The Volokh Conspiracy

In my last post, I said that Obama should be favored to win the election, and suggested he has roughly a 65-70 percent chance of winning. My estimate of Romney’s chances was based in large part on his relatively strong showing in national polls, which still had him even with Obama late last week. Today, however, the Pew Research Center came out with a new poll giving Obama 3 point lead nationally, among likely voters.

Obama’s lead in this poll is actually slightly greater than the survey’s margin of error (2.2 percent). And Pew is one of the best polling firms in the business. In combination with the other evidence, such as the battleground state polls, I think this gives Obama an even higher probability of winning than I suggested yesterday, perhaps 80% or even more.

This is still going to be a close election, and will still be one of the rare instances where the outcome is not a foregone conclusion well before election day. But at this point, it’s looking more like 2004 (a close election where one side nonetheless has a clear edge) than 2000 (close to dead even). The polls are still close enough that Romney has a shot, especially if you buy claims that the pollsters’ turnout models are overestimating the number of Democrats who will vote. But his chances are much weaker than it seemed as recently as a week ago. A Romney victory is possible, but at this point would be a pretty substantial upset.

If Obama does win a narrow victory, it’s possible that the effect of the hurricane will be responsible for pushing him over the edge. But I think it’s at least equally likely that things have just reverted to the outcome that could be predicted based on the underlying condition of the economy, which has long pointed to a narrow Obama victory, as I explained in this September post. Romney might have been able to overcome these odds had he been an unusually appealing candidate, or if the Obama administration suffered a major scandal or some other clear setback. But neither has happened, at least not to any great extent.

UPDATE: It’s worth noting that the hurricane and reversion to the historical mean scenarios are not mutually exclusive. It could be that Obama’s numbers have improved recently for a combination of both reasons.

UPDATE #2: Some other polls released today show a dead heat. On balance, a set of national polls where some give Obama the lead and others point to a tie is not good news for Romney, especially when combined with the state polls. That said, it’s possible he has a better chance than I just suggested above. I still think Obama is very much the favorite, however, and would certainly give him at least the 65-70% chance I suggested yesterday. Whether the probability of his winning is 80% or higher is much harder to say. In any event, we’ll soon see.

I thinking about doing a post on my election prediction, but Ted Frank has written a post on his election prediction and I agree with almost every word. Bottom line: Obama is a 60-40 favorite. Before the hurricane, I would have said “tossup.”

Given the extreme closeness of both the national and battleground state polls, one would think that serious political commentators would avoid making bold predictions about the outcome of the presidential race. After all, an overconfident pundit who turns out to be wrong will have egg on their face in just a few days. This is especially true in a situation where state polls and national polls seem to be in tension with each other.

Yet one of the striking things about recent election commentary is that most conservative Republicans are confidently predicting a Romney victory, while liberal Democrats seem equally convinced that Obama is sure to win. Karl Rove, for example, is predicting a clear Romney win. Liberals such as Joan Walsh and Mark Mellman are just as confident that Romney is doomed.

What explains such seemingly irrational overconfidence? One possibility is that these people are simply engaging in biased wishful thinking. Like sports fans, committed political partisans tend to overvalue evidence that reflects favorably on their preferred “team” and ignore or downplay anything that cuts the other way. But another factor may be the desire to create a “bandwagon effect” by convincing as many people as possible that their candidate will win. As I explained here, a small number of swing voters will tend to gravitate to the side that looks like it’s going to win. In a close election, they could make a decisive difference. If the Roves and Mellmans of the world can persuade the public that their guy has the momentum and is likely to win, it could turn out to be a self-fulfilling prophecy.

A recent Gallup poll shows that 54 percent of the public believe that Obama will win, compared to only 34 percent who predict that Romney will prevail. That certainly does not prove that Obama really will win. It’s possible that Romney will amass enough support to offset the bandwagon effect. But the public’s perception that Obama is the likely winner does give him an edge.

In a recent Language Log post, Mark Liberman argues that surveys overestimate the extent of political ignorance. Unfortunately, his evidence is far from compelling.

He notes a few examples where scholars or reporters simply misstated the results of a particular survey. That surely happens. But it doesn’t account for more than a small fraction of the survey evidence finding widespread political ignorance.

Liberman also cites evidence that surveys based on “open-ended” questions sometimes overestimate ignorance because the coders are given bad instructions. An open-ended survey is one where the respondent is asked a question (e.g. – “Who is the Chief Justice of the United States”), and then must give an answer that he comes up with on his own, instead of choosing from a pre-set range of choices, as with a multiple choice question.

