The Volokh Conspiracy

Rep. Mac Thornberry (R-Texas), member of the US House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, plans to introduce a bill that would increase Congressional oversight over kill-capture operations conducted outside of Afghanistan by the US military.  University of Texas law professor Robert Chesney discusses the proposed legislation over at Lawfare, and gives a section by section commentary.  Whether this is an important step or not depends on one’s starting point, of course; I agree with Chesney that it is a big deal and a welcome step to regularizing . (Though if one’s view is that all these operations are unlawful, or that  they require judicial oversight, or something else, whether from the Left of the Democratic Party or what we might call the Pauline wing of the Republican Party, then you won’t be much moved.)

Seen within the framework of US law and oversight of overseas use of force operations, this is an important step.  A couple of observations.  First, this (soon-to-be) proposed legislation is with respect to operations conducted by the US military under US Code Title 10; it does not cover CIA activities, which are already subject to oversight and reporting under US Code Title 50.  Second, it covers US military operations with respect to the lines of oversight running back to the Armed Services committees; essentially it increases the role of the Armed Services committees in oversight of US military operations in what it defines as “Sensitive Military Operations” – which in practice means clandestine Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) activities.  It does not alter the existing oversight processes of Congressional intelligence committees governing covert action as defined in US Code Title 50, but extends and increases oversight over military operations.  Why this focus on military operations conducted by JSOC?

Counterintuitive as many might find it, the CIA is subject to far greater oversight, and at a far higher level of government, in its conduct of Title 50 covert activities than the US military is in its conduct of armed operations under Title 10.  There are good reasons why the military is not subject to direct oversight in essentially tactical decision-making in its traditional military activities once a decision has been made to commit to the use of force.  These decisions have long been understood to be within the discretion and responsibility of commanders who have the expertise to carry them out.  Oversight through the Armed Services committees is robust, including its closed sessions, but is not considered the same as that which Title 50 requires for covert activities because the kinds of activities traditionally conceived – conventional conflict versus covert activities – were different.  However, the expansion of the US military into clandestine activities – which might or might not meet the legal definition of “covert” under Title 50 and so trigger those oversight functions – has raised new questions as to whether the Armed Services committees’ oversight, traditionally conceived for conventional conflicts, keeps Congress sufficiently informed and permits sufficiently timely oversight in the case of activities carried out by JSOC.

[Added: Chesney has amended his original post to emphasize that in practice JSOC operations receive an op-by-op review by the Armed Services committees; he points to this Craig Whitlock article in the Washington Post.  I am quite prepared to believe this, but agree with Bobby that the formalization of this process in law remains just as important as ever. The problem of "institutional settlement" in US counterterrorism policy, discussed at the bottom of this post, is in large part taking jury-rigged and ad hoc processes, in order to both make them permanent features of the national security toolkit and to regularize and institutionalize them.]

Whether there is sufficient oversight depends partly on whether you think that oversight by the Intelligence committees is sufficient, or whether, in the case of US military operations through JSOC, the Armed Services committees ought to be more involved irrespective of what happens in the Intelligence committees.  My strong impression is that members of the Armed Services committees, on both sides of the aisle, believe that there needs to be a stronger role for those committees; this bill is partly a response to that concern.  This is reinforced by a further feature of the existing legislative structure for oversight.  Title 50 defines covert activities, but then exempts from the definition “traditional” military activities as well as activities done in routine support of others’ (e.g., CIA) activities.

This suggests – at least as a structural possibility – that important JSOC operations might be carried out on an internal legal view that they do not constitute “covert” activities because they are “traditional” military activities, and therefore do not trigger Title 50 oversight.  As military activities, oversight would take place through the Armed Services committees, but only in the relatively limited way that now exists.  One result of Rep. Thornberry’s proposed reforms would be essentially to close that structural gap. It does so by requiring oversight through the Armed Services committees for any “Sensitive Military Operation” carried out by the military, without regard to any other obligations under Title 50 covert activities.  Among its specifics, it requires reporting on the process and criteria for targeting decisions – the so-called “kill list” committees and “disposition matrix.”

This seems to me a very good idea.  I need to think through other parts of the proposed legislation to be sure I understand the implications, but as a general proposition, I’ve long believed that “institutional settlement” of the permanent structure of US “counterterrorism-on-offense,” as I’ve sometimes termed it, requires important reforms and updating of the legislative structure of oversight in order to take account of the realities of targeted killing, drone warfare, and other forms of highly targeted use of force, as well as the expansion of JSOC and its capabilities.  This proposed legislation is a first, and welcome, step toward getting Congress directly involved in that reform process.  Congress needs to be directly involved in updating the machinery of covert and clandestine operations – more precisely, in delineating the range of activities that involve discrete, intelligence-driven uses of force that carry hostilities directly to terrorism targets – and the oversight processes.  The administration ought to work with Congress to do that.  It is an area that – unlike many others, such as Guantanamo, what happened and why at Benghazi, etc. – ought to permit for a lot of bipartisan agreement.  Here is Chesney’s bottom line:

What’s not to like?  I have long had concerns with respect to whether there was adequate operation-by-operation transparency vis-à-vis Congress when it came to JSOC direct action outside of Afghanistan.  This legislation speaks directly and clearly to that concern, while also moving the ball forward at least a bit in terms of forcing the executive branch to explain to the armed services committees the legal and policy elements that govern its decisions regarding the designation of individuals or groups as objects of direct action.  The Obama administration should get behind this, not resist it—especially if it is inclined to shift some or all of the CIA’s kinetic portfolio over to JSOC.

