The Volokh Conspiracy

In Friday’s Washington Post, state legislators Scott Surovell and Linda Puller published an op ed attacking Question 1, the eminent domain reform referendum question that Virginians will vote on in November. Unfortunately, their arguments are off-base, and some are seriously misleading.

Question 1 would amend Virginia’s Constitution to forbid economic development takings of the kind the US Supreme Court allowed in Kelo v. City of New London. Such takings often enable powerful interest groups to use the power of eminent domain to transfer property to themselves at the expense of the politically weak; they also tend to destroy more economic value than they create. If adopted by the voters, Question 1 would provide some important protection against such abuses.

Surovell and Puller’s critique of Question 1 completely ignores the fact that Virginia’s present constitution is one of the worst in the country when it comes to protecting property rights. Article 1 Section 11 states that the “public uses” for which property can be taken by the government are to be “defined by the General Assembly” – the state legislature. This gives the legislators a blank check to authorize the taking of property for any reason they wish, including benefiting powerful interest groups at the expense of the poor and weak.

Surovell and Puller claim that “[t]he language in the Fifth Amendment [of the federal Constitution] is virtually identical to existing language in Article I of the Virginia constitution because James Madison borrowed the concept from George Mason, who had written it into the Declaration of Rights in 1776. It has stood virtually unchanged for 236 years.” They accuse supporters of Question 1 of seeking to “change language in the Virginia constitution that dates to George Mason.”

In reality, neither the Fifth Amendment nor Virginia’s original 1776 Constitution include language giving the legislature unconstrained authority to define what counts as a public use. The state legislature did not get unconstrained power to define “public use” until the Constitution was last rewritten in 1971. That change certainly wasn’t the handiwork of George Mason and James Madison. Madison famously wrote that “Government is instituted to protect property of every sort...that alone is a just government, which impartially secures to every man, whatever is his own.” I doubt he would approve of a constitution that allows the legislature to take property for any reason it wants.

Surovell and Puller correctly point out that Virginia’s 2007 statutory eminent domain reform law already forbids Kelo-style economic development takings. But they ignore the reality that protecting these rights in the state constitution is necessary to prevent future legislatures from backsliding on the issue. Until Kelo thrust the problem of eminent domain abuse into the national spotlight, most voters were unaware of it. As public attention moves on to other issues, developers and other interest groups could successfully lobby for a return to business as usual. Virginia’s permissive pre-Kelo eminent domain law licensed egregious abuse for the benefit of private interests. Question 1 would help ensure that those days don’t return.

Surovell and Puller complain about Question 1′s requirement that businesses whose property is condemned will be entitled to compensation for lost profits and lost access, as well as the value of the land itself. They claim “this is unfair because it gives businesses more rights than people.” Since businesses are in fact owned by people, this is a strange dichotomy.

In any event, it is not just commercial enterprises but all property owners who will be entitled for compensation for lost profits and lost access if their land is condemned. The wording of Question 1 makes no distinction between businesses and other owners. Obviously, business owners are more likely to suffer lost profits in the event of a taking than residential ones. But that fact in no way justifies ignoring these losses.

Compensation for lost access and lost profits is itself a matter of fairness. As the Supreme Court put it in 1960, the whole point of requiring compensation for takings is to “bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.” Loss of access and profits is part of the burden that takings impose on property owners, and they deserve compensation for that no less than for the loss of the land as such. If, as Surovell and Puller claim, takings create “broad public benefits,” then the public should compensate the property owners who are forced to sacrifice their rights. If local governments decide that such compensation is too much to pay, that might be a sign that the alleged “public benefits” aren’t really worth their cost.

Surovell and Puller worry that compensation for lost profits result in compensation for individuals even when they lose part of their land for projects that actually increase the profitability of their businesses. If that happens, however, there need be no compensation for lost profits, because no profit will actually have been lost. If the government can prove that landowners’ profits will actually go up after a taking, nothing in Question 1 requires them to pay compensation for losses that don’t actually exist.

It’s also worth noting that Question 1 gives the state legislature the power to define what counts as loss of “profit” and “access” for purposes of compensation. Given the lobbying power of local governments, it’s unlikely that the legislature will define these concepts in a way that imposes excessive burdens on them. If anything, there is a greater danger that the Assembly will shortchange property owners. Owners targeted for condemnation rarely wield great political power; otherwise their land probably would not be condemned in the first place.

In sum, Question 1 is far from perfect. It does not protect property rights as fully as it should. But it’s a major improvement over Virginia’s current constitution.