Open-ended questions do indeed have their flaws. But extensive political ignorance shows up in multiple-choice surveys too. For example, multiple choice surveys showed that only about 32% of the public knew that Paul Ryan was a member of the House of Representatives. These polls were taken before he was nominated for the vice presidency but after he had been a major figure in American politics for several years. Other multiple choice questions reveal massive ignorance about the distribution of federal spending. Back in 2009, a multiple-choice survey found that only 24% knew that “cap and trade” is an environmental program, even though it had just passed the House of Representatives (I cite the data in this article). And there’s many other examples where those came from.

Moreover, if open-ended survey items overstate ignorance, multiple-choice questions often understate it, because ignorant people will sometimes get the right answer by guessing. In an age of standardized testing, many people are used to the idea that they should guess on a survey question if they don’t know the right answer. And some prefer that option to admitting ignorance. If there are 4 options on a multiple-choice question, random guessing gives you a 25% chance of getting the right answer, and your odds go up if there are only 2 or 3 options.

Finally, it’s worth noting that a recent article by political scientists John Bullock and Robert Luskin shows that much of the criticism of open-ended questions is overstated. Even after correcting for various flaws pointed out by critics, they find that the evidence still shows a generally low level of knowledge.

In sum, both open-ended and multiple choice questions have their shortcomings. Survey researchers and people who cite their work should exercise due caution. But the overall picture painted even by multiple choice surveys is one where the public is ignorant about a wide range of basic facts about numerous political issues.

Ever since Obama established a narrow but clear edge in the polls after the Democratic Convention, conservative commentators such as Niall Ferguson, Andrew McCarthy, John Hinderaker, and Peter Robinson have claimed that this is an unusual historical anomaly explicable only by Romney’s poor campaign strategy or lack of personal appeal, or by some sort of transformation of the electorate in a left-wing direction. They assume, as Hinderaker puts it, that “this election should be a cakewalk for the Republicans” because of the poor state of the economy.

In reality, however, standard economic models of presidential election outcomes all point to a close race, for reasons I explained in this post. Larry Sabato’s recent summary of the predictions of 13 standard election models relying primarily on economic variables also points to a close race with a small edge to Obama. On average, the models predict that he will get 50.2% of the two-party vote. A crude summary of the reasons why the models come out this way is that 1) there has been some improvement in economic conditions since 2008, even if a modest one and 2) things were pretty bad in 2008 to begin with, which leads some swing voters to blame Bush and the GOP for the slow pace of the recovery as much or more than Obama and the Democrats.

Some of the models also take account of foreign policy events. While one can certainly make a case against Obama’s foreign policy, he has not presided over a large and obvious failure that can clearly be laid at his door in a way that swing voters – most of whom have very low levels of political knowledge – can readily grasp.

It’s worth noting that these models also do not account for any boost that Obama is getting for having ordered the operation that killed Osama Bin Laden. If Obama has gotten even a 1 or 2 point boost from that event, that’s enough to account for much of his edge in the polls (currently about 3% in RCP’s average of national polls). The death of Bin Laden is a large and obvious success that even relatively ignorant voters are likely to find out about and appreciate.

The bottom line is that if Obama is overperforming historical expectations, it is only by a slight margin. Similarly, Mitt Romney is doing at most only slightly worse than historical averages would predict – unless you want to argue that Obama is running a highly incompetent campaign that has somehow been offset by even greater incompetence on Romney’s part. We can’t categorically rule that possibility out. But I think it’s pretty obvious that the Obama campaign has displayed at least average levels of competence, if not better.

I am no great fan of Romney, who I think is far from an ideal candidate. A GOP candidate with great bipartisan prestige (e.g. – Eisenhower in 1952) or high charisma (e.g. – Reagan in 1980), would likely have done better. I am also no great admirer of Romney’s record on policy issues, or his technocratic mentality.

So far, however, Romney’s performance in this race is relatively par for the historical course. It is reasonable to argue that he should be doing slightly better, but not to suggest he should be winning in a “cakewalk.”

