiations with North Korea were certain to work. I never even said they would probably work. I said they were our only option if we want to prevent North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons and ICBMs.
NK's constant requests for bilateral negotiations with the United States makes it pretty clear that they see both nuclear weapons and ICBMs as chits to bargain with for aid and diplomatic recognition. That's a form of extortion, and rewarding that aggression is appeasement. But the threat works because it is based on an accurate assessment of our national interests. Let me put it this way: NK would be happy to trade their chits in for aid. Or, they would be happy to sit back and just acquire more and more chits. It's our choice. But the former option, despite being repugnant, is better for our national security. This ICBM test is just another in a series of reminders of why that is the case.
The North Koreans probably would have developed nuclear weapons a decade ago if it were not for the Agreed Framework. Again, the Framework wasn't perfect and does not offer certainty. But it at least offers the possibility of control over North Korea's behavior. We were better off having some leverage than no leverage at all.
I don't care who is morally culpable. I care whether millions of people live or die. The original article is advocating a policy that could result in the deaths of millions of innocent people, most of whom are ROK allies who want nothing to do with this conflict. That is unacceptable regardless of who, on some abstract level, is 'culpable'.
This represents either a far-too-narrow definition of cost, or a gross failure of imagination.
In general, people offering the realpolitik arguments seem to be overlooking the fact that we actually do have purely selfish interests at stake in the region. Just to give one example, South Korea has something like the 11th-largest economy in the world, and is something like our 7th-largest trading partner. That means we have a very large economic stake in preventing the devastation of the South Korean economy. And the regional effects could quickly magnify--anything that messed with the economies of China and Japan (which I believe are our 3rd- and 4th-largest trading partners, after Canada and Mexico) could cause even further economic loss.
So, it is not being a realist to imply that it is no great concern of ours what North Korea does to South Korea. It is just being dumb.
Read Taeyoung's 1:32 post. There's good reason to believe that North Korea had nuclear weapons before the Agreed Framework. There's also reason to believe that they increased their nuclear arsenal during the time the Agreed Framework was in force. They certainly upgraded their ballistic missile capbility.
I take it that isn't your understanding of what has occurred, but would you concede that it's a possible scenario? If you did think that is what ocurred, would you still have confidence that negotiations were a useful path?
Negotiations are most emphatically not the only option. The refusal to accept the use of force as an option decreases the likelihood that negotiations will be successful, and increases the likelihood that force will become necessary.
I’ll eat the crow.
As an aside, I think I let my rhetoric get away from me in that post, and I apologize.
I am not advocating the author's position. However, we should not dismiss it on the grounds that it might "immorally" endanger South Korea. Instead, the risks to South Korea should be viewed through a lens of costs-benefit including PR and reputation.
I have heard of "might makes right." However, your concept seems to imply "turpitude makes right." It is extraordinarily dangerous to give into our enemies just because they are willing to be so utterly depraved and despicable.
Let me interject here:
"Let me put it this way: NK would be happy to trade their chits in for aid. Or, they would be happy to sit back and just acquire more and more chits. It's our choice. But the former option, despite being repugnant, is better for our national security."
You are forgetting choice (c): Prepare to fight a war.
Moreover, how is playing the world's patsy good for our security? Sure, we are wealthy and powerful enough to afford it now. However, what if more two-bit dictators decide to start playing this game? Building missiles and nuclear bombs is not that hard.
Some people think that the North Korean regime has abandoned its plans to reunify the peninsula under North Korean leadership -- I am not one of them. During reunification talks in the 70's, they were boring invasion tunnels under the DMZ, after all. I assume they still would like to, if they could.
At the moment, though, they couldn't beat South Korea if they wanted to, since they're coming off a major famine and South Korea's military is actually quite good. But my take is that they're biding their time now, waiting until the situation shifts in their favour. Young people in the ROK, for example, oppose mandatory military service (for obvious reasons), and perhaps the ROK military will shrink in future years. North Korea is very keen on preventing the GNP from returning to power too, and would prefer a government bent on conciliation and military drawdown. Factoring in South Korea's plummeting birthrate, the North Korean regime might be willing to gamble that in 10 or 20 years, events will have shifted in their favour.
