The Volokh Conspiracy

Merits of the Filibuster?:
If you read the commentary these days about filibustering judicial nominees, you have to conclude either that a) filibustering is essential to the Rule of Law, b) filibustering will destroy the Rule of Law, or c) arguments (a) and (b) are just the arguments du jour of those who either like or dislike Bush's nominees and need to fill up op-ed space.

  I'm wondering, has anyone written anything good about the structural and systematic effect of filibustering judicial nominees? Putting aside the question of this president and these nominees, it seems to me that having a de facto 60-vote requirement for confirming appellate judges is an interesting idea. I don't know how it would work or what the scope of it would be, but I'd be interested in reading something thoughtful about its pros and cons. If anyone knows of such a discussion, please provide a citation to it (with the URL or a link if it's online) in the comment section.

  UPDATE: A reader asks why I think a 60-vote requirement might be an interesting idea. I'm an outsider to this area, but I imagine the pro-con debate might go something like this:
Pro: A 60-vote requirement is a good idea because we don't want extremist judges. We should have judges with bipartisan support, and a 60-vote requirement ensures that.
Con: You're being naive. You're assuming that the minority party will act in good faith, only blocking judges that they think are "extremist." In reality, minority parties will just block judges they don't like.
Pro: How can the minority party only block judges they don't like? They won't like any of the opposing party's nominees. They'll have to pick and choose which judges to filibuster, and they'll pick the most extreme nominees.
Con: But that will only create an incentive for the President to nominate more "extreme" nominees, whatever that means. If the minority can only stop a few, the President will name a few people knowing that they won't get confirmed.
Pro: Maybe, but political pressures might just prevent that from happening.
Something like that, anyway.
Paul Gowder (mail):
I don't know of such a discussion, but can we start one here? :-) It seems like there's something to be said for the proposition, insofar as judges are supposed to be nonpartisan, so requirng some measure of assent from both parties would seem to permit the bench to be less politicized than it might otherwise would be.
5.11.2005 2:49pm
Wince and Nod (mail) (www):
It would drive judge choices towards the middle, although we can still hope for the ocassional iconoclast. That leaves both conservatives and liberals out in the cold.

Yours,
Wince
5.11.2005 2:54pm
JKG (mail):
Here's Ackerman on the German system: Ackerman

Here's McGinnis and Rappaport in this year's Cardozo Law Review:
McGinnis
5.11.2005 2:55pm
Steve:
One effect of the "nuclear option" is that it would become EASIER for the President to get his judicial appointees than it would for him to get his other appointees. I don't know if I can think of a principled argument for this result, although Senate Republicans continue to insist they only want to eliminate the filibuster for judicial nominees, and not other nominees.

If anything, you'd think it should be tougher to get judges approved, since they are (1) lifetime appointments, and (2) part of an independent branch of government. But at a minimum, it sure seems hard to justify why they should be MORE easily confirmed than other nominees.
5.11.2005 3:16pm
Anderson (mail) (www):
Skimming the Cardozo article, I am skeptical of the authors' contention that a supermajority should be applied, if at all, only to SCOTUS nominees, on the theory that "Lower court judges have only a limited ability to entrench norms without affirmation from the Supreme Court." Given the very small % of cases on which the SCOTUS will, or can, grant cert, this technically "limited ability" is pretty broad in practice.

Not that my opinion matters, but I would agree with a supermajority for the reasons stated above by wiser commenters. I am even starting to think that a single term of 15 years or so might be a good idea, rather than lifetime appointments.
5.11.2005 3:31pm
CitizzenQ (mail) (www):
Here's a novel concept: how about voting on batches of nominees instead of one at a time, much the same way a parliament will approve a new executive government. If there could be a semiannual round up of all appellate and lower court openings, and spots are divvied up according to the party’s representation. The president submits all nominees, and the majority party gets to pick some of them out of that pool (55% under the current Senate breakdown), and the minority gets to pick the rest. There could even be a system where the party leadership of each party submits names that they request the President include in his nominations. This way, we would maintain a system where, regardless of President, liberal, conservative, and moderate judges all get on the bench.
5.11.2005 3:31pm
Felix (mail):
5.11.2005 4:47pm
Jimm (mail):
Federalist papers #76 and 77 talk about the logic behind the 'advise and consent' responsibility of the Senate. It pretty clearly implied that the main reason is not to deny the President judicial picks that the Senate doesn't like, but to require that the whole process be done in the public eye. That way the public can get rid of Senators and/or the President at the next election if they see either wanton unreasonableness or corruption. My take on the Federalist's arguments seems to lean against fillibusters, but I'm no lawyer, just a libertarian geek.
5.11.2005 5:01pm
JJ (mail):
In addition to asking whether a 60-vote requirement to confirm judicial nominees is more or less desirable than 50-vote requirement, we should also ask:

