Below, I asked a subset of our religious readers a question that I think many irreligious readers might want to know the answer to. Now, I’d like to ask our irreligious readers a question that I think many religious readers might want to know the answer to. Again, I ask this out of respect to for your views, not disrespect: I want people on the other side to understand your views.
Let me therefore ask a question of those irreligious readers that believe that certain things — murder, rape, robbery, and more — are morally wrong. Irreligious people, like religious people, often feel this very strongly, and are willing both to act and to refrain from acting based on these judgments. They might, for instance, refuse to do certain things that are practically advantageous to them because they think they would be wrong; or they may do certain things that are risky or costly because they think that these actions are needed to prevent wrong. I’d love to hear your thoughts, if you fall in the category given above. I have also asked a related question of a subset of my religious readers, so don’t feel like I’m only picking on one side here.
Here’s the question: Many of your beliefs might flow logically (perhaps not syllogistically, but using logical argument) from other beliefs. But at some point, you must reach what one might call a moral axiom that you can’t logically demonstrate. You doubtless find this axiom appealing. Yet why do you accept it?
There are, after all, many rivals. Just to list a few: We should seek the greatest good for the greatest number of humans; the greatest good for the greatest number of my fellow citizens of a certain country; the greatest good for me and my family; the greatest good for me; the greatest good for all sentient species on the Earth; the greatest good for humanity in all future generations. We should not initiate force or fraud against others; we should not engage in force or fraud against others even if they initiate it; we should not initiate force but we may initiate fraud; “others” should only include humans; “others” should include all animals that can feel pain; “others” should include all animals that have more than some threshold of intelligence. We should do only those things that we would be willing to have all others do; some of us should do whatever we want to do, because we’re superior to others; we should do those things that are best for us, since others are going to do the same in any event.
Now if you believed that there was a God who created the world, who was concerned with human affairs, who in some measure controlled access to a happy afterlife, and who made his will known by delivering a book that chronicled both his prescriptions and a list of miracles that he himself had performed, you might choose as an axiom “Do what God tells me to do.” This itself wouldn’t be an open and shut argument; but I think that, if the factual assertions behind it were accurate, it would have substantial plausibility.
But you don’t believe this. Why then do you order your life around some particular moral axiom that you can’t logically support, especially when disregarding this axiom could save you a lot of hassle? Or do you think that you can indeed logically support your choice of axiom, without calling on some other axioms that you can’t logically support — and, if so, how?
In any event, I’d love to hear your thoughts, if you fall in the category given above. I also ask below a related question of my religious readers, so don’t feel like I’m only picking on one side here.
Note, though, an important rule applicable only to the comments to this post and its mate: I want only comments that try to answer these questions, not those that argue against the answers, or that criticize the answers, even politely. I do reserve for myself the blogger’s prerogative of adding updates that clarify the question or ask for clarifications to the answers. But because I want people to feel as free as possible to express their deeply held views, in this instance I would rather that they do so without risk of criticism from fellow commenters.
Remember: The point of this thread is so that religious people are more able to understand the other side, not so that we can have a debate on this question.
Those who really want to comment on the questions generally, rather than to answer them (or to criticize the answers), may do so in the comments to this placeholder post.
I do good because it is in my best interest. I want to be treated well, so I treat others well. It grows.
And of course, morality is selected for. We (humans) wouldn't be here if our natures tilted too strongly toward amorality.
#1, a non-logical reason: I have absorbed so deeply the values that my parents taught by example that I don't need any logical or theological grounds for behaving the way I beieve is right (ie, being considerate to others, caring about the world around me, etc.)
#2, a more-logical, and probably less accurately descriptive reason: I accept the evidence of my senses that other people are sentient beings deserving of equal consideration. Hence, do unto others as you best perceive that they would want to be done unto them. (With some caveats, but here isn't the place to spell out one's moral philosophy).
I hope this is the sort of response you were looking for. Many thanks for this question, which should spark a great discussion. FWIW, I'm trying to convince myself to become religious at this moment, so maybe I'm unrepresentive.
In iterated games of prisoner's dilemma with an infinite or unknown number of iterations, the strategy which strikes the best balance between simplicity and efficacy is tit-for-tat (in that it is VERY simple and VERY effective) that is to say - cooperation until the other party defects, then retaliatory defection to minimize losses.
A society which practices this (or a similar strategy of two-tits-for-a-tat or one-tit-for-two-tats - depending on the degree to which the defecting behavior needs to be disincentivised) will succeed in the long run over a society that always defects or always cooperates.
Thus we have morally "right" to keep us cooperating, and morally "wrong" to ensure we react to defectors.
I have come to the conclusion that the core value of all morality is self-interest. Moral concepts that appear to not further self-interest on the surface are the result of a long negotiation process - millions of years long - that has resulted in contracts, compromises, habits, and mechanisms of coercion.
As a small example of how moral principles can emerge from self interest, take a Google at the concept of "forgiving tit for tat" in studies of iterated prisoners dilemma games. The concept of "forgiveness" emerges, surprisingly, in a way that is almost impossible to predict rationally, and which is driven entirely by self-interest. It seems quite plausible that all of human morality could, in principle, be modelled and accounted for on the same foundation.
Except, of course, that "self interest" really means the continuity of our genes through history.
I'm really just rehashing and extrapolating the premises of evolutionary psychology here, with a dash of Dawkins' "selfish gene" perspective. It's not very original, but it's the only account of morality that makes any sense at all to me.
Perhaps this sounds dry and heartless - but it isn't. The idea that romantic love, for instance, could arise through this process is a wonderful thing, nearly a miracle. And this viewpoint greatly increases my respect for seemingly "unselfish" forces such as altruism and compassion, and leads me in the end to what anyone would consider a more moral existence.
In more extreme cases, such as sacrificing my own life to save another's, it's trickier. I could probably get over the bad feelings of letting someone die a lot easier than I could get over dying myself. I don't know whether I'd actually sacrifice myself, but I feel like I should to save, say, my sister. Or a schoolbus full of orphans.
