The Volokh Conspiracy

Stuart and Jonathan have both commented on the legal analysis in today’s City of Arlington v. FCC opinion from the Supreme Court, about which I have nothing to say.  I want to direct your attention to footnote 1 in Justice Scalia’s opinion for the majority.  He has just introduced one of the parties, “CTIA-The Wireless Association,” and in the footnote he continues:

“This is not a typographical error. CTIA—The Wireless Association was the name of the petitioner. CTIA is presumably an (unpronounceable) acronym, but even the organization’s website does not say what itstands for. That secret, known only to wireless-service-provider insiders, we will not disclose here.”

This is a really embarrassing bit of nonsense — smarmy and snarky and extraordinarily stupid.

First:  0.45 seconds of work reveals that CTIA originally stood for the “Cellular Telephone Industry Association.”  It’s not a big mystery, “known only to wireless-service-provider insiders”: that’s what it says on the organization’s Wikipedia page.  So Scalia’s footnote communicates, to me, that he has never heard of “the Internet” and the very amazing things called “search engines” that let you “retrieve information” very, very quickly

And why that snarky remark about how it’s unpronounceable?  Let’s see ... can Justice Scalia pronounce “FBI”?  (here’s a hint: “eff-bee-eye”).  DHS?    KLM Airlines?

If this were a student paper, I’d circle this and write something like:  “Really bad footnote – why highlight your own cluelessness in the very first footnote.”  From the Supreme Court, it’s really a bit embarrassing.  Reminds me, again, of what Justice Jackson said many years ago:  We’re not final because we’re infallible, we’re infallible because we’re final.

[Thanks to Peter Shane for the pointer]

I’m told that such arrests and charges are very rare, so I thought this was noteworthy, from the Austin American-Statesman, April 19, 2013 (thanks to Lawrence Goldman [White Collar Crim Prof Blog] for the pointer):

Former Williamson County District Attorney Ken Anderson was arrested ... after a specially convened court found that he intentionally hid evidence to secure Michael Morton’s 1987 conviction for murder.

In a blunt and scathing ruling, District Judge Louis Sturns said Anderson acted to defraud the trial court and Morton’s defense lawyers, resulting in an innocent man serving almost 25 years in prison.

“This court cannot think of a more intentionally harmful act than a prosecutor’s conscious choice to hide mitigating evidence so as to create an uneven playing field for a defendant facing a murder charge and a life sentence,” Sturns said.

Sturns, presiding over a court of inquiry that examined the Morton prosecution, found probable cause to believe that Anderson broke two state laws and committed criminal contempt of court for lying to Morton’s trial judge. He then signed a warrant for Anderson’s arrest as required under state law governing courts of inquiry....

Sturns’ ruling is the first step in a potential criminal case against Anderson, who was Williamson County’s celebrated law-and-order district attorney for 16 years before he became a district judge in 2002. His current term as judge will end in 2014. State law does not require him to step down as the case against him progresses....

Morton was sentenced to life in prison for the murder of his first wife, Christine, in their Williamson County home. He was freed and declared innocent in 2011 after DNA tests pointed to another man as the killer....
Sturns told the standing-room-only courtroom that the evidence showed that Anderson improperly concealed two pieces of evidence that could have helped Morton fight the murder charge:

• The transcript of a police interview revealing that the Mortons’ 3-year-old son, Eric, witnessed the murder and said Michael Morton wasn’t home at the time.

• A police report about a suspicious man who had parked a green van near the Morton home and, on several occasions, walked into the wooded area behind the house.

Anderson also improperly concealed the documents from District Judge William Lott, who presided over Morton’s trial, Sturns said.

“Judge Lott specifically asked Mr. Anderson in open court whether the state had any evidence that was favorable to the accused,” Sturns said. “To which Anderson replied, ‘No, sir.’ ” ...

Judge Sturns’ report is here (thanks to Grits for Breakfast for the pointer).

A comment reminded me of this passage from Justice Stevens’ opinion in County of Allegheny v. ACLU:

It is also significant that the final draft [of the Establishment Clause] contains the word “respecting.” Like “touching,” “respecting” means concerning, or with reference to. But it also means with respect — that is, “reverence,” “good will,” “regard” — to. [Footnote: "Respect," as defined in T. Sheridan, A Complete Dictionary of the English Language (6th ed. 1796). See S. Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language (7th ed. 1785); see also The Oxford English Dictionary 733-734 (1989); Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 1004 (1988).] Taking into account this richer meaning, the Establishment Clause, in banning laws that concern religion, especially prohibits those that pay homage to religion.

