The Volokh Conspiracy

Law professor Glenn Reynolds (AKA Instapundit) has an interesting column in USA Today advocating that we increase penalties for politicians who do a poor job in office:

As scandals explode across Washington... one thing that I’ve noticed is that the people involved don’t seem to suffer much....

Government officials are happy making and executing plans that affect the lives of millions, but when things go wrong, well ... they’re willing to accept the responsibility, but they’re not willing to take the blame. What’s the difference? People who are to blame lose their jobs. People who are “responsible,” do not...

Given the low penalties for failure it faces, our political class is one for whom falling down is usually painless and even — given the surprisingly common tendency of people who have presided over debacles to be given promotions rather than the boot — actually pleasurable....

The problem is that they don’t have, in President Obama’s words, “skin in the game.” When it comes to actual wrongdoing, they’re shielded by doctrines of “absolute immunity” (for the president) and “qualified immunity” (for lesser officials). This means that the president can’t be sued for anything he does as president, while lower-ranking officials can’t be sued so long as they can show that they were acting in a “good faith” belief that they were following the law.

Such defenses aren’t available to the rest of us. And they’re not even the product of legislation passed by Congress after considered judgment — they’re judicially created....

Reynolds proposes that we eliminate judicially created immunity doctrines and impose tougher penalties on failed political leaders:

I’d favor some changes that put accountability back in. First, I’d get rid of judicially created immunities....

I’d also cut all payments to members of Congress whenever they haven’t passed a budget. If they can’t take care of that basic responsibility, why should they get paid? Likewise, I’d ban presidential travel when there’s not a budget. He can do his job from the White House.

I’m willing to consider other changes: Term limits that kick in whenever there’s a deficit for more than two years in a row. Limitations on civil-service protections to allow wronged citizens to get offending bureaucrats fired. Pay cuts for elected officials whenever inflation or unemployment are above a threshold.

I’m sympathetic to the idea of eliminating or at least cutting back judicially created immunities, and some of Reynolds’ other ideas are also worth considering. Others, however, might have unintended negative side effects. For example, if members of Congress don’t get paid unless they pass a budget, that might give them an incentive to pass any budget, even a terrible one that creates even more fiscal problems than presently exist.

More fundamentally, however, the big problem is not that we don’t have penalties for underperforming politicians, but that often the voters don’t enforce them. If a politician is widely considered a failure, he is likely to be voted out of office, thereby losing the power and prestige that goes with it. Think of Jimmy Carter in 1980 or the Republican Congress in 2006. That’s very significant punishment, because politicians tend to be people who care a great deal about getting into power and keeping it. Some of them also care about their historical reputations, and therefore don’t want to be remembered as the next Herbert Hoover or Neville Chamberlain.

For these reasons, the political system actually does a fairly good job of punishing policy errors that are large, obvious, and easily traceable to a specific politician or party. The problem is that most political failures are more subtle than that. Most of the time, the failure itself isn’t obvious, it takes some knowledge to figure out who is responsible, or some combination of both. In these more typical cases, voters often do a poor job of assessing politicians’ performance, in large part because of widespread political ignorance. They reward and punish incumbents for events they didn’t cause, while often ignoring or undervaluing those incumbents do have an effect on.

It’s also interesting to ask why the public hasn’t revolted against the judicially-created immunity doctrines that Reynolds criticizes and forced Congress to pass statutes overriding them and the president to appoint judges who might overrule the relevant precedents. I haven’t seen polling data on the subject. But I suspect that most voters have no idea these doctrines exist in the first place. Among the minority who do know about these issues, there are many biased partisans who are happy to prosecute misbehaving incumbents when the opposing party is in power, but reflexively conclude that it’s all an unfair witch hunt when it’s their own. More knowledgeable voters are also the ones most likely to be highly biased “political fans.”

Ultimately, the poor incentives of politicians are a reflection of the poor incentives of the voters who elect them. Most of the time, it is rational for voters to be ignorant about political issues, and also to be highly biased in their assessment of the information they do know. If we want to improve decision-making, we should consider deciding fewer issues at the ballot box and more by “voting with our feet,” where informational incentives tend to be better.