My parents, teachers, peers, and TV taught me about morality. As I got older, I started to question things. The unsupported belief that it's immoral for two men to shag went away. The unsupported belief that it's immoral to murder didn't. I've twisted and turned my mind around the subject, but the belief just doesn't go away. I have a hunch it has something to do with biology, with some lessons being learned so thoroughly that we aren't capable of abandoning them. But I don't really know.
The book combines game theory models with evolution to argue that moral beliefs like altruism could be arrived at through evolution.
And although I don’t have the link for it, there have been several studies done showing that monkeys (with whom we share genes) hold "moral" opinions about fairness. Such as getting upset when they see another monkey getting paid more for doing the same work.
This of course doesn’t explain why people continue to hold these beliefs after becoming irreligious but it does explain why the beliefs seem so acceptable to people, whether religious or not.
The easy, but unsatisfactory, answer is "social conditioning."
The most interesting answer and satisfying answer I can come up with on the top of my head is this:
Unethical behavior, by certain narrow standards of ethics, is self-defeating in two senses: first, it is likely to not be universally usable (consider a common Kantian argument against lies: "if everyone did it, it wouldn't work"). Hence, we're all in a situation related to each other that could be rougly approximated by a prisoner's dilemma: I get immediate marginal utility from any one lie (etc.) but would get more utility (along with everyone else) if nobody lied. Society, recognizing this, sanctions the behavior (and individual social relations adopt, in a general sense, a tit for tat strategy) Hence, in those cases where the benefit is VERY high and the risk of discovery is VERY low, I might tell a lie or two, but ordinarily my interest in a functioning society + my fear of punishment + social conditioning + possible evolutionary effects keep me in line. Sort of like rule-utilitarianism backed up with punishment.
Of course, the easiest answer of all is: Wait a few years. Neurobiology will answer.
That's basically what it boils down to--morality stems from the logic of intelligence, not from external factors.
But where does this 'Natural Law' come from? The best answer I can give upon examination is that, to avoid a Hobbesian existence, there has to be an implied Agreement, a 'social contract', to cooperate in avoiding the prisoner's dillema. I'm not sure that 'contract' is the right word to use because there is a moral component to this Agreement that I don't think applies to contracts-at-law, but for lack of a better term, I'll use it.
Notions of privacy, private property and individual rights neccesarily include the right to be free from others imposing or impinging upon those things without just cause. In order for the Contract to survive, definition of that 'just cause' must begin with a person's own actions, else the 'consideration' is illusory.
As I work through this myself, I see that without this baseline level of respect for the persons and possessions of others, 'self-determination' becomes largely illusory. As a person of non-faith, self-determinism is probably the biggest wedge between myself and any sort of deism.
Sorry if this is a little bit rambling. I'm very anxious to see the responses of others both here and in the 'religious persons' section.
As for personal codes of conduct, there are many reasons to hold some sort of code: so that people know they can trust you; so as to make a good example for others to follow; because it is the best thing to do (for society, &c.) and one simply practices what they preach; or simply having a high moral character will be beneficial to one's self.
Also, the question asked would also be applicable to those who follow religions where one does not fear being smited or what not.
In recent years I have become somewhat more aggressive in my defense of my system of morality, which is not grounded in any belief in an afterlife. Example: religious people I work with will sometimes make comments that they cannot trust in the goodness of nonreligious persons. My response: if I must say so myself, my behavior is more worthy of praise as altruistic than theirs. I try to act responsibly and avoid doing harm to others simply because I want to, and not with the expectation that my seemingly altruistic behavior will be "rewarded" in some future life. Example: we had considered hiring a Mormon. The person in charge of the hiring made a comment praising him for his altruistic behavior in adopting five foreign-born children, and noted that he actually wanted to adopt more. His interest in adopting these children may have been motivated by a desire to rescue these children from a life of poverty. But in Mormon doctrine, one's status in the afterlife is rather directly tied to the size of one's family. Was his motivation truly "altruistic?" Maybe, but maybe not. If I do some "good" on earth that does not benefit me in this world, but that I believe will benefit me in some future world, is that behavior truly "altruistic?" If Mohammad Atta truly expected to be rewarded by a harem of 70 virgins at his feet was his act of terrorism a "sacrifice?"
Whenever I am made aware of a situation where someone is wronged, I cannot prevent myself from imagining, and thus feeling, what that person's pain must be like.
So if I were to willfully victimize someone, I would also be victimizing myself.
For example: It is, perhaps, impossible to "logically" demonstrate that it is better to not be in pain than to be in pain. One can demonstrate this observationally, both through one's own experience and in noting that others will (generally) attempt to avoid pain, but one cannot really demonstrate it "logically." Similar, though inverse, rules apply to pleasure.
Does this put an axiom such as "do that which avoids pain" or "do that which maximizes pleasure" on the same plane as an axiom such as "do that which God tells you to do?" I don't think so, which is why I think the question can be misleading. The value or "good" that comes from the first two axioms is, I take it, both self-evident to every sentient being and observable on an empirical basis. The value of the third (regarding God) is neither self-evident nor observable, and requires instead a belief about the fundamental nature of reality that cannot be proven based on existing evidence.
There are obviously a large number of logical constructs that you could build on the two axioms I've described above, and the shape of those constructs are well outside the scope of this discussion. It seems to me, though, based on our current experience and knowledge of the world, this is the only place it makes any sense to begin, and ultimately must be the irreducible bedrock on which we attempt to have logical discussions of morality and ethics.
I found this very convincing. I was not convinced, however, by the next part of his argument: that this demonstrated that there was a God as understood by Christians, Jews, and Muslims.