At that point, however, whenever that point comes, they will need to prevent outside forces from intervening, because if outside forces intervene, North Korea will lose, and badly. So the US and Japan need to be deterred from intervening on behalf of South Korea. Nuclear weapons on ballistic missiles are a credible deterrent. We might want to save the 13th largest economy in the world. But not at the expense of the second largest economy in the world (Japan), or our own cities.
A secondary purpose to developing nuclear weapons (mounted on shorter range ballistic missiles) is that they would provide North Korea with a nontrivial tactical advantage in invading South Korea. Next time around, if the South Koreans hole up in Pusan again, rather than trying to invade, they can just nuke them. South Korea is full of fortified emplacements too, and nukes would be helpful in reducing them. ICBM's have nothing to do with this though.
Thank you for putting me in my place.
(Note: If we come to the conclusion that North Korea somehow won't attack South Korea if we blow up the ICBM, I'd definitely endorse the operation)
Yeah, that isn't my understanding of what occured, and while I'm sure that Taeyoung knows far more about every aspect of this conflict than I do, I believe that is a minority opinion amoung experts on such matters. Nonetheless, I do not consider North Korea a 'good faith' trading partner; as far as I'm concerned, they deserve no trust whatsoever. Whatever concessions we buy from NK would have to be thoroughly verified.
Keep in mind, I'm not saying this is a good option. I'm saying that it is better than the alternatives. If someone could propose something that would be more likely to work, I'd be happy to hear it.
As far as minority opinion goes, you may be correct. But I think even our intelligence services have acknowledged that before the Agreed Framework, North Korea had extracted several kilograms of weaponisable plutonium (enough for at least one bomb, and probably two or three). Korean and Japanese intelligence apparently indicate about twice as much plutonium removed as American intelligence, but either way, they had enough material for a bomb at that point.
The question is whether they had a working detonation system -- for plutonium, my understanding is that this would be an implosion-type device. We developed one by 1945, so it doesn't seem implausible that they could have developed one by 1993 (when they decided to withdraw from the NPT). Even if they did not have one by 1993, under the 1994 Agreed Framework, we and the IAEA only had visibility into their Yongbyon reactor operations, as far as I know. We could verify that they were not extracting additional nuclear material. We could not, as far as I know, verify that they were not developing or refining the mechanism for an implosion device. We can verify that they have not yet tested a live nuke. I don't think we can test anything more than that.
The other thing to note is that after the signing of the Agreed framework -- within a year or two after signature, in fact -- North Korea appears to have turned around and started in on weaponising uranium. It was this program we confronted them with in 2002, I believe, as we'd gotten hard evidence that they were using a gaseous diffusion process to purify uranium.
Anyhow, they seem not to have had the slightest intention of adhering to the Agreed Framework, even if they didn't have nukes then.
Two reasons why North Korea is unique:
1) They have the third largest army in the world (hardly a two-bit dictator), behind only China and India.
2) Any other country trying a similar strategy would have to be willing to accept complete economic and diplomatic isolation, which would probably ensure their people would be poor to the point of near-starvation. Most people aren't willing to accept that; the North Koreans are willing to accept it only because of the utter totalitarian nature of the North Korean state. (Their people think that the U.N. aid trucks that provide them with food do so not out of pity, but as tribute to their national greatness). If North Korea didn't already exist, it would be very hard to construct a similar state anywhere else in the world.
Taeyoung's concern for a future North Korean invasion of ROK is legitimate, but I think a peacefull resolution is more likely. The North Korean government cannot possibly last if their people make contacts with the outside world. If the Sunshine Policy of South Korea is allowed to expand, and North Koreans are exposed to the truth of their situation, I believe their government will crumble, and quickly, much like East Germany. The current U.S. policy undermines these efforts by ROK, which IMO are the ultaimte solution to the conflict.
If you don't trust North Korea to honor any agreement and you've ruled out the use of force, on what basis do you think there can be a negotiated settlement?
Assume that there's a robust verification protocol in place and it reveals a violation of this hypothetical agreement. The worst that can be done (since you've ruled out force) is to cease with any incentives that we're providing. That's exactly the status quo. Since North Korea seems content with the current situation, they have no incentive to live up to any bargain. They can always revert back to the acceptable status quo.