This is not, as regular readers will know, an unstated attempt on my part to kill off these programs by process reforms.  It is instead endorsement of attempts to “discipline” them – as Harold Koh put it in his Oxford Union speech a few days ago – and put them on a footing of institutional permanence, so that these tools join the permanent repertoire of national security available to presidents into the future.  That requires a process of oversight by the political branches more attuned to the realities of how covert and clandestine uses of force are likely to unfold than existing statutes do today.  As it happens, Benjamin Wittes and I are co-authoring a new book that addresses the terms of institutional settlement in counterterrorism, based in an analysis and reconstruction of speeches by senior Obama officials and agency general counsels on national security (we’re putting it out chapter by chapter online, and Hoover Press will put out a hardback once completed).

The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) sued the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) seeking information about drone strikes.  The CIA filed a so-called “Glomar response,” refusing to confirm or deny the existence of material responsive to the ACLU’s request.  The ACLU then sued, and the district court granted summary judgment to the CIA.   Today, however, in ACLU v. CIA, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. circuit reversed, rejecting the CIA’s justification of its Glomar response. As the court explained:

The CIA has proffered no reason to believe that disclosing whether it has any documents at all about drone strikes will reveal whether the Agency itself — as opposed to some other U.S. entity such as the Defense Department — operates drones. There is no doubt, however, that such disclosure would reveal whether the Agency “at least has an intelligence interest in drone strikes.” . . . The question before us, then, is whether it is “logical or plausible,” . . . for the CIA to contend that it would reveal something not already officially acknowledged to say that the Agency “at least has an intelligence interest” in such strikes. Given the extent of the official statements on the subject, we conclude that the answer to that question is no. . . .

Given . . . official acknowledgments that the United States has participated in drone strikes, it is neither logical nor plausible for the CIA to maintain that it would reveal anything not already in the public domain to say that the Agency “at least has an intelligence interest” in such strikes. . . . The defendant is, after all, the Central Intelligence Agency. And it strains credulity to suggest that an agency charged with gathering intelligence affecting the national security does not have an “intelligence interest” in drone strikes, even if that agency does not operate the drones itself.

The case now goes back to the district court, which will consider whether the CIA may avail itself of any FOIA exemptions to refuse the ACLU’s information requests.

Continuing the analysis of possible Art. I authority for applying the Material Support of Terrrorism statute to three Somali nationals fighting on behalf of al-Shabab in Somalia, with no identifiable link to the U.S. – other than being brought here for trial.

War Powers
The U.S. is not at war with Shabab. They are at war with our pals, Somalia’s notional Transitional government, in a civil war to which we are not a party. It is important to distinguish enemies in the “really hate” sense to war in the constructive or declarative sense.

True, Shabad has aligned itself with Al-Queda. Do the War Powers allow banning anyone in the world from fighting in a conflict to which the U.S. is not a party, but on behalf of a force sympathetic or allied with forces hostile to the U.S.? I don’t know, but my first reaction is that is a stretch. By such logic one could say that the ACA, by making healthier Americans, would make for better soldiers.

Note how this discussion recapitulates government’s move in Hamdan II: first it the argued “material support” rule was an exercise of Offenses Clause powers, then in last minute downgraded D&P to second-stringer, and brought out the general war powers for Art. I support.

With the Supreme Court having declared a limit on the Commerce Clause, the Treaty Power may remain the broadest, least defined governmental power. I do not think general treaties denouncing terrorism would be enough; they specifically do not do what the U.S. wants to do here – establish universal jurisdiction over the crime. Much easier would be to sign a quick executive agreement with the nominal government of part of Somalia, over which the U.S. presumably has a lot of control as it struggles between being nominal and dead.

To be sure, a non-treaty treaty with a non-governing government could be an illustration of the possible excesses of the Treaty power as broadly interpreted. But it might serve the government in a pinch.

Protective Jurisdiction
Assuming their is an Art. I basis, one might ask whether this application of the law would be consistent with international law. Lacking a universal jurisdiction crime, the next fall-back would be “protective jurisdiction.” Definitions of the protective principle require the acts to be “directed against the security of the state” or certain core interests (Restatement). Classic examples have a tight nexus: espionage, counterfeiting. Designation as a foreign terrorist, on the other hand, only requires a determination that the group “threatens” the national security of U.S. or its nationals. I don’t think “threaten” in this context requires any particular intent. Moreover, posing some danger to some U.S. nationals overseas would probably not qualify for the invocation of the protective principle either.

The government is prosecuting three foreigners for the participating in “combat operations” in a foreign civil war.

The indictment apparently alleges no connection to America, or even foreign commerce (unlike a similar 2011 case that lacked an apparent connection to the U.S.) The defendants are Somalis who fought in Somalia. In a previous post, I discussed why the prosecution exceeds’s Congress’s Define & Punish powers; here we’ll consider other possible Art. I grounds. Today – the Foreign Commerce Clause; later today, War and Treaties. Tomorrow: additional thoughts about American exceptionalism in universal jurisdiction.