I am firmly an athiest, and have equally firm views of right and wrong (and honorable and dishonorable) on a wide variety of subjects. It may be possible to derive a core set of axioms that support my various ethical beliefs, but honestly that would be post hoc reasoning at best and impossible at worst. Given that, I would prefer to keep my axioms at this more general level: (1) right and wrong are meaningful concepts; (2) it is possible for human beings, through experience, observation, and honest reflection that weighs not just one's own perspective but the perspective of others, to discern right from wrong; and (3) since it is possible to do so, it is right to do so (this arguably is not an axiom, since it follows from the nature of "right", which is itself axiomatic). Said differently, making ethical judgments is part of our nature (or what we have evolved to do).
Obviously, there is somewhat more to it than that but I'm limiting my answer to the question of axioms or first principles with respect to morality. That's a question for philosphy, an intellectual endeavor I consider a waste of time. If you want to understand moral behavior, look to science, not philosophy.
Daniel Dennett points out in Darwin's Dangerous Idea (a fantastic book) that we are constricted, guided hosts, but we often overcome these desires through cultural evolution.
Empathy leads many non-believers in many different directions. It leads some towards the Kantian view--that we ought to do no wrong to others. It leads me to a more Utilitarian view--the first goal is to make as many people well off as possible, depending on how you define well-off.
There are certain things for which I, and probably many other non-believers, feel that are just wrong for which we are sometimes unable to provide a logical explanation.
For example, my Utilitarian leanings lead me to think that I should care as much about any one person throughout the world as I do about my mother, but I am sure this is not true. I don't doubt that it is logically inconsistent, but I do not think it to be immoral. I think this has some justification in empathetic reasoning--others understand that I ought to care more about my mother.
I think Ron, above, implies that it is in his self-interest to be moral because of empathy. I do not think this is right, just as the arguments that because altruism developed from Evolutionary Psychology, that it therefore must be self-interested. Instead, these capacities for altruism and empathy, coupled with cultural evolution and language, have allowed us to develop an objective morality. In being able to process how others feel, a non-believer can then make a judgement that morality comes from maximizing the feelings of others.
Eugene also asked above about animals and how we judge what deserves moral status. The best argument I have seen is that it is the capacity to suffer that gives something moral status. It is likely why most non-believers do not feel queezy about early stage abortion--there is no suffering except for that which is self-inflicted, but even non-believers feel very queezy as there is a capacity for suffering in later terms. Likewise, I could never bring myself to hurt a dog (unless of course it was hurting me or it was in Paris Hilton's bag, but really I'd be putting that dog out of its own misery ;-)), but I have no problem squishing a spider. I don't think spiders suffer, or have the capacity to suffer. There is no cognition in a spider.
So, in some: the ability to have morality for a non-believer comes from empathy. Then we must judge how to go about that, which are the Kantian/Utilitarian arguments. Then we judge what deserves moral status through what can suffer, which is closely tied to empathy.
As a scientist, I can't believe in believing, let alone in a creator, much less in the murderous God of the Bible. My morals, similar to those of animals, consist of: Seek pleasure, avoid pain. This often implies observing the rights of others and cooperating with them, as do even the ants and elephants.
1) To bootstrap a society participants need to agree on a minimal framework and, unfortunately, religious beliefs do not readily transfer from one culture to another. [Believe me! No! Believe ME!...]
2) A framework that works has to be able to be deduced independently across cultures, urged on by the merest of suggestions. [Please think back to an experience where you thought you were correct and later proved not to be.]
3) So everyone, regardless of culture, carries a map of reality in their mind that is not necessarily accurate, but that needs to be as accurate as possible to plan one's best future. But how can we know when we are in error? [Thus the first simple wisdom: Humility. Sometimes we think we are right, not because we are right, but simply because we think we are right.]
4) Projecting experience over time, people develop a sense of time and one's place in it. A distinguishing characteristic of humanity is the skill to plan -- to predict different futures and the consequences of actions.
5) From humility, the sense of time, and recursion [thinking about thinking] comes the spark of self-regulated learning and an appreciation of the value of community -- to sharpen our mental map.
6) The next simple wisdom that springs from valuing community is the sense that other people live their lives as acutely as each of us lives our own -- Reciprocity. [Leading to the Confucian Golden Rule -- Don't do to others what you don't want done to you.]
7) From these simple wisdoms it is possible to manufacture a moral umbrella open to anyone who chooses to agree to it. And, voila, in the tangle of the mind, mankind has manufactured a safety net that sets humanity apart from the amoral actions of, say, a seal that nips the fins off of a fish to play games with the terrified and helpless prey.
Meanwhile, religion maintains its place to order one's own soul, but society develops using more useful tools. Remember, we are in a race towards civilization that there is no guarantee civilization will win. No. This is no game. But it is my hobby and I enjoy it. Have you seen the graffiti: "Well, Mr. Gandhi, what do you think of western civilization?" "I think it would be a good idea!"
If this appears oversimplified, I'd be pleased to expand. Our schools sometimes overlook that the great minds over the last 2500 years have turned to address the simple daily problems of living.
I think that, partly as a combination of genetic hard wiring and partly as a combination of social conditioning, the vast majority of people feel an instinctive aversion to the idea of harming someone else, with the greater the harm, the greater the aversion. Given enough incentive this can be overcome (e.g. you get $10,000 for being rude to someone - big reward versus trivial harm) and for some people this instinct is missing (again probably some genetic defect or poor social conditioning or both) but by and large I think that's the fundamental motivating principle.
There are questions underlying this. Should it be a fundamental principle? Does it benefit society as a whole (rather than just the individual) if this is a fundamental principle? But I think this is the basic idea.
I'm not even sure this answer differs all that much between religious and non-religious people. After all every religion I'm aware of (certainly Christianity) has a basic notion against harming someone who's done nothing wrong and presumably both Christians and non-Christians, agnostics and athiests would all feel badly doing so regardless of whether (in the case of the Christian) some specific scriptural prohibition could be found against the specific action in question. In other words, a Christian would have the same aversion to harming other people that an athiest would have, even if God were completely silent on that issue.
