The Volokh Conspiracy

Richmond Times-Dispatch columnist A. Barton Hinkle recently published this piece on a case of eminent domain abuse in Virginia:

As a general rule, progressives do not get worked up about property rights the way conservatives do. This is a mistake — as a case out of Norfolk shows.

To the progressive eye, property is bound up with materialism and wealth and greed and other yucky things. But property is also bound up with some things progressives hold dear. And even progressives were outraged when, in its 2005 Kelo decision, the Supreme Court said governments could take property from the poor and give to the rich.

That is what has been happening in Norfolk, where the city’s Redevelopment and Housing Authority has been using eminent domain to take dozens of pieces of private property for resale to a foundation run by Old Dominion University. The housing authority has been collecting commissions on the sales; the foundation has then been turning the property over to developers for their use as part of a swanky new University Village.

Among those properties is the building that houses Central Radio, whose story was detailed here back in May 2010. Some years ago, Norfolk offered to buy the property for a lowball price of $700,000 (more than a decade before, a developer had offered more than $1 million). Central Radio’s president, Bob Wilson, turned the city down. So the city slapped a spurious designation of “blighted” on the property and condemned it.

Norfolk couldn’t get away with that today. Virginia’s General Assembly has sharply curtailed such abusive use of eminent domain, precisely because of cases such as this one and others like it....

But the legislature’s changes to eminent-domain law included a grandfather clause, allowing Norfolk to proceed. Wilson is naturally cheesed off. He has vented his frustration by putting up on the side of his building a protest banner. (“50 years on this street,” it reads. “78 years in Norfolk. 100 workers. Threatened by eminent domain.” The words “eminent domain abuse” are surrounded by a red circle with a slash through it.)

But Norfolk officials apparently feel it is not enough to take away Wilson’s property. They also are trying to take away his right to free speech, by insisting that his banner violates the city’s sign ordinance....

Hinkle correctly notes that this is just one of several recent cases around the country in which local governments and influential developers not only engaged in dubious takings, but also tried to prevent property owners from speaking out against them. As he also points out, Virginia is one of a minority of states that has enacted strong post-Kelo eminent domain reform that will constrain abusive condemnations in the future. But as I documented in this article, in many other states reform still has a long way to go. Even in Virginia, eminent domain reform will not be fully secure in the long run until it has been incorporated into the state constitution, as well as statutory law.

Because blight and “economic development” takings tend to victimize the poor and politically weak for the benefit of the wealthy and politically powerful, they have generated widespread opposition on the left as well as the right. We will need greater cross-ideological cooperation on this issue to fully address the problem.

The New York Times has an article describing how the TransCanada corporation is using eminent domain to forcibly acquire property to build the Keystone oil pipeline:

When the TransCanada men first came, Julia Trigg Crawford said, they were polite. They offered money. Seven thousand dollars to let the Keystone XL pipeline cross her family’s 600-acre farm on its way from the Alberta tar sands to the refineries on the Gulf Coast....

Ms. Crawford, 52, who serves as the farm’s manager, called the rest of the family. They agreed to sign. “We thought that at least if we signed we’d have some say in what happened,” she said.

They called the TransCanada representative. “He told us that if we could come up with a contract that worked for both parties, they wouldn’t condemn the land,” Ms. Crawford said.....

“I fully expected them to counter,” she said. “There were about five or six things we wanted, and we would have been happy to take one or two.”

Then, she said, TransCanada “went full radio silence.” The Crawfords never heard back from them — until October, when they got a letter saying their land had been condemned and a lease awarded to TransCanada.

But as the Crawfords discovered, when voluntary compensation agreements are not reached, Texas law allows certain private pipeline companies to use the right of eminent domain to force landowners to let pipelines through. This was true even for TransCanada, which has yet to get State Department permission to bring the Keystone XL across the Alberta border.

