Bleg for Help Finding Sixth Circuit Fourth Amendment Case:
I've been looking for, but can't seem to find, a Sixth Circuit en banc case from approximately 1991 upholding a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment. I'm specifically interested in the dissenting opinion, which, as I recall, went through a devastating list of contradictory testimony given by federal officers in various cases as to why they suspected a particular passenger (first to get off the train, last to get off the train, middle to get off the train; had no luggage, had too much luggage; meandered his way out of the airport, went directly out of the airport without stopping; etc.) If anyone knows this case, or one like it, please let me know.
Moreover, a canvass of numerous cases reveals the drug courier profile's “chameleon-like way of adapting to any particular set of observations.” United States v. Sokolow, 831 F.2d 1413, 1418 (9th Cir.1987), rev'd,490 U.S. 1, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989):
Arrived late at night United States v. Nurse, 916 F.2d 20, 24 (D.C.Cir.1990).
Arrived early in the morning United States v. Reid, 448 U.S. 438, 441, 100 S.Ct. 2752, 2754, 65 L.Ed.2d 890 (1980); United States v. Millan, 912 F.2d 1014, 1017 (8th Cir.1990).
One of first to deplane United States v. Millan, 912 F.2d at 1015; United States v. Moore, 675 F.2d 802, 803 (6th Cir.1982), cert. denied,460 U.S. 1068, 103 S.Ct. 1521, 75 L.Ed.2d 945 (1983).
One of last to deplane United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 547 n. 1, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1873 n. 1, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980); United States v. Sterling, 909 F.2d 1078, 1079 (7th Cir.1990); United States v. White, 890 F.2d 1413, 1414 (8th Cir.1989), cert. denied,498 U.S. 825, 111 S.Ct. 77, 112 L.Ed.2d 50 (1990).
Deplaned in the middle United States v. Buenaventura-Ariza, 615 F.2d 29, 31 (2d Cir.1980).
Used a one-way ticket United States v. Johnson, 910 F.2d 1506 (7th Cir.1990), cert. denied,498 U.S. 1051, 111 S.Ct. 764, 112 L.Ed.2d 783 (1991); United States v. Colyer, 878 F.2d 469, 471 (D.C.Cir.1989); United States v. Sullivan, 625 F.2d 9, 12 (4th Cir.1980).
Used a round-trip ticket United States v. Craemer, 555 F.2d 594, 595 (6th Cir.1977).
Carried brand-new luggage United States v. Taylor, 917 F.2d at 1403; United States v. Sullivan, 625 F.2d at 12.
Carried a small gym bag United States v. Sanford, 658 F.2d 342, 343 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied,455 U.S. 991, 102 S.Ct. 1618, 71 L.Ed.2d 852 (1982).
Travelled alone United States v. White, 890 F.2d at 1415; United States v. Smith, 574 F.2d 882, 883 (6th Cir.1978).
Travelled with a companion United States v. Garcia, 905 F.2d 557, 559 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,498 U.S. 986, 111 S.Ct. 522, 112 L.Ed.2d 533 (1990); United States v. Fry, 622 F.2d 1218, 1219 (5th Cir.1980).
Acted too nervous United States v. Montilla, 928 F.2d 583, 585 (2d Cir.1991); United States v. Cooke, 915 F.2d 250, 251 (6th Cir.1990).
Acted too calm United States v. McKines, 933 F.2d 1412 (8th Cir.1991); United States v. Himmelwright, 551 F.2d 991, 992 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,434 U.S. 902, 98 S.Ct. 298, 54 L.Ed.2d 189 (1977).
Wore expensive clothing and gold jewelry United States v. Chambers, 918 F.2d 1455, 1462 (9th Cir.1990).
Dressed in black corduroys, white pullover shirt, loafers without socks United States v. McKines, supra.
*500 Dressed in dark slacks, work shirt, and hat United States v. Taylor, 917 F.2d at 1403.
Dressed in brown leather aviator jacket, gold chain, hair down to shoulders United States v. Millan, 912 F.2d at 1015.
Dressed in loose-fitting sweatshirt and denim jacket United States v. Flowers, 909 F.2d 145, 146 (6th Cir.1990).
Walked rapidly through airport United States v. Millan, 912 F.2d at 1017; United States v. Rose, 889 F.2d 1490, 1491 (6th Cir.1989).
Walked aimlessly through airport United States v. Gomez-Norena, 908 F.2d 497, 497 (9th Cir.1990), cert. denied,498 U.S. 947, 111 S.Ct. 363, 112 L.Ed.2d 326 (1991).
Flew in to Washington National Airport on the LaGuardia Shuttle United States v. Powell, 886 F.2d 81, 82 (4th Cir.1989), cert. denied,493 U.S. 1084, 110 S.Ct. 1144, 107 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1990).
Had a white handkerchief in his hand United States v. Garcia, 848 F.2d 58, 59 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,488 U.S. 957, 109 S.Ct. 395, 102 L.Ed.2d 384 (1988).
I don't doubt that the police would make these claims and it is troubling that only a single district judge was present to stop this abuse.