This is really what is meant. Obviously, objectively it is no more rational (Pascal aside) to believe in the Trinity than to believe in Allah, nor to believe in Allah than to believe that Allah doesn't exist. That's kind of the point of irreducible beliefs. Either you believe them or you don't.
To put it another way, we don't really choose them. If you are choosing to change an irreducible belief, it's assumedly on the basis of a deeper belief, suggesting that the changed one wasn't as irreducible as you'd first thought. I know that the “you just know” response seems lame, but there really is no other way of arriving at any of these positions. Not Atheism, not Agnosticism, not Hinduism or Episcopalianism.
If even one person is allowed to choose a certain acttion unilaterally, and exercises it unpunished, then people must protect themselves or their property.
Example: If any individual (be it a despot like S. Hussein, or just a criminal) is permitted kill anyone they want, and the choice is theirs alone, then each person in society must take steps to protect themselves.
Applying the rule means letting an individual decide to go out and kill someone is immoral.
There are other rules, and this one could be better expressed, but this is one I can think of now. I hope the gist of the rule is comprehensible!
In effect, I am challenging your premise. I believe that this is logically self-evident, practically a tautology... But it is the foundational fact that leads my fundamental beliefs about how to act and how to expect others to act.
There is no logical basis for any person to claim that she gets to be the only person out of six billion who gets to force other people do what she wants even while still being free from anybody else forcing her to do what they want.
The only sane conclusion to me seems to be that no one, not even me, should be allowed to initiate force against anyone else. (Of course, there's nothing wrong with defending yourself or others from being forced to do things we don't want to do.)
Call it "libertarianism" or "the golden rule", but to me it is just the way things are.
I happen to like the incidental consequences as well. Without the initiation of force there would be no murder, rape, kidnapping, mugging, etc.
Your idea of a basic moral axiom from which others may be derived bears a striking resemblance to Kelsen's idea of the "Grundnorm" or in Hart's idiom, a "rule of recognition." The underlying thought seems to be that when we ask whether a particular law or rule is valid, we are asking if it has been created by a process stipulated by the rule of recognition or if it can be derived from it. The U.S. Constitution would be one such rule of recognition and particular laws the valid laws that stand in a proper relation to it. Now here's the interesting part. In Plato's dialogue, Euthyphro, the question that is posed reverberates down to this very debate. You might recall that the dilemma presented in that dialogue, though here in this post admittedly pared down, is "Is it good because God commands it?" or "Does God command it because it's good?" If we accept the second horn of the dilemma, then the idea of God seems to be redundant because there is something over and above Him. Though perhaps he has a more complete knowledge of the good than we ever could. This would flow from his omniscience. On the other hand, from God's omnipotence, we might seize the first horn of the dilemma. We might decide, with Abraham, that God's command to kill his son, Jacob, is good because He commands it. But then can it ever be right or in any sense good to kill our own son, even though God commands it?
The Rule of recognition or Grundorm is faced with similar conceptual problems. Is what the Grundnorm commands good because the basic moral axiom commands it? Or does it command what it is already good?
Like all of us, in childhood I robbed (e.g., grabbed toys) and assaulted, and I was likewise robbed from and assaulted. Being a victim hurt. Victimizing did not automatically -- at least at first -- hurt, but eventually it did through guilt and empathy. This conditioning may have been due to the horrible sound of other children crying (which even pre-empathy newborns find highly disturbing) or due to shaming and other punishment by our mothers and other caretakers. I still remember several incidents of guilt felt in my early childhood.
If Godel's theorem is correct, philosophers are bound to fail -- we cannot build supports from the surface of the storm-tossed sea of uncertainty upon which we drift to the firmament at the bottom.
We can only lash ourselves together to float as best we can. In other words, is yours a workable question? And isn't my answer a sensible way to address that which remains unasked -- How wisely to survive?
Many philosophers, greater and deeper thinkers than I, have attempted to find a logical proof for various moral axioms. But, as you observe, none of them, at least to my satisfaction are self-supporting. They all eventually fall back on what you term a moral axiom that is not logically verifiable.
As several posters have noted, various evolutionary biologists/anthropologists have attempted to establish an evolutionary hypothesis for why humans may have an "innate" moral sense. Of course having an "innate" moral sense is not "logical". Nor is it a moral axiom it simply is. Unfortunately the most profound statement I can offer is akin to what several have indicated: there are certain behaviors that just intrinsically seem wrong, regardless of society or law. In a sense it give me pleasure to avoid those behaviors, or conversely I have very little inclination to engagein those behaviors. I can construct logical rationalizations but I don't spend my days doing this, I behave the way I do largely unconsciously, without a great deal of deliberation. I have little desire to hurt others for no reason unless in defense of self, others or my perceived "property". I have no desire to rape. Although I covet others property (and sometimes their wives) I have little difficulty feeling that stealing is wrong and that it diminishes me to engage in it.
In the end, I behave the way I do primarily because of the way I feel/believe about it. Logic and thought may help me make more difficult decisions, but more in the sense that they help me clarify my feelings about a particular action. I don't act/refrain from acting because it is logic, but because logic has helped me to feel comfortable/uncomfortable with the action/result.
Interestingly, if I and the majority of other people behave properly, largely because of our indescribable, inherent beliefs/feelings and not based on a provable set of logical principles, what does that say about crime and criminal behavior. If the criminal simply lacks those inherent moral constraints does that make his/her behaviour immoral or simply outside of majority consent to what is proper?
On a side note, it really scares the crap out of me when religious people say "if there is no god, then what stops me from killing/raping/torturing you for fun?" As much as I hate religion, when I hear religious people respond to atheism/agnosticism with such a question, I'm sadly thankful that they believe the stuff they do, becaues according to their own words their religion is all that stands between their becoming mass murderers.
Morality doesn't come from god, it comes from basic principles of economics coupled with common sense.