(1) What is the optimal number of senate votes that should be required to confirm a judicial nominee?
The mere fact that the senate rules currently say that it only takes 60 votes to end a filibuster is arbitrary. The Senate can change its rules to require 65, 70, 75 or . . . 100 votes to end debate. Maybe we should require more than 60 votes to confirm judicial nominees.

(2) The best interest of who? The senate, the president, the judicial nominees, the "People"?
A thoughtful treatment of this issue should identify very carefully how all the above stakeholders would be impacted by the various voting threshholds.

(3) Would a requirement of 100 votes to confirm a judicial nominee be constitutional?
I don't think so because this would convert the President's influence over the make-up of the federal judiciary into that of a single Senator's (barring recess appointments, which undoubtedly would increase).

(4) If it would be unconstitutional to require 100 votes to confirm a judicial nominee is it constitutional to require anything above 50?
I don't think so. Just as the power to tax is the power to destroy, the power of the Senate to raise the voting requirement above 50 is the power to raise it to 100. This is why I don't like the idea of a judicial filibuster. The Senate should not have the power to increase its influence over the judiciary by an internal senate rule.
5.11.2005 5:06pm
Challenge:
"It seems like there's something to be said for the proposition, insofar as judges are supposed to be nonpartisan, so requirng some measure of assent from both parties would seem to permit the bench to be less politicized than it might otherwise would be."

Come on, Paul. What you're talking about is an increase in bi-partisanship not an increase in non-partisanship. They are different creatures.

What I think you mean by "non-partisan" is that judges should be impartial. They should follow the law, not their opinion of what the law should be. And isn't that the Republican position on judges? Maybe you disagree, but I don't. That is the number one reason I am a Republican and vote for Republicans. It follows, then, that allowing the Democrats to have some sway by requiring 60 votes will make judges more likley to be biased, to read their own preferences into the law, and to adhere to precedent which grossly deforms the Constitution. How is that a formula for impartiality or non-partisanship?

Requiring 60 votes for confirmation would, however, make nominees more "moderate." We would likely get more Sandra Day O'Connors. I don't know many that would describe her as "impartial." Unprincipled and incoherent maybe. Moderate is a word for a politician or a policy, it is not an interpretive philosophy. How do you "moderately" interpret a statute or the Constitution? Choose the position halfway between what a statutue says and what it doesn't say? Halfway between what a statute says and what you want it to say? Maybe you can explain that one to me, Mr Gowder.
5.11.2005 5:08pm
Challenge:
"One effect of the "nuclear option" is that it would become EASIER for the President to get his judicial appointees than it would for him to get his other appointees. I don't know if I can think of a principled argument for this result, although Senate Republicans continue to insist they only want to eliminate the filibuster for judicial nominees, and not other nominees."

Have the Democrats filibustered his other nominees? No, so your argument is a hypothetical.
5.11.2005 5:14pm
Anderson (mail) (www):
Does anyone else agree with JJ's argument that a Senate rule requiring "consent" to be unanimous would be, not just a bad idea, but *unconstitutional*? (And that, by implication, only a simple majority can be required?)

(I'll assume that Challenge disagrees, because he's against reading things into the Constitution that aren't there.)

