The Volokh Conspiracy

Rep. Mac Thornberry (R-Texas), member of the US House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, plans to introduce a bill that would increase Congressional oversight over kill-capture operations conducted outside of Afghanistan by the US military.  University of Texas law professor Robert Chesney discusses the proposed legislation over at Lawfare, and gives a section by section commentary.  Whether this is an important step or not depends on one’s starting point, of course; I agree with Chesney that it is a big deal and a welcome step to regularizing . (Though if one’s view is that all these operations are unlawful, or that  they require judicial oversight, or something else, whether from the Left of the Democratic Party or what we might call the Pauline wing of the Republican Party, then you won’t be much moved.)

Seen within the framework of US law and oversight of overseas use of force operations, this is an important step.  A couple of observations.  First, this (soon-to-be) proposed legislation is with respect to operations conducted by the US military under US Code Title 10; it does not cover CIA activities, which are already subject to oversight and reporting under US Code Title 50.  Second, it covers US military operations with respect to the lines of oversight running back to the Armed Services committees; essentially it increases the role of the Armed Services committees in oversight of US military operations in what it defines as “Sensitive Military Operations” – which in practice means clandestine Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) activities.  It does not alter the existing oversight processes of Congressional intelligence committees governing covert action as defined in US Code Title 50, but extends and increases oversight over military operations.  Why this focus on military operations conducted by JSOC?

Counterintuitive as many might find it, the CIA is subject to far greater oversight, and at a far higher level of government, in its conduct of Title 50 covert activities than the US military is in its conduct of armed operations under Title 10.  There are good reasons why the military is not subject to direct oversight in essentially tactical decision-making in its traditional military activities once a decision has been made to commit to the use of force.  These decisions have long been understood to be within the discretion and responsibility of commanders who have the expertise to carry them out.  Oversight through the Armed Services committees is robust, including its closed sessions, but is not considered the same as that which Title 50 requires for covert activities because the kinds of activities traditionally conceived – conventional conflict versus covert activities – were different.  However, the expansion of the US military into clandestine activities – which might or might not meet the legal definition of “covert” under Title 50 and so trigger those oversight functions – has raised new questions as to whether the Armed Services committees’ oversight, traditionally conceived for conventional conflicts, keeps Congress sufficiently informed and permits sufficiently timely oversight in the case of activities carried out by JSOC.

[Added: Chesney has amended his original post to emphasize that in practice JSOC operations receive an op-by-op review by the Armed Services committees; he points to this Craig Whitlock article in the Washington Post.  I am quite prepared to believe this, but agree with Bobby that the formalization of this process in law remains just as important as ever. The problem of "institutional settlement" in US counterterrorism policy, discussed at the bottom of this post, is in large part taking jury-rigged and ad hoc processes, in order to both make them permanent features of the national security toolkit and to regularize and institutionalize them.]

Whether there is sufficient oversight depends partly on whether you think that oversight by the Intelligence committees is sufficient, or whether, in the case of US military operations through JSOC, the Armed Services committees ought to be more involved irrespective of what happens in the Intelligence committees.  My strong impression is that members of the Armed Services committees, on both sides of the aisle, believe that there needs to be a stronger role for those committees; this bill is partly a response to that concern.  This is reinforced by a further feature of the existing legislative structure for oversight.  Title 50 defines covert activities, but then exempts from the definition “traditional” military activities as well as activities done in routine support of others’ (e.g., CIA) activities.

This suggests – at least as a structural possibility – that important JSOC operations might be carried out on an internal legal view that they do not constitute “covert” activities because they are “traditional” military activities, and therefore do not trigger Title 50 oversight.  As military activities, oversight would take place through the Armed Services committees, but only in the relatively limited way that now exists.  One result of Rep. Thornberry’s proposed reforms would be essentially to close that structural gap. It does so by requiring oversight through the Armed Services committees for any “Sensitive Military Operation” carried out by the military, without regard to any other obligations under Title 50 covert activities.  Among its specifics, it requires reporting on the process and criteria for targeting decisions – the so-called “kill list” committees and “disposition matrix.”