This seems to be a very weak argument — more a play on words than legal analysis.

First, the Clause doesn’t ban laws respecting religion. It bans laws respecting an establishment of religion.

Second, the fact that an English word has multiple meanings doesn’t mean all those meanings are applicable in each context. Indeed, any usage of a word in a legal document (rather than in a joke or in a poem) is usually understood as triggering just one meaning, at least when the meanings are relatively far removed from each other.

For instance, one can debate what “common law” means in the Seventh Amendment protection of a jury trial in suits “at common law,” since at various times (and even at the time of the Framing) “common law” has meant several things: (1) judge-made law (or, if you prefer, judge-found law, though that’s a legal fiction) as opposed to statutes, (2) a particular body of law that was once made by judges, even if now it is codified in statute, as opposed to law that was originally created by a legislature, (3) Anglo-American law as opposed to European civil law, which is derived from Roman law, and (4) law that is sufficiently linked to the sort of law historically enforced in common-law courts as opposed to the sort of law historically enforced in so-called courts of equity. But once courts conclude — and rightly so, I think — that “common law” in the Seventh Amendment is rightly understood using definition 4, they don’t then also bring in the other definitions.

“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion” has long been understood to mean “no law with reference to establishment of religion” [UPDATE: i.e., either an establishment of a national religion or an interference with state establishments of religion] and this understanding of the word “respecting” was pretty clearly the understanding at the time of the Framing (as well as the Fourteenth Amendment). Compare, for instance, article IV, sec. 3, cl. 2 (emphasis added): “The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any particular State.” Or compare the uses of the word “respecting” in the Federalist. That doesn’t tell us just what qualifies as a law that is with reference to establishment of religion [UPDATE: nor does it tell us how the Fourteenth Amendment should affect all this]; but it does give us a general sense of the meaning of “respecting,” though not the meaning of “establishment of religion.”

What reason is there to then read “no law respecting an establishment of religion” as also having the “richer” meaning of “no law that expresses reverence for religion” (omitting the phrase “establishment of” before “religion”)? I see none, other than an interpreter’s preference for the particular result.

The Huffington Post has an article titled, “Kaitlyn Hunt, Florida Teen, Faces Felony Charges Over Same-Sex Relationship”; Opposing Views picks it up as, “Florida Teen Kaitlyn Hunt Arrested, Expelled Over Same-Sex Relationship”; Examiner.com, which is linked to by the Huffington Post piece, has the headline, “Florida teen fights expulsion and criminal charges for same sex relationship”; Think Progress has the headline, “What’s Next For Kaitlyn Hunt, The Teen Charged With A Felony For Same-Sex Relationship With Classmate.”

Except that, as the bodies of the articles indicate, the charge isn’t “same-sex relationship” — it’s the non-sexual-orientation-specific statutory rape statute, Fla. Stats. § 800.04, which says, in relevant part,

A person who:

(a) Engages in sexual activity with a person 12 years of age or older but less than 16 years of age ...

commits lewd or lascivious battery, a felony of the second degree ....

Kaitlyn Hunt, who is now 18, is continuing a sexual relationship with a 15-year-old girl; that seems to me to be a pretty clear violation of the statute. And while statutory rape laws are notoriously underenforced, I would imagine that it would be hardly unheard of for an 18-year-old boy in Florida to be arrested and expelled for having sex with a 15-year-old girl. The ThinkProgress article states, “Kaitlyn’s father suggests his daughters arrest — and the substantial sentence sought by the prosecutor — are motivated by anti-gay bias.” (The proposed deal from the prosecutor was, “She could plead guilty to child abuse, a felony, and spend two years under house arrest. The judge would determine if she would have to register as a sex offender.”) But are Florida prosecutors really materially more lenient when the parents of 15-year-old girls complain about 18-year-old men having sex with those girls? I’ve heard nothing suggesting that this is so.