Foreign Commerce Clause
My previous post focussed on the Define & Punish Clause as the basis for the MST law; today, we will examine some other suggestions. I addressed the Define & Punish clause first because it is the first Art. I power Congress cited in its “findings” in support of the section. (sec. 301(a)(2) of the public law). Later, the findings do suggest the Commerce powers as a tertiary rationale: terrorism discourages travel from the U.S. to affected country, and vice versa. It also mentions general harm to “market stability.” This sounds a lot like the arguments rejected by the Supreme Court in U.S. v Morrison . Surely Congress’s can’t regulate any crime anywhere in the world just because it upsets things. The commerce argument is even weaker here: if someone moves out of their state because of violence against women, they presumably move to another U.S. state. But if they move from Somalia, they do not presumably move to the U.S.

The connection to U.S. commerce would have to be shown. In the one prior universal jurisdiction “material support” case, Ahmed , the government claimed in the indictment, without providing specifics, that it could show real links to commerce. The district judge accepted that as sufficient for starters [in an unpublished opinion, 2011 WL 5041456]. The present indictment says nothing about foreign commerce.

The Supreme Court has said little about the scope of the power. As a textual matter, the foreign commerce power does not allow Congress to simply regulate “foreign commerce,” but rather that part of it which is “with” the United States. It is not clear that the same kind of “foot-bone-is-connected to the ankle bone” games can be played with the Foreign Commerce clause as with the domestic on. Andrew Colangelo, in the leading article on the subject, argues that it requires a substantial U.S. nexus. Indeed, without that, the Constitution would have incorporated broad universal jurisdiction, without anyone knowing about it until now!

If the Foreign Commerce clause is enough here, it would mean several recent federal cases finding no universal jurisdiction over drug trafficking and piracy conspiracy case were wrongly decided: surely those things are linked to foreign commerce in the most general sense.

One can imagine a broader argument that the terrorist group designation is a regulation of foreign commerce, and the material support statute “necessary and proper” to that. And that would turn on the particular group and executive finding...

Some have suggested that the Foreign Commerce Clause should, on the contrary, be broader than the Interstate clause, because there is no background principle of federalism to protect. I see the point, but am hesitant for two reasons.

First, Congress is a government of limited and delegated powers. It can only have powers to regulate conduct anywhere in the world with no demostrable nexus if these were either preexisting powers of states, or somehow a natural emergent power of national sovereignty. I think neither is the case. The latter point can be seen from the fact that no other country exercises universal jurisdiction over this kind of thing...

Second, while Foreign Commerce authority is not concurrent with states, it is shared with other countries, whose existence and sovereign competency the Framers were aware of. Consider Hamilton’s discussion of the Foreign Commerce power (Camillus XXXVI):

Congress (to pursue still the case of regulating trade) may regulate, by law, our own trade and that which foreigners come to carry on with us; but they cannot regulate the trade which we may go to carry on in foreign countries; they can give to us no rights, no privileges, there. This must depend on the will and regulations of those countries; and, consequently, it is the province of the power of treaty to establish the rules of commercial intercourse between foreign nations and the United States. The
legislative may regulate our own trade, but treaty only can regulate the national trade between our own and another country

In the next few days, I’ll discuss possible sources of Art. I authority for the the federal prosecution of three foreigners for fighting on the side of al-Shabab in Somalia, and brought forcibly to the U.S. for trial. Previously, I’ve argued that this prosecution cannot be sustained under the Offenses Clause. But first lets put this in historical and political context.

The use of the material support statute to prosecute foreign fighters in foreign wars is certainly novel, but it has a a historical cousin, which highlights the unusualness of the present prosecution in Brooklyn.

The Neutrality Proclamation of 1793, and subsequent Act, banned Americans from participating, or providing what we might call material support, to the belligerents in the Napoleonic Wars. The idea was such involvement could drag the U.S. into the war. The measures were extremely controversial, leading to the Pacificus-Helvedius debate between Hamilton and Madison. One of the secondary questions was the source of constitutional authority: it was variously placed in what I’d call the “dormant war power” – violations of neutrality by citizens undermined Congress’s prerogative of choosing our wars – or various treaty obligations to the particular warring states. Foreign commerce would do too. (I discuss the Art. I basis for the law in Part II.D.2 of this new article.)

The extraterritorial application of the Material Support statute to foreigners engaged in foreign wars essentially applies the Neutrality Act to the world. Not only must Americans stay of the of designated conflicts, everyone else must to. Of course, the effect is the opposite of the Neutrality Act: instead of distancing the US from foreign wars, it imports them into U.S. court rooms.

It is interesting to note that two of the men have Swedish citizenship, and the third had British citizenship. He became a news item last year when the U.K. revoked his citizenship shortly before his mysterious disappearance in Africa. He only reappeared in Brooklyn federal district court.

Given the lack of protest by Sweden, and the citizenship-stripping by Britain, one might think they are happy/complicit about the U.S. prosecution. I’ve noted before the process of “Goalization,” how countries transfer pirates to African countries with less cumbersome justice systems – a kind of cheapest-justice-provider. Apparently the European governments were watching these Islamist fighters for a while but couldn’t move against them. So maybe transferring terror suspects to the U.S. for trial is the European version of America’s sending them to Egypt or Iraq...