This seems to me a very good idea.  I need to think through other parts of the proposed legislation to be sure I understand the implications, but as a general proposition, I’ve long believed that “institutional settlement” of the permanent structure of US “counterterrorism-on-offense,” as I’ve sometimes termed it, requires important reforms and updating of the legislative structure of oversight in order to take account of the realities of targeted killing, drone warfare, and other forms of highly targeted use of force, as well as the expansion of JSOC and its capabilities.  This proposed legislation is a first, and welcome, step toward getting Congress directly involved in that reform process.  Congress needs to be directly involved in updating the machinery of covert and clandestine operations – more precisely, in delineating the range of activities that involve discrete, intelligence-driven uses of force that carry hostilities directly to terrorism targets – and the oversight processes.  The administration ought to work with Congress to do that.  It is an area that – unlike many others, such as Guantanamo, what happened and why at Benghazi, etc. – ought to permit for a lot of bipartisan agreement.  Here is Chesney’s bottom line:

What’s not to like?  I have long had concerns with respect to whether there was adequate operation-by-operation transparency vis-à-vis Congress when it came to JSOC direct action outside of Afghanistan.  This legislation speaks directly and clearly to that concern, while also moving the ball forward at least a bit in terms of forcing the executive branch to explain to the armed services committees the legal and policy elements that govern its decisions regarding the designation of individuals or groups as objects of direct action.  The Obama administration should get behind this, not resist it—especially if it is inclined to shift some or all of the CIA’s kinetic portfolio over to JSOC.

This is not, as regular readers will know, an unstated attempt on my part to kill off these programs by process reforms.  It is instead endorsement of attempts to “discipline” them – as Harold Koh put it in his Oxford Union speech a few days ago – and put them on a footing of institutional permanence, so that these tools join the permanent repertoire of national security available to presidents into the future.  That requires a process of oversight by the political branches more attuned to the realities of how covert and clandestine uses of force are likely to unfold than existing statutes do today.  As it happens, Benjamin Wittes and I are co-authoring a new book that addresses the terms of institutional settlement in counterterrorism, based in an analysis and reconstruction of speeches by senior Obama officials and agency general counsels on national security (we’re putting it out chapter by chapter online, and Hoover Press will put out a hardback once completed).

Human Rights Watch has just released a report on Israel’s recent “Pillar of Defense” operation to suppress rocket fire from Gaza. The report concludes that 18 airstrikes violated international law by not being properly targeted. I do not know if 18 is a little or a lot for an operation of this scale, as there an no good comparative data (though the report is released as Afghanistan says yet another NATO airstrike hit a house with innocent women and children inside.)

The report, by its description of its methods, appears to be a hit piece. Here is what the report said about the group’s investigative method (emphasis added):

Human Rights Watch sent detailed information about the cases to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) on January 14, 2013, requesting further information. At a meeting on January 24 and in subsequent phone conversations, the military spokesperson’s office told Human Rights Watch that the military chief of staff had ordered a general (aluf) to conduct an “operational debriefing” (tahkir mivtza’i) concerning “dozens” of Israeli attacks during the conflict, including the cases Human Rights Watch investigated, which would be completed by late February.

Because previous Israeli “operational debriefings” involving attacks were not conducted by trained military police investigators or dedicated to investigating alleged laws-of-war violations, Human Rights Watch has decided to publish its findings rather than wait for their results.

In other words, HRW received high-level and consistent cooperation. A meeting between HRW and the IDF took place on Jan 24 (just 10 days after HRW asked for further information), and were told that the IDF would have a more detailed response by late February after its own investigations were over. One month is not a long time to wait, certainly not covering an incident that occurred months ago.