UPDATE: Some commenters and others question whether Obama really has a 3 point lead, as the RealClearPolitics average of recent polls suggests. Given the margin of error of polls, it’s certainly possible that Obama’s true lead is only, say, 1 or 2 points, though an average of multiple polls is more statistically robust than just one. Regardless, my argument is entirely compatible with a slightly smaller Obama lead than RCP shows, or even a tie race. That too is very close to what standard electoral models would predict about this race. My argument would be undermined if the true situation was that Obama has a really big lead (e.g. – 5-10 points or more). In that event, he really would be clearly outperforming historical expectations. But, so far at least, that has not happened.

Ever since the Arab Spring began, I have been concerned that it could ultimately result in the establishment of Islamist regimes as bad or worse than the more secular dictatorships they replaced. One of the reasons for that fear is that public opinion in many Arab nations is highly illiberal and intolerant. As a result, free elections could result in victories for authoritarian and repressive radical Islamists, as has indeed happened in Egypt. The new Islamist Egyptian President has already imposed media censorship and harrassment that activists consider to be worse than Mubarak’s was.

Unfortunately, the recent outbreak of violent riots in many Middle Eastern nations in response to an insignificant anti-Muslim Youtube video is a further indication of the problem. With the important exception of Libya, most Arab and Muslim governments have issued vitriolic condemnations of the video while either ignoring or only mildly criticizing the violent response to it.

In the absence of systematic polling data, it is too early to say what percentage of the population in these countries agrees that violent rioting is a justified response to “blasphemous” speech. But the tepid reaction of Arab governments to the violence suggests that such support is at least relatively common, even if not the view of a majority. And in Egypt, site of some of the worst violence, previous survey data shows that violent religious intolerance does enjoy majority support. For example, a 2010 Pew survey found that 84% of Egyptians believe that Muslims who convert to another religion should be executed.

It would be a mistake to say that such intolerance and illiberalism are an inevitable attribute of Islam. Like Christianity and Judaism, Islam is a centuries-old religion with many different variants, some of them more liberal and tolerant than others. I don’t believe that the radical Islamism is the “true” version of Islam, while liberal variants are somehow “fake.” There is no single true Islam, any more than there is one true version of Christianity. But it is clear that the versions of Islam that enjoy widespread support in much of the Muslim world are authoritarian and oppressive. And, in many countries, the purveyors of such intolerance have been empowered by the Arab Spring to a much greater extent than liberals.

None of this bodes well for the future of the Arab Spring nations. Obviously, public opinion is not the only factor that will determine the outcome. Political elites matter too, as do a variety of other factors. Unfortunately, however, in much of the Arab world, radical Islamists are far better organized than their more liberal opponents, which might enable them to seize and hold power even when majority opinion is not on their side.

Political scientists John Sides and Lynn Vavreck have a helpful post summarizing survey data showing that most of the public knows little or nothing about newly selected GOP vice presidential nominee Paul Ryan:

A series of polls done by YouGov for the Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project suggests that most people have never heard of Paul Ryan before today. In several polls since April 28, YouGov has asked a representative sample of 1,000 people if they have heard of Ryan and to rate him in terms of favorability. This gives us a large sample on which to base this analysis.

Over the last several months, roughly 43% of Americans report that they have never heard of Paul Ryan. In mid-July, 52% could not even make a guess as to whether Ryan was a member of the House, the Senate, was Secretary of State, or was a Governor (32% got it right). Republicans are more likely to know that Ryan was a member of the House—42% of Republicans knew this, compared to 29% of Democrats and 34% of independents.

The above polls may actually understate the true degree of ignorance about Ryan. Studies show that some people don’t like to admit to pollsters that they don’t know something; if presented with a multiple choice question like the one about Ryan’s office, some ignorant respondents will guess rather than choose “don’t know.” In this case, random guessers had a 25% chance of getting the question right.

The degree of ignorance about Ryan is striking. Unlike Sarah Palin in 2008, Ryan is not a relative unknown catapulted onto the national scene for the first time by getting a VP nomination. He’s been a major figure in national politics for several years now, and is the GOP’s leading spokesman on budgetary and economic issues. That said, extensive public ignorance about Ryan is not surprising in light of other data showing widespread ignorance about a wide range of political leaders and policy issues. As I have pointed out many times, such ignorance about politics is actually rational behavior for most voters, because there is so little chance that any one vote will actually affect the outcome of an election.

Obviously, Ryan’s name recognition is going to rapidly increase now that he is the VP nominee. On the other hand, it is much less likely that a majority of voters will come to understand his budget and entitlement reform proposals – the ideas for which he is most famous. These are much more complicated than merely learning a name and job title.