I can't agree that a unanimity requirement would violate the separation of powers; it would make the Senate more powerful vis-a-vis the President, but he would still have the power of nomination, plus other ways to make the Senate behave. Besides the evident impracticality of such a rule.
5.11.2005 5:24pm
Goober (mail):
One skeptical response:

I suspect that such a discussion will not be forthcoming. My own knowledge of the scholarship of the filibuster is that the scholarship is highly abstract, removed and largely speculative. It seems accepted as a truism that the filibuster encourages moderation, but I know of know studies actually showing this in results, and the baseline problem remains inherent (e.g., which was more "radical," supporting the Civil Rights Act or opposing it? it rather depends on your "certain point of view," as Obi-Wan Kenobi reminds us).

And as Prof. Kerr's concern is with a particular application to filibusters of judicial nominees, I suspect hard studies are going to be even more unlikely.

One obvious note: Scalia was confirmed 98-0, and Souter was expected to be a hard conservative vote. The most likely outcome of any change may be null, as predicting judicial behavior is washed out in the noise of misperception (or just the failure of perfect foresight).
5.11.2005 5:24pm
Challenge:
"I'm wondering, has anyone written anything good about the structural and systematic effect of filibustering judicial nominees?"

Let me see, Orin..... Since NO judicial nominees have been filibustered until today (with the exception of Abe Fortas, which was supported by approximately equal numbers of Republicans, and Democrats), that would mean very little would change. Right? What's so drastic of a change? It seems eliminating the filibuster is a formula for maintaining the status quo on judicial nominations rather than a radical change.

Now, maybe the threat of filibuster has been used to temper a given president's choices, but I think that it is unlikely threats alone have played a large role in the nomination process.
5.11.2005 5:26pm
Fr. Bill (mail):
For another question about whether losing the filibuster now is timely or not, try this "though experiment." If Antonin Scalia were nominated to be an associate justice today, would he be filibustered? He was a known quantity when nominated the first time. That we had just gone through some amount of battle over Rehnquist does not explain why Scalia sailed through 98-0 on its own. Things have changed, in the Democrat party, more than on the Republican side. A filibuster rule to "keep out extremists" might make sense if that's how it were used. It is now being used to claim that folks who like Justice Scalia's jurisprudence are "extreme."

I recall that both times President Bush ran he said he would appoint judges like Scalia and Thomas. The idea that these two are so "extreme" as to be unconfirmable today suggests that the filibuster is not now being employed in a way that is consistent with any reasonable interpretation of its meaning or history. For the record, I never agreed with the GOP efforts to block Clinton's nominees to the court, either, but at least then you were dealing with a majority opposition party in the Senate, unlike today.
5.11.2005 5:56pm
Steve:
I don't see how increasing the number of votes required for confirmation in the Senate adds to or subtracts from the Senate's power vis-a-vis the President. If 100 votes were necessary to confirm in the Senate, that would surely increase the power of EACH INDIVIDUAL SENATOR, but the institution as a whole would have the exact same power it had before - it can accept the nomination, or it can reject it.

I hate to clutter up a legal discussion with debate over silly (and false) talking points like "no judicial nominee other than Fortas has ever been filibustered," so I hope that practice will simply stop.
5.11.2005 6:05pm
Drew (mail):
Here is an article I found interesting that has some theoretical research on why supermajorities are preferable in legislation (forget where I first saw it may have even been on this site). This is not directly applicable to judicial nominations, except pointing to the fact that supermajorities lend more stability to parliamentary votes.
Geometry of Chaotic and Stable Discussions

On the other hand it strongly supports the senate not trying to change thier procedures by a simple majority vote (as per the nuclear option).
5.11.2005 6:45pm
Challenge:
"I hate to clutter up a legal discussion with debate over silly (and false) talking points like "no judicial nominee other than Fortas has ever been filibustered," so I hope that practice will simply stop."

That is NOT a false statement. Name another.
5.11.2005 6:53pm
Syd (mail):
"(3) Would a requirement of 100 votes to confirm a judicial nominee be constitutional?
I don't think so because this would convert the President's influence over the make-up of the federal judiciary into that of a single Senator's (barring recess appointments, which undoubtedly would increase). "

Yes, it would be constitutional. It would be a Senate rule, and the Senate makes its own rules. It would be a terrible idea, of course, but constitutional.