It is completely baffling why HRW, would rush to publish their report a mere two weeks before they could hear in full Israel’s response to their allegations. Furthermore, HRW’s explanation why they chose not to wait lacks any coherence. What is so special about designated military police as opposed to toeher investigators? And even if the IDF investigations were not conducted by trained military police, it is unquestionable that the IDF investigators would have access to sources HRW does not. One would expect that an organization whose influence is completely based on their reputation for objectivity and thoroughness would wish to have all the facts before rushing to publish.

Well-meaning observers are often puzzled why Israel sometimes does not cooperate with the multitudinous foreign investigations into its military operations. The minimal lack of procedural fairness investigations such as HRW’s is surely one reason for their reluctance.

Hat tip: Gidon Shaviv

National Security Law in the News: A Guide for Journalists, Scholars, and Policymakers is a new book published by the ABA’s Standing Committee on Law and National Security and Northwestern’s Medill School of Journalism. Despite the title, the book should be of interest to a general audience, as it offers a concise, broad plain-language overview of the many timely issues at the intersection of domestic and international law. I wrote the chapter on piracy. Congratulations to the editors, Paul Rosenzweig, Timothy J. McNulty, and Ellen Shearer.

Here is the overview:

Written by seasoned experts, each chapter contains a summary of legal and policy issues of significance and is accompanied by an annotated bibliography for further reading. The book is divided into four parts:
Part I provides an overview of the basic issues of constitutional and international law including discussion of the scope of the president’s authority, the meaning and effect of the First Amendment, and the role of international law in American courts.
Part II turns the focus to the military and explores questions about military organization and operations.
Part III looks at the world of domestic law enforcement and counterterrorism.
Part IV covers homeland security issues.
An added bonus: a list of experts to contact for additional background information is included in chapter.

Some early journo reactions:

Every reporter on the national security beat should keep this book within reach.”

– Jane Mayer, Staff Writer, The New Yorker Magazine

Finally, we now have a clear-eyed primer on national security law that can serve as an essential reference for journalists as they try to cut through the spin and get to the truth.”

– James Risen, author, State of War: The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration

Politico recently asked its Arena contributors whether the recent death of Muammar Gadhafi vindicates President Obama’s Libya policy:

How much credit should President Barack Obama get for Qadhafi’s death and the tyrannical regime’s ouster? Does it vindicate the president over Libya mission critics like Rep. Michele Bachmann?

My response is available here:

President Obama deserves credit for facilitating the overthrow of a brutal dictator at little immediate cost to the United States. Republican critics were wrong to claim that this result could only be achieved with a much larger commitment of U.S. forces.

On the other hand, it is far from clear whether the new regime in Libya will be any better than the old. The new Libyan government includes many different groups, including an influential radical Islamist faction..... If radical Islamists do take over Libya, the result could well be a regime that is just as oppressive as Gadhafi’s and much more hostile to American interests.

The United States may also pay a price for violating our 2003 agreement with Libya, under which Gadhafi agreed to stop supporting terrorism and give up his nuclear program in exchange for the US and Britain implicitly committing themselves to not seeking his overthrow....

Obviously, Gadhafi deserved to be overthrown. He certainly had no “right” to tyrannize over the people of Libya. But, after seeing what happened to him, other dictatorships such as Iran may be less willing to sign similar deals....

Finally, by going to war without congressional authorization, the president violated both the Constitution and the 1973 War Powers Act. Then-Senator Barack Obama got it right back in 2007, when he wrote that “[t]he president does not have power under the Constitution to unilaterally authorize a military attack in a situation that does not involve stopping an actual or imminent threat to the nation.”

I previously wrote on these issues in more detail here, here, here, and here.

The LA Times has an article describing how ROTC programs have returned to many elite universities in the wake of the abolition of the Don’t Ask Don’t Tell policy:

Helped by the recession, more active recruiting and a sea change in student perceptions of the military, enrollment in ROTC programs on college campuses is booming.

Even with ongoing U.S. involvement in conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq and now Libya, participation in the program has surged 27% over the last four years — to 56,757 men and women, according to the Defense Department. The military boosted the number of ROTC scholarships to help expand the wartime officer corps, and the recession made the offers attractive to students.