National Security Law in the News: A Guide for Journalists, Scholars, and Policymakers is a new book published by the ABA’s Standing Committee on Law and National Security and Northwestern’s Medill School of Journalism. Despite the title, the book should be of interest to a general audience, as it offers a concise, broad plain-language overview of the many timely issues at the intersection of domestic and international law. I wrote the chapter on piracy. Congratulations to the editors, Paul Rosenzweig, Timothy J. McNulty, and Ellen Shearer.

Here is the overview:

Written by seasoned experts, each chapter contains a summary of legal and policy issues of significance and is accompanied by an annotated bibliography for further reading. The book is divided into four parts:
Part I provides an overview of the basic issues of constitutional and international law including discussion of the scope of the president’s authority, the meaning and effect of the First Amendment, and the role of international law in American courts.
Part II turns the focus to the military and explores questions about military organization and operations.
Part III looks at the world of domestic law enforcement and counterterrorism.
Part IV covers homeland security issues.
An added bonus: a list of experts to contact for additional background information is included in chapter.

Some early journo reactions:

Every reporter on the national security beat should keep this book within reach.”

– Jane Mayer, Staff Writer, The New Yorker Magazine

Finally, we now have a clear-eyed primer on national security law that can serve as an essential reference for journalists as they try to cut through the spin and get to the truth.”

– James Risen, author, State of War: The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration

“Syria is Iran’s only ally in the Arab world. It’s their route to the sea.” So said Mitt Romney at the Monday debate. The Associated Press, The Guardian, The Telegraph, New York, U.S. News,  Brad DeLong, Rachel Maddow’s Maddowblog,  Comedy Central, and The Daily Kos promptly seized the opportunity to show off their superior geographical knowledge, pointing out that Iran has a coastline. The explicit or implicit explanation was that Romney does not even know basic geography. “Romney Flubs Geography” announced the A.P. headline on the Washington Post website. Readers in search of more sophisticated coverage  might have turned to Yahoo! Answers:

Q. Why did Romney say that Syria is Iran’s “route to the sea”? ...when 1) Iraq stands between Syria and Iran, and 2) Iran already has the Persian Gulf, not to mention the Indian Sea?

A. Romney was speaking in the context of the debate topic on foreign policy and the sanctions restricting the finances and trade of Iran. Although Iran is indeed located on the seacoast of the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf, the international trade sanctions have restricted and impeded its ability to transport armaments and other goods through its own seaports. To defeat these trade sanctions, Iran has resorted to using its air transportation to transport goods through an air corridor in Iraqi airspace into Syria and its seaports, such as Latakia.

Fact-checkers who actually investigate the facts might have started with expert websites such as StrategyPage. A 2006 article titled Syrian Delivery System for Iranian Nukes details the extensive seaborne smuggling operations carried out by Syrian companies operating out of Syrian ports. The article concludes:

Iran was generous with its “foreign aid” because Syria provided support for terrorists Iran backed. Now Iran is keen on getting nuclear weapons. The first ones Iran will get will be large and delicate. The only feasible intercontinental delivery system will be a ship. A ship that is accustomed to moving illicit goods.

Stratfor, which is an outstanding site for the collection and analysis open source intelligence, has the following reports involving Syria/Iran sea-related collaboration: An Iranian ship at the Syrian port of Tartus (also spelled “Tartous”) picked up Syrian oil for delivery to China, to evade the economic sanctions on Syria (Mar. 30, 2012). Iran warships docked at the port of Latakia in early 2012 (Feb. 18, 2012), and in early 2011 (Feb. 22, 2011; Feb. 24, 2011). During the 2011 visit, the Iranian navy’s commander, Admiral Habibollah Sayyari, announced that Iran was ready to help Syria improve its port facilities, and to collaborate on technical projects with Syria. (Feb. 26, 2011). (All the Stratfor articles are behind a paywall.)

So in short, Syria is Iran’s route for the projection into the Mediterranean Sea (and from there, the Atlantic Ocean) of conventional naval power, and, perhaps soon, of nuclear weaponry.

Post-debate, the Washington Post‘s Glenn Kessler at least made a start towards a serious factcheck of the Romney quote. He published an updated and condensed version of a longer piece he had written last April about Romney’s repeated use of the phrase.

In the April piece, Kessler wondered what difference Syria made, since Iranian ships can enter the Mediterranean via the Suez Canal. True, but anyone with even a mild knowledge of naval affairs could explain the utility of a Mediterranean port, as a opposed to a Persian Gulf port, for ships operating in the Mediterranean. In April and in October, Kessler wrote:

We also checked with other experts, many of whom confessed to being puzzled by Romney’s comments.  [DK: Kessler should have named all the "other" experts, and should also have included the explanation of at least one of the experts who was not among the "many" were were confused.] Tehran certainly uses Syria to supply the militant groups Hezbollah and Hamas, but that has little to do with the water. The relationship with Syria could also effectively allow Iran to project its power to the Mediterranean and the border with Israel. But does that really mean, “a route to the sea”?