Various people have asked me what I think of Virginia Question 1, the eminent domain reform referendum question that will be on the ballot in November. Question 1 is one of many eminent domain reform referendum questions developed as part of the political backlash against the Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v. City of New London (2005), which ruled that the Constitution allows government to take property from one private owner to another on the grounds that doing so might promote “economic development.”

Virginia is one of 44 states that have enacted eminent domain reform legislation since Kelo. The most recent is Mississippi, where voters passed Measure 31 last year. Restrictions on eminent domain were long overdue because economic development and blight takings often victimize property owners for the benefit of powerful interest groups, and actually destroy more economic value than they create.

My bottom-line take on Question 1 is that it is a clear improvement over the status quo, but still has some flaws. As I discussed here, Virginia’s present Constitution is one of the worst in the country when it comes to property rights. Article 1, Section 11 allows government to condemn property for virtually any reason authorized by the legislature. If the voters pass Question 1, that will change.

Unlike many states that have enacted post-Kelo “reform” legislation that doesn’t really constrain eminent domain, Virginia’s state legislature has already enacted a fairly strong reform law through the legislative process, which I briefly described in my article surveying post-Kelo reform in all the states. But a constitutional amendment constraining eminent domain is still valuable because statutory reforms could easily be eroded over time as public attention shifts to other issues, and powerful interest groups lobby the legislature to allow takings that benefit them.

Unfortunately, there are some potential flaws in the proposed Amendment’s wording that make it less effective than it could be. Question 1 would change the state Constitution to forbid takings “the primary use is for private gain, private benefit, private enterprise, increasing jobs, increasing tax revenue, or economic development, except for the elimination of a public nuisance existing on the property.” The amendment also has some valuable provisions forbidding the condemnation of more property than is necessary for the “public use” justifying the taking, increasing compensation for owners of condemned property, and specifying that the right to private property is “fundamental” (which usually triggers a higher degree of judicial protection when the right is threatened).

This is a clear improvement over the status quo. But it leaves the door open for “blight” condemnations enacted under a broad definition of “blight.” In many states, post-Kelo reform has been undermined by blight condemnation laws that define blight so broadly that almost any area can be declared blighted and condemned. It is not clear whether Question 1′s ban on takings takings for “private gain, private benefit, private enterprise, increasing jobs, increasing tax revenue, or economic development” covers blight condemnations adopted under an extremely broad definition of “blight.” If the legislature ever broadens Virginia’s relatively narrow post-Kelo blight law, the courts will have to decide whether that is compatible with Question 1. I think there would be plausible arguments on both sides.

Moreover, even takings enacted under a narrow definition of “blight” are often problematic, because they tend to victimize poor and politically weak communities for the benefit of influential interest groups. There are better ways to improve blighted areas than condemning the neighborhood in order to save it. Indeed, stronger protection for property rights might well promote economic development in poor areas rather than hinder it.

Finally, the fact that Question 1 only bans takings whose “primary” use is “private gain, private benefit, private enterprise, increasing jobs, increasing tax revenue, or economic development,” could potentially allow local governments to slip such takings in through the back door by arguing that economic development is tied to some other goal. Much may depend on how the courts interpret the meaning of “primary.”

Like most other post-Kelo referendum measures, Question 1 will probably pass easily. The vast majority of the public hates the Kelo decision and economic development takings. The only post-Kelo referendum initiatives that have ever failed were three that tied bans on economic development takings to other, less popular proposals, such as abolishing rent control. By contrast, over a dozen relatively “clean” post-Kelo reform initiatives have passed easily.

Question 1 will probably pass as well. Because it is a clear improvement over the status quo, I’m going to vote for it myself. The best should not be the enemy of the good. But Virginians should not imagine that passing this amendment will create an iron-clad safeguard against abusive takings in this state.

The Chronicle of Higher Education has an interesting article on the use of eminent domain to forcibly acquire land for universities. It quotes various scholars and commentators on the subject, including yours truly:

At a time when public university leaders regularly point to the advantages that private institutions have enjoyed over them in recent years – such as freedom from most state regulations, freedom to raise tuition, and often significant financial resources — it’s easy to forget that the public universities still have one significant advantage. They are parts of the state, and that comes with a lot of powers.

Earlier this month, Ball State University’s board of trustees authorized the use of eminent domain – the power of the state to seize private property without the owner’s consent so long as the owner is compensated – to take a piece of property on which it plans to construct a hotel, conference center, restaurants, and dormitory for hospitality students.

If the university does follow through with the plan – and administrators stress that they are trying to reach an agreement with property owners to avoid actually using the power – it will be a rare example of a public university invoking eminent domain, and it could generate controversy, particularly given that the property wouldn’t be used for “traditional” educational purposes....

