The Volokh Conspiracy

There have been many silly posts in the right-leaning blogosphere attacking Nate Silver at the 538 blog for his perceived pro-Obama tendencies. In fact, Silver created his model earlier this year, and has stuck with it as the campaign has progressed. So unless he’s lying about the results of his model, there’s no reason to accuse him of bias.

This, of course, leads to the question of whether his model is correct. In a nuanced post, Ted Frank sees one potential flaw. Conventional wisdom suggests that undecideds tend to break against the incumbent party, and that Republicans tend to outperform the polling data. Silver thinks that’s largely incorrect, but a good part of the reason that he does so is that Al Gore both won the undecideds and vastly outperformed his polls in 2000. As Frank points out, however, 2000 may have been an anomaly because it was the only election in recent memory that featured a last-minute, important “November surprise”–the revelation of Bush’s drunk driving conviction. If you take 2000′s results out of the picture Obama’s outlook looks pretty bad; an incumbent who is consistently polling less than 50% close to the election, as Obama is, is likely to lose.

It’s an intriguing point, and Frank provides the necessary caveats. I’ll add one more: Blog 538′s predictions haven’t been much out of line with those of betting markets, professional and otherwise. (Of course, there is also a chicken and egg problem here, to the extent that bettors think that Silver has the best model).

Meanwhile, I’m still intrigued by the debate Monday night, which I watched despite my better judgment. I thought Obama “won” the debate by seeming more confident while Romney often stuttered and sputtered. But I also thought that Obama adopted the aggressive posture of an underdog trying to make up ground, while Romney seemed to be playing it safe, the posture of someone trying to sit on a lead and run out the clock. It made me wonder whether the campaigns, at least, perceive that the dynamics of the race favor Romney.

As an aside, I’m still suspicious of pundits using polls that are within the margin of error as showing that one or the other candidate is in the lead, either nationally or in a given state. After reviewing the responses I received to my previous post on margins of error, I’m inclined to think that it’s a mistake to aggregate say, three polls from three different pollsters showing Romney with 1 to 3 point lead in Florida, but well within the margin of error, and conclude that Romney is leading on that basis. Silver, among others, clearly disagrees.

UPDATE: Here’s a piece by Mark Halperin discussing the Obama campaign’s (at least public) confidence in victory. Assuming this confidence is sincere, I’d love to ask the officials Halperin interviewed how one squares this performance with Obama’s clearly intentional demeanor in the final debate. I’m not saying it was the demeanor of a loser, but it surely wasn’t the demeanor of a candidate whose aides are telling him that he has the election sewn up. Interestingly, the Obamaites case for confidence seems to be that the demographic makeup of the 2012 electorate will mirror the unusually Democratic-leaning electorate of 2008, especially in the swing states. That’s quite a counterintuitive notion to base one’s campaign on, which is not to say it’s wrong. But there is one significant risk–if Obama’s ground game in the swing states results in a very favorable electorate in those states, but Romney wins the overall popular vote by a percentage point or two, it could be that a state like Pennsylvania, where many fewer resources have been invested, unexpectedly swings Republican, as Michael Barone suggests is possible here, costing Obama his electoral college victory. It’s a very interesting horse race

As Jonathan and Ilya have recently pointed out, Reason Magazine’s writers are overwhelmingly voting for Gary Johnson, or they are not voting at all.

By contrast, most libertarian law professors of my acquaintance are supporting Romney. (And even back in 2008, when some libertarians supported Obama, this was a distinct minority position among libertarian law professors–though David Post did support Obama on this blog.) Why the difference? One reason, undoubtedly, is that law professors have a much greater than average concern about the Supreme Court. And while one can make the case that a libertarian whose primary concern is gay rights or abortion would prefer a Court with Democratic appointees, here’s something to keep in mind, from a post I wrote back in October 2008:

Libertarians have been heavily involved in some of the most important constitutional Supreme Court litigation of the last two decades, either in terms of bringing the case, being among the most important advocates of one side’s constitutional theory, or both. Among the cases in this category are Lopez, Morrison, Boy Scouts v. Dale, U.S. Term Limits, Grutter, Gratz, Kelo, Raich, Heller, and probably a few more that I’m not thinking of offhand. With the minor exception of Justice Breyers’ vote in Gratz, in each of these cases, the ONLY votes the libertarian side received were from Republican appointees, and all of the Democratic appointees, plus the more liberal Republican appointees, ALWAYS voted against the libertarian side. The latter did so even in cases in which their political preferences were either largely irrelevant (Term Limits), or should have led them to sympathize with the plaintiff (Lopez, Kelo, Raich).

To those examples we can add McDonald, Citizens United, American Tradition Partnership, NFIB v. Sebelius, and, I’m sure, a few others that I’m forgetting.

A broader point is that thanks in part to the “fusionist” (libertarian-conservative) nature of the Federalist Society, and the fact that conservative law professors and other elite conservative lawyers tend to be much more libertarian-leaning than conservative voters or elected officials, libertarians have real influence in conservative, and therefore Republican, legal circles. Richard Epstein and Randy Barnett are “rock stars” on the Federalist Society circuit, and other libertarians, not excluding myself, are frequent guests at Federalist Society events. Libertarian legal books get favorable or at least respectful reviews in conservative venues like the Wall Street Journal, National Review, Commentary, and the Claremont Review of Books. The same books don’t get bad reviews in liberal publications; they simply get ignored. I’ve never heard of a conservative professor objecting to a libertarian potential colleague on ideological grounds, but it happens with some frequency among liberal professors.