Public ignorance about federal spending is widespread. One of the challenges that Ryan faces in selling his entitlement reform proposals is that most Americans don’t realize how large a proportion of federal spending is devoted to these programs, and therefore don’t understand that it is impossible to get the budget crisis under control without cutting back in this area.

UPDATE: For those interested, here is a recent video on political ignorance and its implications for democracy that I did for the Cato Institute in June.

In April, a Reuters/Ipsos poll found that the National Rifle Association was viewed favorably by 68% of Americans, and unfavorably by 32%. Unlike most polls, the Reuters poll apparently did not allow “unsure” or “undecided” as a choice. In each of the demographics which the poll provided–Republicans, Democrats, independents, whites, and blacks–the NRA was viewed favorably by at least 55%.

A 2005 Gallup Poll had found a 60/34 favorable/unfavorable view of the NRA. Previous Gallup results were 52/39 (May 2000), 51/39 (April 2000), 51/40 (April 1999, right after the Columbine High School murders), 42/51 (June 1995), and 55/32 (March 1993).

It is interesting to compare the NRA’s ratings with support for handgun control.  Since 1959, Gallup has been asking “Do you think there should or should not be a law that would ban the possession of handguns, except by the police and other authorized persons?” There have been some small changes in wording over the years, and the question is not a perfect test of support for handgun prohibition; some respondents might interpret “other authorized persons” simply as support for the licensing for handgun owners. However, the Gallup question is the closest thing there is to a 50-year gauge for sentiment for banning handguns.

In October 2011, Gallup found that 26% of Americans (a record low) thought that there should be such a law, and 73% did not. The 26/73 anti-/pro-handgun split is fairly close to the 32/68% anti-/pro-NRA split. After Columbine, 38% wanted the anti-handgun law, and 40% disapproved of NRA.

Likewise, Gallup in May 1993 found 54% in against the proposed law, and 55% approval for NRA.

Thus, generally speaking, over the last two decades, Americans who favor handgun prohibition appear to have accurately identified the NRA as a major obstacle to their wishes, and have viewed the NRA unfavorably. Americans who oppose handgun prohibition have viewed the NRA favorably for the same reason.

As American public opinion has evolved from a majority to a super-majority which supports the right to own a handgun, public opinion has likewise moved towards a super-majority with a favorable view of the NRA.

There are many causes for the evolution, but it seems plausible that at least part of the cause has been the increasing effectiveness of the NRA itself. To the extent that the NRA has convinced some Americans that handguns in the right hands are beneficial, then those Americans may have become more likely to view the NRA favorably. To the extent that popular NRA spokesmen (such as three-term NRA President Charlton Heston) or popular NRA programs (such as Eddie Eagle Gun Safety) have made some Americans view the NRA favorably, some of those Americans may have become less inclined to support handgun prohibition.

Because the NRA has (despite some fierce criticisms by Republicans, including in 2010) continued to support Democrats with good records on the Second Amendment, and to oppose Republicans with bad records, the NRA has avoided the problem of being identified with only a single political party. When an interest group supports only one party, that group will inevitably be viewed unfavorably by most members of the other political party.

And now that even long-time anti-gun advocates such as Hillary Clinton and Charles Schumer have been affirming their support for the Second Amendment individual right, the basic premise with which the NRA is identified has become so widely supported that only politicians in very safe districts dare to dispute it publicly.

Founded in 1871, the NRA views itself as “America’s oldest civil rights organization,” an embodiment of American freedom values. These days, it seems that most Americans tend to agree.

The Wall Street Journal recently published an article on widespread public ignorance about federal spending [HT: Andrew Varcoe]:

Many Americans have strong opinions about policy issues shaping the presidential campaign, from immigration to Social Security. But their grasp of numbers that underlie those issues can be tenuous.

Americans vastly overestimate the percentage of fellow residents who are foreign-born, by more than a factor of two, and the percentage who are in the country illegally, by a factor of six or seven. They overestimate spending on foreign aid by a factor of 25, according to a 2010 survey. And more than two-thirds of those who responded to a 2010 Zogby online poll underestimated the part of the federal budget that goes to Social Security or Medicare and Medicaid.

“It’s pretty apparent that Americans routinely don’t know objective facts about the government,” says Joshua Clinton, a political scientist at Vanderbilt University.