Ilya Somin, a law professor at George Mason University who said he doesn’t think the 2005 Kelo case was decided correctly, has argued that even if the law permits states to condemn land for the purposes of private university development, the policy rationale for doing so is dubious.....

“Condemnation of property is rarely if ever actually useful for the purposes of advancing research or educating poor students. In general, research can be undertaken and students educated just as well on voluntarily purchased land,” he wrote in a 2006 blog post about the Columbia [University] dispute. “If universities wish to pursue these goals by acquiring additional land, they should do it by competing with other potential buyers in the real estate market.”

Even in cases such as Ball State, where the legality of the university’s action doesn’t appear to be in question, Somin said universities should still avoid use of the power. “It might well be legal under the state law and under the federal constitution, but that does not mean it’s good idea,” he said. “It does tend to destroy economic value.”

The 2006 post cited in the article is here. In it, I explained why takings for the benefit of universities are generally a bad idea even if they are legal. In this article, I criticized the New York Court of Appeals’ decision upholding the controversial blight condemnations that transferred property to Columbia University.

In the last paragraph of the Chronicle article, another legal scholar defended the use of eminent domain in this context:

In many states, because of rigorous legal requirements and the potential for litigation, the use of eminent domain isn’t any cheaper than buying the property outright, said Cynthia Baker, a law professor at Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis. But that doesn’t mean it isn’t a good power to have.

“More and more as the burden of the cost of higher education is placed on the backs of students, eminent domain is something the state can do for higher education,” Baker said. “It’s a different kind of relationship.”

If the problem is that students are paying too much for their education, eminent domain is a poor solution. Many of the benefits of using eminent domain to acquire land are likely to go to faculty and administrators rather than students. The state could instead simply subsidize tuition or, in the case of public universities, charge lower tuition in the first place. If there is a genuine public interest in increasing tuition subsidies, the cost should be spread among all the state’s taxpayers rather than concentrated on property owners who happen to own land near a university.

Finally, I would like to thank Chronicle reporter Kevin Kiley for promptly recognizing and correcting a minor mistake in his summary of my views in the original article.

What happens when the eminent domain power is used to obtain title to lands or other properties in which there are public trust responsibilities?  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit confronted this question in U.S. v. California State Lands Commission (aka U.S. v. 32.42 Acres of Land. In particular, the court considered whether the federal government’s use of eminent domain authority to acquire land for military operations necessarily extinguished California public trust rights, such that any subsequent owner would not take possession subject to the public trust burden. In a unanimous opinion issued last week, the Ninth Circuit concluded eminent domain creates a new title, completely unencumbered by any prior public trust rights. As the opinion concludes:

In the well-chosen words of Justice Holmes, “if there is such a thing as a new title known to the law, one founded upon the taking by the right of eminent domain is as clear an example as can be found.” Emery v. Boston Terminal Co., 178 Mass. 172, 184 (1901). The United States seeks to establish such a new title here, and has paid the $2,910,000 a jurydetermined was just compensation to extinguish the property rights of California and the San Diego Port District. Having paid just compensation, the United States is entitled to the interest it sought in its complaint in condemnation: full fee simple, free of California’s public trust. We have concluded that neither the equal-footing doctrine nor the public trust doctrine prevents the federal government from taking that interest in the land unencumbered.

This is but another example of how the expansive use of eminent domain can threaten environmental conservation.

Richmond Times-Dispatch columnist A. Barton Hinkle recently published this piece on a case of eminent domain abuse in Virginia:

As a general rule, progressives do not get worked up about property rights the way conservatives do. This is a mistake — as a case out of Norfolk shows.

To the progressive eye, property is bound up with materialism and wealth and greed and other yucky things. But property is also bound up with some things progressives hold dear. And even progressives were outraged when, in its 2005 Kelo decision, the Supreme Court said governments could take property from the poor and give to the rich.

That is what has been happening in Norfolk, where the city’s Redevelopment and Housing Authority has been using eminent domain to take dozens of pieces of private property for resale to a foundation run by Old Dominion University. The housing authority has been collecting commissions on the sales; the foundation has then been turning the property over to developers for their use as part of a swanky new University Village.

Among those properties is the building that houses Central Radio, whose story was detailed here back in May 2010. Some years ago, Norfolk offered to buy the property for a lowball price of $700,000 (more than a decade before, a developer had offered more than $1 million). Central Radio’s president, Bob Wilson, turned the city down. So the city slapped a spurious designation of “blighted” on the property and condemned it.

Norfolk couldn’t get away with that today. Virginia’s General Assembly has sharply curtailed such abusive use of eminent domain, precisely because of cases such as this one and others like it....