Today’s college students, who never faced a military draft and whose childhood memories include the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, are more receptive than their parents’ generation to seeing fellow students in uniform. Returning veterans who served in Iraq and Afghanistan and are now enrolled in college also create a more sympathetic, and familiar, image of the military.

In another sign of the changing times, the congressional rescinding last year of the “don’t ask, don’t tell” ban on gays serving openly in the military has recently led Stanford, Harvard and several other elite universities to take steps to welcome the ROTC back to their campuses for the first time in 40 years.

On-campus military training still raises hackles for some. Yet even critics acknowledge that most current college students are willing to accept the ROTC.

I previously wrote about the return of ROTC here and here. Although I thought that DADT was a shortsighted and unjust policy, I also argued that banning ROTC and military recruiters from campus was not the right way to combat this form of anti-gay discrimination. Be that as it may, the return of ROTC to schools that had previously banned it is a positive development.

A few weeks ago, I wrote a post about the question of whether elite universities will allow ROTC programs to return to campus now that the don’t ask don’t tell policy has been repealed and gays and lesbians can serve openly in the military. I am happy to report that Harvard University has now agreed to recognize ROTC [HT: Harvard student Yair Rosenberg]:

The Reserve Officers’ Training Corps will be formally recognized by Harvard tomorrow after a 40-year hiatus, the University announced today. University President Drew G. Faust and Navy Secretary Ray Mabus are set to sign an agreement Friday that will recognize the Naval ROTC on campus.

“Our renewed relationship affirms the vital role that the members of our Armed Forces play in serving the nation and securing our freedoms, while also affirming inclusion and opportunity as powerful American ideals,” Faust said in a statement. “It broadens the pathways for students to participate in an honorable and admirable calling and in so doing advances our commitment to both learning and service.”

Previously, University officials have stated that they would not recognize the program until “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”—the military policy which banned gays from openly serving the military—was lifted. Since Congress repealed the ban in November, Faust and other officials have been in discussions with the Pentagon about bringing the program back to campus.

Apparently, Harvard ROTC participants will continue to train at MIT rather than at Harvard itself. That, however, seems to be a cost-driven decision by the Pentagon, not the result of any effort by Harvard to keep the military off-campus.

Although I have always opposed DADT, I also argued that banning ROTC and military recruiters from campus was not the right way to combat this form of anti-gay discrimination. Be that has it may, there is no good reason for universities to exclude ROTC from campus now that DADT has been repealed. Hopefully, other universities will follow Harvard’s example.

At the Weekly Standard blog, Cheryl Miller asks whether the repeal of Don’t Ask Don’t Tell will lead to the return of ROTC programs to elite university campuses [HT: here]. In recent years, university officials have defended the exclusion of ROTC from campus as a way of countering the military’ discrimination against gays and lesbians, and have vehemently denied that they are antimilitary. With the end of DADT, that obstacle to ROTC should be removed.

As Miller points out, the Pentagon may have reasons for its own for choosing not to establish ROTC programs at some elite schools. And there are those in the military who strongly dislike elite academia. Thus, some schools might not get ROTC programs any time soon even if university administrators support the idea. Still, nothing prevents university officials from announcing that they would now welcome the return of ROTC programs if the military is interested. President Obama urged them to do just that in his recent State of the Union speech.

The same point applies to law schools. After having lost a Supreme Court case over the issue, law schools were forced to permit military recruiters to interview on campus as a condition of receiving federal funding under the Solomon Amendment. In the aftermath of this legal defeat, most law schools admitted recruiters, but continued to emphasize that they were doing so under duress. Some also adopted various “ameliorative practices” required by the American Association of Law Schools, and designed to emphasize their opposition to the presence of military recruiters. Both the AALS and individual schools should repeal the varous ameliorative practices and officially indicate that they now voluntarily welcome military recruiters on the same basis as other interviewers. As recently as May 2010, the AALS emphasized that its opposition to military recruiters should not be interpreted as “antimilitary,” but was instead merely an effort to oppose discrimination against gays and lesbians. The time has come to live up to those principles.