The article notes TransCanada’s claim that it has acquired the overwhelming majority of the property they needed for the pipeline through voluntary land sales. This may be true, but it is misleading. Like the Crawfords, these owners agreed to sell their land under the threat of eminent domain if they refused. Some might well have refused to sell for the price offered by the firm if eminent domain were off the table. The voluntariness of land sales undertaken in the shadow of threats of condemnation is dubious at best.

Back in 2006, co-blogger Jonathan Adler and I published an article explaining the environmental dangers of allowing the use of eminent domain for private economic development projects, as the Supreme Court ruled in the Kelo case. At the time, some environmentalists pooh-pooed the article, and one group even declared our article the environmental “outrage of the month” (it must have been a slow month for actual pollution). Ironically, as Jonathan explained here, several environmental groups are now trying to use post-Kelo reform laws restricting economic development takings to block the Keystone takings.

Such efforts are unlikely to succeed in Texas. As I described in this article, Texas is one of many states that have passed post-Kelo reform laws that pretend to constrain economic development takings without actually doing so. They might have a better chance in one of the other states through which the pipeline must pass.

Even if Kelo had been decided the other way, some pipeline takings might still be constitutional. The Constitution permits takings for “public use,” and even under the traditional definition of public use advocated by Kelo’s critics, condemnations for public utilities or common carriers that the general population has a legal right of access to are often permissible. However, pipeline takings would be subject to tougher constitutional constraints than under Kelo, and the government would at least have to prove that the pipelines in question really are public utilities or common carriers open to the general public.

Regardless, as Jonathan points out, the controversy over Keystone has led “some environmentalists... to recognize that allowing the government to seize private property for the purpose of encouraging private economic development can facilitate environmentally undesirable projects.”

UPDATE: In a response to this post, Mark Kleiman claims that Jonathan Adler and I “don’t seem interested in the fact that none of their friends on the side of inalienable property rights seems to have any problem with the use of eminent domain to build Keystone (any more than they objected to George W. Bush’s use of it to enrich himself and his business partners in the Texas Rangers by seizing private property to build, not merely a stadium, but a shopping mall).” Actually, people who are genuinely “on the side of inalienable property rights” are likely to be opposed to the use of eminent domain for this project. But if Kleiman means to refer to the GOP, I thought the fact that most Republicans support the pipeline is too well-known to require dwelling on. By contrast, (some) environmentalists’ change of heart on eminent domain is a development that is much less widely appreciated.

I have, however, criticized eminent domain abuses advocated by Republicans in many previous posts, such as here and here. In this 2006 post, I noted the inadequacy of the Bush administration’s response to Kelo. Few if any opponents of Kelo approve of the use of eminent domain to build sports stadiums. George W. Bush’s exploitation of it, of course, occurred many years before Kelo thrust the issue of eminent domain into the limelight, and few nonexperts remember it today.

This Thursday at 4 PM, I will be speaking on “Property Rights Since Kelo” at Tulane Law School. Thanks to the Tulane Federalist Society for inviting me.

Much has happened on both the legislative and judicial fronts in the last few years. Considerable progress has been made in protecting property rights against abusive takings, but much work remains to be done in many states. I intend to give the audience a bird’s-eye survey of the good, the bad, and the ugly alike!

This Thursday at noon, I will be speaking at the University of North Carolina Law School on “Property Rights Since Kelo.” Much has happened on both the legislative and judicial fronts in the last few years. Considerable progress has been made in protecting property rights against abusive takings, but much work remains to be done in many states. University of North Carolina law professor Carol Brown – a leading expert on the impact of eminent domain on low-income and minority communities – will comment on my talk, which is sponsored by the UNC Federalist Society.

This may be one of the few events at UNC Law School over the next few days that does not involve either the NCAA tournament or the individual mandate litigation!

The Fordham Urban Law Journal City Square website has posted a debate between NYU Professor Roderick Hills and myself on the the New York Court of Appeals controversial decisions upholding “blight” condemnations in the Atlantic Yards and Columbia University cases. In my 2011 symposium article “Let there Be Blight,” I argued that these takings violated both the New York state and federal constitutions. I especially emphasized the incompability between the court’s decision defining blight so broadly that virtually any area could qualify with the New York state constitutional provision limiting blight condemnations to “substandard and unsanitary areas.” Hills has written a critique of my analysis. My reply is available here.