UPDATE: To avoid confusion, I should note that I am not endorsing here the comprehensive abolition of all judicially created immunities for government officials. I think many of them should be eliminated, but I am not convinced that is true of all.

The Supreme Court of Missouri recently issued Missouri Ex. Rel. Jackson v. Dolan, an important decision interpreting the state’s post-Kelo eminent domain reform law, which bans the use of eminent domain to condemn property for “solely economic development purposes.” As Robert Thomas points out at the Inverse Condemnation Blog, the ruling gives the statute more bite in constraining eminent domain than most experts (myself included) expected it to have.

In the aftermath of the federal Supreme Court’s unpopular decision in Kelo v. City of New London, which ruled that the federal constitution permits economic development takings, 44 states adopted eminent domain reform laws that supposedly restricted such condemnations. Unfortunately, many of the new laws do little to actually constrain the use of eminent domain authority, often allowing the same old takings to continue under other names. Most commentators believed that the Missouri law was one such ineffectual reform, because, as Thomas explains, “it would seem that all a condemnor need do is throw in another reason — in addition to economic development — and it would be off the hook.” As he points out, courts in other states that ban takings “solely” or “primarily” for economic development have accepted such circumvention. In Jackson, however, the Missouri Supreme Court struck down a condemnation that, in addition to promoting economic development, would also supposedly enhance port facilities and “improve” river commerce. The Court ruled that these alternative rationales were not genuinely different from economic development because “”[t]he record demonstrates that the only manner in which the taking will ‘improve river commerce’ is by drawing more economic development into the area” and that any enhancement of port facilities would be of value only because it too promotes development.

Thomas is right that this ruling could potentially constrain economic development takings in Missouri, since it looks like condemning authorities will only be able to take property if they come up with a rationale more distinct from promoting development than the Port Authority in this case. However, The Court did emphasize that the statute “only prohibits a taking if the sole purpose for the taking is economic development and no other purpose supports the taking.” Thus, even a fairly modest indication of some other purpose might be enough to justify a condemnation. For example, the Court noted that the taking would have been upheld if it “improved” river commerce by “making such commerce easier to conduct.” It is possible, therefore, that Missouri condemning authorities can still justify economic development takings by linking them to other non-”development” rationales. They might even be able to claim that statute advances those other purposes by promoting economic development itself (for example, increased economic development might lead to reduced crime or improved infrastructure). Future state court cases will likely determine how hard this will be. Regardless, this decision definitely makes condemnors’ task harder. As the state supreme court puts it, “[t]hough [the post-Kelo reform law] may make a taking more difficult to effectuate, that difficulty is the intended result of the statute, the primary purpose of which was to limit the opportunities for which a condemning authority may use the power of eminent domain.”

UPDATE: I have slightly expanded the last paragraph of this post.

In his speech on drones and the War on Terror today President Obama made many valid points. But he also continued to elide some key issues. On the plus side, Obama correctly emphasized that the use of drones against terrorists is not inherently illegal nor immoral, that drones are often more discriminating and less likely to inflict civilian casualties than other military tactics, and that US citizens can be legitimate targets when they become enemy combatants.

Unfortunately, Obama also continued to dance around the more problematic aspects of his drone policy: who decides whether a particular individual being considered as a potential target is really a member of Al Qaeda and how much evidence is needed to back up such a determination? I emphasized these issues in my recent Senate Judiciary Subcommittee testimony on drones and here. Here are the most relevant parts of Obama’s speech on these questions:

In the Afghan war theater, we must — and will — continue to support our troops until the transition is complete at the end of 2014. And that means we will continue to take strikes against high value al Qaeda targets, but also against forces that are massing to support attacks on coalition forces. But by the end of 2014, we will no longer have the same need for force protection, and the progress we’ve made against core al Qaeda will reduce the need for unmanned strikes.