But the legislature’s changes to eminent-domain law included a grandfather clause, allowing Norfolk to proceed. Wilson is naturally cheesed off. He has vented his frustration by putting up on the side of his building a protest banner. (“50 years on this street,” it reads. “78 years in Norfolk. 100 workers. Threatened by eminent domain.” The words “eminent domain abuse” are surrounded by a red circle with a slash through it.)

But Norfolk officials apparently feel it is not enough to take away Wilson’s property. They also are trying to take away his right to free speech, by insisting that his banner violates the city’s sign ordinance....

Hinkle correctly notes that this is just one of several recent cases around the country in which local governments and influential developers not only engaged in dubious takings, but also tried to prevent property owners from speaking out against them. As he also points out, Virginia is one of a minority of states that has enacted strong post-Kelo eminent domain reform that will constrain abusive condemnations in the future. But as I documented in this article, in many other states reform still has a long way to go. Even in Virginia, eminent domain reform will not be fully secure in the long run until it has been incorporated into the state constitution, as well as statutory law.

Because blight and “economic development” takings tend to victimize the poor and politically weak for the benefit of the wealthy and politically powerful, they have generated widespread opposition on the left as well as the right. We will need greater cross-ideological cooperation on this issue to fully address the problem.

This Thursday at noon, I will be speaking at the University of North Carolina Law School on “Property Rights Since Kelo.” Much has happened on both the legislative and judicial fronts in the last few years. Considerable progress has been made in protecting property rights against abusive takings, but much work remains to be done in many states. University of North Carolina law professor Carol Brown – a leading expert on the impact of eminent domain on low-income and minority communities – will comment on my talk, which is sponsored by the UNC Federalist Society.

This may be one of the few events at UNC Law School over the next few days that does not involve either the NCAA tournament or the individual mandate litigation!

The Fordham Urban Law Journal City Square website has posted a debate between NYU Professor Roderick Hills and myself on the the New York Court of Appeals controversial decisions upholding “blight” condemnations in the Atlantic Yards and Columbia University cases. In my 2011 symposium article “Let there Be Blight,” I argued that these takings violated both the New York state and federal constitutions. I especially emphasized the incompability between the court’s decision defining blight so broadly that virtually any area could qualify with the New York state constitutional provision limiting blight condemnations to “substandard and unsanitary areas.” Hills has written a critique of my analysis. My reply is available here.

Hills is one of the leading property and federalism scholars out there, and I always learn from our exchanges. As I explain near the end of my reply, in this case there may be more areas of agreement between us than initially meet the eye.

The Private Property Rights Protection Act of 2012 passed the House yesterday on an overwhelming voice vote. I wrote about the bill in this post. As I explained there, the PRPA is far from a panacea for eminent domain abuse. But it takes a modest step in the right direction by cutting off some types of federal subsidies from local governments that engage in Kelo v. New London-like economic development takings.

This is not the first time that the PRPA passed the House by an overwhelming margin. The same thing happened in 2005, when a previous version of the bill won a lopsided 376-38 vote in the House only to die in the Senate without ever getting to a floor vote. Hopefully, we can avoid a repeat performance this year. But the Senate rarely moves quickly in an election year, and there are plenty of organized interest groups that are likely to lobby the senators to drag their heels until the 112th Congress expires – thereby forcing the bill’s proponents to go back to square one.

In 2006, Ilya and I co-authored “The Green Costs of Kelo: Economic Development Takings and Environmental Protection,” in which we argued that allowing the use of eminent domain for economic development was bad for environmental conservation.  Environmentalist advocates responded with disbelief.  The Community Rights Counsel (the precursor to the Constitutional Accountability Center) went so far as to label our paper the “outrage of the month” and labeled our argument “a skewed view from the libertarian fringe.”   Six years later, however, it appears some environmentalist advocates are coming around to our point of view.

Yesterday, E&E News reported (subscription required) that several major environmental groups are looking to block the use of eminent domain for the construction of portions of the Keystone XL pipeline that are still slated for construction.  In particular, they plan to argue that the use of eminent domain for the pipeline will violate state rules that preclude eminent domain’s use for private economic development.

In a conference call with reporters today, representatives of four environmental organizations — Bold Nebraska, the Natural Resources Defense Council, 350.org and the Sierra Club — said they believe they have a strong legal case against the company on eminent domain issues. The company is seeking to use condemnation power against a north Texas farmer.

The groups’ main argument is that, as a nonpublic entity looking to build a project for profit, TransCanada does not qualify for eminent domain power in most states.