There's no downside to them in taking our food, fuel and cash for as long as we'll give it to them, and then declaring any deal null whenever it suits their purposes. That's what they did with the NPT treaty. Maybe (maybe) a negotiated settlement could buy time, but it's definitely not clear who's interests are best served by playing for time.
Why would they think so? It hardly matters. They're nuts. They could easily misconstrue our democrats' BDS as real pacificism. Which is may well be, or may not, but it wouldn't matter afterwards.
They may choose to pay overmuch attention to some public figure who campaigns against retaliation on the plausible grounds that we would think it immoral to murder millions of Nork sillyvilians for no reason at all--they had nothign to do with it.
I've heard it said that Hitler paid too much attention to the Oxford Union debate of 1933, and the Norks too much attention to Dean Acheson's speech in 1950 saying that Korea was not in our sphere of interest.
Did the Argy generals misunderstand when they started the Falklands War? Sure did.
It's a really, really bad idea to insist that another's view of reality is the same as our view of reality, and it's especially tricky when the view of reality happens to justify the most convenient course of action on our part.
First, I don't believe that I have ruled out force. I believe that there is no plausible military option, and the North Koreans know there is no plausible military option, and therefore the threat of force is nothing but ineffective bluster.
Second, the hope is that the North Koreans calculate the benefits of any agreement with the United States (domestic nuclear energy, for example) outweigh the benefits of violating the treaty by building nuclear weapons. Since I believe that their primary purpose in building nuclear weapons is to get a favorable treaty from the United States, I suspect that this might be persuasive, but I am certainly not assuming that to be the case. And yes, the hope is to buy time. The government of North Korea is a relic from a previous age. We know it has no future.
Of course there's a plausible military option. If they're wasn't one the Korean peninsula would be unified under North Korean rule. The question is under what circumstances does military conflict become the least bad option.
FWIW, I don't think this missile test meets that threshold.
Can you cite a single poll from Taiwan to support this assertion? Chen Shuibian, certainly the most pro-independence important political figure, currently has an approval rating in the single digits. There may well be a plurality of Taiwanese who would like Taiwan to be a formally independent country (as I personally very much feel it should be), but there's certainly not a plurality in favor of declaring independence at this time.
In that case, we are in complete agreement. I think it is unlikely that North Korea will present us with a situation in which it is clear that war is the preferable option, but it is certainly conceivable.
Incidentally, the PRC is loving the growing split between ROK and the US. Bush's cavilier policy towards North Korea has angered so many people in ROK that one of the most passionate allies of the United States is increasingly looking to China as its primary regional ally. This administration has no talent for the subtle diplomacy required in Asia. As a result, the PRC's sphere of influence grows - and our own influence wanes.
Can we re-arm Japan and let them deal with it?
I think Taeyoung's analysis is also (conditionally) compelling: if it is true that North Korea is developing nuclear weapons as cover for an invasion of South Korea, then at some point we may have to intervene anyway, even if it risks sparking an immediate invasion of South Korea. But I do think that ultimately this is less about a direct threat to the United States proper, and mostly about threats to our interests in the region.
SG,
I would assume that North Korea would eventually break any deal we made and then hold us up for another new and improved payout. I know that this very idea makes a lot of people think that such a deal is therefore unwise, but I actually think that repeatedly "buying time" in this fashion could be the best of the possible strategies.
In particular, I think that question in turn depends on North Korea's long term goals. If their long term goal is to secretly acquire nuclear weapons and then invade South Korea, we probably have to draw the line at some point. But if their goal is simply to get western aid to perpetuate their regime as long as possible, then it might be the least-bad option.
Of course, here I am also engaging in my own realpolitik: it is not doing the people of North Korea any favors to perpetuate the North Korean regime. But if that is the price we have to pay to keep North Korea from starting a regional war, perhaps with nuclear weapons involved, then it might be what we have to do.
The Korean orientation towards China also has at least as much to do with simple economic realities as it has to do with North Korea, and has been a similarly long-term development not really traceable to Bush's policies. Frankly, China is a big economy, full of cheap labour, and it's right across the Bohai from Korea. Young Koreans (and old Koreans) see huge economic opportunity as China develops.