Beyond the Afghan theater, we only target al Qaeda and its associated forces. And even then, the use of drones is heavily constrained. America does not take strikes when we have the ability to capture individual terrorists; our preference is always to detain, interrogate, and prosecute. America cannot take strikes wherever we choose; our actions are bound by consultations with partners, and respect for state sovereignty.

America does not take strikes to punish individuals; we act against terrorists who pose a continuing and imminent threat to the American people, and when there are no other governments capable of effectively addressing the threat. And before any strike is taken, there must be near-certainty that no civilians will be killed or injured — the highest standard we can set.

All of the above strikes me as entirely defensible so far as it goes. But it leaves unanswered the crucial question of how we determine that a given individual really is a member of “al Qaeda and its associated forces.” It also ignores the issue of how we decide which groups qualify as associated forces of al Qaeda – another difficult definitional issue that I noted in my testimony. The 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force that constitutes the legal basis for the War on Terror only authorizes military action against “those nations, organizations, or persons [the president] determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons.” North Africa and the Middle East are full of Islamist groups whose ideology is in at least some ways similar to that of al Qaeda and who support its goals to at least some degree. We are not and should not be at war with all of them. At the same time, the president is surely right that our military efforts cannot be limited to the narrowest possible definition of al Qaeda.

For reasons outlined by the president and co-blogger Ken Anderson, among others, I think it would be a serious mistake to abjure the use of drone strikes entirely. At the same time, we cannot allow boundless executive discretion in this area either. There must be tighter and clearer legal limits on presidential power in this field.

As President Obama himself puts it, there should be “strong oversight of all lethal action.” But it is not yet clear exactly what kinds of measures Obama has in mind or would accept. In a later part of the speech, Obama lists several possibilities, but does not actually endorse any of them:

Going forward, I’ve asked my administration to review proposals to extend oversight of lethal actions outside of warzones that go beyond our reporting to Congress. Each option has virtues in theory, but poses difficulties in practice. For example, the establishment of a special court to evaluate and authorize lethal action has the benefit of bringing a third branch of government into the process, but raises serious constitutional issues about presidential and judicial authority. Another idea that’s been suggested — the establishment of an independent oversight board in the executive branch — avoids those problems, but may introduce a layer of bureaucracy into national security decision-making, without inspiring additional public confidence in the process. But despite these challenges, I look forward to actively engaging Congress to explore these and other options for increased oversight.

It is certainly true that no oversight system is going to be perfect. But unconstrained executive discretion also poses severe problems. In the long run, moreover, such unconstrained power is likely to undermine the legitimacy of the use of drones altogether, just as the Bush administration’s advocacy of unlimited executive power undermined confidence in its detention and interrogation policies.

Today between 4:30 and 5 PM, I will be participating in a Huffington Post Live discussion on the use of political profiling by the IRS. You can watch it live here. I will also be drawing connections between this issue and the question of racial profiling, a parallel I discussed in this post.

UPDATE: You can now watch the video of the HuffPost discussion here.

Slate columnist Farhad Manjoo has an interesting article arguing that conservatives are right to complain about the IRS’ use of political profiling, but argues that they should use the same reasoning to rethink their support for racial profiling in law enforcement. As he points out the IRS justification for political profiling is very similar to standard arguments for racial profiling in combatting terrorism and crime:

Pretend you work at the Internal Revenue Service... Every day, a big stack of files lands on your desk.... Each file represents a new application for a certain tax status—501(c)(4), a tax-exempt designation meant for “social welfare” organizations. Nonprofits with this status aren’t required to disclose the identity of their donors and they’re allowed to lobby legislative officials. The catch is that they must limit their political campaign activity....

It’s your job to decide which 501(c)(4) applications represent legitimate social-welfare organizations, and which ones are from groups trying to hide their campaign activities. What’s more, you’ve got to sort the good from the bad very quickly, as you’re being inundated with applications....

So what do you do? You look for a shortcut. Someone at your office notices that a lot of the applications for 501(c)(4) status are from groups that claim to be part of the burgeoning Tea Party movement. Aha! When you’re looking for signs of political activity, wouldn’t it make sense to search for criteria related to the largest new political movement of our times? So that’s what you do...