Whatever the merits of the pipeline, it appears that some environmentalists are beginning to recognize that allowing the government to seize private property for the purpose of encouraging private economic development an facilitate environmentally undesirable projects. Indeed, insofar as such efforts are successful at promoting economic growth, the use of eminent domain for economic development necessarily results in more development than would have occurred absent its use. In other words, the use of eminent domain for economic development results in more environmental harm than if the market were left alone. Further, as we noted in our paper, limiting the ability of governments to use eminent domain for economic development, whether through the Constitution or legislative reform, does not preclude most environmentally beneficial uses of eminent domain, such as the eradication of blight or the provision of public goods.

I’m not sure whether any of the environmentalist groups involved in this dispute acknowledge our work, but it’s nice to see them come around to our way of thinking, even if only on this one issue.

In the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s controversial Kelo decision, which allowed the condemnation of private property for economic development, some 44 states have passed eminent domain reform laws. Although many of those laws are likely to be ineffective, overall a good deal of progress has been made at the state level in curbing abusive condemnations, including by state courts enforcing the property rights provisions of their state constitutions.

Unfortunately, very little has been achieved at the federal level during that time. On the third anniversary of Kelo in 2008, I summed up federal reform efforts as follows:

...

...

[Insert sound of crickets chirping, grass growing, and paint drying].

Not much has changed since then. This is unfortunate because there is much that the federal government can do to prevent harmful takings. Many states have failed to pass effective reform laws, and federal funding often facilitates Kelo-like takings there.

Fortunately, as Christina Walsh of the Institute for Justice explains in this recent op ed, Congress now has another opportunity to rectify its previous omissions:

It has been demonstrated time and again that eminent domain is routinely used to wipe out black, Hispanic and poorer communities, with less political capital and influence, in favor of developers’ grand plans.

It also has been demonstrated that restrictions on eminent domain in no way inhibit economic growth, as the beneficiaries of eminent domain abuse would like you to believe....

Groups across the philosophical spectrum have recognized the need to limit this abuse of power to protect those who are defenseless against the seemingly unstoppable alliance of powerful, deep-pocketed developers and their politician friends. The diverse coalition has included the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the League of United Latin American Citizens, the National Federation of Independent Business and the Farm Bureau. It’s safe to say that the coalition also includes more than 80 percent of Americans, as demonstrated poll after poll taken after Kelo.

Despite the evidence that Americans are united against the misuse of eminent domain, Congress has yet to to take even a modest step. A bipartisan bill, H.R. 1433, making its way through the House would strip a city of federal economic development funding for two years if the city takes private property to give to someone else for their private use....

This bill undoubtedly will pass the House as it did in 2005, and likely will get stalled in the Senate Judiciary Committee, headed by Sen. Patrick J. Leahy, Vermont Democrat, where it has gone to die in years past.

It is tragic because this is exactly the kind of centrist reform – uniting minority advocates and small-business interests – where Republicans and Democrats should be able to work together.

Even if it passes, this bill would not end eminent domain abuse or even all federal funding for it. But it would be a valuable step on the right direction. Past history does not bode well for the bill’s prospects in the Senate. And it’s especially difficult to pass legislation during an election year. However, it’s possible that things will be different this time.

For those who worry that federal intervention in this field would undermine federalism, I have addressed that argument in considerable detail here.

My new article “What if Kelo v. City of New London Had Gone the Other Way?” is now available on SSRN. It is part of an Indiana Law Review symposium on “What if? Counterfactuals in Constitutional History.” Here is the abstract:

Kelo v. City of New London is one of the most controversial decisions in U.S. Supreme Court history. The Kelo Court held that the Public Use Clause of the Fifth Amendment allows government to condemn private property and transfer it to other private parties for purposes of “economic development.” This Article considers the question of what might have happened if the Supreme Court decided Kelo v. City of New London in favor of the property owners. Such counterfactual analysis may seem frivolous. But it is, in fact, useful in understanding constitutional history. Any assessment of the impact of a legal decision depends on at least an implicit judgment as to the likely consequences of a ruling the other way. Analysis can be improved by making these implicit counterfactual assumptions clear and systematically considering their implications.

Part I briefly describes the Kelo case and its aftermath, focusing especially on the massive political backlash. That backlash led to numerous new reform laws. However, many of them turned out to be largely symbolic. Part II discusses the potential value of a counterfactual analysis of Kelo. It could help shed light on a longstanding debate over the effects of Supreme Court decisions on society. Some have argued that court decisions have little impact, mostly protecting only those rights that the political branches of government would protect of their own accord. Others contend that this pessimistic view underrates the potential effect of Supreme Court decisions.