In short, for the most part modern liberal legalism doesn’t take libertarian ideas seriously, and when it does it tends to be hostile. Modern legal conservatism, on the other hand, has substantial libertarian influence. Given that the home of modern legal liberalism is the Democratic Party, and the home of modern legal conservatism is the Republican Party, it’s not surprising that libertarian law professors tend to overall prefer the latter, albeit typically as the lesser of two evils.

UPDATE: It’s also worth noting that Republican presidents have occasionally appointed libertarian-leaning judges, from Alex Kozinski to Janice Brown, and others in between, to the federal courts. I can’t think of any similar examples from the Democratic side. Republican-appointed judges have been very friendly to libertarian law clerks (who go on to become law professors). Democratic-appointed judges, not so much. Libertarian law professors who have held high-ranking government positions–Brad Smith, Todd Zywicki, among others–have almost always done so at the instigation of Republicans, not Democrats. And so on.

 
I find it strange that the Obama campaign would be making so much of Romney’s income from foreign sources when Obama’s foreign source income appears to be a much bigger percentage of his income over the last few years. Of course, one can’t tell for sure because Mitt Romney has not released his 2009 tax return.

Yet in the three tax years in which Barack Obama has been President (2009, 2010, and 2011), fully 30.1% of the Obamas’ gross income has come from foreign sources: ($2,711,340 out of a 3-year total gross income of $8,993,449).  In 2009, 26.5% of the Obamas’ gross income came from foreign sources. In 2010 it was a whopping 41.4%, and in 2010 it was 30.2%.

The salary that we taxpayers pay him as President (just under $1.2 million over the 3 years) accounted for less than 13% of the Obamas’ income, a share dwarfed by their 30% from foreign sources over the same period.

From 2009 through 2011, the Obamas paid $87,429 in foreign taxes, which they applied toward a credit to reduce their U.S. tax bill.  The amounts I examined are reported on Form 1116, of which there are two filed along with their 1040 when they had both general and passive foreign income.

Their returns do not disclose which foreign countries are responsible for paying the Obamas the $2.7 million in foreign source income, but the overwhelming bulk of it must come from payments resulting directly or indirectly from book sales.  Nonetheless, the Obamas did report a total of $3,611 in foreign passive income in 2009 and 2010, a type of income that most often results from investments in foreign countries.  Like some of the foreign investments for which Romney has been pilloried, this Obama passive foreign income might result from the foreign investments of U.S. financial entities in which the Obamas invested. [See update below; the passive income indeed came from the foreign investments of a U.S. entity in which the Obama's had an interest (Michelle Obama in a beneficiary), but it is not one over which they had any control over the investments.]

I hope that the White House press will be able to determine the foreign sources that account for over 30% of the Obamas’ income. And given President Obama’s campaign rhetoric, I would especially like to know the origins of the foreign passive income [again, see below].

UPDATE: Mystery solved. Jeffery Silver, Visiting Asst. Professor at Detroit Mercy, kindly emails to point out that in the 2010 return Statement 14 following one of the the Obamas’ Forms 1116 shows that 2010′s passive foreign source income ($1,571) resulted from “Freeman Henry G. Jr. Decd TW,” which is the so-called “Pin Money Trust” set up for first ladies by Henry Freeman, who died in 1917. The 2009 return does not appear to contain a similar statement, but given the similarity in amounts, the passive income in that year must come from the same source. Just to be clear, the Obamas would have no discretion over the investment of the Freeman Trust.

McCulloch v. Maryland had a very good day at the Supreme Court yesterday, with NFIB relying on and applying McCulloch‘s rules for when an enactment violates the Necessary and Proper Clause. What happened after the McCulloch decision also shows the next steps in battle over the individual mandate, as I suggest in an essay this morning for National Review Online.

In refusing to hold the Second Bank of the United States unconstitutional, the McCulloch Court gave Congress broad latitude in Congress’s own evaluation of whether the Bank was “necessary” in a constitutional sense. Relying on and quoting McCulloch, President Andrew Jackson made his own judgment of constitutional necessity when he vetoed the recharter of the Bank in 1832. After a titanic political struggle, the Bank was gone, and a new term created by Jackson, “equal protection,” had become part of what the American People were coming to believe the Constitution was supposed to mean.

President Jackson dealt the Bank a fatal blow by withdrawing federal deposits from the Bank, and moving them to state banks. President Romney can follow Jackson’s lead on his first day in office, instructing the Acting Secretary of Health and Human Services to use the waiver powers in the ACA statute to issue waivers to everyone for the individual mandate. Because the individual mandate is (supposedly) a tax, it can then be repealed through the budget reconciliation process, which cannot be filibustered.

I predict that the individual mandate will never mandate anyone. Yet the mandate will be long remembered as one of the most consequential laws enacted by a Congress. The result of the “bank battle” was that even though a central bank was judicially permissible, central banking was politically toxic for the rest of the century. The “mandate battle” may have the same effect in deterring any future thoughts of congressionally-imposed mandates. (Putting aside the obvious exception for mandates that have a solid basis in the constitutional text, such as jury service.)