Some Koreans also see China's rise as a major threat to Korean economic development, because China (being huge, with central regulation) will be a much more attractive investment prospect than Korea -- you'll get access to a larger workforce and a larger market for the same fuss. Turning Korea into one of the major investors in Chinese economic development helps secure Korea an influential place in a China-dominated East Asian economic community.
Really, without suppressing Chinese economic development, there's no way we could prevent Chinese influence from increasing, at the expense of our own. They're right there. We're way over here. Korea was a protectorate of China until the Treaty of Shimonoseki, after the Sino-Japanese War, allowed the Korean king to conduct his own foreign policy. There's a huge Korean population living in Manchuria. Korean students, for over a thousand years, have been required to learn Chinese characters in school. Korean government, for as long or longer, has used a Chinese model as its guide. There's historical ties and cultural commonality there from which the US is excluded.
As far as Korea as a "passionate" ally of the United States, really, it wasn't the Koreans who were passionate about it. Not uniformly, certainly -- although the older generation, liberated from the Japanese by US invasion and then defended from North Korea by US occupation, apparently tend to be (and remain) more consistently pro-US than their children or their grandchildren. The people who were really passionate about the US-alliance were the military presidents (Chung Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo) and their governments. I suspect the protesters, like those massacred at Kwangju, were . . . not so keen on the US.
The authors consider, and dismiss, only one NK option: starting an all-out war on the Korean Peninsula. They believe that such a war would end in North Korean defeat in a few weeks. That is certainly one possible outcome of such a war, but I think that it is not the most probable outcome. It is more likely that the war will open with tremendous destruction in South Korea, as North Korea fires its artillery at Seoul. The ROK might well blame the US for the war, and might refuse to participate in any offensive operations across the armistice line. Without ROK support, the US does not have enough ground forces to conquer NK. I doubt the ROK would be enthusiastic about a war that was reopened by the US (in their view) without their approval.
Short of war, NK has other options:
1. Do nothing. The authors think that North Korea will do this.
2. Ask China to host the next North Korean test launch. Would the US launch the same preemptive strike on Chinese soil?
3. Ask China or Russia to sell it some long-range missiles. Either country might agree, since they both have an interest in seeing as many problem areas in the world for the US as possible.
4. Announce that they consider the 1953 armistice to be suspended and that they plan to resume military operations in 30 days. Then tell South Korea that they will continue to honor the armistice if South Korean will expel all US forces from South Korea.
5. Ask China and Russia to refer the US to the Security Council for violating the armistice.
If I were the Ultimate Leader of NK, I would pick options 2, 4 and 5. China would probably use the test launch request as leverage against the US, and anything that weakens the US is a gain for NK. Threatening war (as opposed to waging it) gives NK the opportunity for a huge gain at no cost. The South Koreans might be angry enough with the US for putting
them at risk that they might agree to the demand. And if they don't, NK can let the deadline expire and do nothing. Requesting Security Council referral would have comic and irritation value. It would never pass, but it might provide a platform for embarrassing the US.
The problem for the US is that we have no good options and no leverage. A "regime change" war would be extremely expensive and bloody (and make the war in Iraq seem cheap by comparison).
Any military action would show the split between US interests and the interests of its two principal allies, the ROK and Japan. The ROK and Japan want to continue to buy North Korea off. While they would prefer that NK not acquire nuclear weapons and missiles, they want to avoid war at all costs. They believe that they will always be able to afford the protection payments that NK will demand, and those, in any case, will be cheaper than the costs of a war.
China is the only country with substantial leverage over NK,
since NK is dependent on China for the imports that keep the
country from collapsing. China, at present, has no interest in using their influence to stop NK from acquiring nuclear weapons and missiles, since they want to keep NK in play as a threat to US interests.
I believe that the best available policy option for the US is containment.
a. Refuse bilateral talks with NK. Negotiated agreements are useless, since NK already violated the last agreement.
b. Do not send any aid to NK.
c. Try to persuade ROK and Japan to limit their aid to NK.
d. Build defenses against ballistic missiles.
e. Wait for Kim Jong-Il to die.
There is no guarantee that the next ruler would be any better (from our point of view) than current one, but he is unlikely to be worse.
