The big decision of the day was that in Hudson v. Michigan. The "knock and announce" case produced a 5-4, conservative-liberal split. Lyle Denniston summarizes the case here. Orin has several posts on the decision over at that other site of his.
How can Justice Scalia maintain that the evidence here---a gun and drugs seized in the home---is not the fruit of the illegal entry.
Isn't the rule that policemen have to knock?
This is not to say, of course, that every entry must be preceded by an announcement. The Fourth Amendment's flexible requirement of reasonableness should not be read to mandate a rigid rule of announcement that ignores countervailing law enforcement interests.
Just a thought on the supposed congeniality of the "new" court: In Justice Breyer's dissent, he questions the logic of the majority opinion and refers to the majority, not as "the majority" or as "the Court," but instead, singles out the author---Justice Scalia---for its faults. On page 25 of the dissent, Breyer writes "How can Justice Scalia maintain that the evidence here---a gun and drugs seized in the home---is not the fruit of the illegal entry."
Having 6 or 8 armored SWAT guys with assault weapons bust down your door and throw concussion grenades through your glass windows is a bit more troubling than being seen in one's pajamas.
my preference is not the same thing as a constitutional command.
No knock / dynamic entry warrants are not benign and are highly dangerous to citizens and police officers. They should be used only when the benefits outweigh the risks to the police and innocent citizens. The Hudson ruling makes it possible for the police to execute any type of search warrant as a no knock warrant with no fear of any sanction. This increases the risks to both paramilitary swat teams and citizens.
Apparently you believe police can cure addiction.
BTW I am glad you like my sense of humor - despite our other differences.
This was not, contra your rhetoric, a "may police kick down doors?" case. That issue is long settled. This is just an issue of whether they have to wait 5 seconds or 15 seconds before doing so
Look up the footage of raids. They are all over the internet.
What in the world are you talking about?
Here is what happens: There is a guy with a battering ram. He swings it back and at the top of his backstroke another guy knocks on the door and yells police as guy 1 is swinging the ram forward. Look up the footage of raids. They are all over the internet. [...] With the Hudson ruling, the above will be the norm.
Yes, our liberty now rests with precinct captains who will discipline their officers for conducting searches IN A PERFECTLY LEGAL WAY AS RECOGNIZED BY THE SUPREME COURT. Christ almighty.
Oh please - rights without remedies are about as useful as my dog's vomit. The REMEDY now will be up to supervising police officers. If you think that there is police officer in the world who is going to discipline an officer for not observing the niceties of procedure - where all of the evidence obtained following his or her actions is admissible - you must be smoking crack.
Have you heard of 42 USC 1983?
If you make it past the string of immunities, the motions for summary judgment and get to trial (not likely) you will very likely get a miniscule award.
Yes, that is a fine and dandy remedy.
If you take a look at the link I provided in my post you will find numerous examples where paramilitary swat teams were used in situations where no reasonable risk/benefit analysis would justify them.
[A] a reviewing court should take care both to review findings of historical fact only for clear error and to give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers.
A trial judge views the facts of a particular case in light of the distinctive features and events of the community; likewise a police officer views the facts through the lens of his police experience and expertise. The background facts provide a context for the historical facts, and when seen together yield inferences that deserve deference. For example, what may not amount to reasonable suspicion at a motel located alongside a transcontinental highway at the height of the summer tourist season may rise to that level in December in Milwaukee. That city is unlikely to have been an overnight stop selected at the last minute by a traveler coming from California to points east. The 85-mile width of Lake Michigan blocks any further eastward progress. And while the city's salubrious summer climate and seasonal attractions bring many tourists at that time of year, the same is not true in December. Milwaukee's average daily high temperature in that month is 31 degrees and its average daily low is 17 degrees; the percentage of possible sunshine is only 38 percent. It is a reasonable inference that a Californian stopping in Milwaukee in December is either there to transact business or to visit family or friends. The background facts, though rarely the subject of explicit findings, inform the judge's assessment of the historical facts.
I find it interesting that the risk to innocent citizens never enters into your calculus.
"Certainly, Mr. Leatherman's performance at oral argument before this court indicates how fortunate Mr. Robbins was to have such a compelling advocate on his side. But any temptation we may have to reward Mr. Leatherman for his service is overcome by our duty to respect an Act of Congress."
The "violate now and pay later" character of the tort remedy would permit the government to buy itself out of having to comply with constitutional commands. To abolish the exclusionary rule and replace it with an action for damages against the government treasury is to have the law speak with two voices. The Fourth Amendment does not grant the government the discretion to decide whether the benefits of infringing the public's right to be protected from unreasonable searches and seizures are worth some expenditure of the public's funds; the language of the amendment is an affirmative command."
"So Robbins' attorney did all that work for free. But as a consolation prize, the Court applauds his performance at oral argument, calling to mind a certain credit card advertisement:
Winning a civil rights case . . . $10,000 . . .
Losing on appeal . . . $1.50 . . .
The unanimous praise of an en banc panel of the Tenth Circuit . . . priceless."