Hills is one of the leading property and federalism scholars out there, and I always learn from our exchanges. As I explain near the end of my reply, in this case there may be more areas of agreement between us than initially meet the eye.

The Private Property Rights Protection Act of 2012 passed the House yesterday on an overwhelming voice vote. I wrote about the bill in this post. As I explained there, the PRPA is far from a panacea for eminent domain abuse. But it takes a modest step in the right direction by cutting off some types of federal subsidies from local governments that engage in Kelo v. New London-like economic development takings.

This is not the first time that the PRPA passed the House by an overwhelming margin. The same thing happened in 2005, when a previous version of the bill won a lopsided 376-38 vote in the House only to die in the Senate without ever getting to a floor vote. Hopefully, we can avoid a repeat performance this year. But the Senate rarely moves quickly in an election year, and there are plenty of organized interest groups that are likely to lobby the senators to drag their heels until the 112th Congress expires – thereby forcing the bill’s proponents to go back to square one.

In the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s controversial Kelo decision, which allowed the condemnation of private property for economic development, some 44 states have passed eminent domain reform laws. Although many of those laws are likely to be ineffective, overall a good deal of progress has been made at the state level in curbing abusive condemnations, including by state courts enforcing the property rights provisions of their state constitutions.

Unfortunately, very little has been achieved at the federal level during that time. On the third anniversary of Kelo in 2008, I summed up federal reform efforts as follows:

...

...

[Insert sound of crickets chirping, grass growing, and paint drying].

Not much has changed since then. This is unfortunate because there is much that the federal government can do to prevent harmful takings. Many states have failed to pass effective reform laws, and federal funding often facilitates Kelo-like takings there.

Fortunately, as Christina Walsh of the Institute for Justice explains in this recent op ed, Congress now has another opportunity to rectify its previous omissions:

It has been demonstrated time and again that eminent domain is routinely used to wipe out black, Hispanic and poorer communities, with less political capital and influence, in favor of developers’ grand plans.

It also has been demonstrated that restrictions on eminent domain in no way inhibit economic growth, as the beneficiaries of eminent domain abuse would like you to believe....

Groups across the philosophical spectrum have recognized the need to limit this abuse of power to protect those who are defenseless against the seemingly unstoppable alliance of powerful, deep-pocketed developers and their politician friends. The diverse coalition has included the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the League of United Latin American Citizens, the National Federation of Independent Business and the Farm Bureau. It’s safe to say that the coalition also includes more than 80 percent of Americans, as demonstrated poll after poll taken after Kelo.

Despite the evidence that Americans are united against the misuse of eminent domain, Congress has yet to to take even a modest step. A bipartisan bill, H.R. 1433, making its way through the House would strip a city of federal economic development funding for two years if the city takes private property to give to someone else for their private use....

This bill undoubtedly will pass the House as it did in 2005, and likely will get stalled in the Senate Judiciary Committee, headed by Sen. Patrick J. Leahy, Vermont Democrat, where it has gone to die in years past.

It is tragic because this is exactly the kind of centrist reform – uniting minority advocates and small-business interests – where Republicans and Democrats should be able to work together.

Even if it passes, this bill would not end eminent domain abuse or even all federal funding for it. But it would be a valuable step on the right direction. Past history does not bode well for the bill’s prospects in the Senate. And it’s especially difficult to pass legislation during an election year. However, it’s possible that things will be different this time.

For those who worry that federal intervention in this field would undermine federalism, I have addressed that argument in considerable detail here.