I think blocking appointees in committee without a vote is more objectionable than filibustering them.
5.11.2005 7:08pm
Challenge:
"Yes, it would be constitutional. It would be a Senate rule, and the Senate makes its own rules. It would be a terrible idea, of course, but constitutional."

It makes its own rules within the confines of the Constitution. If "advise and consent" was intended to mean "majority vote" then such a rule would indeed be unconstitutional.
5.11.2005 7:16pm
JJ (mail):
Anderson,

If Challenge is an originalist, he won't have a difficult time discoverying that the precise allocation of powers found in our Constitution was the subject of great debate among the framers. Is it consistent with that debate to believe that the Senate has the power to upset that allocation of powers by senate rule? Did the framers really give the Senate the power to unilaterally increase its own influence over the make-up of the judiciary at the president's expense? I don't see any difficulty for originalists in concluding that the answer is "No."

Now, whether the "political question doctrine" should or would permit a court to strike down judicial filibusters as unconstitutional is a question I'll leave for someone else.
5.11.2005 7:33pm
Citizen Jeremy (mail):
Assuming that a lack of accepted judicial nominees would actually result in emptier benches and an even more clogged court system, I wonder who would be held responsible by the public - the majority or the filibusterers? Or if the required vote was 65, would the blame for the gridlock lie on the nominating president to offer more "centrist" nominees or on the minority senators to relaz their standards and concede to the majority?
5.11.2005 7:34pm
JJ (mail):
Syd,

Are you suggesting senate rules are impervious to constitutional attack simply because the Senate has the power to adopt the rules of its proceedings? What if the Senate adopted a rule prohibiting black senators from holding leadership positions?
5.11.2005 7:48pm
JJ (mail):
Steve,

Nice distinction between the Senate as an institution and individual senators. I think Challenge is right though. The question is what was intended by "advise and consent." If it was intended to mean "majority vote" then the Senate cannot thwart that meaning through the use of a senate rule.
5.11.2005 7:55pm
Craig (mail) (www):
The Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy had a fairly comprehensive article on filibusters (.pdf file):
THE CONSTITUTIONAL OPTION TO CHANGE SENATE RULES AND PROCEDURES:

A MAJORITARIAN MEANS TO OVERCOME THE FILIBUSTER
5.11.2005 8:36pm
Robert Schwartz (mail):
I am old enough to remember when filibusters were used by Senators like Robert Byrd (back when politcally correct liberals shunned him because he was a Klan member) and Strom Thurmond for the purpose for which they were invented -- preserving the Peculiar Institution of the South.

I was in high school when Southern DEMOCRATS stalled the passage of the Civil Rights Act and Voting Rights Act by using the filibuster. At that time every politically correct liberal believed that the filibuster was an abomination.

In that opinion, I concured. I have not changed my opinion on that subject. Of course that is not the only subject on which my opinion has not changed, but on which the so-called liberals have abandonded me, which explains why I am not a liberal anymore.

Every argument advanced by the parties to the current debate was advanced by their opponents a few years ago. Newspapers like the NYTimes which for years condemed the filibuster in the most rigorus terms have now discovered its virtues. Yet no one is embarased.

I have not changed my position, the filibuster needs to be sent to join the hateful instituons it was invented to protect, in the dustbin of history.
5.11.2005 9:23pm
Adam (www):
Have the Democrats filibustered his other nominees? No, so your argument is a hypothetical.

Well, the Republicans filibustered President Clinton's choice for Surgeon General, Henry Foster . . .
5.11.2005 10:24pm
John Korey (mail) (www):
Mark Silverstein and William Haltom, "You Can't Always Get What You Want: Reflections on the Ginsburg and Breyer Nominations," in Jeffrey Cohen and David Nice, eds., The Presidency: Classic and Contemporary Readings (McGraw Hill, 2003) argue that, in part, the implicit threat of a Republican filibuster in 2003-2004 led Clinton to nominate "techno-judges." While it is certainly not the authors' view, it seems to me that in a democracy there's a lot to be said for techno-judges.
5.11.2005 10:25pm
Bernard Yomtov (mail):
I don't think the 60-vote requirement would lead to more extreme appointments, as the last "con" argument would have it.