I think the biggest part is the recognition that social constructs, in particular religious ones have been vital in the creation of our societies. That is to say, without these moral principles none of us would exist. Relying on each other to recognize this and all act together in the best interest of the whole would be as reliable as negotiating rush hour without traffic laws, signs or lights. Religion serves the purpose in our society of those traffic laws on behavior. I'm rather "irreligious" myself, but I also recognize that if too many people get irreligious we're all in a heap of trouble, because, just ask any former communist -- vast numbers of people will not act in the best interest of the whole without the concept of the "Great Traffic Cop" to compel them.
The second reason is more biological. Self Awareness in humans exists on a sliding scale, based on pattern recognition, heavily biased toward visual patterns. The more something looks like us, or behaves in a way we associate without ourselves, the closer we are drawn to a self-protection instinct. Hence our protective hierarchy goes something like this Self->Family->Others Humans->Animals with a traits we identify with->etc.
As a final note: Many irreligious people are in fact anti-religious people -- that is neither a thoughtful nor useful position.
I'm honestly not sure if the "axiom" should be something like "when people are happy, that's good" or something that explicitly talks about preference satisfaction, to deal with Socrates unsatisfied/pig satisfied problems. There are porblems with the idea of preferences too, so I usually just go by the former as a rough-and-ready guide.
I think you can consider most moral codes to be sort of heuristics for welfare maximization, and happily the broader ones seem to be largely co-extensive. There are weird scenarios around theedges where they conflict, but I feel like we can cross those bridges when we get to them. By really any decent moral standard, there's plenty of work we can do first without worrying about them.
The general rules that I have turned into my own personal morals are those that I think benefit society and myself. We can produce more goods, services and happiness if people are allowed to pursue whatever ends they want, free from coercion so long as they do not impede others from pursuing their own ends.
This principle obviously has serious flaws because of the distibutive element. However, given diminishing marginal returns on happiness, I think that we don't run into too many problems with rules that will greatly benefit the many at great expense of the few. Things like slavery cannot be supported in the long run, even though they might be defended on consequentialist grounds in the short run.
I respect people's rights to invent morality because that is a world that they would want a live in. Coercion being bad. Private property and a right to self-determiniation being good.
I just don't buy into the fact that there is anything inherently wrong in any act. Humans have just evolved to generally agree that a few types of acts lead to a lot of adverse consequences, not the least of which is massive uncertainty, and so we just consider those things immoral.
Some things I've seen on utilitarianism, and my thoughts:
1. "This is, 'The ends justify the means.'" This is certainly correct. But the ends of, say, lying, include an increased propensity for lying by the liar. Lying is normally wrong because of the harm done, and in close cases, lies should be avoided because of the possibility of self-delusion over the overall effect of the lies.
But the ends do justify the means. (I'm known to be an honest guy, but if you ask me where the infants are that you want to strangle, you're getting a lie.)
2. Eugene cites various forms of the "greatest good" calculus; I'm for "greatest good for all sentient beings." Animals count, though not (generally) nearly as much as humans.
3. The execution of utilitarianism is based on imperfect information and can lead to bad results based on this. (Presumption 1: Canadians are pesky. Presumption 2: Peskiness is bad. Conclusion: Eliminate Canada.)
This is obviously a legitimate criticism; execution may be marred by self-delusion, ignorance, or other factors. It is quite easy to reach opposite conclusions with utilitarianism based on underlying presumptions.
However, the underlying ethical view is still good, in my opinion.
There are positive side benefits to this - one tends to view oneself as a good person. I'm prone to healthy charitable donations; I have a job that is more fulfilling but less renumerative than others in the field; and I'm having a generally charming life. But if it comes to something where my loss leads to a higher gain for the world, I'm inclined to do that.
Still, utilitarianism is not martyrdom. It's taking actions with the welfare of others in significant consideration.
I logically support this axiom through the belief that greater good is good. I am all too aware that there are many amoral thugs who are quite happy with their lives, unfettered by consideration for others. I think we should condemn them, whatever their religious beliefs or lack thereof.
--JRM
I believe morality to be a direct consequence of the mathematical underpinnings of reality, and have found experientially that each time I try to ignore reality, things go poorly.
Babies take years to reach maturity and independence, and they couldn't do it without empathy and cooperation from their fellow humans. So we evolved to experience those things, and the attendant moral code they create. I can't help but know that others suffer. I can't help but know that suffering is bad. Thus, my moral code directs me to avoid causing suffering whenever and wherever I can.
Empathy, a sense of fairness, a sense of "mine" and "yours"...these are all selected for evolutionary traits, nothing more. They give rise to inescapable moral codes, and it's only after the fact that we try to rationally justify them.
So here's the thing: even though I know intellectually that moral codes are just human constructs that have no independent importance, I'm still compelled to follow them. As far as "the universe" is concerned, a baby in a burning building is meaningless. But I could no more allow a baby to burn than I could resist a hamburger after starving for 2 weeks. It's unnatural for humans to break their moral codes.
In other words, I've reached the conclusion that while religion is not the source of morality for its adherents, it does serve to reinforce morality - and that one of the ways in which it does so is by claiming that it - or to be more precise, the God at its center - is in fact the actual source of morality.
It's much more like the judicial system. You make decisions on a case-by-case basis, using past wisdom, accounting for context, and following a set of broad (and sometimes contradictory!) moral guidelines.
The set of moral guidelines can come from anywhere - mine I guess are rooted in a combination of built-in empathy and social pressures.
I recently realized many religious people are afraid that without the moral compass provided by religion, they (or others) wouldn't have the ability to morally guide themselves (and end up socially destructive). Those of us who have no problem morally guiding ourselves often overlook this legitimate fear.
Moral codes are human constructs, but I wouldn't say that they are "just human constructs" because that implies that they are basically arbitrary or morally insignificant. No doubt the reason most of us are disturbed by other humans in distress, especially crying children, is Darwinian. And indeed, a sociopath is far more likely than the rest of us to die young. Reason alone does not give us morality, but reason combined with the Darwinian imperative (e.g., strongly preferring not to die) does do so.