The enactment of the mandate has also significantly increased the probability that the next Supreme Court appointments will be made by a President and confirmed by a Senate which denounces the mandate as unconstitutional, and that the new Justices will be the kind who are inclined to vigorously enforce the many strong constitutional limits on congressional over-reaching which are articulated in NFIB v. Sebelius.

I would have preferred that the mandate had met its end yesterday morning, but the fact that the mandate will have to be finished off by the People in November and their elected officials in January may lead to even better long-term results for advocates of a constitutionally limited federal government.

My article yesterday for Scotusblog discussed the tremendous importance of the Court’s 7-2 use of the non-coercion rule to limit Spending Clause violations of State sovereignty and independence. The rule has been around ever since Steward Machine Company v. Davis (1937), but NFIB v. Sebelius is the first decision by any federal court to find that a conditional congressional grant violates the rule.

The folks who think that the “evolving Constitution” completed its evolution in 1937-42, and that everything the Court did during those years must be applied today with the broadest possible reading, should be especially pleased with the NFIB Court’s vigorous enforcement of a very important New Deal precedent.

My essay argues that the application of the non-coercion rule, as well as the  application of the doctrine of incidental powers for the Necessary and Proper Clause, are among the many elements of the Roberts opinion whose significance approaches that of some of the most important opinions by Chief Justice Marshall.

Although we do not know Chief Justice Roberts’ motives, I suggestion a comparison of NFIB to Marbury v. Madison: adroitly escaping from a partisan assault on the Court itself, the opinion moves constitutional law very far in the opposite of the direction favored by partisan assaulters–and does so in a way that leaves the partisan assaulters unable to use the case in their attacks on the Court.

Do U.S. Supreme Court justices tend to try to time their retirements to help the political party of the president who appointed them? University of Chicago sociologist Rafe Stolzenberg and I have an article in the journal Demography that finally answers that question: Yes, justices do act politically when deciding whether to retire or take senior status.  One interesting finding is that since 1789 justices have been more likely to die in office when the party of the current president is different from the party of the president who appointed him.

Our paper, “Retirement and Death in Office of U.S. Supreme Court Justices,” can be downloaded at SSRN.

Here is the abstract [abstract revised after posting]:

In this study, we construct demographic models of retirement and death in office of U.S. Supreme Court justices, a group that has gained demographic notice, evaded demographic analysis, and is said to diverge from expected retirement patterns. Models build on prior multi-state labor force status studies and data on justices permit an unusually clear distinction between voluntary and “induced” retirement. Using data on every justice from 1789 through 2006, with robust, cluster-corrected, discrete time, censored, event history methods, we (1) estimate retirement effects of pension eligibility, age, health, and tenure on the timing of justices’ retirements and deaths in office, (2) resolve decades of debate over the Politicized Departure Hypothesis that justices tend to alter the timing of their retirements for the political benefit or detriment of the incumbent President, (3) reconsider the nature of rationality in retirement decisions, and (4) consider the relevance of organizational conditions as well as personal circumstances to retirement decisions.

Computing robust standard errors with adjustments for clustering by justice, we find that the odds that a justice will retire (or resign or take senior status) in the first two years of the term of a president of the same political party as the president who first appointed him to the Court are about 2.6 times the odds of retiring under a president of the opposing party in the last two years of his presidential term. As hypothesized, roughly the opposite pattern is observed for dying: The odds of death in office odds are about three times higher when the incumbent president is not of the same party as the president who appointed the justice (compared with when the incumbent president is of the same party).

To illustrate that our analyses are not sensitive to different ways of conceptualizing the problem, we also show that if one views death and retirement as competing risks, an approach that we do not favor, the results of a multinomial probit show much the same effects as we show for separate analyses of retirement and death in office.

We find that the odds that justices will retire or take senior status in a year when they are eligible for their pension are more than eight times larger than the odds of retirement in years in which they are not eligible for their pension. Also, contrary to researchers who have hypothesized tenure on the bench as a linear predictor or those who find that increasing tenure always increases the estimated odds of retirement, we find that until judges have been on the bench for 25 or more years, each additional year of tenure makes them less likely to retire, rather than more likely to retire. We also document the secular increases since 1789 in the ages at which United States Supreme Court justices leave the Court, the ages at which they ultimately die, their length of tenure on the Court, and the probability that they will leave office by retirement, rather than by death.

In general, our empirical account supports the rich historical literature that documented individual cases in which justices resigned, retired, or took senior status to perpetuate party influence on the Court. We find that Supreme Court Justices act more or less as one would expect sophisticated people to act regarding their careers. While personal factors, such as pension eligibility, are more important predictors of retirement than political variables, the data are nonetheless consistent with a hypothesis of politicized departure: Whether leaving by retirement, resignation, or death, justices tend to time their departures from the Court based in part on a president’s party and the years remaining in a president’s term in office.