For reasons I outlined here, I think that it was wrong to exclude ROTC and military recruiters even while DADT was in force, despite the fact that I also believe that that policy was a serious injustice. Regardless, with DADT on its way out there is no longer any plausible reason for universities to exclude either ROTC programs or military recruiters.

UPDATE: The Harvard Crimson, Harvard’s main student newspaper, just published an editorial calling for the return of ROTC to campus [HT: Harvard student and Crimson writer Yair Rosenberg:

Just as DADT represented an outdated prejudice directed toward gay American citizens, the absence of ROTC now stands as a relic of an outdated bias against the American armed forces. When ROTC was expelled from Harvard in 1969, military enlistment was mandatory, as was ROTC participation on countless U.S. campuses. Today, absent its prior objectionable compulsory and discriminatory policies, ROTC deserves recognition as a legitimate pre-professional track at Harvard. The university supports pre-law, pre-med and pre-business activities on the part of its students; it should support pre-military study as well. Further, the same access to Harvard’s student body that is granted to recruiters for countless career paths should be given to the U.S. military....

We remind those who would oppose this move that President Faust and other Harvard administrators have repeatedly predicated the return of ROTC upon the repeal of DADT. Thus, should the university backtrack on its public commitment, its political credibility will be greatly impaired, as will Harvard’s ability to influence future legislation with similar pronouncements.

The Chronicle of Higher Education has not yet revealed the results of its investigation of the veracity of Michael Bellesiles’s story about a dying soldier and his student brother. One can only speculate why it is taking more than a day or two to verify a story that should have been easy to verify (if it is true).

While waiting for the Chronicle, I thought I’d post the views of a commenter (who says that he is a professor of military history) published in the comments after Bellesiles’s story at the Chronicle Review website (scroll down to comment 71, by mhl1972):

I actually do teach military history, in the present, at a large R-1 university. And I didn’t believe a word of Bellesisles’ story, even before I made the connection to his earlier troubles. Here’s why:

The characters are just too perfectly drawn, and the events unfold in a predictably tragic yet meaningful way. “Ernesto” and “Javier”–they are plucky immigrants that liberal academics are bound to root for, as opposed to white meatheads named Dave and Bob. Javier joined the military to thank the nation for “giving his family refuge”–they came here for political purposes, not to take our jobs! Ernesto, a Latino, writes a paper critical of DADT, in order to cement our liberal affection for him . . . . What’s more, his research paper is “amazing,” so that all us academics, who by June are ready to stab our own eyes out after spending 9 months trying to teach disinterested students who IM right through class, will like him all the more! Because it would be totally unrealistic to imagine that a non-native speaker of English in a college history class might struggle with his work! Ernesto’s brother is serving in combat–how enobling! And how rare, especially in Iraq these days! And then he gets shot in the head by a sniper, an uncomplicated death that makes clear who was right and who was wrong, because the shooter is obviously skilled, and poor Javier couldn’t fight back because he couldn’t even see the person sniping at him! It works much better than, say, “he got killed by friendly fire while kicking down the door to a family’s house,” or, “he got electrocuted because a greedy private contractor installed faulty wiring in a FOB shower.”

It’s all so perfectly tragic! And, Javier’s condition is such that he can’t even get evacuated to Germany, which serves the narrative very conveniently, because the author needs the family to not be able to go to Javier’s bedside, something the real-life military would facilitate, so that Ernesto can remain in the story. And then Ernesto, in the course of just a few weeks, becomes a skinhead military junkie–but one who still comes to class! Yes, that is far more realistic than someone with profound depression, say, withdrawing from the university or just dropping out altogether.

It’s all just so perfect–so achingly, tragically, profoundly perfect. Just like real life!