The last two sentences are really the buried lede of the story: Romney is raising a very important issue (Syria as the base for the projection of Iranian naval power), but Romney is not explaining himself in a manner which the less well-informed members of the public (e.g., the sources linked in the 1st paragraph of this post) can understand. If Romney were a better communicator, he would have laid out the facts in greater detail, as Ronald Reagan and Winston Churchill did in their own time, when warning their countrymen about the military dangers of aggressive totalitarian regimes. As Kessler wrote in April, “If Romney is elected president, he will quickly learn that words have consequences. Precision in language is especially important in diplomacy, and here Romney used a phrase that left people befuddled as to his intent and meaning, especially since he did not even make a distinction between the Mediterranean and Arabian seas.”

If you’re a journalist or a commentator, there’s no reason be ashamed just because a Washington Post writer reported a story much better than you did. But when you find yourself being outclassed by Yahoo! Answers, perhaps it’s time to rethink your assumptions that you’re much smarter and better informed than Mitt Romney.

President Obama today fired his opening salvo in an unprecedented attack on the Constitution of the United States. Regarding the impending Supreme Court ruling on the health control law, the President said, “Ultimately, I’m confident that the Supreme Court will not take what would be an unprecedented, extraordinary step of overturning a law that was passed by a strong majority of a democratically elected Congress.”

His factual claims are false. His principle is a direct assault on the Constitution’s creation of an independent judicial branch as a check on constitutional violations by the other two branches.

It is certainly not “unprecedented” for the Court to overturn a law passed by “a democratically elected Congress.” The Court has done so 165 times, as of 2010. (See p. 201 of this Congressional Research Service report.)

President Obama can call legislation enacted by a vote of 219 to 212 a “strong” majority if he wishes. But there is nothing in the Constitution suggesting that a bill which garners the votes of 50.3% of the House of Representatives has such a “strong” majority that it therefore becomes exempt from judicial review. To the contrary, almost all of the 165 federal statutes which the Court has ruled unconstitutional had much larger majorities, most of them attracted votes from both Democrats and Republicans, and some of them were enacted nearly unanimously.

That the Supreme Court would declare as unconstitutional congressional “laws” which illegally violated the Constitution was one of the benefits of the Constitution, which the Constitution’s advocates used to help convince the People to ratify the Constitution. In Federalist 78, Alexander Hamilton explained why unconstitutional actions of Congress are not real laws, and why the judiciary has a duty to say so:

There is no position which depends on clearer principles, than that every act of a delegated authority, contrary to the tenor of the commission under which it is exercised, is void. No legislative act, therefore, contrary to the Constitution, can be valid. To deny this, would be to affirm, that the deputy is greater than his principal; that the servant is above his master; that the representatives of the people are superior to the people themselves; that men acting by virtue of powers, may do not only what their powers do not authorize, but what they forbid. . . .

Nor does this conclusion by any means suppose a superiority of the judicial to the legislative power. It only supposes that the power of the people is superior to both; and that where the will of the legislature, declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of the people, declared in the Constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the latter rather than the former. They ought to regulate their decisions by the fundamental laws, rather than by those which are not fundamental.

Because Hamilton was the foremost “big government” advocate of his time, it is especially notable that he was a leading advocate for judicial review of whether any part of the federal government had exceeded its delegated powers.

Well before Marbury v. Madison, the Supreme Court recognized that the People had given the Court the inescapable duty of reviewing the constitutionality of statutes which came before the Court. The Court fulfilled this duty in cases such as Hylton v. U.S. (1796) (Is congressional tax on carriages a direct tax, and therefore illegal because it is not apportioned according to state population?); and Calder v. Bull (1798) (Is Connecticut change in inheritance laws an ex post facto law?). The Court found that the particular statutes in question did not violate the Constitution. (The ex post facto clause applies only to criminal laws; the carriage tax was an indirect tax, not a direct tax.) However, the Court’s authority to judge the statutes’ constitutionality was not disputed.

It would not be unfair to charge President Obama with hypocrisy given his strong complaints when the Court did not strike down the federal ban on partial birth abortions, and given his approval of the Supreme Court decision (Boumediene v. Bush) striking down a congressional statute restricting habeas corpus rights of Guantanamo detainees. (For the record, I think that the federal abortion ban should have been declared void as because it was not within Congress’s interstate commerce power, and that Boumediene was probably decided correctly, although I have not studied the issue sufficiently to have a solid opinion.) The federal ban on abortion, and the federal restriction on habeas corpus were each passed with more than a “strong” 50.3% majority of a democratically elected Congress.

As a politician complaining that a Supreme Court which should strike down laws he doesn’t like, while simultaneously asserting that a judicial decision against a law he does like is improperly “activist,” President Obama is no more hypocritical than many other Presidents. But in asserting that the actions of a “strong” majority of Congress are unreviewable, President Obama’s word are truly unprecedented. Certainly no President in the last 150 years has claimed asserted that a “strong” majority of Congress can exempt a statute from judicial review. President Lincoln’s First Inaugural criticized the Dred Scott majority for using a case between two private litigants for its over-reaching into a major national question, but Lincoln affirmed that the Court can, and should, provide a binding resolution to disputes between the parties before the Court. And in 2012, the government of the United States is one of the parties before the Court. (And the government is before the Court in part because the government filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to ask the Court to use its discretion to decide the case.)