Every year the political roundtable show Colorado Inside Out does a time machine episode. Last year’s 1951 episode has just been nominated for a regional Emmy Award, in the news/interview program category. Our topics for the episode were the firing of Gen. Douglas MacArthur, the Korean War, duck and cover training, and the new federal government center in Denver. Characters were the famous singer and actress Ethel Merman, who had recently moved to Denver (played by Westword publisher Patty Calhoun), newspaperman Al Nakula (played by former Rocky Mountain News journalist Kevin Flynn), sociology professor Lois Waddell (played by Dani Newsum), and southern Colorado newspaper editor Cecil Koplowitz (played by me, evoking my father’s first journalism job, in Walsenberg).

We  are getting ready to tape a new episode, which will be set in 1912. Patty Calhoun will portray Denver socialite and social climber Molly Brown. I’m busy reading about the Balkan War which began in 1912. The episode will premiere on Friday, July 6.

In April, a Reuters/Ipsos poll found that the National Rifle Association was viewed favorably by 68% of Americans, and unfavorably by 32%. Unlike most polls, the Reuters poll apparently did not allow “unsure” or “undecided” as a choice. In each of the demographics which the poll provided–Republicans, Democrats, independents, whites, and blacks–the NRA was viewed favorably by at least 55%.

A 2005 Gallup Poll had found a 60/34 favorable/unfavorable view of the NRA. Previous Gallup results were 52/39 (May 2000), 51/39 (April 2000), 51/40 (April 1999, right after the Columbine High School murders), 42/51 (June 1995), and 55/32 (March 1993).

It is interesting to compare the NRA’s ratings with support for handgun control.  Since 1959, Gallup has been asking “Do you think there should or should not be a law that would ban the possession of handguns, except by the police and other authorized persons?” There have been some small changes in wording over the years, and the question is not a perfect test of support for handgun prohibition; some respondents might interpret “other authorized persons” simply as support for the licensing for handgun owners. However, the Gallup question is the closest thing there is to a 50-year gauge for sentiment for banning handguns.

In October 2011, Gallup found that 26% of Americans (a record low) thought that there should be such a law, and 73% did not. The 26/73 anti-/pro-handgun split is fairly close to the 32/68% anti-/pro-NRA split. After Columbine, 38% wanted the anti-handgun law, and 40% disapproved of NRA.

Likewise, Gallup in May 1993 found 54% in against the proposed law, and 55% approval for NRA.

Thus, generally speaking, over the last two decades, Americans who favor handgun prohibition appear to have accurately identified the NRA as a major obstacle to their wishes, and have viewed the NRA unfavorably. Americans who oppose handgun prohibition have viewed the NRA favorably for the same reason.

As American public opinion has evolved from a majority to a super-majority which supports the right to own a handgun, public opinion has likewise moved towards a super-majority with a favorable view of the NRA.

There are many causes for the evolution, but it seems plausible that at least part of the cause has been the increasing effectiveness of the NRA itself. To the extent that the NRA has convinced some Americans that handguns in the right hands are beneficial, then those Americans may have become more likely to view the NRA favorably. To the extent that popular NRA spokesmen (such as three-term NRA President Charlton Heston) or popular NRA programs (such as Eddie Eagle Gun Safety) have made some Americans view the NRA favorably, some of those Americans may have become less inclined to support handgun prohibition.

Because the NRA has (despite some fierce criticisms by Republicans, including in 2010) continued to support Democrats with good records on the Second Amendment, and to oppose Republicans with bad records, the NRA has avoided the problem of being identified with only a single political party. When an interest group supports only one party, that group will inevitably be viewed unfavorably by most members of the other political party.

And now that even long-time anti-gun advocates such as Hillary Clinton and Charles Schumer have been affirming their support for the Second Amendment individual right, the basic premise with which the NRA is identified has become so widely supported that only politicians in very safe districts dare to dispute it publicly.

Founded in 1871, the NRA views itself as “America’s oldest civil rights organization,” an embodiment of American freedom values. These days, it seems that most Americans tend to agree.

This is the subject of my article in a forthcoming symposium issue of the Fordham Urban Law Journal. The article details the political, cultural, social, and legal battles over gun control from the 1920s to the early 21st century. Here’s the abstract:

A movement to ban handguns began in the 1920s in the Northeast, led by the conservative business establishment. In response, the National Rifle Association began to get involved in politics, and was able to defeat handgun prohibition. Gun control and gun rights became the subjects of intense political, social, and cultural battles for much of the rest of the 20th century, and into the 21st.

Often, the battles were a clash of absolutes: One side contended that there was absolutely no right to arms, that defensive gun ownership must be prohibited, and that gun ownership for sporting purposes could be, at most, allowed as a very limited privilege. Another side asserted that the right to arms was absolute, and that any gun control laws were infringements of that right.

By the time that Heller and McDonald came to the Supreme Court, the battles had mostly been resolved; the Supreme Court did not break new ground, but instead reinforced what had become the American consensus: the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms, especially for self-defense, is a fundamental individual right. That right, however, is not absolute. There are some gun control laws which do not violate the right, particularly laws which aim to keep guns out of the hands of people who have proven themselves to be dangerous.

In the post-Heller world, as in the post-Brown v. Board world, a key role of the courts will be to enforce federal constitutional rights against some local or state jurisdictions whose extreme laws make them outliers from the national consensus.