[T]here’s a name for the kind of shortcut that the IRS’s Cincinnati office used to pick out applications for greater scrutiny: “profiling.” By using superficial characteristics—groups’ names or mission statements—to determine whether they should be subject to deeper investigation, the IRS was acting like the TSA agent who pulls aside the guy in the turban, or the FBI agents that target mosques when investigating terrorism, or New York City cops who stop and frisk young black males in an effort to prevent crime....

All these efforts rely on the same intellectual justification—looking at surface characteristics makes sense because they’re a potential signal of deeper activity, whether it’s terrorism or crime or electioneering. As a right-wing blogger might say, “Not all Muslims are terrorists—but most terrorists are Muslims....”

That’s exactly what the IRS was doing with Tea Party groups. Not all Tea Party groups applying for 501(c)(4) status were engaged in campaign politics. But out of all the many groups that applied for such status, wouldn’t any reasonable person guess that a group called “Tea Party Patriots” is more likely to be engaged in campaign activity than, say, a group focused on rescuing abandoned puppies?

The deep irony of the IRS scandal is that people on the political right are being subjected to exactly the kind of profiling that they’ve long advocated in fighting terrorism and crime—and they don’t seem to appreciate it. I’m on their side: This case perfectly illustrates why profiling is wrong...

I made a similar point several years ago when I explained the parallels between the conservative defense of racial profiling and left-wing rationales for affirmative action (see here and here). Overall, I think Manjoo is right. And if he has not already done so, he should extent his skepticism about the use of profiling to cover the affirmative action case.

But I do have two caveats about his argument. First, I am not convinced that the IRS was merely engaged in neutral profiling intended to increase the chance of ferreting out political groups. It is true that “a group called ‘Tea Party Patriots’ is more likely to be engaged in campaign activity than, say, a group focused on rescuing abandoned puppies.” But the same is true of a group called “Occupy Wall Street” or one with some other name using a standard left-wing catch-phrase. Yet there is no evidence that the IRS targeted groups with liberal code words in their names in the same way it targeted conservative ones. That suggests political bias, not just a simple effort to economize on search costs. Obviously, however, racial profiling in law enforcement often flunks the neutrality test as well.

Second, I would not go as far as Manjoo in abjuring all forms of profiling. There is a difference between profiling based on characteristics that impinge on important constitutional rights such as freedom of speech and freedom from racial discrimination by government and profiling policies that rely on less problematic proxies. The latter may also be unjust or ineffective. But they are not as objectionable as profiling based on race or ideology.

That said, I hope that the IRS scandal will indeed persuade conservatives who support racial profiling to reconsider the issue. I also hope that more liberals will apply their critique of racial profiling to affirmative action.

Last week, economist Bryan Caplan wrote an interesting post explaining why people’s virtue or lack thereof is often most evident in their unpopular views:

Consider a world where 80% of people are Conformists, 10% of people are Righteous, and 10% are Reprobates. The Conformists are epistemically and morally neutral, so they believe and support whatever is popular. The Righteous are epistemically and morally virtuous, so they believe and support whatever is true and right. The Reprobates are epistemically and morally vicious, so they believe and support the opposite of what the Righteous believe and support....

What happens? There are clearly two equilibria: one good, one bad. If the true&right is popular, then the Conformists and the Righteous have 90% of the vote, so the true&right prevails. If the true&right is unpopular, then the Conformists and Reprobates have 90% of the vote, so the false&wicked prevails.

Now suppose that in this world, you are trying to assess an individual’s virtue. In the good equilibrium, identifying the virtuous is hard. Only 1 out of 9 supporters of the status quo is genuinely virtuous. The vast majority support the true&right out of sheer convenience. Identifying the vicious, however, is easy. In the good equilibrium, all supporters of the false&wicked are vicious.

The mirror image holds in the bad equilibrium. Identifying the virtuous is easy: Everyone who supports the true&right despite their unpopularity is virtuous. Identifying the vicious, in contrast, becomes hard...