The story alleges that the 15-year-old girl’s parents are upset about the same-sex nature of the relationship, so it’s possible that their motivation in complaining to the police relates to that. (I’m not certain that this is so, since it’s quite possible that the parents would also be upset about their 15-year-old daughter having an opposite-sex relationship with an 18-year-old man, so the same-sex nature of the relationship may not even be a but-for cause of the complaint; but let’s set that aside for now.) But the police and the school can’t just say, “Your motivation for the complaint is hostility against lesbianism, so we’ll refuse to act on the complaint, even though this is a crime that we’d take seriously if we thought your complaint was motivated by general disapproval of sex between 15- and 18-year-olds.” And absent some evidence that Florida authorities turn a blind eye on parental complaints about 18-year-old men having sex with 15-year-old girls, I don’t really see this as a case about “same-sex relationship[s]” as such.

Now this having been said, one can actually make a rational argument for treating lesbian relationships less severely than opposite-sex relationships. Lesbian relationships can’t lead to unwanted pregnancy, and, to my knowledge, are much less likely to spread the most serious sexually transmitted diseases. And while they can involve lies, lead to heartbreak, leave one or both members with a sense that one has been emotionally mistreated and taken advantage of, and so on, one can imagine a parent who can reasonably think “Phew, better that my daughter is having sex with a woman than with a man.”

One can even imagine legal rules that draw this distinction, and constitutional rules that uphold such a distinction. Michael M. v. Superior Court (1980) upheld a sex-specific statutory rape law, which punished only males and not females, on the grounds that the law reflects real sex differences, including differential susceptibility to pregnancy. That argument would be even stronger as to a distinction between women-women relationships and other relationships, even given that sex classifications are subjected to heightened constitutional scrutiny (see Michael M. itself), and even if sexual orientation classifications come to be subjected to heightened constitutional scrutiny as well.

But such an approach, while not irrational, is certainly not the law in Florida, and it’s far from clear that it is correct. The risk of emotional harm to 15-year-olds — harm that they may be even less prepared to deal with than older people are, and harm that they can’t reasonably be seen as consenting to, given their immaturity — remains in lesbian relationships even if the risk of pregnancy is removed and the risk of disease is very low. And in any event this is not, I take it, the argument being made by the articles I cite.

City of Arlington v. FCC has some interesting nuggets.  For instance, Scalia’s majority flatly states: “Make no mistake—the ultimate target here is Chevron itself,” though the dissent disclaims any such intent.  But I want to flag here another iteration of debates over how to characterize agencies’ power.  Roberts’ dissent says that

Although modern administrative agencies fit most comfortably within the Executive Branch, as a practical matter they exercise legislative power, by promulgating regulations with the force of law; executive power, by policing compliance with those regulations; and judicial power, by adjudicating enforcement actions and imposing sanctions on those found to have violated their rules.

Scalia’s majority opinion responds that

the dissent overstates when it claims that agencies exercise “legislative power” and “judicial power.” The former is vested exclusively in Congress, U. S. Const., Art. I, §1, the latter in the “one supreme Court” and “such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish,” Art. III, §1. Agencies make rules (“Private cattle may be grazed on public lands X, Y, and Z subject to certain conditions”) and conduct adjudications (“This rancher’s grazing permit is revoked for violation of the conditions”) and have done so since the beginning of the Republic. These activities take “legislative” and “judicial” forms, but they are exercises of—indeed, under our constitutional structure they must be exercises of—the “executive Power.” Art. II, §1, cl. 1.

Note that Roberts is saying that “as a practical matter” they exercise legislative and judicial power, and Scalia is saying that as a constitutional matter they don’t. But perhaps Roberts has come to the conclusion that, as a constitutional matter, agencies exercise these powers as well. Justice Stevens, after all, said as much in his concurrence in Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, Inc.

Today, in Arlington v. FCC, the Supreme Court held 6-3 that courts should confer Chevron deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions concerning the scope of agency jurisdiction.  Justice Scalia wrote for the majority.  Justice Breyer filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.  The Chief Justice dissented, joined by Justices Kennedy and Alito.

I participated in an amicus brief in this case, largely based on an article I co-authored with Nathan Sales. Alas, we were on the losing side.  My prior posts on this case are here and here, and earlier posts on the issue are here and here.

I hope to have more to say about the decision later today.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has been on quite a losing streak in the High Court, particularly when it comes to habeas cases.  This morning, the Sixth Circuit was reversed again by a unanimous court in Metrish v. Lancaster, vindicating Judge Batchelder who had dissented from the original panel opinion.  As has been the norm, the Supreme Court concluded that the Sixth Circuit was too quick to grant a habeas petition.  SCOTUSBlog has more background on the case here.