So "do unto others as you would have them do to you" is both:
1) a moral command which assumes that we want to be treated well.
2) an empirical statement similar to "he who lives by the sword, dies by the sword," or "most people play tit-for-tat" -- a reminder that even if killing isn't actually immoral, you should refrain lest others agree that killing you isn't actually immoral.
It may be interesting, however, that the irreligious seem more likely to cite external influences as reasons why they avoid breaking other peoples' moral codes (e.g., I don't want others to do it to me, I want to be left alone, I was raised to comply without thinking about it). None of these reasons seem to allow me to independently create a moral code of my own. Perhaps, as an irreligious person, I'm not capable of understanding morals (which may be, at their core, illogical and unexplainable) but simply go along to get along because that is the easiest way to function in society?
What I am saying is that I think most of this discussion is a red herring. I think "morale axioms" for philosophy majors are the same as "species preservation instincts" for neuro-biologists. All complex species of creatures have evolved to have a set of instructions designed to protect and help propagate their own species. If we all lied, killed and treated each other poorly, then our species would grow weak, and those sneaky dolphins would make their move and take over the place.
But the rules themselves aren't hard-wired into our brains. We are instinctual programmed to identify and absorb these rules from the culture around us. We aren't born with these moral axioms - we get them from our culture and society as a whole. Sometimes from our friends and family, sometimes from our religious leaders, sometimes from our political leaders, and sometimes from our cultural leaders.
People who are more inclined to receive these cultural instructions thrive. They are considered "good" people, and in healthy societies they rise to become community leaders. People who are less inclined to absorb cultural rules become criminals, and end up in jail.
Religious people can say they come from religion, and non-religious people can say they come from logic; but then why do they change over time? The "morale axioms" are whatever mankind needs them to be.
So, if you're going to have any sort of code, whether it'll be rock solid or shifting, you have to get it from somewhere.
Many, especially those in religious traditions, accept a code (or claim to--I'm skeptical, but this is a separate issue) that comes from a supernatural source. The people who are writing in this section, I think, realize how weak, even silly, all the different arguments are for supernatural sources of morality. Thus, they reject them. I don't have time to go into the many arguments that go against supernatural sources for codes--I suppose it should be enough, logically, for our purposes to accept that a certain portion of people reject them. The question then becomes what code will they live by.
This, in fact, has been a (the?) central question of philosophy since Socrates, and has fascinated Western (and others minds) as much as anything in the past 500 years.
Now there are some "natural" explanations as to where our code might come from, and they're not bad. (I'm sorry I have to keep skimming over things, but after all, people have written tomes on all these questions so what am I to do.) Evolutionary studies have explained quite well, for instance, the growth of altruism--even beyond one's own family, or, indeed, species. Once you are able to care for others (essentially a requirement in evolution if you have offspring) you can at least have a seed of a code. Your code, in other words, extends beyond surviving and taking care of yourself.
Once higher intelligence developes, you can start thinking abstractly about such things, and develop codes of morality. (Complex morality belongs to humans, but there are arguably rudimentary moral codes in some animals.) Not only do you have the natural moral sentiments born into you, but you can abstractly understand how others feel--empathy--so care about them.
A main question then becomes, once you operate on a higher level than just instinct, how will one live? Once again, I note many cultures will use their abstract thought to create supernatural sources that "give" morality to society, but if you feel their arguments are too weak, you must reject this and come to morality in some other way. (You'd also claim, in fact, they have no basis for morality but a sort of magic that, if investigated, disappears--that they're really only using morality they themselves believe in and created, not something that was given from on high and can't be argued with.)
So the question becomes how to live life, and how to set up society. There are "natural" rights you might find--in nature, you can walk about as you like, take food as you like, essentially do what you want and believe what you want, as long as you can survive. But you might realize (especially since it is pretty hard to live on your own, whether humans or social animals or not) life is better and easier in a society. Less violent, easier to get food, more fun, etc. So just for your own happiness (which is certain one reason you set up society), you accept living with others. Once you do this, you have to create rules to live with others. And you may have to give up some of your "natural" rights.
What code or codes do you get then? Well, there are too many to go into. Perhaps not as many as religions, but there will be different sentiments from different people in different parts of society. (A big split may be along sex lines.)
The most famous modern responses as to why and how to set up a society--create a social contract which is part and parcel of your morality--were probably by Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau. And since then, we've had numerous people filling in the blanks. (I guess I shouldn't forget Kant, who certainly is central when it comes to understanding the world and morality, even if you don't agree with him.)
So it starts with both natural feeling--inborn. They may be instinct in animals, but with the addition of abstract thinking, these instincts become moral sentiments. Then there is both the question of how to live the best life for myself, then for others I care about. Then finally the question of how to set up society, so it's smoothly run. The arguments are based on both feelings, situations one finds oneself in, and logic. (I'd claim this is true of all morality, even those that pretend to have a supernatural source.)
Obviously people can feel strongly about these things. Strongly enough to die for them. (Religion might be better at making people die for ideas, since a reward can be promised, but it's not the only way. And if religious people claim it makes no sense to die for an idea if you don't believe in an afterlife (how about religion with no afterlife?), there are at least two answers--the first is the "is life so dear?" category, the other is plenty of people mistakenly fool themselves into dying for false religions, so it's all about feelings, so are the feelings any worse if they "fool" you into dying for something not supernatural?) And, as Hume pointed out, everywhere you look, passions rules. There's logic involved, certainly, but there will almost always be things that are "felt" because, at the very least, no one has perfect information. Furthermore, there are probably unprovable axioms that everyone must accept on one side of another, and it might be based on your feelings, both those you were born with and those you developed and learned as you grew. Maybe, ultimately, you can't "prove" there is right or wrong, but then, neither can anyone who believes in a supernatural source--they have to accept things on faith. But once you reject the supernatural, at least your reasoning can be based on what seems to be taking place in the real world, through the filter of your experience and your biology.