Americans’ numerical misapprehension can be traced to a range of factors, including where they live, the news they consume, the political rhetoric they hear and even the challenges of numbers themselves. And it isn’t even clear how much this matters: Telling people the right numbers often doesn’t change their views.

These are not new findings. I wrote about earlier survey data with similar results here and here. Despite the growing fiscal crisis that has emerged over the last few years, most of the public knows very little about federal spending.

The article suggests that this ignorance may not matter much because the majority of survey respondents don’t change their minds about policy priorities even when presented with correct information. It is certainly true that people are slow to change their minds about political issues, often even rejecting outright any data that conflicts with their preexisting views. In general, however, people with higher levels of political knowledge have much different views on many issues than those with low levels, even after controlling for partisanship, race, gender, income, and many other background variables. Knowing one key fact about the budget may not change your mind. But being generally knowledgeable about federal spending may well lead you to have different views from otherwise similar people who are mostly ignorant about it. Moreover, on some key issues where the balance of political power is close, there could be important effects on policy even if only five or ten percent of voters change their minds.

In this case, the public’s failure to understand that entitlements and defense constitute the lion’s share of federal spending probably makes them more reluctant to consider cuts in these areas. Conversely, the belief that foreign aid and payments to illegal immigrants are much greater than they actually are lead voters to focus their ire on these issues far more than is warranted.

Heather Mac Donald has an interesting column on the widely discussed data showing that some 87% of all Wikipedia contributors are male. She argues persuasively that it’s difficult to attribute the gap to discrimination, since most Wikipedia writers are anonymous, thereby making it virtually impossible for Wikipedia to discriminate against women even if they wanted to.

Wikipedia obviously covers many subjects. But to the extent that the underrepresentation of women there extends to the entries on politics and policy issues, it’s part of a longstanding pattern of lesser interest in such issues among women as compared to men. For example, decades of research show that there is a substantial gender gap in political knowledge, with men especially overrepresented among the 5% of the population who follow politics most closely, as measured by political knowledge levels (a group that is some 80% male). I present some of the relevant data in Part VI of this article, including the figure about the top 5%. As I describe there, the gender gap in political knowledge covers a wide range of issues. There are relatively few exceptions. Similarly, this recent Harris poll shows that 25% of men, but only 10% of women report reading at least one nonfiction book on politics over the last year. As in the case of Wikipedia, it’s hard to attribute these gaps to discrimination. Basic political information of the kind tested by pollsters is easily accessed in many different places, and booksellers would be more than happy to sell more political books to women.

Obviously, it would also be wrong to attribute the gap to “stupidity” on the part of women. Political ignorance is not stupidity. As I have often pointed out in the past, it is actually rational behavior for most citizens, assuming that their only reason to become informed is to be a “better” voter. Most of those who do acquire a lot of political knowledge do so primarily because they find it interesting, rather than because they are unusually intelligent or patriotic. Moreover, it is clearly not the case that women are generally less knowledgeable than men. Younger women today have higher average levels of educational attainment than men, and the Harris poll mentioned above shows that they also read more than men do overall.

Thus, the gender gap in political knowledge and interest in politics is likely due to lower interest among women in this particular field rather than “stupidity” or a general unwillingness or inability to acquire information. More men than women are interested in reading about politics and following policy issues closely.

Why the difference? The most obvious explanation is that politics was historically a male-dominated sphere from which women were largely excluded. Only in the last few decades has that begun to change in a major way. Elements of the old attitude surely persist, and they probably influence women’s propensity to become interested in politics. At the same time, that may not be the only factor. Despite massive changes in public attitudes on women’s role in politics over the last fifty years, the general gap in political knowledge has declined only modestly over time (I cite some of the relevant data in this article). The gender gap might therefore persist even after sexism in politics has been more fully overcome than it has been so far. One possibility is that women are simply more likely to have various nonpolitical interests than men are, which leaves less free time available to follow politics. For example, the Harris survey shows that many more women than men read various genres of fiction than men do (science fiction is an unusual, but predictable exception).

At this point, some readers will be tempted to dismiss the data by saying something like “I’m a woman and I love politics,” or “I know many women who follow politics all the time.” But the data are based on statistically representative samples of the population as a whole. For every such general pattern, there are many individual exceptions. The fact that I like Jane Austen novels doesn’t discredit the data showing that her readership is disproportionately female.