My new article “What if Kelo v. City of New London Had Gone the Other Way?” is now available on SSRN. It is part of an Indiana Law Review symposium on “What if? Counterfactuals in Constitutional History.” Here is the abstract:

Kelo v. City of New London is one of the most controversial decisions in U.S. Supreme Court history. The Kelo Court held that the Public Use Clause of the Fifth Amendment allows government to condemn private property and transfer it to other private parties for purposes of “economic development.” This Article considers the question of what might have happened if the Supreme Court decided Kelo v. City of New London in favor of the property owners. Such counterfactual analysis may seem frivolous. But it is, in fact, useful in understanding constitutional history. Any assessment of the impact of a legal decision depends on at least an implicit judgment as to the likely consequences of a ruling the other way. Analysis can be improved by making these implicit counterfactual assumptions clear and systematically considering their implications.

Part I briefly describes the Kelo case and its aftermath, focusing especially on the massive political backlash. That backlash led to numerous new reform laws. However, many of them turned out to be largely symbolic. Part II discusses the potential value of a counterfactual analysis of Kelo. It could help shed light on a longstanding debate over the effects of Supreme Court decisions on society. Some have argued that court decisions have little impact, mostly protecting only those rights that the political branches of government would protect of their own accord. Others contend that this pessimistic view underrates the potential effect of Supreme Court decisions.

Part III considers the possible legal effect of a ruling in favor of the property owners. Such a decision could have taken several potential forms. One possibility is that the Court could have adopted the view advocated by the four Kelo dissenters: that economic development condemnations are categorically forbidden by the Public Use Clause. This would have provided strong protection to property owners and significantly altered the legal landscape. On the other hand, the Court could easily have decided in favor of the property owners on one of two narrower grounds. Such a ruling would have led to much weaker protections for property owners.

Part IV weighs the potential political impact of a decision favoring the property owners. Such an outcome might have forestalled the massive political backlash that Kelo caused. Ironically, a narrow ruling in favor of the owners that did not significantly constrain future takings might have left the cause of property rights worse off than defeat did. On the other hand, a strong ruling categorically banning economic development takings would likely have done more for property rights than the backlash did, especially considering the uneven nature of the latter. Furthermore, political movements sometimes build on legal victories, as well as defeats, as happened in the case of the Civil Rights movement in the wake of Brown v. Board of Education. It is possible that property rights advocates could have similarly exploited a victory in Kelo.

The California Supreme Court recently issued a ruling upholding the constitutionality of a law abolishing the state’s numerous redevelopment agencies:

The California Supreme Court ruled Thursday against redevelopment agencies, including San Diego’s, and said they cannot remain in business by paying the state a portion of their property tax receipts....

The court was dealing with two laws passed by the Legislature in June to help close the state budget deficit by tapping the redevelopment funds held by redevelopment agencies.

One, AB1X26, abolished the redevelopment agencies and set up a mechanism to shift the redevelopment taxes back to the cities, counties, schools and others.

The second, AB1x27, allowed the agencies to continue but required them to opt in but only by paying pay the state $1.7 billion from their tax revenues this year and about $400 million annually in the future or about 10 percent of their tax receipts....

The second law is unconstitutional, the court said, because the agencies do have a right under Proposition 22, passed last year, to retain local revenues.

“We largely uphold Assembly Bill 1X26 and invalidate Assembly BillX127,” the court said.

And so in an ironic twist of fate, the agencies won their argument that they can keep their money but lost their argument that they can continue to exist.

Although the bill abolishing the redevelopment agencies was adopted primarily for the purpose of alleviating the state’s dire fiscal problems, it also has the beneficial side effect of curtailing eminent domain abuse. As I explained in this post defending the new legislation before it passed, the redevelopment agencies routinely engaged in dubious takings that transferred property to favored interest groups and destroyed more value than they created.

The Institute for Justice – a leading libertarian public interest law firm specializing in eminent domain issues – addressed the property rights benefits of the ruling in this statement:

In a landmark victory for private property owners in the Golden State, the California Supreme Court today upheld a statute abolishing the nearly 400 redevelopment agencies across the state. The court also struck down a law that would have allowed these agencies to buy their way back into existence. The final outcome of the case is that, in 2012, California’s decades-long redevelopment nightmare will finally come to an end.