Alone among the Presidents, Thomas Jefferson appears as a strong opponent of judicial review per se. Notably, he did not propose that Congress be the final judge of its own powers, especially when Congress intruded on matters which the Constitution had reserved to the States. Rather, Jefferson argued that in such a dispute the matter should be resolved by a Convention of the States, and the States would be make the final decision. Given that 28 States have already appeared as parties in court arguing that the individual mandate is unconstitutional, we can make a good guess about what a Convention would decide about the constitutionality of the health control law.

President Obama, however, wants Obamacare to be reviewable by no-one: not by the Supreme Court, not by the States.  You can find professors and partisans who have argued for such lawlessness, but for a President to do so is unprecedented.

The People gave Congress the enumerated power “To regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.” According to the Obama administration, this delegation of power also includes the power to compel commerce. Opponents contend that the power to regulate commerce does not include the far greater power to compel commerce, and that the individual mandate is therefore an ultra vires act by a deputy (Congress) in violation of the grant of power from the principal (the People). Seventy-two percent of the public, including a majority of Democrats, agrees that the mandate is unconstitutional. Few acts of Congress have ever had such sustained opposition of a supermajority of the American public.

President Obama today has considerably raised the stakes in Sebelius v. Florida. At issue now is not just the issue of whether Congress can commandeer the People and compel them to purchase the products of a particular oligopoly. At issue is whether the Court will bow to a President who denies they very legitimacy of judicial review of congressional statutes–or at least those that statutes which garnered the “strong” majority of 219 out of 435 Representatives.

The NYT’s Charlie Savage has an interesting report that begins:

For more than two years, a handful of Democrats on the Senate intelligence committee have warned that the government is secretly interpreting its surveillance powers under thePatriot Act in a way that would be alarming if the public — or even others in Congress — knew about it.

On Thursday, two of those senators —Ron Wyden of Oregon and Mark Udall of Colorado — went further. They said a top-secret intelligence operation that is based on that secret legal theory is not as crucial to national security as executive branch officials have maintained.

H.R. 1540, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, has already passed the House, and is currently before the Senate. One section of the bill gives the President the authority to detain indefinitely American citizens, picked up on American soil, because they are allegedly supporting the enemy:

SEC. 1034. AFFIRMATION OF ARMED CONFLICT WITH AL QAEDA, THE TALIBAN, AND ASSOCIATED FORCES.
Congress affirms that—
(1) the United States is engaged in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces and that those entities continue to pose a threat to the United States and its citizens, both domestically and abroad;
(2) the President has the authority to use all necessary and appropriate force during the current armed conflict with al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (Public Law 107–40; 50 U.S.C. 23 1541 note);
(3) the current armed conflict includes nations, organization, and persons who—
(A) are part of, or are substantially supporting, al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners; or
(B) have engaged in hostilities or have directly supported hostilities in aid of a nation, organization, or person described in subparagraph (A); and
(4) the President’s authority pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (Public Law 11 107–40; 50 U.S.C. 1541 note) includes the authority to detain belligerents, including persons described in paragraph (3), until the termination of hostilities.

Yesterday the Senate rejected an amendment by Senator Mark Udall (D-Colo.) that would have stricken the detention provisions, and required the Executive branch to submit a report (within 90 days) on the the legal and practical issues involving detention, and required Congress to hold hearings on the detention within the next 45 days after receipt of the report.

The bill also includes provisions to prevent civilian trials of prisoners currently held at Guantanamo. The Obama administration is threatening to veto the bill, although the objections appear to involve Guantanamo-type issues, and not the expansion of the executive’s detention powers. [Note: The bill version quoted above is the version as passed by the House and sent to the Senate. It is the latest version available on Thomas. The numbering for some sections may be different in earlier versions of the bill.] Kudos to Senator Udall, one of the few genuine civil libertarians in Congress, for taking the lead on this issue.

UPDATE: A commenter points out that, according to Senator Carl Levin, it was the Obama administration which told Congress to remove the language in the original bill which exempted American citizens and lawful residents from the detention power. See the C-Span video of the debate on the floor of the Senate, at 4:43:29. This is not the Obama I caucused for in Feb. 2008.

 Professor Guiora (a colleague of mine at Utah) and I recently debate the appropriateness of Miranda warnings in the context of terrorism investigations.  Here’s a link to the Federalist Society’s podcast of the debate, which revolves around whether or not the “public safety” exception to Miranda  should apply in the context of questioning suspected terrorists.  I argue that, under current doctrine, the exception easily applies; Professor Guiora argues that using the exception would put us on a slippery slope, sliding toward the destruction of civil liberties.

Today at 12:15 at the University of Utah College of Law I will be debating my colleague Amos Guiora about whether Miranda rights should be extended to terrorists.  I have previously blogged here and here about my view that Miranda’s “public safety” exception means that law enforcement officers investigating terrorist incidents need not give Miranda warnings.  I thought I’d briely lay out my argument a bit more fully now in anticipation of the debate.