Yes, teaching military history in a time of war IS hard, because, more often, you have students in ROTC uniforms, which is kind of the equivalent of the football team wearing their uniforms to class, using said symbol of national sacrifice to bully and silence other students in the class who are afraid of appearing that they “don’t support the troops” if they offer a critical appraisal of American foreign policy. And then there are the real veterans–the combat veterans tend to be quiet, and they smile these knowing little smiles and tell you creepy things in confidence after class, while the retired pillow-case stuffers and chairborne rangers (the vast majority of military veterans) use their “status” to bluff, bluster, and intimidate.

I don’t believe a word [o]f Bellesisles’ “story.” As Tim O’Brien tells us in “The Things They Carried,” any meaning or moral that can be teased out of a “true war story” ought to make you wary of its veracity. . . . [Bellesiles's] piece is based solely on his own observations, so it rests on his credibility alone–and he has none. The Chronicle should be embarrassed to have printed this drivel. [emphasis added]

I would repeat the caveats I made last week about a similar characterization made by a commenter:

I would not endorse the tone of this commenter (let alone the added details not in Bellesiles’s story, e.g., . . . [Ernesto's first language]), and it is definitely too soon to conclude that Bellesiles has fabricated the details of his story. Yet the commenter highlights the anti-war implications of Bellesiles’s claims.

Indeed, in style Bellesiles’s piece reads as if it were a short story (perhaps inspired by a real case) with himself playing the part of the sensitive, caring professor.

Late Monday afternoon, I received a one-sentence email from Liz McMillen, Editor of the Chronicle Review:

I just wanted to let you know that we are looking into the questions you have raised in your blog post Friday about Michael Bellesiles’s article for us.

Here is some background on Bellesiles’s June 27th article.

Here is some background on Bellesiles’s problems in 2000-2002.

A few days ago, questions were raised first by Big Journalism and then by me about a story that Michael Bellesiles published in the June 27th issue of the Chronicle of Higher Education: Teaching Military History in a Time of War. I have now read through every DoD casualty report from last fall for both Iraq and Afghanistan and news obituaries for most of them, and I have found none that was even remotely possible as the case that Bellesiles wrote about in the Chronicle. This post discusses the serious questions this raises for the veracity of Bellesiles account.

Continue reading ‘Serious Questions About the Veracity of Michael Bellesiles’s Latest Tale’ »

In its June 27, 2010 issue, the Chronicle of Higher Education published an essay by Michael Bellesiles, Teaching Military History in a Time of War:

Yet the reality of teaching in wartime, most particularly at a working-class college such as Central Connecticut State University, is that war has touched the families of many of our students, and it is a tragic error to think that they have not experienced the staggering blow of loss and personal sacrifice.

That lesson came home to me with great force this last semester. . . . On the first day of my military-history class, after a discussion of the concept of democratic warfare, I asked my usual question about veterans or National Guard members present, and if any students had family members serving in the military. Ernesto (I have changed names out of respect for this family’s privacy), a shy but exceedingly bright student, smiled with evident pride as he mentioned that his brother Javier had recently enlisted in the Army. We discussed his brother’s reasons for enlisting, which mostly focused on a sense of gratitude to a country that had given their family refuge.

Two weeks later, the class discussed Baron von Steuben’s training of the American Continental Army . . . . Afterward, Ernesto told me that his brother had been sent to Iraq. He admitted he was worried about Javier’s safety, but had read several articles indicating that the war was winding down.

Then, after a class . . . [on the Mexican War], Ernesto told me that Javier had called him the day before and described his first encounter with enemy fire, which had been chaotic and without consequence. A few days later, Ernesto gave an amazing paper on a woman who had disguised herself as a man so that she could join the Union Army . . . . In the minutes before the very next class, during which we explored Ulysses S. Grant’s strategy of attrition, Ernesto came to me and said that he could not attend class, as his brother had been shot in the head by a sniper and was in critical condition.