Also recently published in SSRN is a very good draft article by David Hardy, analyzing the four opinions in McDonald v. Chicago. As he persuasively shows, the arguments by Justice Stevens and Breyer against enforcing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms against the states would, if taken seriously, cast serious doubt on the legitimacy of enforcing against the states almost everything else in the Bill of Rights.

The Obama campaign is plugging “The Life of Julia,” designed to show how the government in general, and this administration’s policies in particular, help a hypothetical woman throughout her life.

The last entry, showing Julia at 67, really annoyed me:

Under President Obama: Julia retires. After years of contributing to Social Security, she receives monthly benefits that help her retire comfortably, without worrying that she’ll run out of savings. This allows her to volunteer at a community garden.

Really? We’re going to let Social Security remain unsound actuarially and allow it and other benefits for the elderly to bankrupt the country so “Julia” can volunteer in a community garden? I think that if “Julia” is healthy enough to be down on her hands and knees digging and weeding in the Summer sun, “Julia” can retire a couple of years later and help stave off national bankruptcy. [Note that the average sixty-seven year old woman has a life expectancy of eighteen years. "Julia" perhaps a bit longer, given her apparent health. Eighteen-plus years is an awfully long time to promise a healthy person he or she can retire on borrowed public money--which is probably why the president has said the age for social security should be on the table.]

Here’s Clinton speaking in Tunisia. Note that the questioner operates under the assumption that to be pro-Israel is to be against the “common Arab citizen,” and Clinton not only fails to challenge that assumption, but implies that rhetoric that pleases the “Zionist lobby” is somehow anti-Muslim.  She then suggests that Americans (and others) are fools if they take seriously anything said during campaign season [note that "our" in the title therefore refers to Americas' political class as a whole, not just (but not exclusive of) the Obama administration].

QUESTION: My name is Ivan. After the electoral campaign starts in the United States – it started some time ago – we noticed here in Tunisia that most of the candidates from the both sides run towards the Zionist lobbies to get their support in the States. And afterwards, once they are elected, they come to show their support for countries like Tunisia and Egypt for a common Tunisian or a common Arab citizen. How would you reassure and gain his trust again once given the fact that you are supporting his enemy as well at the same time?

SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, first, let me say you will learn as your democracy develops that a lot of things are said in political campaigns that should not bear a lot of attention. There are comments made that certainly don’t reflect the United States, don’t reflect our foreign policy, don’t reflect who we are as a people. I mean, if you go to the United States, you see mosques everywhere, you see Muslim Americans everywhere. That’s the fact. So I would not pay attention to the rhetoric.

Secondly, I would say watch what President Obama says and does. He’s our President. He represents all of the United States, and he will be reelected President, so I think that that will be a very clear signal to the entire world as to what our values are and what our President believes. So I think it’s a fair question because I know that – I sometimes am a little surprised that people around the world pay more attention to what is said in our political campaigns than most Americans, say, are paying attention. So I think you have to shut out some of the rhetoric and just focus on what we’re doing and what we stand for, and particularly what our President represents.

I’m sure Clinton didn’t mean it the way it came out, but it’s embarrassing nevertheless.  As Glenn Reynolds likes to say, the country is in the best of hands.

UPDATE: Several early commenters suggest that Clinton’s comments were directed at GOP rhetoric in this campaign season.  That makes sense [better put, it makes Clinton's comments more comprehensible], but the questioner wasn’t asking about what one commenter suggested was the GOP’s “belligerent” rhetoric. Rather, he was clearly asking about both sides‘ rhetoric–I’ve now highlighted the “both sides”  in the original question so it’s clear what the questioner was saying: every campaign season we see both Republican and Democratic candidates [including, obviously, Pres. Obama] appealing to pro-Israel constituencies,  and then when they get into office we see they aren’t as hostile to Arab individuals as we thought, even though they still support the Arabs’ “enemy”.  “Don’t believe what you hear in campaigns” isn’t even the beginning of an adequate answer to that.

FURTHER UPDATE: Some commenters are also insisting that Clinton’s comments are directed at GOP rhetoric on Iran.  I don’t see any indication in either the question or the answer that Iran is under discussion.  Moreover, Iranians are not Arabs–I’m sure Clinton is aware of this–and the questioner references only Arab countries (Tunisia and Egypt) and the “common Arab on the street.” Indeed, it’s kind of odd that Clinton segues into a discussion of Muslims in the U.S.; the questioner didn’t suggest that the U.S. is hostile to Muslims, but to Arabs because the U.S. supports Israel.  I’m guessing that Clinton had some talking points she wanted to express, and tried to awkwardly shoehorn them into an answer to a question they weren’t responsive to.  So awkwardly, in fact, that when she tried to circle back to answer the question she wound up saying “don’t pay attention to anything American politicians say during campaign season.”

FINAL UPDATE: Even for those inclined to read Clinton’s comments in what they think of as charitably–I’m not inclined to think it’s “charitable” to suggest that rather than simply misspeaking, she,  in her capacity as Secretary of State in a foreign country, was actually implicitly attacking Republicans, one of whom may be the president soon–she still failed to address various nefarious ideas embedded in the question, including the idea that Israel is an enemy of the “common Arab citizen”, that American support for Israel implies a hostility to Arabs, and that U.S. support for Israel, rhetorical or otherwise, reflects the power of “Zionist lobbies” as opposed to a widespread consensus among Americans. Indeed, she seemed to (but I doubt meant to) suggest that Obama administration policies are actually a lot less pro-Israel than that might appear at first glance.