On the plausible assumption that most real-world people are basically conformists, you can’t accurately assess virtue by studying people’s views in isolation. You have to look at their unpopular views. Believing true&right things despite their unpopularity is a sign of genuine virtue. Believing false&wrong things despite their unpopularity is a sign of genuine vice.

There is a lot of truth to Bryan’s argument. For example, modern Americans deserve little credit for being opposed to slavery, because almost everyone holds that view today. By contrast, William Lloyd Garrison deserves great credit for being an antislavery activist back when it was extremely unpopular in the 1830s. I would, however, extend Bryan’s argument to separate out moral and epistemic virtue. Some people might be genuine truth-seekers willing to court unpopularity, but simply do a poor job of evaluating the truth or falsehood of particular views. Others might be very good at evaluation, but choose not to use those skills because they care more about social acceptance than truth. One could argue that the well-intentioned but epistemically incompetent person deserves greater moral credit than the one who combines the opposite set of traits.

For readers who want to evaluate me using Bryan’s test, here are some of the most unpopular views I have ever expressed here at the VC, based on their divergence from those of the average voter:

1. Organ markets should be legalized.

2. Most (though not all) public sex and public nudity should be legalized.

3. Knowledgeable children should be allowed to vote.

4. The entire War on Drugs (not just the ban on marijuana and a few other relatively popular drugs) should be abolished.

5. It is unjust to decide immigration policy without giving the rights and interests of would-be immigrants at least close to the same weight as those of current residents of the United States.

Somewhat less unpopular, but still strongly counter to conventional wisdom:

6. No one has any special moral obligations to other people of the same race or ethnicity, including members of historically persecuted minority groups, (e.g. – Jews have no special moral obligations to other Jews, blacks have no special obligations to other blacks, etc.). It is possible that this position is more popular than I think it is. I haven’t seen any systematic survey data on it, and am mostly judging based on personal experience, combined with the ubiquity of rhetoric claiming that we have obligations to “our people” and the like.

7. Nationalism is a great evil, usually causing more harm than good even in its relatively more moderate forms. The conventional wisdom, I think, is that nationalism is a generally good or at least neutral phenomenon that becomes problematic only if taken to extremes.

There are important commonalities between 1, 2, and 4 on my list, and also between 5, 6, and 7. The former stem in part from my rejection of moral arguments that draw on the “yuck factor,” at least in so far as they are used to justify making anything illegal. The latter are partly a reflection of my unusually strong skepticism about moral claims based on ties of race, ethnicity, culture, or sovereignty.

Several of the above positions are less uncommon in academia than among the general public. But most do not enjoy majority support even among academics. There are, of course, many other issues where I go against the views of the majority of academics (who are, on average, much more left-wing than I am). But most of them are cases where my view has much greater support from general public opinion than the above.

UPDATE: I have made a few stylistic changes to this post.

This Vancouver Sun article reports that dogs are much more effective at sniffing out meat than drugs [HT: Steve Bainbridge]:

Federal search dogs at international border entry points have a penchant for sniffing out one thing more than anything else: meat.

In fact, dogs trained to find animal products turn up meat around 20 times more frequently than drug-sniffing dogs find narcotics, according to government documents obtained by Postmedia News under access-to-information legislation.

The release of the data comes as federal officials question the necessity and effectiveness of the dogs, with the Canada Border Services Agency dismantling some of its search-dog teams over the past year – a move the federal union believes will erode the ability to quickly search incoming cargo and seize drugs and firearms.

The article gives lots of explanations for this entirely unsurprising finding. But it ignores the obvious points that dogs like meat a lot more than drugs. Meat is edible while drugs (usually) are not. Thus, your average canine has evolved to be a much better meat detector than drug detector. In addition, as I discussed in this post, drug-sniffing dogs often err because their main objective is to please their human handlers rather than find the drugs as such; as a result they tend to signal “false positives” if they sense that that’s what the handler wants. By contrast, meat-sniffing dogs have reasons of their own for finding meat. The point is so glaringly obvious that this could be considered a dog-bites-man story – except that it is actually much more common for dogs to bite pieces of meat than humans.