Part III considers the possible legal effect of a ruling in favor of the property owners. Such a decision could have taken several potential forms. One possibility is that the Court could have adopted the view advocated by the four Kelo dissenters: that economic development condemnations are categorically forbidden by the Public Use Clause. This would have provided strong protection to property owners and significantly altered the legal landscape. On the other hand, the Court could easily have decided in favor of the property owners on one of two narrower grounds. Such a ruling would have led to much weaker protections for property owners.

Part IV weighs the potential political impact of a decision favoring the property owners. Such an outcome might have forestalled the massive political backlash that Kelo caused. Ironically, a narrow ruling in favor of the owners that did not significantly constrain future takings might have left the cause of property rights worse off than defeat did. On the other hand, a strong ruling categorically banning economic development takings would likely have done more for property rights than the backlash did, especially considering the uneven nature of the latter. Furthermore, political movements sometimes build on legal victories, as well as defeats, as happened in the case of the Civil Rights movement in the wake of Brown v. Board of Education. It is possible that property rights advocates could have similarly exploited a victory in Kelo.

The California Supreme Court recently issued a ruling upholding the constitutionality of a law abolishing the state’s numerous redevelopment agencies:

The California Supreme Court ruled Thursday against redevelopment agencies, including San Diego’s, and said they cannot remain in business by paying the state a portion of their property tax receipts....

The court was dealing with two laws passed by the Legislature in June to help close the state budget deficit by tapping the redevelopment funds held by redevelopment agencies.

One, AB1X26, abolished the redevelopment agencies and set up a mechanism to shift the redevelopment taxes back to the cities, counties, schools and others.

The second, AB1x27, allowed the agencies to continue but required them to opt in but only by paying pay the state $1.7 billion from their tax revenues this year and about $400 million annually in the future or about 10 percent of their tax receipts....

The second law is unconstitutional, the court said, because the agencies do have a right under Proposition 22, passed last year, to retain local revenues.

“We largely uphold Assembly Bill 1X26 and invalidate Assembly BillX127,” the court said.

And so in an ironic twist of fate, the agencies won their argument that they can keep their money but lost their argument that they can continue to exist.

Although the bill abolishing the redevelopment agencies was adopted primarily for the purpose of alleviating the state’s dire fiscal problems, it also has the beneficial side effect of curtailing eminent domain abuse. As I explained in this post defending the new legislation before it passed, the redevelopment agencies routinely engaged in dubious takings that transferred property to favored interest groups and destroyed more value than they created.

The Institute for Justice – a leading libertarian public interest law firm specializing in eminent domain issues – addressed the property rights benefits of the ruling in this statement:

In a landmark victory for private property owners in the Golden State, the California Supreme Court today upheld a statute abolishing the nearly 400 redevelopment agencies across the state. The court also struck down a law that would have allowed these agencies to buy their way back into existence. The final outcome of the case is that, in 2012, California’s decades-long redevelopment nightmare will finally come to an end.

California redevelopment agencies have been some of the worst abusers of eminent domain for decades, violating the private property rights of tens of thousands of home, business, church and farm owners. The Institute for Justice has catalogued more than 200 abuses of eminent domain across California during the past ten years alone....

While the decision focused on specific provisions of the California Constitution, its practical effect represents a significant victory for California property owners. “Redevelopment in California has been a billion-dollar, state-subsidized boondoggle that has completely eroded private property rights through the abuse of eminent domain for private gain,” said Christina Walsh, the Institute’s director of activism and coalitions. “With the court’s decision, redevelopment has finally met its long-overdue end, and property owners who have been living in terror across the state can finally rest safe in what they’ve worked so hard to own.”

The ruling won’t necessarily end all eminent domain abuse in California. Other government bodies also sometimes engage in abusive takings, and it’s possible that the state legislature will give more condemnation authority to some of those agencies now that the redevelopment agencies are gone. Nevertheless, the abolition of those agencies is a major step forward for property rights in California, as well as for the state’s beleaguered taxpayers.

Proposed by a liberal Democratic governor and supported by a wide range of libertarian and conservative property rights advocates, the law upheld in this case is a good example of the kind of cross-ideological cooperation on property rights issues that we need to see more of.

Virginia was one of several states that enacted a strong eminent domain reform law after the Supreme Court ruled in Kelo v. City of New London that it was permissible for government to take private property and transfer it to other private individuals in order to promote economic development. Supporters of the Virginia law are now trying to incorporate it into the state Constitution. But, as the Washington Times reports, they are beginning to encounter resistance from local governments, which have a vested interest in keeping their eminent domain authority as broad as possible [HT: VC reader James Taylor]:

A state constitutional amendment to expand Virginia’s eminent domain laws is meeting local resistance, with the city of Alexandria agreeing to contribute as much as $5,000 for a lobbying firm to help fight the legislation.