Some books for people interested in this meta-ethical view are Grant Sterling's "Ethical Intuitionism And Its Critics" and Michael Huemer's "Ethical Intuitionism". (Huemer also has some webbed papers on the subject at http://home.sprynet.com/~owl1/ethics.htm).
(1) A moral principle that is not justified based on any other principle, or
(2) A moral principle that is not justified based on any other moral principle.
If Hume's "is-ought gap" thesis is correct (and I'm inclined to think it is), then (2) collapses into (1).
And if Hume's thesis is correct, then the only sort of answer one can give to "Yet why do you accept it?" is a causal explanation. This explanation might appeal to my personal history, evolutionary psychology, Freudian psychology, or any number of other causes.
The interesting philosophical question then is, given whatever cause rise (or sustains) a moral belief M, does knowledge of this cause give me reason to be skeptical about the truth of M.
My perceptual beliefs are not typically justified by other beliefs, but knowledge of their causes does not justify being skeptical about these beliefs. Typically, I believe that there is a dagger before me because there is a dagger before me. However, if I learn that someone has given me a drug that will cause me to hallucinate that there is a dagger before me, I will have reason to be skeptical about the existence of the daggger.
Does knowlege of the genealogy of our moral axioms give us reason to doubt them? Must we postulate an form of "ethical perception" (I believe that X is wrong because X is in fact wrong) to avoid moral skepticism?
I'm inclined to think we must.
For the irreligious, "you" are a pattern of ideas, feelings, responses and so forth -- a collection of memes. The collection evolves, over timescales of minutes and of megayears. Morality describes some aspects of your operating system, parts of how you live, parts of how you evaluate the foreseeable consequences of your choices -- including what's worth dying for, or killing for. That doesn't mean that morality is subjective or "relative" in any interesting sense; I don't believe it is. It does mean that I don't try to find "fundamental" axioms for my choices.
Does that seem evasive? Sorry -- I'm just doing the best I can, like most everybody else...
We all live on the same planet. There’s only one planet we can inhabit so far (that we know of) and so in order for this to work, we have to get along.
Humans are social animals, I believe our moral imperatives are inherent to our nature, that is, a result of the cumulative successes of our ancestors in the selection of those who act in ways most favorable to the survival of the population of humans in general. Essentially we are beings who are altruistic to those we know and love (related to) and the flip side of that is that we’re a smidge tribalist. But in general, I think morality is based on the fact that humans are social animals and as such we find our identity couched in the communities we belong to and in order for communities to be healthy and thrive, we generally act in ways that are best for the health of the overall whole. If the community is healthy every individual is benefited thus and vice verse.
For a community of organisms whose singularly defining characteristic is their capacity for abstract and rational thought, it just makes sense that our essential axiom is the golden rule. If we ourselves want to live a fulfilling, happy life then we act in ways that will enable the same for everyone else.
There are lots of things that could happen to me that would be bad for me - I could be robbed, beaten, etc. And there are lots of things that could happen that would be good for me. These things matter. They're important. It makes sense for me to take them into account when I figure out what to do. There are also lots of things that could happen to others that would be bad for them, or good for them, just like some things are bad or good for me. These things also matter. They're important, and worth taking into account in my decisions. I guess you could call that my "moral axiom".
So why do I accept it? Well, mostly because it just seems obvious. The axiom that my decisions should take into account things that matter for others is hardly less plausible than the axiom that I should take into account things that matter for me. Also, doing things that are bad for others just feels wrong. I can't even imagine always setting out to do whatever is most advantageous to me, pretending that what happened to everyone else was irrelevant. What kind of person is that?
The rules of either system largely correspond to sociobiological developments, axioms and laws both being attempted verbalizations of social moral consensus. Internalizing the most basic moral principles, the malum in se ones, is the job of parents, who also should stress respect for the greater complexity of the law of malum prohibitum. Internalization can be achieved with or without the aid of religious instruction.
Basically, my methodology is to engage in serious reflection and try to minimize conflicts between seemingly contrary moral intuitions. Right and wrong are often self-evident, and I work from there.
I follow this axiom (however imperfectly) because I find the impulse to do so irresistable (in most cases). I'm sure this is due to a mix of innate and socially conditioned affects and dispositions whose etiology is mostly opaque to me.
Your question is this: "Why then do you order your life around some particular moral axiom that you can’t logically support, especially when disregarding this axiom could save you a lot of hassle? "
This is two questions: (1) why do I behave morally? (2) why do I expect/demand others to behave morally?
Why do I behave morally? Because I like to and I dislike behaving in ways society generally considers immoral. I think I'm this way because of evolution, as so many commenters above have argued. Sociopaths simply do not have this genetic aversion to "immoral" behavior.
Why do I expect others to behave morally? Or, to put it another way, what argument can I plausably make to convince others to behave morally? I can do what C.S. Lewis does at the beginning of Mere Christianity and argue that we all "feel" morality and it therefore must exist somehow, or some variant of that argument. This may convince non-sociopaths and is usually the battle ground for most moral argument. I can also argue that it is in the other's best intersts to behave morally, and support that conclusion with evidence. This may even convince the sociopath. If I cannot make an empirical case that it is the other's best interest to behave morally, or as you say "when disregarding this axiom could save you a lot of hassle," I do not believe I can convince the sociopath to behave morally.
To a sociopath, an appeal to an absolute morality is meaningless. My personal belief that something is immoral holds no intuitive appeal to a sociopath and I cannot make a logical argument (and I have never seen one made) that objective standards of right and wrong behavior exist. Sure, there are objective behaviors that are better or worse at prodicing a particular result, either a societal result or an individual result. But who can say that one result is "better" than any other result without an absolute referent - i.e., God?
A sociopathic radical environmentalist may very well prefer a world where the majority of human beings are wiped out by a plague. This may even be true even if the sociopath correctly understands what such a world would be like (I'm sure the guy who got himself eaten by a bear truly loved living with bears). If the sociopath has the means of bringing about this result, I see no way to convince him or her that she "ought" not try.