That would only happen if Senators of the President's party never opposed a nominee. Surely once you get to the further edges there will be opposition even from within the party. And note that, as is happening with the Bolton UN nomination, that it may take only one or two such Senators to block a nominee in committee.
5.11.2005 10:59pm
Some Jarhead:
It's a moot point when you get to the heart of the matter - the GOP will have 60 votes a year from November (ok, January, technicall).

Or maybe 62... who can tell?
5.11.2005 11:41pm
Daniel Chapman (mail):
First of all, I tend to agree that the constitution doesn't forbid judicial filibusters per se. At least not as easily as some people tend to argue. Who better to decide what constitutes "consent" than the body doing the consenting? If the senate rules required a 60 vote majority to consent, great... they can still change those rules though.

I think the better argument would be that it violates separation of powers by showing disrespect to the executive branch. Legislation requires extensive debate to weigh the pros and cons of any particular law... in the case of judicial nominations, that is the job of the executive branch. I don't think we should be seeing compromises of this sort in the senate because the only real choice should be "yes or no" for each nominee individually. I still don't think this argument carries much weight though...

It's been argued here that one benefit of the filibuster is that it would promote "moderation" in the courts. I wonder though... is this a good thing? I really don't think the federal courts are the proper forum for political compromise. Perhaps it goes along with my belief that most of the issues the Court deals in these days should properly be handled in the legislature. Political moderation and compromise are only a good thing if you're setting policy.
5.11.2005 11:46pm
Chuck (mail):
Hamilton, in Federalist #76, seems to agree with Daniel Chapman's worry in that he "[doesn't] think the federal courts are the proper forum for political compromise". Transforming the Senate's advise-and-consent role with respect to the executive's delegated power to nominate/appoint into a "committee of 100+1" would lead to the problems outlined in Hamilton's essay: that the give-and-take "I'll give you that candidate if you give me this one" behavior that necessarily attends such committee-driven appontments would lead to mediocre, not necessarily moderate, appointees.
5.12.2005 12:29am
Syd (mail):
"JJ (mail):
Syd,

Are you suggesting senate rules are impervious to constitutional attack simply because the Senate has the power to adopt the rules of its proceedings? What if the Senate adopted a rule prohibiting black senators from holding leadership positions?"

The courts might be willing to squeeze their way in through the 14th Amendment, but I think they would more likely decide they have no jurisdiction over the matter. The actual penalty would be that the senators who voted for the rule would stand a high probability of being thrown out at the next election.

The filibuster, on the other hand, is a consequence of the rules of debate in the Senate, and the courts have no authority to tell the Senate how to conduct debate.
5.12.2005 2:06am
Anon7 (mail):
A group of Republicans tried (unsuccessfully) to filibuster Clinton nominees Marsha Berzon and Richard Paez. Combine that with the Abe Fortas situation, and the current filibustering of judges has quite a bit of precedent.
5.12.2005 6:53am
Ryan M:
In a more intellectually honest political environmnet, I'd say 60 would not be totally unreasonable. But, that is not the case today. Proof?

When Justice Scalia was nominated in 1986, he was well known as an honest conservative and originalist, and has since performed as expected. He was unanimously confirmed by a 98-0 Senate vote! Do you think Democrats would confirm Scalia today 100-0 like in 1986? Of course not. Pelosi, Boxer, Biden and the like would filibuster, then levy a bogus character assassination, claim he will destroy democracy as we know it with right-wing hate, and call Scalia the most "activist" judge ever presented to the Senate.

If Democrats actually thought a minority party filibustering a judge was appropriate, they would have done it with Clarence Thomas.
5.12.2005 9:36am
Fr. Bill (mail):
Anon7, you infer just the wrong thing from the facts, I think. True, some Republicans (including Sen. Frist) wanted to filibuster Berzon and Paez. But cooler heads prevailed, and they failed in their effort (despite being the majority party). The idea that this is unprecedented is not rooted in the claim that nobody has ever tried it, it's that neither party has ever behaved as irresponsibly as the Democrats now are. Further, in the Fortas case, though there was technically a "filibuster" it was not in that case to support "minority rights." When a cloture vote was called, only some 40 senators supported it, I believe. Thus, Fortas did not have majority support in the Senate, unlike all of the "extremist" nominees being filibustered today.