Unfortunately, there is a more serious side to the story. Despite the fact that drug-sniffing dogs have a high error rate, government policy – and even Supreme Court decisions - are often based on the assumption that they are far more accurate than the evidence shows.

In his first Inaugural Address, President Obama famously said that we should not ask “whether our government is too big or too small, but whether it works.” I criticized this indifference to the size of government in one of my very first posts of the Obama Presidency. More recently, however, longtime Obama adviser David Axelrod recognized that the size of government does matter after all:

As the nation’s chief executive, President Obama is accountable for the IRS, State Department and Justice Department. His longtime adviser David Axelrod last week blamed a too-big government for the scandals: “Part of being president is that there’s so much beneath you that you can’t know because the government is so vast.” [HT: Don Boudreaux]

In my 2009 post on Obama’s Inaugural Address and in a forthcoming book, I explained that one of the dangers of big government is that rationally ignorant voters are unable to effectively monitor its activities. A closely related problem is that the modern federal government is also too large for the president to effectively monitor – even with the help of topnotch advisers like Axelrod.

Axelrod’s defense of Obama is actually very plausible. It is quite possible that Obama didn’t know about the IRS’ abusive targeting of conservative groups, and that if he had known he would have ordered them to stop – if only to forestall a scandal that might become a dangerous political liability. Yet Obama probably didn’t know because, as Axelrod puts it, “the government is so vast” that he could not possibly keep track of what it was doing.

In fairness to Obama, much of the government growth that makes his job so difficult occurred on his predecessor’s watch. The current administration is far from solely responsible for the overgrown size of modern government. But the president would be entitled to greater sympathy if he hadn’t spent much of the last four years expanding the size of government even further, and claiming that we shouldn’t worry about its growth.

UPDATE: This recent Washington Post story reports that senior White House officials admit they knew about the IRS abuses in April but claim they did not tell Obama. Even if we decide not to believe their denials on the latter point and conclude that Obama found out at the same time as they did, that still means he was unaware of the problem for over three years, since the targeting of Tea Party groups apparently began in March 2010.

Patrick Allen Foster of the Pub Editor blog has an interesting round-up of commentary generated by Matthew Yglesias’ recent Slate article on Star Trek, including my own post on the subject.

My wife and I recently watched Star Trek: Into Darkness, the second in the series of J.J. Abrams-directed”reboot” Star Trek movies that began in 2009. On the plus side, the film had some impressive action scenes and special effects. It also had more and somewhat better character development than its predecessor. Long-time fans of the series might like the many clever nods to the original series from the 1960s. At the very least, the movie was fun to watch, and I think we got our money’s worth.

Nonetheless, the negatives outweigh the positives. Unsurprisingly, Into Darkness has most of the same flaws as the previous Abrams Star Trek movie, which I criticized here. Both films essential turn Star Trek into an action movie that just happens to utilize Trek characters and settings. I am far from an uncritical admirer of Star Trek as envisioned by Gene Roddenberry and his successors. Nor was I ever the kind of fanatical Trekkie who goes to conventions wearing Vulcan ears or signs up for classes at the Klingon Language Institute. But, despite its many flaws, I admired the Star Trek franchise’s willingness to take on big questions about the kind of future we should want for humanity. Abrams’ “reboot” essentially ignores all serious issues, and just ramps up the action. I don’t deny that a “reboot” may have been needed, given the poor quality of the last several old-line Star Trek movies; but not a reboot that jettisons almost everything that made Star Trek interesting and unique.

In addition, Into Darkness has huge plot holes big enough to fly a whole fleet of Romulan warbirds through. In the interest of avoiding spoilers, I won’t go through them in detail. I will only note that, for the Federation to get into the predicament that is the main focus of the plot, Star Fleet’s leadership would have to be ridiculously stupid. To take just one of many examples, it seems that Star Fleet Headquarters and Earth generally have no fixed defenses of any kind against incoming warships and missiles, even though previous history clearly established that such defenses are both feasible given the level of their technology, and clearly necessary, given previous enemy attacks. Yet none of the characters even mention this and other comparably ridiculous mistakes, not even the supposedly hyper-logical Mr. Spock (who makes some whopping errors of his own in the movie, which are also ignored by the other characters).