California redevelopment agencies have been some of the worst abusers of eminent domain for decades, violating the private property rights of tens of thousands of home, business, church and farm owners. The Institute for Justice has catalogued more than 200 abuses of eminent domain across California during the past ten years alone....

While the decision focused on specific provisions of the California Constitution, its practical effect represents a significant victory for California property owners. “Redevelopment in California has been a billion-dollar, state-subsidized boondoggle that has completely eroded private property rights through the abuse of eminent domain for private gain,” said Christina Walsh, the Institute’s director of activism and coalitions. “With the court’s decision, redevelopment has finally met its long-overdue end, and property owners who have been living in terror across the state can finally rest safe in what they’ve worked so hard to own.”

The ruling won’t necessarily end all eminent domain abuse in California. Other government bodies also sometimes engage in abusive takings, and it’s possible that the state legislature will give more condemnation authority to some of those agencies now that the redevelopment agencies are gone. Nevertheless, the abolition of those agencies is a major step forward for property rights in California, as well as for the state’s beleaguered taxpayers.

Proposed by a liberal Democratic governor and supported by a wide range of libertarian and conservative property rights advocates, the law upheld in this case is a good example of the kind of cross-ideological cooperation on property rights issues that we need to see more of.

Virginia was one of several states that enacted a strong eminent domain reform law after the Supreme Court ruled in Kelo v. City of New London that it was permissible for government to take private property and transfer it to other private individuals in order to promote economic development. Supporters of the Virginia law are now trying to incorporate it into the state Constitution. But, as the Washington Times reports, they are beginning to encounter resistance from local governments, which have a vested interest in keeping their eminent domain authority as broad as possible [HT: VC reader James Taylor]:

A state constitutional amendment to expand Virginia’s eminent domain laws is meeting local resistance, with the city of Alexandria agreeing to contribute as much as $5,000 for a lobbying firm to help fight the legislation.

The amendment, sponsored for the 2012 General Assembly session by Delegate Rob Bell, Albemarle Republican, attempts to change the Virginia Constitution by updating a law enacted in 2007 that says private property can be taken only when the public interest dominates the private gain, among other conditions.

“The goal is to put [the amendment] into the constitution so that it can’t be tinkered with,” Mr. Bell said....

The amendment passed with wide support during the 2011 General Assembly session, with help from Mr. Bell. It cleared the House by a vote of 83-15 and the Senate by a vote of 35-5.

But to amend the state constitution, the measure must pass again in the assembly before going to the public as a voter referendum on the 2012 ballot.

Despite the broad support, Mr. Bell said, amendment supporters are girding a fight.

“We are not taking anything for granted,” he said....

Mr. Bell said, the impetus was to protect property owners.

“The local governments were certainly opposed to the original statute and claimed it would bring along the end of the world,” he said. “Of course, it hasn’t.

When it comes to property rights, Virginia’s present constitution is one of the least protective in the country. Article I, Section 11 gives the state legislature virtually unconstrained authority to “define” what qualifies as a “public use” that justifies taking property by eminent domain. Essentially, the legislature can license the condemnation of property for virtually any reason it wants. Few if any other state constitutional rights are left so completely to the mercy of the very state officials they are supposed to protect us against. It would be as if the legislature had total discretion to determine what kind of speech can be censored or when police are authorized to search your home.

In the short term, it doesn’t matter much whether eminent domain in Virginia is constrained only by strong statutory restrictions or by a constitutional amendment. But in the long run, a constitutional amendment would be a vital safeguard against the gradual erosion of property rights. Effective post-Kelo reforms like that in enacted in Virginia are the product of an unusual upsurge in public attention focused on eminent domain issues. Most of the time, the vast majority of “rationally ignorant” voters pay little or no attention to the subject. Even in the immediate aftermath of Kelo, many states enacted ineffective laws in part because voter ignorance makes it difficult for the electorate to tell the difference between genuine reforms and those that only pretend to constrain economic development takings.