Sorrow was written across Ernesto’s young face. Here was a student I relied on for an astute observation and a ready smile; now he looked on the verge of tears. I told him to give no further thought to the class, but to devote himself to his family. Ernesto missed the wars against the Plains Indians and the Spanish-American War, but showed up in time for the Philippine Insurrection. I hoped that Ernesto’s presence meant that his brother had recovered, only to be surprised to hear that Javier was still in danger, his condition so serious that the doctors feared moving him to the military hospital in Germany. When I asked him why he had come to class, Ernesto insisted that he hoped his studies would take his mind off his worries for his brother.

That afternoon I asked my teaching assistant, a Marine veteran named Joe, to talk with Ernesto. Over the next several weeks, as we traversed the terrain of the 20th century with the two world wars and Korea, Joe spoke regularly with Ernesto, advising him on his final paper and on dealing with the military bureaucracy. . . . And then, just as we were coming to . . . Vietnam, I received an e-mail from Ernesto letting me know that his brother had died.

Not surprisingly, Ernesto’s attendance became erratic, and he skipped entirely the discussion of our current wars.

In today’s Big Journalism, Dutton Peabody calls Bellesiles’s story “fishy” and asks whether the Chronicle bothered to check the story:

But given Mr. Bellesiles’ last book, unkind minds have fallen back on President Reagan’s “trust, but verify” maxim.

Peabody has trouble finding Bellesiles on the Central Connecticut State University (CCSU) website, but I found him there. Bellesiles taught at CCSU in both the Fall 2009 and the Spring 2010 terms. However, according to the course listings there, he taught his Military History course in the Fall 2009 semester, not the Spring 2010 semester. The Spring term ended in May, so (if the CCSU website is correct) Bellesiles may have been mistaken in describing the events as occurring in “this last semester.”

Peabody also wonders about the fast progression from the brother “Javier” being “recently enlisted” as of the first class and yet seriously wounded only a few weeks later.

But Peabody’s chief problem is this:

Funny: the Hartford Courant keeps careful track of Connecticut casualties, and there has been only one fatality so far this year, reported on April 4th as recently killed. That would seem weeks before Mr. Bellesiles says Javier died in Iraq. And then Lance Corporal Tyler Griffin was a Marine, not Army. And killed by an IED, not a shot to the head. And in Afghanistan, not Iraq. Nor was he an immigrant, as Javier is described. (“We discussed [his] reasons for enlisting, which mostly focused on a sense of gratitude to a country that had given their family refuge.”) And there is no sign of a brother in the Courant obituary.

In my review of several sites, but chiefly ICasualties, I find no Connecticut military killed in Iraq in 2009 or 2010 (and only one in 2008, a Marine who died from a non-hostile cause). If one expands the search to all US military deaths in Iraq from all US states and territories from the beginning of the Fall 2009 semester through the end of classes in the May 2010 semester, I could find no deaths from any state that fit Bellesiles’s account (Iraq War, recent Army enlistee, hostile fire from a rifle or similar weapon, lingering death). Nor did my quick review of all US military deaths in Afghanistan (if one changed the theater from Iraq to Afghanistan) during the last two CCSU semesters turn up any likely prospects (though I would need a closer review to be certain).

Thus it appears that Bellesiles’s account is false in at least some trivial respect–probably in the term he taught the course and in the circumstances of “Javier’s” service or death.

Further, without personal knowledge of Army procedures, I found it strange that a critically injured US soldier would not be brought to Germany for treatment over a period of several weeks. Further, while not suspicious in itself, at this stage of the Iraqi War almost all US deaths occur on the same day as the attack or on the following day. Indeed, this detail alone can be used to exclude most deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan in the last year.

If I had to guess, I would suspect that the story Bellesiles told in the Chronicle is mostly true; after all, it would be too easy for the Chronicle or Bellesiles’s department chair to check the facts with “Ernesto” and with Joe, Bellesiles’s teaching assistant. Yet some things reported by Bellesiles in the Chronicle appear to be false: the term he says he taught Military History is inconsistent with CCSU’s website, and the facts of “Javier’s” Army service and death in Iraq do not match any deaths reported by the Department of Defense for soldiers from any US state or territory.