Perhaps the real implicit message of the reboot movies is to endorse the views of social critics who worry that advancing technology has bred a “generation of nincompoops.” Maybe the producers expect the nincompoopery to get even worse in the future, infecting Vulcans and Klingons as well as humans. Indeed, if the Klingons, Romulans, and other rivals of the Federation were minimally competent, it’s hard to understand how the Star Fleet portrayed in the reboot movies could possibly have become a major power in the galaxy. Maybe the “darkness” into which the Federation has descended is a severe outbreak of extreme stupidity among Star Fleet’s best and brightest. Although I strongly disagree with this kind of technopessimism, a science fiction series that seriously explored the idea that high technology leads to a “dumbed down” society might be interesting. Unfortunately, Abrams’ movies seem to raise the issue only unintentionally.

UPDATE: Mike Rappaport responds to this post here:

I agree with Ilya that the new movie fails to address the serious questions, but I think that was largely true of all of the Star Trek movies – especially the good ones. It was the series – and especially some of the individual episodes – that really addressed these matters. And, of course, it is a lot easier to do that in a series....

[T]he new movie and the rebooted movie series were able to accomplish something that the old movies never achieved: the first two consecutive movies were both good. The old series of movies, peculiarly but consistently, generated one good movie only to be followed by a bad movie. That was frustrating. Star Trek: Into Darkness was able to avoid this affliction.

I agree that serious issues are easier to address in a TV series than in a movie. But I think Mike is too soft on the Abrams movies (neither of which were actually good, given the stupidity of their plots, and the weak characterization in the first one), and too hard on some of the earlier Star Trek movies. The first two earlier movies were both good and took on serious issues. The first movie addressed the nature of sentience, while the second took on the ethics of genetic engineering and revenge. And both had at least minimally intelligent plots, which is more than can be said for either Abrams production.

Next Monday at 7 AM eastern time (probably rebroadcasting at that time in other time zones), I will be on Stand Up! with Pete Dominick on Sirius XM Satellite Radio, discussing my forthcoming book Democracy and Political Ignorance: Why Smaller Government is Smarter, which will be published by Stanford University Press in early fall (probably September or early October).

Stanford UP has created a website for the book. You can, if you like, preorder the book there. We even have a special coupon code just for Volokh Conspiracy readers that will give you a 20% discount at the Stanford site; the code is S13LAW. OK, actually the code is available to anyone who wants to use it. But at least VC readers will now be the first to find out about it! You can also preorder the book at Amazon, while still being eligible for any price reductions that either Amazon or Stanford UP adopt between now and the publication date.

Sirius Satellite Radio has posted the audio of my recentdiscussion of the Supreme Court with George State University Professor Eric Segall on Stand Up! With Pete Dominick. The audio is available here.

Much of the discussion focuses on general issues of constitutional theory and the extent to which the Supreme Court is or is not politicized, which I recently wrote about in this article. But towards the end, we also talked about the gay marriage cases currently before the Court, including my view that laws banning same-sex marriage are examples of unconstitutional sex discrimination.

After years of resistance, I have finally joined Twitter. Perhaps, as the Borg would say, resistance is futile and assimilation into Twitter is inevitable. For readers who may be interested, my Twitter username is IlyaSomin.

Despite this capitulation, I will not be completely assimilated into the Twitterverse. Given my rational ignorance about pop culture other than sports and science fiction, I won’t be tweeting any celebrity-related gossip. Not even if I somehow turn into the Twitter equivalent of Locutus. Instead, I will most likely be using the account to tweet about my activities elsewhere, such as recent or forthcoming books, articles, speaking appearances, and the like.