United States Court of Appeals,Sixth Circuit.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Eddie Louis TAYLOR, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 89-6396.
Reargued May 22, 1991.
Decided Feb. 10, 1992.
Defendant was convicted in the United States District Court for the
Western
District of Tennessee, Odell Horton, Chief Judge, of possessing cocaine
with
intent to distribute, and he appealed. The Court of Appeal, 917 F.2d
1402,
reversed. Rehearing en banc was granted, 925 F.2d 990. The Court of
Appeals, Krupansky, Senior Circuit Judge, held that: (1) initial
contact
between airport police officers and defendant constituted consensual
interview, and (2) two spherical, tape-wrapped bundles found in
defendant's
bag during consensual search gave officers probable cause to arrest
defendant.
He would probably tell you that any group of those things mentioned above might have triggered his spider sense and he wouldn't think of it as a contradiction or fudging. Of course his succes record of stops to finds (he dosen't need a warrant so he operates in a frictionless labratory of sorts) is extremely high. See below.
Bob Smith"since I apparently lack the highly refined intellgence necessary to understand these issues".
You've got that right Bob! The specialized knowledge and the intelligence that it takes to be a good or even great Police Officer or anything else for that matter is experience and learning what works, and how it does, in the real world.
If you are a lawyer I am sure you remember your first day at court on you own and how repetition and familiarity with how it really works. As opposed to how it was presented in school. That only comes with time and with making mistakes that you learn from. You seem to have forgotten.
The judge cited above, Judge Pratt was myopic in his dissent.
thedaddy
But the things mentioned above cover basically everyone. So your friend would tell you that everyone triggers his sense?
Look at it from the perspective of an innocent person who wishes to avoid being stopped (which is really whom laws about unreasonable search and seizure are supposed to protect). Based on that list of "suspicious" actions, how must he act to avoid being stopped by your friend?
The problem seems to be explaining the "hunch" in retrospect. The inspector sees someone who "doesn't look right," and can't tell why, but must give an explanation after the fact. As one might imagine, these explanations are often unsatisfactory when aggregated in this way.
When the average person encounters someone and makes a snap judgment about whether you think that person is trustworthy, I doubt if the person making the judgment can come up with a satisfying explanation that could be programmed into a computer and used to screen people.
This is not to say that "hunches" should be unquestionable black boxes, only that there's something about them that eludes description, and I don't think that Justice Marshall's collection of cases is conclusive of abuse. If a loan officer denies loans to people based on hunches, and it turns out that over the course of 5 years 90% of his hunches precluded racial minorities with solid credit profiles from getting loans, then his hunches are most likely a proxy for conscious or subconscious racism.
In police work, however, I don't think it makes sense to hold that all searches that can't be justified by a clearly-defined algorithm are per se unconstitutional.
Look at it from the perspective of an innocent person who wishes to avoid being stopped (which is really whom laws about unreasonable search and seizure are supposed to protect). Based on that list of "suspicious" actions, how must he act to avoid being stopped by your friend?
Much of the point of police stops is that you can't tell who's innocent and who's guilty just by looking at them. If there were a clearly-defined list of actions that a person could do to avoid being stopped, guilty people as well as innocent people would do them, and only incompetent criminals would ever get arrested. I think Mr. Arromdee is asking the wrong question.
1. He was travelling down a highway that was a corridor for drug smuggling. Admission on cross ex that ALL highways in AZ are corridors.
2. He was driving at rush hour, which is when smugglers will drive so as to blend in. (i.e., appearing innocent is suspicious indeed).
3. There was another car near him, with a CB radio (ten yrs ago, when these were popular). Smugglers often use CB to communicate. As did everyone else.
4. When the LEOs drove alongside him, he did not make eye contact. (Rather difficult to make eye contact with driver alongside when doing 75 MPH. If he had, I suspect that would have been cited as suspicious, too).
Search upheld, of course.
Depending on the level of intrusiveness, the standard for conducting a search is either "probable cause" or "reasonable suspicion." In either case, however, you are by definition talking about "law abiding behavior."
If the behavior were criminal, the officer could simply proceed to an arrest, making the lower standard for a search unnecessary.
Which further seems no different than anti-trust laws. As "made more profit, "made less profit", "made the same profit" have all been used in those cases. Or by their better known names respectively monopoly pricing, price dumping, and collusive pricing.
In your latest post, on Israeli checkpoints, you conclude: "When your enemies are unwilling to respect any boundaries in their efforts to murder innocents, what are you to do?" But you did not open that post to responses.
Isn't it inappropriate to ask a question and then prevent others from answering? There are a number of substantive answers, but you won't be in a position to learn about any of them if you close off your posts. Alternatively, if you're not interesting in any dialog, as would seem to be the case, shouldn't you simply make statements rather than ask questions of your audience?
In that case, why do we even bother making the police describe why the suspect seems suspicious? It seems to me that the whole point of making the police describe that is that we don't want the police to stop someone if they can't articulate a reason. If any reason or none would do, then we would be more honest if we just said that the police can stop people, period, without having to give a reason.
In other words the Fourth was designed with contraband in mind.
Origins of the Fourth Amendment