China is really the key to stopping North Korea without resorting to war. Only they have the leverage necessary. I don't know of any way to persuade them that keeping ICBMs and nukes out of North Korea's hands is in their interest. Does anyone have any ideas on how to do that?
I'm starting to agree with the pacifists here. Let's wait to see if North Korea nukes us, before we take any rash action. We wouldn't want to risk North Korea crushing the poor helpless South Korean military...
Dear God...
A) Announce that we will remove all of our troops from South Korea during a period of 2 years.
B) Actually remove them.
South Korea can defend itself. It's GDP is ~40 times that of North Korea.
"The optimum policy for the USA might, in fact, be to threaten our total withdrawal from the region unless the PRC, the RKO, and Japan cooperate to deal with a threat that is after all in their immediate territories and most immediately dangerous to them to them."
Interesting suggestion. If the US was willing to back away from Japan, Russia, ROK and China as trade partners, or put a tax on that trade, to be collected until NK drops its WMD, we might see some willingness in China, ROK, Japan and Russia to work with us to efficiently crush the NK WMD program.
Apparently no one of the other five feels as threatened as the US. It might be interesting to see if the US electorate would by referendum support a 10% tax on imports from China, ROK, Japan and Russia pending removal of WMD's from NK.
No doubt GM and Ford would approve of such a tax, though Wal Mart would have concerns about shifting to suppliers from Taiwan, India, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Vietnam, etc.
With a reasonable amount of lead time, say phase-in of the tax over three years, I suspect the US economy could be reasonably protected. If NK did not budge, at least we would have some $$ for a war, or deficit reduction.
It is a mystery to me why so many people in this thread assume we would do anything to North Korea without ROK approval. I think it is obvious we would not. I am also sure that scenarios like this have been extensively discussed and wargamed many, many times since the 1998 missile test if not before. I bet the ROK government and the US government already have a clear idea of what each would do in the event of another missile test (or imminent test).
Ask China and Russia to refer the US to the Security Council for violating the armistice.
Gee, can we go to the UN, too? Firing a missile out of North Korean territory also violates the armistice.
Any military action would show the split between US interests and the interests of its two principal allies, the ROK and Japan.
Again, you're assuming we're acting independently from the ROK and Japan. I think we are not and will not. Therefore no split.
I believe that the best available policy option for the US is containment.
By your own logic, containment cannot succeed, since the Chinese are determined to provide North Korea with missiles and nuclear weapons.
2: Dan28 was saying that any action would result in annihilation of Seoul, so we can not take any action. This is a reprise of the Dem's stance on any foreign engagement since the 60s and was a broadly accepted position previous to that, though vigourously opposed by Scoop Jackson and limply opposed by JFK (look back at game theory review of Cuban Missile Crisis, you'll find that the Sovs were much less blood thirsty than their fellow travellers gave them credit for, and the war party could have pushed them down much faster than the pinko containment strategy did).
London was Blitzed, Paris was attacked in WWI, and in neither case did the government change its policies 1 iota. All UK needed to do was to cede Europe to Hitler and they could have had a peace (of at least a few years) instead of the Battle of Britain and the Blitz. Mosley et al demanded surrender. Real men said no.
Dan aka Mosley wants to surrender to the barabrian (you were at the NION rallies against the Afghan campaign too weren't ya babe?) since there is a chance he would slaughter 20M people. I call BS. There are plenty of other options, and we have much better leverage: threaten Beijing. KJI is their Frankenstein, and it would be very easy to slag China if they don't rein him in. Y'all claim that China can force us out, but as per usual with lefties playing strategy, you never see our opponents as moral characters themselves or see how we have other options. The US can credibly threaten to send the ChiComs back to the rice paddies, and no one in their fascist government wants that. They like having Frankenstein to screw with the US, but they have many vital interests that can easily be threatened. Then you can bring up the game by going strategic...
PRC can be subdued and sent back to Qing Dynasty of being split into many foreign fiefs. They have no ability to project power (outside of a few ICBMs) and are the enemy US forces are designed to deal with. Ballistic submarines to deal with DPRK while main forces and the Japanese eliminate PRC... taht gives you some interesting games for the ChiComs to think about before backing DPRK up on its mad quest. As always, the leftists are actively, intentionally hurting the US' position by trying to take options off the table and declaring them Anathema. They are, if you don't want the US to win, and if you are trying to silence debate but preventing falsely small option sets.