The case of Umar Farouk Abdulmautallab (the so-called “Christmas Day Bomber”) usefully frames the issue.  According to public reports, Abdulmutallab spoke openly to FBI agents in his initial 50-minute interrogation — questioning that took place before he was Mirandized.  He then received treatment for his burns. And five hours after his initial interrogation a second team of interrogators was brought in to question him. These interrogators were part of a “clean team,” brought in to interrogate him after he was read his Miranda rights. The “clean team” began by reading Abdulmutallab his rights. And Abdulmutallab, advised of his right to remain silent, chose to exercise it.

The policy question here is why would anyone want to give Abdulmautallab Miranda warnings?  As Stewart Taylor forcefully wrote here:  

But no reasonable person could doubt that starting out with “you have the right to remain silent” is not the way to save lives.  Yet this is essentially the policy into which the Obama administration has locked itself by insisting that it did the right thing when it read Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the would-be Christmas Day bomber, his Miranda rights after only 50 minutes of questioning and a hospital visit.

The only reason that I can see for giving Miranda warning in such a situation is that the is a constitutional requirement to do so.  But Miranda has been interpreted (in New York v. Quarles) as containing a “public safety” exception, allowing police officers to jettison the Miranda procedures in situations where the question is motivated by preventing further danger to the public.  In that case, for example, police officers were allowed to question suspect Quarles aboutt the location of gun he had apparently discarded in a supermarket. 

The exact parameters of the public safety exception are unclear.  But if any circumstance would appear to involve overriding public safety concerns, it would be a circumstance involving a terrorist investigation.  Indeed, the Second Circuit has allowed un-Mirandized question of terrorist suspects about how bombers were made and how to disarm bombs that were uncovered.  U.S. v. Khalil, 214 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2000).  Questioning of suspects like Abdulmutallab would seem to comfortably fit within the exception.

Because there appears to be some legal uncertainty about whether the public safety exception covers terrorist investigations, it would be useful for Congress to weigh in on the subject and clearly express its view.  Here’s one way a statute covering terrorist investigations could be drafted:

¨“When a law enforcement officer questions any suspect arrested for terrorist offenses found in chapter 113B of Title 18, or comparable offenses under state law, a situation involving the public safety shall automatically be deemed to exist and the officer need not provide any advice of rights to the suspect.  Any voluntary statements made by the suspect shall be admissible in any prosecution thereafter brought by the United States or by the District of Columbia.”

I will be interested to see what Professor Guiora and others think of my proposed statute.

Update:  Rick Pildes from NYU has alerted me to his excellent post, found here on Balkinization, also arguing for a codification of the Miranda public safety exception in terrorist situations.  Here an excerpt from his argument:

Congress [should] . . .  enact legislation to define the contours and boundaries of the public-safety exception to Miranda in terrorism cases. The public-safety exception already exists: the question is how it ought to apply in contexts, such as terrorism investigations, in which there is uncertainty because the courts have not yet had to define the scope of the exception. Congress could define the circumstances in which law enforcement can engage in non-coercive questioning of terrorist suspects, without Miranda warnings, for purposes of gathering general intelligence information, purpose (2) above, while still being able to use any statements against that suspect at trial. Informed by counterterrorism experts, Congress could specify the time period in which such questioning is necessary and permissible (hours? a day? several days?). Congress could consider authorizing a brief period of initial, non-Miranda interrogation, but then require law enforcement to get judicial authorization for any further period of such questioning. In other ways, Congress and the President could codify what these two institutions jointly believe is the appropriate and necessary contours of an intelligence focused, non-Miranda period of questioning.

Further update:  I’m embarrassed that I didn’t cite co-blogger Orin Kerr’s analysis of this same issue, which can be found here.

Via FuturePundit, who observes that this is really much more broadly about lie detection than counterterrorism as such, note this press release from Northwestern University:

For the first time, the Northwestern researchers used the P300 testing in a mock terrorism scenario in which the subjects are planning, rather than perpetrating, a crime. The P300 brain waves were measured by electrodes attached to the scalp of the make-believe “persons of interest” in the lab.

The most intriguing part of the study in terms of real-word implications, Rosenfeld said, is that even when the researchers had no advance details about mock terrorism plans, the technology was still accurate in identifying critical concealed information.

“Without any prior knowledge of the planned crime in our mock terrorism scenarios, we were able to identify 10 out of 12 terrorists and, among them, 20 out of 30 crime- related details,” Rosenfeld said. “The test was 83 percent accurate in predicting concealed knowledge, suggesting that our complex protocol could identify future terrorist activity.”

Rosenfeld is a leading scholar in the study of P300 testing to reveal concealed information. Basically, electrodes are attached to the scalp to record P300 brain activity — or brief electrical patterns in the cortex — that occur, according to the research, when meaningful information is presented to a person with “guilty knowledge.”

Research on the P300 testing emerged in the 1980s as a handful of scientists looked for an alternative to polygraph tests for lie detection. Since it was invented in the 1920s, polygraphy has been under fire, especially by academics, with critics insisting that such testing measures emotion rather than knowledge.

University press releases about new research tend to promise more than the research subsequently delivers, of course. Check back in a few years and we’ll see if this turned into an actual technology; if so, there will be a number of legal questions involved.  I don’t have any expertise or background knowledge in this particular technology, and would be interested in comments from people who know something about it.