Back in the olden days, readers interested in the history of a presidential race would have to wait until the year after the election to read a book about it. Theodore White created the genre of presidential campaign books with The Making of the President 1960. It was published in 1961. White wrote three more books in the series, and they are still great reading for people interested in the history of American politics. Although be forewarned, the 1964 and 1968 books are enormous.

There was once a time when it was considered unseemly for even the most ambitious candidates to announce before the calendar year of the election. That’s one reason that John F. Kennedy waited until Jan. 2, 1960, to formally announce. George McGovern broke the mold by formally announcing on Jan. 18, 1971, which turned out to be the right strategy for a long-shot who needed plenty of time to organize. Jimmy Carter studied the McGovern campaign assiduously, and used its tactics, including the very early announcement, to win his own long-shot race in 1976.

So now, with almost everyone practicing McGovernism, the presidential campaign has been going hard for much of the pre-election year. If you want to know the history thus far, the just-published Election 2012: The Battle Begins is a strong choice. It’s written by Tom Bevan and Carl Cannon, and published by RealClearPolitics.com, the world’s best political website. Election 2012 is e-book only, and costs just $2.99. The ideal reader might be someone who lives abroad, is very interested in American politics, and only gets the limited coverage available from the International Herald Tribune, or foreign papers. In the United States, readers who are so fascinated with politics as to want to read a history of the election the year before the election will probably already know most of what’s in the narrative. Yet even those readers will find interesting details about the behind-the-scenes strategizing and the battles within the campaign staffs, especially for Gingrich, Bachmann, and Pawlenty. And the story of how Huckabee looked very seriously at a run, and then backed away. Readers will also learn about the inside of the Romney campaign, but not about behind-the-scenes turmoil, because this time around Mitt’s campaign is as smooth and unflappable as is Mitt himself while on a debate stage.

This is an interesting piece defending the Obama Administration’s record on Israel.

For what it’s worth, I don’t think Obama is “anti-Israel.” But I think the NY Mag piece misses some significant elements of the puzzle. Obama made it clear during the 2008 campaign that he was anti-Likud. Likud happened to be the Israeli party in power when he came into office. This created several problems for Obama, some substantive and some for “optics.”

On the optics side, it’s pretty hard to be anti-Likud when the Likud is in power and not look like you are exhibiting some hostility to Israel.

Relatedly, on the substantive side, it’s pretty clear to me that the Obama Administration wanted to topple the Likud-led government so they could get a more dovish government more to their liking in power.

This led the Administration to publicly demand that Israel initiate a full settlement freeze, something the Palestinians themselves had never demanded [as a precondition to negotiations]. The strategy, as I see it, was that with a new extremely popular president Israel wouldn’t be able to say no, but Netanyahu’s coalition was too right-wing to say yes. So the government would have to fall, as Shamir’s did in the early ’90s in part because he couldn’t get along with the Bush Administration.

This proved a spectacular miscalculation. Netanyahu had a much broader coalition than Shamir’s, including the Labor Party. And Israel has become a major issue in conservative politics, which is was not twenty years ago. Pressure on Netanyahu invited pushback from the Republicans, leading Democrats to tell the president to ratchet it down. And again optics-wise, how often does the U.S. try to undermine the coalition governing one of its democratic allies?

Meanwhile, the Palestinians couldn’t demand less from the Israelis than Obama demanded, so they refused negotiations in the absence of a full settlement freeze. In interviews I’ve seen, Palestinian officials have been quite explicit that this is the reason they have been unwilling to negotiate with Israel. So Obama not only came off as anti-Israel to many friends of Israel, he also undermined what was left of the peace process.

Finally, with regard to domestic politics I pointed out repeatedly during the 2008 campaign that one of Obama’s weaknesses was that his entire adult life was spent in circles in which liberal/left views were taken for granted. In Obama’s circles, publicly pressuring Israel and using “evenhanded” language to refer to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (while favoring Israel beneath the rhetorical surface) seems perfectly reasonable, even a bit “right-wing.” The JStreet types that are Obama’s natural constituency would certainly think so. (The mistaken assumption, pushed by JStreet itself, was that the average pro-Israel American was the equivalent of a JStreeter. This isn’t true, and to the extent it applies to some Jewish voters, the JStreeter types are almost all hardcore Democrats, not the swing voters/donors Obama is having trouble with.)

But in mainstream pro-Israel sentiment, especially among the more traditional Jewish communities on the East Coast, “evenhanded” sentiment sounds extremely suspicious, especially (lest we forget) given that Obama still faced suspicion thanks to his longstanding membership in a church with an arguably anti-Semitic and certainly anti-Israel minister. (Remarkably, Rev. Wright never comes up in the NY Mag piece).