I'm pretty sure Japan actually feels quite threatened, probably rather more than us. It's not coincidental that the Japanese government has been seriously considering rewriting the constitution we imposed on them to allow formal rearmament, has been engaging in (in post-WWII terms) extremely aggressive exercise of military power in Afghanistan and Iraq, and has been our major partner in working on missile defense systems. Part of this is a broader resurgence of Japanese nationalism, but part of this is also that the missile the DPRK fired over Japan woke policymakers up to the unfortunate reality that they're sitting in North Korea's sights.
The South Koreans are also probably feeling pretty threatened too -- hence their anxiety that we might refuse to give in to the madman with the gun pointed at their head. It's a different kind of anxiety though, since there's pretty much nothing they can do but give the man their wallet.
If I recall correctly, China, Japan, and South Korea are not only #3, #4, and #7 respectively in total trade, but also #4, #3, and #7 respectively in exports. Such tariffs would be bad for the US economy in any event, but a trade war with those countries would be absolutely awful.
I think it might encourage the PRC to come around to our way of thinking on nuclear proliferation.
Again, show me a single poll. I certainly agree that a lot of people want formal independence for Taiwan, but I've never seen a poll showing more than something like 20-30% in favor of a declaring formal independence for the simple reason that they have a legitimate fear of the PRC's reaction. And by the way, Shuibian is his given name. His surname is Chen.
PRC can be subdued and sent back to Qing Dynasty of being split into many foreign fiefs.
Um, for much of the Qing it was the largest nation on the planet. Even when parts of it were colonized it was only very small parts. Is your suggestion here that "foreign" powers (whoever they may be) should invade China and divide it up among themselves? If so, congrats for the single most moronic suggestion in the thread. What great good would this accomplish that would justify destroying the US economy and that of much of the rest of the world, not to mention costing the lives of millions of people? The US can't even control a bunch of guys with explosives in coffee cans in Iraq, do you really think we'll be able to take down the PLA with ease?
I'd consider informing the PRC that, given the nuclearization of the North Korea, we might consider it to be in the best interests of South Korea, Japan and even Taiwan to develop their own nuclear deterrent capabilities.
This is actually a very interesting idea. Taiwan started a nuclear weapons program many years ago but was forced by the US to stop.
Trade war would be awful compared to what? Not compared to having a city like LA nuked. At any rate, the US has to somehow balance trade with China, in particular, at some time. One cannot run a huge trade deficit forever. China, Japan and SK could choose to fight with US (retaliate against trade) or make life harder for Kim Jong Il. I suspect they would help face down KJI before trying to hurt the US economy (making it harder for US consumers to buy exports).
SK is showing a serious lack of spine, it seems. The artillery risk should cause them to seek arms to deal with artillery (radar and cannons for counter-battery fire). Build the sort of shelters needed to protect the population. Ask for troops from Japan, China, Russia, US. Build up (or borrow) the air force and navy needed. Take some loans and build up the needed tank force. Pay for soldiers to join the SK Army - build a volunteer force of the sort we have in the US.
If China says it will stand by NK, we know who we can count on in the GWOT, right?
Arguing for "handing over the wallet" sounds too much like what Chamberlain did back in the 30's. If SK insists on a "we give up" approach, the US probably should tax the SK trade - better to deal with countries we can count on to help out in the GWOT, or just build Samsung/Hyundai/Hanjin/LG, etc. products in the US, Taiwan, Canada, India, Australia, etc..
I assume that the ROK would not approve any military action, which is why, when considering US mililtary action, I wrote of it in terms of a unilateral strike.
If the missile is fired at a neighbor, then you are right, it is a violation of the armistice. However, I assume that a "test launch" would not have a neighbor as its aim point.
My reading of the situation is that ROK and Japan will not approve of military action under the current state of affairs. I will go further and say that I don't believe that the ROK and Japan would approve of US military action against North Korea unless North Korea attacked someone directly. If my estimate of the situation is correct, then US military action would necessarily show a split between the US and its two regional allies.