And note that Bellesiles opens his Chronicle article with a warning that many military stories can’t be trusted, even eyewitness ones. Is this his sly way of warning us that he doesn’t fully trust “Ernesto’s” account himself or that Bellesiles is telling us a tall tale? For his sake, I hope not.

What happened last week to the federal ban on military service by gays and lesbians? Chris Geidner has an excellent summary of the developments.

The Senate Armed Services Committee has just voted 16-12 to repeal Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell. The repeal would take effect after the release of a Pentagon study on how (not whether) to repeal the policy and after both the president and Defense Department have certified that the repeal will have no detrimental effect on recruitment, retention, unit cohesion, and so on. The House will vote soon. 

Meanwhile, Republican House members are taking the floor to complain that gay military personnel are trying to push their “overt” sexuality on others “in a bunker where they’re confined under fire,” that they “don’t care” about the military, and that they’re exploiting the armed forces for some kind of “liberal social experiment.”  Perhaps, but it appears 78% of Americans, including a majority of Republicans, are flaming liberals on this one.

UPDATE: The House of Representatives has voted to repeal DADT. The vote was 234-194, with only five Republicans supporting it and 26 Democrats opposed.

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZnBYiHHAifU[/youtube]

to a repeal of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell. Sen. Ben Nelson (D-Nebraska) has now said he will vote for repeal, Politico reports:

“I don’t believe that most Nebraskans want to continue a policy that
not only encourages but requires people to be deceptive and to lie.
The ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ policy does just that,” Nelson said. “It
also encourages suspicion and senior officers to look the other way.
In a military which values honesty and integrity, this policy
encourages deceit.”

“I will support the Lieberman compromise because it removes politics
from the process. It bases implementation of the repeal on the
Pentagon’s review and a determination by our military leaders that
repeal is consistent with military readiness and effectiveness, and
that the Pentagon has prepared the necessary regulations to make the
changes,” he said, adding that he spoke with Defense Secretary Robert
Gates about the issue.

“He advised that while he preferred waiting until the study is
completed, he can live with this compromise,” Nelson said.

Add that to pledges from Susan Collins (R-ME) and moderate Democrats Evan Bayh (Indiana) and Bill Nelson (Florida) to support repeal. While some gay activists and analysts have denounced the proposal as too weak because it does not actually require the military to stop discharging gay personnel, that criticism is misplaced. This is a “compromise” that eviscerates the statutory basis for the 16-year-old policy.

UPDATE:  Developments are coming quickly.  The Weekly Standard says that Sen. John McCain is organizing resistance to the repeal, releasing letters from the heads of the military branches opposing it until the Pentagon review of the policy is completed in December.  By then, it would be much more difficult to repeal the policy because a repeal would be subject to filibuster.  Additionally, action after this year would be more difficult because the next Congress is likely to be less supportive of repeal.

FURTHER UPDATE: The duel of generals has begun. Former Joint Chiefs Chairman General John Shalikashvili responds to the military chiefs. Even Sen. Robert Byrd (D-WV) is on board. That makes 16 votes on the Senate Armed Services Committee.

A deal is in the works to add a repeal of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell to this year’s Defense Authorization bill, the method by which it was originally made law. It’s not clear that the votes are there in the House to do it, and if they aren’t there this year they’re unlikely to be there in the next Congress. It would not be subject to filibuster in the Senate. 

The repeal is limited in one sense. It does not ban discimination against gays in the militery. It returns the status quo ante DADT in 1993 when the president had sole authority to set military personnel policies on gays. The difference is that now the president has promised to reverse the old policy after a study is issued in December on how to implement the change. 

In theory, the next president could reassert the ban. But that’s very unlikely to happen once gays are serving openly. Liberalization of anti-gay public policy tends to be governed by one-way ratchet. Plus, the experience in other countries has been that allowing service by openly gay personnel presents no real problems for recruitment, retention, or discipline, and controversy about it quickly subsides.