As Kelo recedes into the past, public attention will understandably focus on other matters, and influential interest groups can lobby state legislators to gradually roll back post-Kelo reforms. The public might not even notice what is happening, just as most of them were unaware of the prevalence of Kelo-style takings in many states before the Supreme Court focused a national spotlight on the issue in 2005. A state constitutional amendment can help forestall this kind of gradual erosion of property rights. Unlike some other state constitutions, the Virginia Constitution is relatively difficult to amend. Thus, it will be much harder to roll back a constitutional reform than a purely statutory one.

UPDATE: Richmond Times-Dispatch columnist A. Barton Hinkle has a good column about the proposed Virginia amendment here.

In a recent Wall Street Journal interview, retired Justice John Paul Stevens defended his controversial majority opinion in Kelo v. City of New London, which ruled that it was permissible for government to condemn private property for transfer to private parties in order to promote “economic development.” The Court ruled that this was a permissible “public use” under the Fifth Amendment. Stevens was particularly critical of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s dissenting opinion, which he claims contradicted her earlier opinion in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff

Stevens’ critique of O’Connor is not entirely without merit. In Midkiff, O’Connor wrote a majority opinion concluding that pretty much any rationale for a taking qualifies as a public use so long as it is “rationally related to a conceivable public purpose.” In Kelo, O’Connor dismissed this as merely “errant language.” But as Ben Barros has shown, it was actually deliberately inserted in the Midkiff opinion (O’Connor refused to take it out even after Justice Lewis Powell warned her that it would license virtually unconstrained takings).

That said, Stevens is wrong to suggest that the Court’s only options were either to overrule Midkiff and Berman v. Parker, or uphold the Kelo takings. Justice O’Connor’s dissent draws a perfectly reasonable distinction beween takings that eliminate some preexisting harm (severe blight in Berman, a supposed oligopoly in the property market in Midkiff), versus those that just seek to create some future public benefit. In the former case, there may be less danger that a taking that transfers property to a private party is just a scheme to benefit the new owner, since the public objective can be achieved simply by terminating the previous harmful use of the land. Many state supreme courts have adopted a similar approach under their state constitutions, permitting private-to-private takings for the purpose of eliminating severe blight, but forbidding them in most other situations.

It is not unusual for the Supreme Court to significantly narrow the scope of a precedent without completely overruling it. For example, the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in the Guantanamo cases narrow but do not overrule World War II-era precedents such as Korematsu and Quirin, which apply broad deference to the executive on wartime military decisions. Stevens voted with the majority in all those cases. Justice Stevens himself is the author of the Court’s decision in Gonzales v. Raich, which severely undercut its previous decisions in Lopez and Morrison, but did not overrule them completely. Like Justice Clarence Thomas, I wish the Court had overruled Berman and Midkiff completely. But I can understand why Justice O’Connor (along with Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist), preferred a more cautious approach.

It’s also worth noting that Stevens’ Kelo opinion misinterprets precedent at least as much as O’Connor’s did. For example, Stevens claimed that his position was supported by “a century” of precedent. But, as I explained in this article (pp. 240-44), all but the two most recent of those cases did not involve the Public Use Clause of the Fifth Amendment. They addressed challenges to takings brought under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Stevens also draws a distinction between takings that are part of a redevelopment plan and stand-alone “one-to-one” takings, claiming that broad judicial deference to the government is particularly appropriate in the former scenario, because the planning process protects property owners against abusive condemnations. However, as I explain here (pp. 228-29), the California district course he cites as a paradigmatic example of a “one-to-one” taking actually involved a redevelopment plan. This last mistake is more than just a minor technical error. Getting it right might have helped Stevens and the other majority justices understand that nearly all economic development takings occur in the context of redevelopment plans, and that the existence of a plan provides little or no protection against the use of eminent domain for the benefit of private interests. Influential interest groups routinely use the planning process to their advantage, as the Pfizer Corporation did in Kelo itself. Recognizing this might not have changed Stevens’ mind; but only one of the five majority justices would have had switch his or her vote for the case to have gone the other way.