In short, I think the Obama Administration took it for granted that pro-Israel Americans would understand Obama and his administration were pro-Israel, but were simply willing to pressure Israel for its own good, at the expense of the Likud and its allies but not Israel. Instead, what a lot of Americans thought they saw was the Administration pressuring Israel publicly but coddling the other side. The NY Mag piece suggests that the Administration was also pressuring the Arabs, but much more quietly. Perhaps, but you can only get away with that if folks trust your pro-Israel bona fides, which they did not with Obama.

Today South Carolina Republican Senator Jim Demint hosted a forum at which five Republican presidential candidates spoke. The transcript is here.  Each candidate appeared one at a time, and the format allowed for in-depth questions and answers. Among the questioners was Princeton University’s Robert George. Prof. George asked each candidate if he or she would support congressional legislation, under section 5 of the 14th Amendment, to ban abortion. To state the obvious, such legislation would be contrary not only to Roe v. Wade and Penn. v. Casey (abortion rights are protected by section 1 of the 14th Amendment), but also to Boerne v. Flores (Congress cannot use section 5 to protect a right in defiance of direct Supreme Court holding about the particular aspect of the right).  The question explicitly presumed that Roe v. Wade had not been overturned, and that a Human Life Amendment to the Constitution had not been adopted.

The candidates’ answers were as follows:

Bachmann: Yes.

Cain: Yes.

Gingrich: Yes. Cooper v. Aaron‘s assertion of judicial supremacy was wrong. Following the precedent of the first Jefferson administration, I would abolish some federal judgeships. But I am not as bold as Jefferson. “I would do no more than eliminate Judge Barry in San Antonio and the ninth circuit. That’s the most I would go for. (LAUGHTER) (APPLAUSE). But let me say this. That’s part of the national debate. That’s not a rhetorical comment. I believe the legislative and executive branches have an obligation to defend the constitution against judges who are tyrannical and who seek to impose un-American values on the people of the United States.”

Paul: No. Violence and murder should be dealt with by the states. The federal police are already too numerous. I support a bill to deprive lower federal courts of jurisdiction over abortion cases, so that state restrictions on abortion would be immune from judicial review.

Romney: No. I would focus on appointing judges who would return abortion regulation to the states. The George proposal “would create obviously a constitutional crisis. Could that happen in this country? Could there be circumstances where that might occur? I think it’s reasonable that something of that nature might happen someday. That’s not something I would precipitate.”

Personally, I agree with the Romney approach. Moreover, the next President is going to have to address a fiscal crisis that will devastate the United States economy soon if it is not solved. Dealing with the fiscal crisis is going to be quite difficult politically, in part because there are many millions of people who benefit from the current, and unsustainable, levels of federal spending. The tax consumers may be very highly resistant to any reduction in the amount of money that flows to them. So there will be no shortage of national division and acrimony. Thus, 2013 would be an especially bad time to precipitate a constitutional crisis over a social issue. The answers of Romney and Paul displayed prudence, which I think is a very important characteristic for a President, and the answers of Bachmann, Cain, and Gingrich did not.

As for the Ninth Circuit, Gingrich has been saying the same thing since March, according to Politico. I have not found anywhere where he has provided details on this plan, but perhaps it would involve merging the 9th circuit states into the 8th and 10th circuits, since they border the 9th. The Politico article is not entirely clear, but it appears that Gingrich has claimed that he could get rid of the 9th circuit by signing an executive order. This would be plainly unconstitutional, a usurpation of power worthy of impeachment. Article III gives Congress, not the President, the power to “ordain and establish” the inferior federal courts. During the Jefferson administration, the Judiciary Act of 1802 repealed the Judiciary Act of 1801, in which the lame duck Federalist Congress had created many new federal judgeships, to which President John Adams had appointed Federalists in the waning days of his administration. As President Jefferson recognized, the choice to eliminate federal judgeships belongs to Congress, not the President acting by himself. [Update: a commenter says the video (for which a link was not provided) shows that Gingrich was not claiming that he could abolish the 9th Cir. by executive order. I looked on the Internet, and did not find a video of the March 25 Iowa speech by Gingrich. There's a video of a speech earlier that month in Iowa, in which he criticizes the 9th cir. but does not call for its abolition.]

Following up my post on what might happen if liberals and libertarians agreed on empirical issues, this post addresses the question of what might happen if libertarians came to agree on empirical issues with conservatives.

Unfortunately, answering this question is a lot tougher than the previous one about liberals. Libertarianism and liberalism are fairly coherent ideological movements. By contrast, “conservatism” is a hodgepodge of different ideologies united mainly by their opposition to the political left. George Will, Pat Buchanan, Bill Kristol, and Mike Huckabee are all considered conservatives. But they differ greatly from each other on both empirical issues and values. So too with neoconservatives, religious right social conservatives, and Burkean conservatives. Moreover, some conservatives are quite close to libertarians on most issues because they have a assimilated a great many libertarian ideas.

To make the question more tractable, I’m going to focus primarily on social conservatives who generally support free market policies on “economic” issues, while also supporting a high degree of “social” regulation. I recognize that this is far from the only type of conservatism out there. But it’s probably the most common one in the United States, especially among conservative intellectuals.