At Slate, Matthew Yglesias has an interesting article reviewing all of the Star Trek and many of the movies from the original 1960s series to the present. He especially focuses on the series’ ideology and politics, and its “utopian” vision of the future.

Despite coming at the issue from a very different perspective, I actually agree with much of Yglesias’ analysis. I think he is right that Deep Space Nine had many of Star Trek’s best episodes, that Voyager was the worst of the TV shows, and that the 2009 “reboot” movie (which I criticized here) takes the series in the wrong direction. Most fundamentally, I think we agree that Star Trek is interesting because it takes on serious issues about the kind of future we should want for humanity. That is a big part of the reason we are still talking about Trek almost fifty years after it began.

On the other hand, I have a much more critical perspective than Yglesias on Star Trek’s mostly left-wing politics, which I articulated in this Institute for Humane Studies podcast. As I explain in the podcast, I like Deep Space Nine better than the other series in part because it is more willing to question the Federation’s values, though it ultimately does still endorse them. I also disagree with Yglesias’ view that the economy of Star Trek is post-scarcity, thereby making socialism workable (and indeed the only feasible economic system). As I discuss here, many important goods and services are still limited in the Star Trek universe, including the energy sources that power starships, planetary real estate, a variety of personal services, and – most importantly – replicators. The replicator – the very technology that supposedly eliminates scarcity – is itself scarce; the Federation and its various rivals apparently cannot replicate a replicator.

Even if scarcity were more fully eliminated than in the Star Trek universe, I don’t think it follows that socialism is the only viable response, or that the knowledge and incentive problems that make socialism a menace in our world would suddenly disappear. So long as there are any important scarce goods at all, a government monopoly over them would still be a terrible danger, even if the government were democratic. If scarcity were truly abolished and anyone could have any good or service they wanted at zero cost, there would be no point to socialism, since we would not need government to either facilitate production or redistribute wealth.

Be that as it may, I agree with Yglesias that there is much to admire in Star Trek at its best, and I like some of his ideas for a new Star Trek series. Perhaps a new series will go where no series has gone before and hire him as a consultant.

The Institute for Justice, a leading libertarian public interest law firm that has litigated numerous property rights cases, reports that the Illinois state senate has passed a bill authorizing the use of eminent domain for the benefit of casinos:

The bill passed 32-20 in the state Senate on May 1 and is now being considered by the House Executive Committee. Gov. Pat Quinn has previously vetoed two Chicago casino bills in the past. However, while the governor still has concerns about this new casino bill, he has indicated he could sign, so long as gambling revenue funds education and ethics standards are tightened. (After all, four of Illinois’ last seven governors have gone to prison.) Yet casinos abusing eminent domain apparently hasn’t crossed Quinn’s mind.

As the IJ post notes, takings for the benefit of casino interests have occurred in other states, and often lead to the same sorts of abuses as other “economic development” condemnations of the type upheld by the federal Supreme Court in Kelo v. City of New London. Such takings are routinely used by politically powerful firms to acquire property from the politically weak. They also often destroy more economic value than they create. I discuss these problems in much more detail in this article.

In the aftermath of Kelo, some 44 states passed eminent domain reform laws intended to curb such abuses. But Illinois’ law is one of many that contain major loopholes that prevent them from providing much in the way of meaningful protection for property owners. The IJ post notes that Illinois’ 2006 law rates only a D+ under their grading scale.

Hopefully, the Illinois House of Representatives will reject the Senate bill. The legislation is currently before the House Executive Committee. If the House does not reject the bill, it is possible that state courts would strike it down. In a 2002 decision, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that the potential economic benefits of expanding the operations of a private business is not a “public use” justifying the use of eminent domain under the state Constitution. As the Court put it (quoting a lower-court dissenting opinion), “the economic by-products of a private capitalist’s ability to develop land cannot justify a surrender of ownership to eminent domain.” At least some takings for the benefit of casino interests could run afoul of this ruling, although the state supreme court did not categorically ban all takings that transfer land to private parties for economic development purposes.

UPDATE: I have made a few stylistic revisions to this post.