You are right that by my logic containment cannot prevent NK from acquiring nuclear weapons and missiles. What I was trying to convey is that in my view there is no practical US policy that would achieve the objective of keeping missiles and nuclear weapons out of NK hands. War, in this instance, is not a practical policy.
They live under the shadow of an overwhelming military force and you sit safely at your computer halfway accross the world and call them cowards? For not inviting a war in our name that would be an absolute apokolypse for them? Do you have any understanding of the significance of war? You act like this is some schoolyard fight. It's a metropolitan area of 20 million people that could be absolutely leveled. We're talking like, take September 11 and multiply it by 500.
I'm not even going to address the rest of your post, since it is obvious you don't understand the situation at all (for example, South Korea has mandatory conscription and a much larger army than the United States). But seriously dude. Do not get judgmental about others operating in situations that you don't remotely understand. You end up sounding really obnoxious.
Doesn't need to have it as an aim point - even shooting it over Japan is a highly provocative act, and the Japanese Prime Minister has warned that Japan will take "severe action" if they do.
I have been to Seoul and represented Hanjin, Hyundai, Samsung and LG. My father served in Korea as an engineer in the Korean Wra. No one considers the citizens of SK cowards. The Brits are not cowards but they erred with Chamberlain, yes? Warning against error is of course reasonably safe here in LA, but it should not be construed as claiming cowardice.
"For not inviting a war in our name that would be an absolute apokolypse for them? Do you have any understanding of the significance of war?"
My service was as a Captain in Germany for 4 years in 1981-85 - 8th Infantry (Mech) then V Corps. Nuclear capable units. Quite well-equipped to level several Seoul-sized cities.
"You act like this is some schoolyard fight."
It is bullying by NK of the sort that the Brits and French failed to properly face down in the 1930's, yes?
"It's a metropolitan area of 20 million people that could be absolutely leveled. We're talking like, take September 11 and multiply it by 500."
Europe and the US had larger risks they faced in the Cold War. The risks are still there, with extreme Islamics. When a risk arises that SK can help manage, it can and should do its part to squash the risk, yes? One reduces the risk here, perhaps, by beefing up SK and facing down NK, as the Brits and French could and should have done with the dictators they faced in the 30's.
"I'm not even going to address the rest of your post, since it is obvious you don't understand the situation at all (for example, South Korea has mandatory conscription and a much larger army than the United States)."
I suspect you are wrong about the size of the SK Army vs. size of US Army (say 1.4 million). My point is that SK with say 500,000 from SK plus 100,000 each from US, Russia, Japan, China, plus better planes and technology than NK can field, could face down NK and win without firing a shot. That happened in Europe, why not also in Asia?
One does not impress with mention of mandatory conscription vs. hiring SK soldiers who volunteer to serve (and properly funding the troops). SK with its allies has the $$, equipment, manpower and population to raise forces sufficent to dominate NK, and force the abandonment of WMD's by NK, like NATO faced down the Soviet Union.
"But seriously dude. Do not get judgmental about others operating in situations that you don't remotely understand. You end up sounding really obnoxious."
And your background in military affairs is what? You have what precedent to support your "give them the wallet" approach?
So many seem so bold and so sure of their positions, yet aren't willing to back their stance with actual military service. This is not to say that there are not some who advocate for miltary strike and have served, or are currently serving.
I have come to the realization that a return of the draft is indeed in order. As things stand today a too narrow portion of the populace has to pay the price for decisions that are made increasing by people who talk tough but refuse to serve. Perhaps if we had to demonstrate our spine rather than write about it things would be different.
I dare say that if one has seen war up close that it may not then be so easy to reduce to a philosophical certainty the risk of millions of deaths of people who wish not to die.
How refreshing it would be to hear from someone in this "debate" who has had to try to hold in the guts of a fellow soldier give us a reality-based perspective(taking either position).
Think about it, wouldn't this exercise benefit from someone currently serving in the DMZ? How about a fellow law student/lawyer/professor in South Korea or Japan? How can any position be well grounded without the imput of all the stakeholders?
No matter what position one takes, there is more than a small amount of disingenuousness in both the article and this discussion.