Our personal experience can be a poor guide to general patterns because we and the people we know are often unrepresentative. If you regularly read political blogs such as this one, you and your friends are likely to be much more interested in politics than the average person – male or female. The fact that women on average are less interested in politics than men is perfectly consistent with the existence of many individual women who follow politics closely and an even larger number of men who don’t. Indeed, the statistically average man is very far from being a political junkie. But among those people who do fall into that category, men are significantly more common than women.

UPDATE: In this 2008 post, I commented on the related fact that the vast majority of political bloggers are male, as are about 70-80% of political blog readers.

Although federal spending was a major political issue in the 2010 campaign and for many months before it, this recently released CBS poll [HT: Dan Mitchell] reveals widespread public ignorance about the distribution of spending between various programs. The detailed data reveal that only 23% know that Medicare and Medicaid take up between 20 and 30% of federal spending, and only 15% realize that Social Security takes up between 20 and 30%. Some 48% underestimate the extent of Social Security spending, with a much smaller percentage overstating it. Similarly, only 23% recognize that defense spending takes up between 20% and 30% of the budget. In this case, the most common error is to overestimate the extent of spending (a mistake made by 42%). Defense, Social Security, and Medicare/Medicaid, are by far the three largest items in the federal budget. And the vast majority of Americans don’t know how much of the federal budget is spent on them. Even if we count as “correct” answers that are close to the truth (on the grounds that all three programs are right around 20%, so both 10 to 20% and 20 to 30% might potentially be correct), the large majority still doesn’t know the answer in all three cases.

The majority overestimates the percentage of federal spending that goes to foreign aid, welfare, and earmarks. For example, only 9% realize that foreign aid is less than 5% of the federal budget, while 67% believe that it is higher than that, including 48% who believe that the true figure is a whopping 10% or more.

Knowing approximately how much federal spending goes to which program is not enough to have a reasonably informed discussion on spending policy. But it’s probably a necessary prerequisite to doing so. Therefore, it’s noteworthy that the majority of the public is ignorant on these points, despite the extensive public debate over the issue over the last two years.

This result is, of course, in line with previous data showing widespread public ignorance on a wide range of issues. As I have argued elsewhere, it is in fact rational for most voters to make little or no effort to acquire political information, because the chance of influencing electoral outcomes is so low. Few people find the details of federal spending policy interesting, and there is little incentive to learn about them just to be a better voter. Political ignorance is individually rational behavior that leads to bad collective outcomes. Voters may have a duty to become informed, but if so few take that obligation seriously.

It is tempting instead to blame politicians and the media for the extent of public ignorance on these issues. Certainly, politicians often talk about spending in very vague terms, and pretend that we can cut the deficit without touching entitlement programs or defense. No doubt, the media is also often uninformative. However, it is still easy for people to get accurate data on federal spending if they were so inclined. A quick google search turns up several easy to use sites such as this one and this one. It’s also not hard to find think tank studies, newspaper and magazine articles, and other information sources that discuss the budget in an accessible way.

Moreover, to the extent that politicians and the media don’t provide more information on spending, it is largely because they are responding to voter and consumer demand. If TV news viewers wanted more programs discussing the details of the federal budget, TV and radio news stations would be happy to provide it. It would be cheaper to produce than much of their current programming. Similarly, if voters punished at the polls politicians who fail to discuss budget specifics, more candidates would do so. In reality, of course, politicians are more likely to be rewarded at the polls for avoiding discussion of specific budget cuts than for embracing it. Doing the latter will earn them the ire of organized interest groups, while getting little reward from the general public. And TV news executives know that most viewers prefer entertainment to stories on the budget. In sum, politicians and the media are primarily responding to and exploiting public ignorance, rather than creating it. They may exacerbate the problem, but they didn’t cause it.

UPDATE: To my mind, the good news in the CBS poll is that it partly refutes the conventional wisdom that the public wants to cut spending in general, but opposes cuts in specific programs. Substantial majorities say they are willing to cut Social Security benefits for “retirees with higher incomes,” farm subsidies, defense spending, and money for “projects in your community.” There is a statistical dead heat (45% in favor, 48% against) on eliminating the mortgage interest deduction. The public isn’t nearly as willing to cut spending as I would prefer. But it is not correct to say that they oppose cuts in all important programs.

Of course the fact that a majority is willing to support cuts in these areas does not necessarily mean that any will actually be enacted. Social Security, farm subsidies, defense spending, and porkbarrel grants all have strong interest group constituencies behind them, which may be able to prevail against poorly organized majority public opinion.