As with some libertarians and liberals, some social conservatives are purely utilitarian in their values. They support conservative policies because they think that will maximize human happiness. If a utilitarian libertarian and a utilitarian conservative could agree on empirical issues, their policy differences would disappear. They would then agree on both values and the best way to implement them. But pure utilitarianism is even less common among conservatives than among liberals and libertarians, possibly because many social conservatives are strongly religious and the major religions all incorporate many non-utilitarian values. Here are some issues where non-utilitarian conservatives will continue to disagree with libertarians even if the two groups could come to a consensus on empirics:

I. Nationalism.

Many, though not all, conservatives are nationalistic. By contrast, most libertarians are hostile to nationalism, usually for the kinds of reasons I outlined here. Some of these differences are traceable to disagreements over the empirical effects of nationalism. But not all of them. At the level of fundamental values, many nationalistic conservatives are willing to impose severe costs on foreigners for the purpose of securing significantly smaller benefits for members of their own polity.

This has important implications for issues like trade and immigration. Let’s assume that greatly expanded immigration creates huge net benefits for immigrants, but inflicts much smaller net costs on native-born Americans. Most libertarians would accept that tradeoff. After all, the freedom and utility of immigrants is, in their view, no less valuable than that of natives. And the majority of libertarians see immigration restrictions as infringements on liberty, not just utilitarian harms.

Not so with nationalistic conservatives. For example, conservative Harvard economist George Borjas wants to greatly reduce immigration in order to prevent what he estimates to be fairly modest wage reductions for low-skilled Americans, even though he realizes the enormous harm that would inflict on potential migrants. In a recent book, conservative scholar Edgar Browning explicitly states that immigration policy should be determined entirely without reference to the welfare of the immigrants themselves (which he views as an uncontroversial premise). Views like Borjas’ and Browning’s are quite common among nationalistic conservatives, though admittedly not universal.

What is true for immigration also holds for trade. The only difference is that fewer conservatives believe that free trade inflicts net harms on Americans than believe the same of immigration. Those who do believe that trade inflicts net harm on Americans tend to support protectionism entirely without reference to the impact on foreigners (Pat Buchanan is a good example).

Agreement on empirical issues surrounding immigration, trade and other such issues would eliminate libertarian-conservative differences only if conservatives came to believe that fully laissez-faire policies in these fields create net benefits for current American citizens.

II. Social Regulation.

Much of the libertarian-conservative disagreement over social and “morals” regulation comes down to disagreement over the empirical effects of such regulations. Elsewhere, I have criticized conservatives such as Robert Bork for ignoring the ways in which their empirical critiques of economic regulation apply to social regulation as well.

But empirical disagreements are not the only source of the conflict. Many conservatives believe that some forms of “immoral” behavior are intrinsically wrong even if legalizing them would increase happiness on net. For example, some argue that it is intrinsically wrong to gamble, take mind-altering drugs, engage in “unnatural” sex, or consume pornography. Conservatives who believe this might still be willing to support legalization if the harms of prohibition are great enough. That accounts for William F. Buckley’s and now Pat Robertson’s opposition to the War on Drugs. But the threshold level of harm needed to persuade social conservatives to support legalization is a lot higher than for libertarians.

The flip side is that many libertarians might still oppose social regulation even in cases where they agree that it creates net utilitarian benefits. They, after all, value social freedom for its own sake, not just because they think it increases happiness. Most libertarians might be willing to support regulation if they thought the utilitarian benefits were extremely large. If banning pornography were the only way to prevent a massive epidemic of rape, I would be in favor of it. But the threshold level of benefit would, for most libertarians, have to be pretty high. Certainly much higher than for most social conservatives.

III. Retribution.

Conservatives generally favor harsher punishments for criminals than libertarians do. This difference reflects various empirical disagreements between the two groups. But there’s also a difference in values. Conservatives are, on average, much more committed to the value of retribution than libertarians are. That’s a key reason why many libertarians, but almost no conservatives, favor moving the criminal justice system towards a model based on restitution rather than punishment (see this article by co-blogger Randy Barnett). Personally, I’m much more of a retributivist than most of my fellow libertarians. But my view is definitely in the minority among libertarian intellectuals.

I have not mentioned war and foreign policy in this post, largely because the issue deeply divides libertarians among themselves. I think that the internal division among libertarians (people who mostly share the same values) suggests that the divide between dovish libertarians and hawkish conservatives on these issues is also largely about empirics rather than values. However, it’s possible that the conservative commitment to nationalism also plays a role here.

Overall, a social conservative who came to agree with libertarians on empirical issues but not values would be more supportive of free trade and immigration and more skeptical of social regulation. But she might still differ with libertarians on these issues because of the conservative commitment to nationalism and nonutilitarian justifications for social regulation. Full convergence with libertarian policy positions would only occur if the conservative came to believe that social regulation inflicts very great harm and that free migration is a net benefit to Americans. Even then, we would still have the disagreement over retribution.

A libertarian who came to agree with social conservatives on empirical issues would endorse higher levels of social regulation and lower levels of immigration. But we would only see full convergence if the libertarian came to believe that the harm caused by laissez-faire was great enough to outweigh the nonutilitarian value he assigns to freedom.

UPDATE: For readers who may be interested, here’s a post I wrote about F.A. Hayek’s classic libertarian critique of conservatism that focuses on some of the same issues as this one, though it does not try to distinguish empirical issues from differences in values.