Justice Stevens’ retrospective on Kelo is an interesting counterpoint to those of Justice Scalia and Connecticut Supreme Court Justice Richard Palmer. He makes some reasonable criticisms of the dissenting justices’ treatment of precedent. Perhaps in the future he will be equally forthcoming about his own similar mistakes.

UPDATE: As commenter “Steve” points out, I was wrong to suggest in my article that the Court did not mention the Public Use Clause of the Fifth Amendment in the 1896 case of Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley. The Court did mention it, but only to point out that it did not apply to the states:

There is no specific prohibition in the federal constitution which acts upon the states in regard to their taking private property for any but a public use. The fifth amendment, which provides, among other things, that such property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation, applies only to the federal government, as has many times been decided.

I am sorry I made this mistake, and grateful to the commenter for pointing it out. But getting it right would have actually strengthened my point.

As I noted in the article linked in my original post, the late nineteenth and early 20th century Supreme Court did consider challenges to state takings under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. But it did so under a much more deferential standard of review than in the rare cases where it recognized that the Fifth Amendment does apply because the taking in question was conducted by the federal government.

UPDATE #2: When I wrote my initial post above, I did not yet have available the full text of Justice Stevens’ speech, which is available here. To his credit, Stevens actually admits his error in misdescribing the nineteenth and early twentieth century Due Process Clause decisions as Takings Clause cases. However, he does not acknowledge the fact that this error undermines his claim in the Kelo opinion that his position was backed by a century of precedent.

Today, I published an op ed in the Daily Caller on the passage of Mississippi referendum Measure 31, an important eminent domain reform law. Here is an excerpt:

The Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in Kelo v. City of New London generated a record political backlash. Kelo upheld the condemnation of private property for transfer to other private owners in order to promote “economic development.” The case inspired widespread outrage. Polls show that over 80% of the public opposes economic development takings. As a result, 44 states have enacted eminent domain reform laws that restrict the condemnation of property for the benefit of private interests.

The most recent state to react to Kelo is Mississippi. On Tuesday, Mississippi voters adopted Measure 31 by a decisive 73% to 27% margin. The new law will make taking property for economic development unprofitable by forbidding most transfers of condemned land to a private party for 10 years after condemnation. The measure is a major victory for both property owners and the state’s economy.

Mississippi Measure 31 - the important eminent domain reform initiative – has passed, probably by an overwhelming margin. Although the returns are not yet completely in, the “yes” side has 74% of the vote with almost 65% of precincts reporting. I outlined the case for Measure 31 here.

The overwhelming support for the measure is consistent with results in previous referenda on post-Kelo reform initiatives. No anti-Kelo referendum initiative has ever been defeated except in cases where a ban on Kelo-style “economic development” takings was packaged with some other, much less popular measure (as in the case of California Proposition 98). By contrast, all twelve “clean” anti-Kelo measures have passed, usually by lopsided margins, though a few of them fail to provide genuinely effective protection for property owners. I discuss all the referendum measures enacted up until mid-2009 in this article (see also here for an analysis of a Texas referendum initiative that passed after the article came out).

For reasons I summarized in my last post on Measure 31, reforms adopted by means of citizen-initiated referenda generally provide stronger protection for property rights than those enacted by state legislatures.

UPDATE: I have fixed the incorrect link to the vote tabulation.

UPDATE #2: With 90% of precincts reporting, Measure 31 is winning by a 73-27 margin. That makes it virtually certain that it will not only pass, but do so overwhelmingly.

Tomorrow, Mississippi voters will decide the fate of Measure 31, an important eminent domain reform proposal. Mississippi is one of only seven states that has not enacted any eminent domain reforms at all since the Supreme Court’s decision controversial decision upholding “economic development” takings in Kelo v. City of New London.