Kelo v. City of New London, which ruled that government has the power to forcibly transfer property from one private owner to another in order to promote “economic development,” was one of the most unpopular decisions in the history of the Supreme Court. Polls conducted soon after the decision was issued in 2005 found that over 80% of the public opposed it.

Recent survey data compiled by Stephen Ansolabehere and Nathaniel Persily as part of a general study of public attitudes on constitutional issues sheds new light on public attitudes towards Kelo. The study, which is based on a poll taken in July 2009, finds that the public remains just as strongly opposed to economic development takings as in 2005. But it also indicates considerable public ignorance about the Court’s decision.

Question 215 in the 2009 survey asked respondents the following:

Governments sometimes use the power of eminent domain to acquire a person’s property at a fair market price for other uses. Recently, a local government transferred someone’s property to private developers whose commercial projects could benefit the local economy. Do you think the local government should be able to use eminent domain for this purpose or not?

This wording is quite favorable to the pro-Kelo side. It mentions the rationale for the taking (“benefit [to] the local economy”) and notes that the owners will get a “fair market price.” Respondents who are not experts in this field might believe that the latter actually means a “fair price” that takes account of the full extent of the owners’ losses, even though it only actually means “fair market value,” which is often not enough to fully compensate owners for the loss of “subjective value.” On the other hand, the question doesn’t mention any of the arguments against such takings, such as the strong likelihood that they will destroy more economic value than they create. Nonetheless, 81% of respondents said that government “should not be able” to engage in economic development takings, while only 16% concluded that it should have the power to do so. There was little disagreement between respondents with different partisan commitments or ideologies. This is almost exactly the same result as in the 2005 surveys. It suggests that public opposition to economic development takings is not a temporary artifact of the Kelo backlash, nor is it the product of question wording that favors opponents.

On the other hand, Question 301 in the same survey found that only 42% realized that the Court ruled that economic development takings were permissible, while 14% thought that the Court had ruled the other way and 43% were not sure. These figures likely overstate the true degree of public knowledge of Kelo because some people probably hit on the right answer by guessing without actually knowing it (a random guesser had a 50% chance of getting the right result). Previous research shows that a substantial minority of survey respondents prefer to guess rather than admit ignorance. Individuals who don’t even know which way the Court ruled in Kelo are probably also unlikely to keep track of post-Kelo reforms. As I argued in this article, this kind of public ignorance helps explain why so many of the latter have been ineffective. A 42% rate of correct answers is higher than we would get for most Supreme Court decisions. It also beats the mere 21% who knew (in a 2007 survey) whether their states had enacted post-Kelo reforms, and the mere 13% who both knew that and whether their state’s reforms were likely to be effective. But the 42% figure is still unimpressive for a ruling that drew such widespread press coverage and political opposition.

I do not believe that the strong public opposition to Kelo by itself proves that the case was wrongly decided or even that economic development takings are bad policy. After all, I have repeatedly argued elsewhere that public political attitudes are often the result of ignorance and irrationality. Nonetheless, the depth and persistence of public opposition to economic development takings is interesting, as is the extent to which it is coupled with widespread ignorance about the issue.

Just published at The New Ledger, an article describing the Democratic effort to label Ronald Reagan as an “extremist,” during his 1966 campaign for Governor of California. Thanks to all the VC folks who responded to my bleg a few days ago, and provided good research leads.

The Democratic Strategist (a website run by, you guessed it, Democratic strategists): “In recent days, as increasingly negative projections regarding the November election have appeared, a substantial number of Democrats have been seized with a genuine sense of panic.”

The article goes on to argue that such panic is unwarranted, as the recent polls merely reflect the movement of swing voters from the Democrats to the GOP, not a fundamental shift in political alliances by the great bulk of voters.

Earlier today, I received a robocall from a DNC-affiliated pollster asking whether I plan to vote for the Republican or Democratic congressional candidate in my district, and also asking my opinion of Barack Obama’s performance as president. The rub is that I live in Arlington, Virginia, represented in Congress by Rep. Jim Moran. Moran won reelection with almost 70% of the vote in 2008, and his district is one of the few areas that voted Democrat in last year’s gubernatorial election.

Maybe the DNC had some other reason to want survey voters in my district, but if, as the call suggests, the Democrats are worried about whether Moran is vulnerable, panic must be really setting in.