From the George Mason Law School website:
March 6, 2006: By an 8-0 margin, the Supreme Court decided that Congress can give the military a statutory right to recruit prospective lawyers at law schools whose universities receive federal aid, grants or contracts. Rumsfeld v. FAIR, No. 04-1152.
The Court's decision closely follows the amicus brief filed by members of the George Mason law school community — the only members of the national community of law schools to brief the case in behalf of the armed services. Several dozen amicus briefs were filed on the losing side (including briefs in behalf of the professors at Yale University, Harvard University, Columbia University, New York University, Cornell University and the University of Pennsylvania), arguing that the Solomon Amendment's requirement of equal access for military recruiters was unconstitutional under the First Amendment.
The George Mason brief was signed by Dean Daniel Polsby and Professors Nelson Lund and Joseph Zengerle in behalf of four other George Mason professors, seven George Mason law students, and some eighty professors and students from other law schools. Lead counsel on the George Mason brief was Will Consovoy, ’01, along with Andrew McBride and Wiley, Rein & Fielding.
Dean Dan Polsby of George Mason Law School comments to Powerline:
This is really a stinging rebuke, not only to FAIR but to an entire industry that has become complacent and self-indulgent. Many law professors really do believe, with the late Justice Brennan, that their own strongly-held policy preferences are all encoded somehow in the Constitution. This is a timely reminder that it just isn’t so.
Meanwhile, from Georgetown's web site, solomonresponse.org:
The Supreme Court's opinion in Rumsfeld v. FAIR is a call to arms to law school administrations across the country to vocally demonstrate their oppostion to the military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy. Please visit the Protest & Amelioration section for more information.
Avery Katz of Columbia writes (in response to Dean Polsby's comment) to clarify that the Columbia law faculty brief (as distinguished from the Columbia University brief), as well as a similar brief by the Harvard law faculty (again, distinguished from the University), "was not based on any constitutional issue, but instead made a statutory argument based on the text of the Solomon amendment itself." The opinion, of course, considered and rejected that statutory argument as well.