I don't understand your logic. You have the United States screwing its own economy by imposing unilateral tariffs on these other countries in order to put pressure on them to do something about North Korea. Your condition was that you would keep on screwing the US economy "until NK drops its WMD". And so you assume that other countries would rather deal with North Korea than participate in a trade war.
But for the same reasons, this should be a bad idea for us too--just like these other countries, WE should also prefer to deal with North Korea than to participate in a trade war. In other words, you have inconsistent assumptions: that a trade war wouldn't hurt the United States, but somehow that it would hurt these other countries so badly that they would start to do our bidding on North Korea.
Incidentally, it is just plain silly to present this as a choice between starting a trade war or letting LA get nuked. For one thing, you have no idea if this plan would actually work to stop North Korea's nuclear ambitions. But it would be guaranteed to cost the US economy billions of dollars, even assuming no trade retaliation (which, again, is a ridiculous assumption).
And the bottomline is that this really isn't about North Korea nuking LA. No one really thinks North Korea wants to do that. Our actual interest in this region is precisely the economic interests you are so willing to toss aside. So you are basically trying to "win" this conflict by sacrificing the interests we are trying to protect in the first place.
Which makes no sense.
End the "Sunshine Policy" until NK disarms. They'll starve to death.
The Chickenhawk argument is not only completely stale but as contemptible as ever. There is no requirement in law or logic for military service as a prerequisite for having an opinion on issues of war and peace. We do not live in the Starship Troopers society, and I am sure you would be the first to reject the argument of anyone who thumped their chest and said, "I serve in the US military, so mine are the only opinions that count!"
"I don't understand your logic. You have the United States screwing its own economy by imposing unilateral tariffs on these other countries in order to put pressure on them to do something about North Korea."
10% on imports from non-cooperating countries (say China) is not much more than token. Wal Mart brings in say $300 billion from China. That nets us $30 billion. Most cars from Japan are from the US now, not Japan. The point is, send the Chinese a signal. If China wanted to retaliate, it could invest its trade surplus in the EU. But we need China's investment less, it seems to me, than they need $300 billion from WalMart. And they can get benefit from defanging NK along with the US, Japan, SK and Russia.
"Your condition was that you would keep on screwing the US economy "until NK drops its WMD". And so you assume that other countries would rather deal with North Korea than participate in a trade war."
Yes, I do assume China would rather squash NK than "trade war" with the US over a token tax of 10%.
"But for the same reasons, this should be a bad idea for us too--just like these other countries, WE should also prefer to deal with North Korea than to participate in a trade war."
NK will not keep its word, so they need to be isolated and quarantined.
"In other words, you have inconsistent assumptions: that a trade war wouldn't hurt the United States, but somehow that it would hurt these other countries so badly that they would start to do our bidding on North Korea."
I do think a 10% tax would get the attention of China without major harm to the US economy.
"Incidentally, it is just plain silly to present this as a choice between starting a trade war or letting LA get nuked. "
Trade war is your term. Charging nominally for "free riding" on US police services is another way of phrasing it.
"For one thing, you have no idea if this plan would actually work to stop North Korea's nuclear ambitions."
We have the example of NATO and Soviets - containment worked. Containing NK (quarantining) would be a smaller task (less population, less land, less military equipment, less nukes, less chemical weapons, less conventional munitions). I also note the Kennedy success in backing down Soviets and Cubans (embargo, quarantine).
"But it would be guaranteed to cost the US economy billions of dollars, even assuming no trade retaliation (which, again, is a ridiculous assumption)."
Net cost to US economy of a 10% tariff is your assumption. The benefit of squashing a nuclear risk is ignored in your calculus.
"And the bottomline is that this really isn't about North Korea nuking LA. No one really thinks North Korea wants to do that."
NK would sell what it has to AQ in a NY minute for the right price, true?
"Our actual interest in this region is precisely the economic interests you are so willing to toss aside."
No, we also have security interests - keep nukes off our territory. Do not let NK become a dealer in nukes.
"So you are basically trying to "win" this conflict by sacrificing the interests we are trying to protect in the first place."
US would incur no major sacrifice (damage to economy) with a 10% tax, I suggest. And the benefit sought is peace and safety, not wealth.