My concepts presented above are not a priori Aristotelian universals, nor are they Kantian pure reason. They are not formulaic utilitarian, which self-destructs without assitance, chaotic abdication such as drove Nietzsche mad, or Sartre-like relativism. My goal was to express something I could live by and convince others to do the same. While not universal, they are timeless and universally accessible. Could you ask for more?
Regards/sbw
We pass the code to new members of society and socialize them to think of it as the natural way to live. It leads to succesful and prosperous societies. I presume societies that didn't figure this out are no longer with us.
Clearly someone who is unable to learn grammar or morality is likely to have trouble in any society. So it makes sense to suppose that evolution has given us the capacity to learn grammatical or moral rules and apply them without conscious thought.
To the extent that I reason consciously about morality I believe that society should adopt the moral code that will serve it best. So in doubtful cases I will choose the moral positions that I would like to see my society as a whole adopt. This seems sensible to me and I don't feel any great need to logically justify it.
Nature decides who will survive in the long run by this method of net usefulness to all Life. We can either choose to follow this path, or we will eventually be replaced. Most of our morality questions come down to disagreements about what is 'good' or 'bad' based on anecdotal power brokering between various branches of 'leadership' profiteers. Our logical purpose is staring us in the face, and we have to decide the hard questions right now: How do we want our offspring to be able to live, at what level of comfort, and how many of them will nature allow? All the other questions (murder, compassion, exploitation, societal 'rights' -there are no others) are superfluous to the question of what we all are here to accomplish for the universe.
Religion is entertainment, not morality. It's all in the marketing.
I accept that there is a moral axiom, external of biology, conditioning or self-interest. I think any of those justifications misses the point of the moral enterprise, and possibly EV's question.
This moral axiom is probably the Golden Rule, but frankly I only think about which moral principle is more important when two rules come in conflict. Nonetheless, I'm confident that there is a fundamental moral axiom, I'm just too lazy to figure out what it is.
The bigger question, as EV correctly stated, is how we irreligious folks justify belief in such an axiom. I'm willing to admit that I accept it on faith. There's nothing supporting it, except maybe the turtles. Or perhaps it just represents the reflective equilibrium between my considered judgments and intuition. Who knows.
That said, there is still (I think) a tremendous difference between my faith and that of religious believers. While I would like to think that at least in theory I could eventually deduce a complete, intelligible and empirically supported moral framework from one core principle using exclusively reason, theists seem to be willing to substitute's God's word on an ad hoc basis for "lesser" moral issues. While acknowledging that it is necessary at the axiomatic level, I would like faith to play as small a role in my belief-set as possible; theists often seem to want the inverse. Even those theists who believe that logic is a gift from God to understand His ways generally seem to agree that where the two conflict, God wins. Though they often take great pains to show that these two do not conflict, at least in principle it seems to me that they would have to accept the primacy of God in such a situation.
Of course, the rebuttal is that the minimal role of faith is a second axiom. In response to this critique: oops.
After all, how many Joe sixpack athiests have worked through a prisoners dilemma before deciding whether to raid their company's pension fund or whether they should leave a note on the parked car they just sideswiped? And even if the prisoner's dilemma would lead to anarchy if everyone raided the pension fund or no one left a note, if only you did it, what would be the consequence? More likely than not, you would get away with it. But you probably wouldn't raid the pension fund and you would leave a note because of social pressure and conscience (internal social pressure), not because of an econimic analysis of the costs and benefits or because it violates Part 1, Clause 4 of your personal code.
Likewise, I have a hard time believing that religious people truly get their principles from religion. People change religions all the time, and people choose their houses of worship based in large part on the way they were brought up. Clayton Cramer said somewhere above that when he could not reduce his code to an axiom or a series of axioms, he decided to become a Christian. But why a Christian and not a Buddhist, or a Scientologist, or a ZoroAstrian, ora Satan worshiper? There are a lot of differences between religions and he could have picked any one of them. I presume that Christianity was the one closest to the values he held and became self-reinforcing.
I don't know which of the principles I hold are from religion, which are from my parents (or their religious values -- one is essentially an athiest and one is not), which I picked up along the way through trial and error, etc. Ultimately though, I think the whole question is kind of a chicken and egg inquiry because I would not stay a part of a religion that I thought was immoral, and yet I am sure my values are influenced by the religion I follow.
Apologies for posting on the wrong thread, if I did.
My logic for moral behavior is self-referential but not focused on self-interest. The logic is that I wish to attain happiness, or at least contentment. I cannot be content if others assault, rob, swindle, mislead, harass, forcibly confine, silence, or enslave me. The logic of social interactions (as shown in the prisoners' dilemma and other game theories) indicates that I should not do any of those things to others.
My morality simplifies into the inverse of the golden rule: do not do unto others that which you do not wish done unto you. The golden rule is less important to my morality: I do not believe there is a moral requirement to actively do desirable things to others (such as praise them), although following the golden rule can help one attain happiness.
There are other reasons. I get angry when people are destructive toward things I care about. Thus, if I want to take myself seriously, I can't be destructive toward things others care about, at least without good cause. And I'd like to take myself seriously, wouldn't we all?
Morality can be misleading though. People should behave in their own interests, not others'. I really do believe in following the truth wherever it takes us -- not following a maxim whether it is right or wrong. So I think that fundamentally, people should follow rules that work. Rules that are rational, that achieve what we inherently want to achieve. Really, I think it's something that can be passionately appreciated by anyone that's ever had an idiot for a boss.
Rational behavior does have to be taught though. To an extent it has to be taught both emotionally and intellectually. People are often weak, and don't always behave even as they know they really should. To that extent, as an emotional idea, I think morality is important. Of course, this is somewhat clinical, but it seems that's what you wanted.
I also believe in beauty, though, and I think there is beauty in cooperation. Like someone else said, evil is ugly.
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