The amendment, sponsored for the 2012 General Assembly session by Delegate Rob Bell, Albemarle Republican, attempts to change the Virginia Constitution by updating a law enacted in 2007 that says private property can be taken only when the public interest dominates the private gain, among other conditions.

“The goal is to put [the amendment] into the constitution so that it can’t be tinkered with,” Mr. Bell said....

The amendment passed with wide support during the 2011 General Assembly session, with help from Mr. Bell. It cleared the House by a vote of 83-15 and the Senate by a vote of 35-5.

But to amend the state constitution, the measure must pass again in the assembly before going to the public as a voter referendum on the 2012 ballot.

Despite the broad support, Mr. Bell said, amendment supporters are girding a fight.

“We are not taking anything for granted,” he said....

Mr. Bell said, the impetus was to protect property owners.

“The local governments were certainly opposed to the original statute and claimed it would bring along the end of the world,” he said. “Of course, it hasn’t.

When it comes to property rights, Virginia’s present constitution is one of the least protective in the country. Article I, Section 11 gives the state legislature virtually unconstrained authority to “define” what qualifies as a “public use” that justifies taking property by eminent domain. Essentially, the legislature can license the condemnation of property for virtually any reason it wants. Few if any other state constitutional rights are left so completely to the mercy of the very state officials they are supposed to protect us against. It would be as if the legislature had total discretion to determine what kind of speech can be censored or when police are authorized to search your home.

In the short term, it doesn’t matter much whether eminent domain in Virginia is constrained only by strong statutory restrictions or by a constitutional amendment. But in the long run, a constitutional amendment would be a vital safeguard against the gradual erosion of property rights. Effective post-Kelo reforms like that in enacted in Virginia are the product of an unusual upsurge in public attention focused on eminent domain issues. Most of the time, the vast majority of “rationally ignorant” voters pay little or no attention to the subject. Even in the immediate aftermath of Kelo, many states enacted ineffective laws in part because voter ignorance makes it difficult for the electorate to tell the difference between genuine reforms and those that only pretend to constrain economic development takings.

As Kelo recedes into the past, public attention will understandably focus on other matters, and influential interest groups can lobby state legislators to gradually roll back post-Kelo reforms. The public might not even notice what is happening, just as most of them were unaware of the prevalence of Kelo-style takings in many states before the Supreme Court focused a national spotlight on the issue in 2005. A state constitutional amendment can help forestall this kind of gradual erosion of property rights. Unlike some other state constitutions, the Virginia Constitution is relatively difficult to amend. Thus, it will be much harder to roll back a constitutional reform than a purely statutory one.

UPDATE: Richmond Times-Dispatch columnist A. Barton Hinkle has a good column about the proposed Virginia amendment here.

In a recent Wall Street Journal interview, retired Justice John Paul Stevens defended his controversial majority opinion in Kelo v. City of New London, which ruled that it was permissible for government to condemn private property for transfer to private parties in order to promote “economic development.” The Court ruled that this was a permissible “public use” under the Fifth Amendment. Stevens was particularly critical of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s dissenting opinion, which he claims contradicted her earlier opinion in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff

Stevens’ critique of O’Connor is not entirely without merit. In Midkiff, O’Connor wrote a majority opinion concluding that pretty much any rationale for a taking qualifies as a public use so long as it is “rationally related to a conceivable public purpose.” In Kelo, O’Connor dismissed this as merely “errant language.” But as Ben Barros has shown, it was actually deliberately inserted in the Midkiff opinion (O’Connor refused to take it out even after Justice Lewis Powell warned her that it would license virtually unconstrained takings).

That said, Stevens is wrong to suggest that the Court’s only options were either to overrule Midkiff and Berman v. Parker, or uphold the Kelo takings. Justice O’Connor’s dissent draws a perfectly reasonable distinction beween takings that eliminate some preexisting harm (severe blight in Berman, a supposed oligopoly in the property market in Midkiff), versus those that just seek to create some future public benefit. In the former case, there may be less danger that a taking that transfers property to a private party is just a scheme to benefit the new owner, since the public objective can be achieved simply by terminating the previous harmful use of the land. Many state supreme courts have adopted a similar approach under their state constitutions, permitting private-to-private takings for the purpose of eliminating severe blight, but forbidding them in most other situations.