Measure 31 would effectively ban economic development takings by forbidding most condemnations that transfer land to private parties during the first ten years after condemnation. Economic development condemnations are often used by powerful interest groups to acquire land for themselves at the expense of the poor and politically weak. In Mississippi, recent condemnations have transferred land to big auto firms such as Nissan and Toyota. Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour and others claim that these takings are needed to promote economic growth. In reality, economic development condemnations often destroy far more economic value than they create, by wiping out homes, small businesses and schools.

Many of the post-Kelo reform laws enacted in other states fail to impose genuinely effective restrictions on economic development condemnations. Legislators have found various ways to produce bills that have major loopholes. The most common tactic is that of allowing economic development condemnations to continue under the guise of alleviating “blight.” Many states define “blight” so broadly that almost any neighborhood qualifies and is therefore subject to condemnation. Such unlikely areas as downtown Las Vegas and New York’s Times Square have been declared “blighted” for the purpose of justifying condemnations. The New York Court of Appeals recently upheld blight takings justified by a combination of virtually limitless definitions of blight and biased studies conducted by a firm with a severe conflict of interest. Fortunately, Measure 31 avoids this pitfall by forbidding blight takings except in cases where the land in question is severely dilapidated or poses a direct threat to public health and safety.

Politicians enact ineffective reform laws in part because it is difficult for voters to tell the difference between a real “anti-Kelo” bill and one just for show. A 2007 Saint Index survey found that only about 13% of Americans knew whether or not their state had passed an effective post-Kelo reform law. As I explain in this article, referendum initiatives like Measure 31 tend to be stronger than reforms adopted by state legislatures because many of them are drafted by activists rather than by politicians. Measure 31 was submitted by the Mississippi Farm Bureau Federation (small farmers are often victims of eminent domain in the state). The vast majority of post-Kelo referenda adopted by voters impose tough restrictions on takings.

Unlike state legislators, the property rights activists who wrote most of the citizen-initiated anti-Kelo ballot initiatives had no need to appease powerful pro-condemnation interest groups in order to improve their reelection chances.

Measure 31 isn’t perfect. It still leaves the door open to abusive takings in genuinely blighted areas, and possibly to dubious condemnations on behalf of common carriers and public utilities. But it’s still a huge improvement over the status quo in Mississippi, which includes both an extremely broad definition of blight and a statute authorizing large-scale economic development takings.

On Monday, October 10, I will be speaking at the University of Mississippi School of Law on a Mississippi eminent domain reform referendum initiative, Measure 31 (which is on the ballot this November). The talk is sponsored by the University of Mississippi Federalist Society, and will begun at 12:30 PM in Room 2094.

Mississippi is one of only a handful of states that have not enacted any eminent domain reforms at all since the Supreme Court’s controversial 2005 decision in Kelo v. City of New London, which ruled that the Constitution allows government to forcibly transfer private property to other private entities for purposes of “economic development.” Forty-three other states have enacted new laws, though many of them are likely to be ineffective.

Mississippi has a considerable history of dubious takings. Republican Governor Haley Barbour is a prominent advocate of massive condemnations that transfer property to big business interests such as auto manufacturers. In 2009, he vetoed a legislative eminent domain reform billIn this article, I explained why the kinds of economic development takings Barbour supports generally create more economic harm than benefit.

Although Measure 31 is not perfect, it would be a major improvement over current Mississippi law, which allows a wide range of economic development takings for big development projects, and also defines “blight” so broadly that virtually any area can be declared blighted and condemned. The initiative precludes economic development takings almost entirely by forbidding the transfer of condemned property to private interests for at least 10 years after the taking. It does create an exemption to this rule for property that is unfit for human habitation or poses a “direct threat” to public health or safety. But that is much more restrictive than the state’s current blight law. Broad definitions of blight that license abusive takings are a serious problem in many other states, including New York.

I will have more to say about Measure 31 at my presentation, and probably in a follow-up post that I will write after the talk for readers interested in the issue who are unable to attend.