Many of my posts have criticized privacy groups and their doctrines.  How come, some of you have asked?  Aren’t privacy advocates the Ewoks of the policy world — cute and cuddly and easy to like even when they’re on the other side?  After all, most of us share their overall goal.  We would all like more privacy.  We’re all a little uncomfortable with the new places that information technology is taking us.  What harm is there in measures to preserve a bit of the old, comfortable sense of privacy we had before the days of cheap data?

My problem is that I used to believe that too.  I even supported a wall between intelligence gathering and law enforcement because it seemed like a nice, rather harmless way to protect criminal defendants and perhaps the rest of us from the intrusive capabilities of the intelligence community.

As it turned out, though, the wall was anything but harmless in practice.  In fact, we’ve never counted how much harm it caused the US in August 2001, as we stumbled in the dark, trying to piece together the September 11 plot before disaster struck.  

Much of my work in government has been devoted to undoing the harm the wall caused.  But until I started researching it for my book, I had no idea how much it had contributed to 9/11.  In particular, I had not realized that the wall in its later stages was a creature of a special intelligence court, known as the FISA court, that was itself a civil liberties innovation of the Carter years.  I was astonished to discover how aggressively the FISA court had enforced the wall, and how that aggressive stance had distrorted the priorities of counterterrorism investigators.

The 9/11 Commission didn’t highlight this issue.  Perhaps in part it was political correctness; some of the commissioners were determined to show their “courage” by refusing to criticize civil liberties excesses.  A more immediate cause was Attorney General Ashcroft’s accusation that former Deputy Attorney General Jamie Gorelick had been a principal architect of the wall.  The accusation was in fact a bit unfair, my research showed; it also seems to have provoked the 9/11 Commission to unite behind Jamie Gorelick and to focus much of its research on proving that she wasn’t responsible for the wall.  That’s too bad, because the fight over Jamie Gorelick was a sideshow that obscured the real story of the wall.  

I have tried to tell what I see as the story of the wall in the book, using interviews and official sources (including some late-declassified 9/11 commission work).  I slipped from memoir to reportage because the wall played such a role in my government service — and because the story of the wall shows why I finally concluded that we can’t treat privacy and civil liberties doctrines as harmless good-government proposals.  In fact, those proposals have the potential to get a lot of Americans killed.  In the weeks before 9/11, it was these two civil liberties innovations that did the most to cripple our effort to catch the hijackers before the attack.  

So, the story of the wall is in a sense the heart of the book, and of my career in government.  The relevant chapter has been released on www.skatingonstilts.com, and I’ve excerpted a bit of the story below.

The FISA Court Stages a Coup

The issue came to a head in 1998. Al Qaeda’s bombing of two U.S. embassies in East Africa had put the Southern District’s latest criminal investigation of the group into overdrive. But it also put the wall front and center. As with other al Qaeda cases, the criminal investigation was practically inseparable from the ongoing intelligence monitoring.

So what rules would govern this investigation? The intelligence review office did not want to return to New York for another chest-bumping showdown over the wall. The prosecutors were winning. If the guidelines had to be reworked for the East Africa cases, the intelligence review office would go into battle with half the department arrayed against it.

Staring defeat in the face, the intelligence review office finally played its trump card—the FISA court.

Judge Lamberth remembers Kornblum suggesting that the guidelines be turned into FISA court orders. “He felt, and we agreed, that if you have rules, you should follow them,” says the judge.

The idea had understandable appeal from a civil liberties viewpoint, too. Unlike the attorney general, who was, after all, a prosecutor at heart, the court would be an honest broker. It could give the rights of defendants their due weight, without a conflict of interest and without yielding to the importunings of the prosecutors.

And so it was done. The FISA court simply annexed the attorney general’s guidelines, making the wall a matter of court order.

It was as simple as that; a quiet coup on the top floor of the Justice Department. From now on, the court would decide what was needed to prevent misuse of FISA taps, and the rules it settled on would simply be imposed as a condition on any antiterrorism wiretaps approved by the court.

For the prosecutors it was check and mate.

Continue reading ‘The Wall and the Least Dangerous Branch’ »

As Professor Philip Alston’s report as special rapporteur to the UN Human Rights Council on targeted killings, drones, CIA and military, and related issues is released today, I’ve been asked by numerous people to comment on it.  I’ve read it once, but need to finish re-reading it before I’m ready to say anything that goes to the inside of the report.  However, in preparation for the report’s release, I have posted to SSRN my testimony in the second round of House subcommittee hearings, “Drones II,” held on April 28, 2010 – an annotated version with various explanatory footnotes added.  The best way to read this testimony is alongside the other written witness submissions, as taken together they offer a good compendium of the extant expert views in the US on how to see drones and the CIA – and the CIA and its use of force is, at the end of the day, the biggest issue here.  Drone technology is best understood as a stalking horse for the question of the CIA’s use of force.  I have a rambling blog post at Opinio Juris on the background to this; it is somewhat inside international law professor baseball, however – also, the links and tags point to a long,  long series of back and forth posts at that international law blog site that fill in much background to the issue.  SSRN abstract below the fold.

Continue reading ‘My House Testimony in “Drones II”’ »