There is simply no real world precedent for the Democrat party's behavior here--the evidence you cite is evidence, in two cases, of failed attempts and in one case of a successful filibuster against a nominee who, because of his ethical lapses, did not have the support of a majority of senators. Quite a bit of precedent?
5.12.2005 9:42am
Ryan M:
Anon7: "A group of Republicans tried (unsuccessfully) to filibuster Clinton nominees Marsha Berzon and Richard Paez. Combine that with the Abe Fortas situation, and the current filibustering of judges has quite a bit of precedent."

Never before has a MINORITY of Senate support stopped a judge from getting an up or down vote. That is the main distinction today. Almost 30% of Bush's appellate nominees have been filibustered indefinitely by a MINORITY.

Fortas was filibustered for 4 DAYS before voluntarily withdrawing, Pracilla Owens was filibustered repeatedly for more than 2 YEARS.
5.12.2005 9:51am
adam (mail) (www):
Never before has a MINORITY of Senate support stopped a judge from getting an up or down vote. That is the main distinction today.

Really? How about when one Senator does it, as happened all the time during the 1990s (and before) by use of a blue slip.

If it's okay for one Senator to unilaterally derail a nominee, why not 41?
5.12.2005 12:05pm
Daniel Chapman (mail):
From my understanding, a blue slip meant a senator had some particular objection to a district court judge that would serve in his state. The rest of the senate would respect his judgment. It wasn't really a filibuster since a blue slip was powerless without the cooperation of the majority.

I don't think blue slips were ever used on circuit court nominees, either.

Honestly though, I'd never heard of blue slips until this filibuster debate entered the news. Please let me know if I'm mistaken here.
5.12.2005 12:18pm
Dirtyfingers (mail):
So much for winning elections and being the majority party these days...
5.12.2005 12:45pm
adam (mail) (www):
You are mistaken: Sen. Helms used the blue slip to block two African American nominees to the 4th Circuit: James Beaty and James Wynn. Spence Abraham used it to block Kathleen McCree Lewis, Helene White and Kent Marcus from the 6th; Gramm and Hutchison used the blue slip to block Jorge Rangel and Enrique Moreno from the 5th Circuit.

None of these nominees ever received a hearing, let alone a vote.
5.12.2005 1:17pm
Ambrose (mail):
Anyone who believes that the SC does not make policy is living in a dream world. If the Senate is going to change its rules, then the filibuster should be eliminated for all purposes, not just judges. Most of the arguments agaist its use on judges apply equally to all actions by the Senate. The protections that it affords to minority rights should not be discarded lightly.
5.12.2005 4:57pm
Al (mail):
Just a thought...

How about a senator introducing a resolution to withhold consent for a nominee, and if that resolution fails, make the assumption that the failure to withold consent implies consent?
5.12.2005 11:46pm
Michael Edward McNeil (mail) (www):
Lee Harris has a very interesting article in Tech Central Station on the history of the filibuster, which can be read here. In it he reports that, rather than dating back to the early days of the American republic, the filibuster actually began only in 1872, when the president of the Senate, aka the vice president of the United States -- at the time Vice President Schuyler Colfax -- declared that "under the practice of the Senate the presiding officer could not restrain a Senator in remarks which the Senator considers pertinent to the pending matter" -- thus creating the filibuster virtually de novo. Prior to that, if I understand Harris correctly, for the entire preceding century the Senate president (VPOTUS) wielded the uncontested power to cut off any senator at any time for any reason.

It would appear, therefore, that the Senate prior to 1872 was a very different institution from that which followed -- purely because the vice president of the United States once declared it so. Could the president of the United States similarly abandon one of his constitutional powers -- committing his successors to the change for all time -- simply by declaring it gone?

Am I misunderstanding the history and meaning of this?
5.13.2005 10:58am
adam (mail) (www):
What I believe you're missing, Michael, is that the filibuster is now embedded in Senate Rule 22, and there are particular procedures which are supposed to be followed in terms of amending said rules, many of which are about to be broken.
5.13.2005 1:06pm