It is not unusual for the Supreme Court to significantly narrow the scope of a precedent without completely overruling it. For example, the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in the Guantanamo cases narrow but do not overrule World War II-era precedents such as Korematsu and Quirin, which apply broad deference to the executive on wartime military decisions. Stevens voted with the majority in all those cases. Justice Stevens himself is the author of the Court’s decision in Gonzales v. Raich, which severely undercut its previous decisions in Lopez and Morrison, but did not overrule them completely. Like Justice Clarence Thomas, I wish the Court had overruled Berman and Midkiff completely. But I can understand why Justice O’Connor (along with Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist), preferred a more cautious approach.

It’s also worth noting that Stevens’ Kelo opinion misinterprets precedent at least as much as O’Connor’s did. For example, Stevens claimed that his position was supported by “a century” of precedent. But, as I explained in this article (pp. 240-44), all but the two most recent of those cases did not involve the Public Use Clause of the Fifth Amendment. They addressed challenges to takings brought under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Stevens also draws a distinction between takings that are part of a redevelopment plan and stand-alone “one-to-one” takings, claiming that broad judicial deference to the government is particularly appropriate in the former scenario, because the planning process protects property owners against abusive condemnations. However, as I explain here (pp. 228-29), the California district course he cites as a paradigmatic example of a “one-to-one” taking actually involved a redevelopment plan. This last mistake is more than just a minor technical error. Getting it right might have helped Stevens and the other majority justices understand that nearly all economic development takings occur in the context of redevelopment plans, and that the existence of a plan provides little or no protection against the use of eminent domain for the benefit of private interests. Influential interest groups routinely use the planning process to their advantage, as the Pfizer Corporation did in Kelo itself. Recognizing this might not have changed Stevens’ mind; but only one of the five majority justices would have had switch his or her vote for the case to have gone the other way.

Justice Stevens’ retrospective on Kelo is an interesting counterpoint to those of Justice Scalia and Connecticut Supreme Court Justice Richard Palmer. He makes some reasonable criticisms of the dissenting justices’ treatment of precedent. Perhaps in the future he will be equally forthcoming about his own similar mistakes.

UPDATE: As commenter “Steve” points out, I was wrong to suggest in my article that the Court did not mention the Public Use Clause of the Fifth Amendment in the 1896 case of Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley. The Court did mention it, but only to point out that it did not apply to the states:

There is no specific prohibition in the federal constitution which acts upon the states in regard to their taking private property for any but a public use. The fifth amendment, which provides, among other things, that such property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation, applies only to the federal government, as has many times been decided.

I am sorry I made this mistake, and grateful to the commenter for pointing it out. But getting it right would have actually strengthened my point.

As I noted in the article linked in my original post, the late nineteenth and early 20th century Supreme Court did consider challenges to state takings under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. But it did so under a much more deferential standard of review than in the rare cases where it recognized that the Fifth Amendment does apply because the taking in question was conducted by the federal government.

UPDATE #2: When I wrote my initial post above, I did not yet have available the full text of Justice Stevens’ speech, which is available here. To his credit, Stevens actually admits his error in misdescribing the nineteenth and early twentieth century Due Process Clause decisions as Takings Clause cases. However, he does not acknowledge the fact that this error undermines his claim in the Kelo opinion that his position was backed by a century of precedent.

The WSJ‘s Jess Bravin reports on an interview with recently retired Justice John Paul Stevens in which he defended his “most unpopular opinion” — Kelo v. New London — from recent criticism by Justice Antonin Scalia (see here and here).

“It’s the most unpopular opinion I ever wrote, no doubt about it,” Justice Stevens said in an interview. He said he empathized with Ms. Kelo, “but the legal issue would have been exactly the same if it had been a gas station or a pool hall.” . . .

“I had people at a bridge game stop me and ask, ‘How could you have written that opinion? We thought you were a good judge, but we learned otherwise,’ ” he said. “But you can’t explain the whole law of eminent domain to your bridge opponents.”

He particularly criticized the logic of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, who wrote the 1984 opinion supporting eminent domain in Hawaii and then turned around to write a passionate dissent in favor of Ms. Kelo. . . .

Justice Stevens suggested that Justice Scalia’s view on Kelo had hardened over the years. When the decision came down, “Clarence wrote an intellectually honest opinion,” Justice Stevens said, referring to a dissent by Justice Clarence Thomas. “He said you’ve got to go back and overrule this whole line of cases, which would be a fairly dramatic thing.”

But Justice Scalia “did not join the opinion that would have overruled that. Rather, he joined Sandra’s,” Justice Stevens said.

FWIW, I’ve never been convinced that the Kelo dissenters are correct as a matter of constitutional law. While I think the use of eminent domain by the city of New London was horrendous policy, and I fully support efforts to constrain such eminent domain abuse through legislation and state constitutional amendments, I am not convinced such actions are barred by the Fifth Amendment, as I explained here and here.