The Court just agreed to hear Town of Greece v. Galloway, a case involving legislative prayer. In Marsh v. Chambers (1983), the Supreme Court upheld legislative prayers against an Establishment Clause challenge, based on the very long American tradition of such prayers (dating back to the same First Congress that proposed the Establishment Clause); nonetheless, the scope of Marsh is unclear, and in particular it’s unclear to what extent legislative prayers might be seen as unconstitutionally preferring a particular religion or denomination.

Or that at least is the narrow question raised by the case. But I think it’s also possible that the Court may use the case as a means of reconsidering the “endorsement test,” under which the Establishment Clause is read as barring government speech (or even government action) that a “reasonable observer” would see as “endorsing or disapproving” of religion (either a particular religion or religion generally). The test has long been controversial; it was relied on by the decision below, so it’s very much in play in this case; and I suspect that there are five votes to overrule it. (Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas are on the record as rejecting it, and I suspect Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito take a similar view.) Should be a very interesting decision, which will be out in the first half of next year.

My review of Vern McKinley’s book Financing Failure: A Century of Bailouts has been posted at the Law & Liberty blog.

The Case Western Reserve Law Review has published its fall symposium on “The Law and Policy of Hydraulic Fracturing: Addressing the Issues of the Natural Gas Boom.”  I blogged about the symposium here.  The full issue is available onilne in PDF, and I’ve posted links to the articles below.

On Friday, Jonathan pointed out United States v. Blewett, the new Sixth Circuit decision on the 100-1 crack-cocaine sentencing disparity. Jonathan described the issue in that case as being whether the 2010 Fair Sentencing Act applied retroactively. But the most remarkable part of Blewett actually decides a different question that was neither briefed nor argued: Whether the 100-1 disparity in effect before 2010 was constitutional. And the majority’s argument for why the 100-1 disparity was unconstitutional strikes me as not just wrong but obviously so.

According to the majority opinion signed by Judges Merritt and joined by Judge Martin, the Equal Protection Clause requires judges to disregard bodies of law that have known racially discriminatory effects. That’s the case because applying law that has a known discriminatory impact would be an intentional act of discrimination by judges that the Equal Protection clause forbids. Here’s the key part of the opinion:

In view of the statistical facts and the widespread congressional consensus leading to the adoption of the Fair Sentencing Act’s remedial provisions [replacing the 100-1 ratio in 2010 with an 18-1 ratio], there can be no doubt that the old crack law was racially discriminatory in effect. As a matter of legal doctrine, there is no equal protection violation without discriminatory intent. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). When the old 100-to-1 crack cocaine statute was adopted, it presumably did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because there was no intent or design to discriminate on a racial basis. Its adoption was simply a mistake. Since 1986, however, we have gained knowledge of the old statute’s devastating effect on blacks. Congress itself acknowledged this problem by enacting the Fair Sentencing Act.

The Fair Sentencing Act was a step forward, but it did not finish the job. The racial discrimination continues by virtue of a web of statutes, sentencing guidelines, and court cases that maintain the harsh provisions for those defendants sentenced before the Fair Sentencing Act. If we continue now with a construction of the statute that perpetuates the discrimination, there is no longer any defense that the discrimination is unintentional. The discriminatory nature of the old sentencing regime is so obvious that it cannot seriously be argued that race does not play a role in the failure to retroactively apply the Fair Sentencing Act. A “disparate impact” case now becomes an intentional subjugation or discriminatory purpose case. Like slavery and Jim Crow laws, the intentional maintenance of discriminatory sentences is a denial of equal protection.

As I understand the reasoning, Judges Merritt and Martin work around the requirement of invidious purpose to discriminate by saying that judicial application of laws with known discriminatory effect forces the judges to have invidious purpose to discriminate when they apply the law. In other words, discriminatory effect plus awareness of it amounts to intentional discrimination in the act of applying the law. And the need to avoid discrimination not only trumps the law but also trumps binding precedents saying that the law is constitutional. The argument doesn’t work on its face, as a judge who applies binding law that may have a discriminatory effect does so not because she wants to achieve a discriminatory result but because that result is what the controlling law requires. But in any event, Judge Gilman’s dissent nicely points out the binding precedent to the contrary. The majority doesn’t even bother with much of a response to Judge Gilman’s dissent: See Footnote 6, which for the most part doesn’t even track forms of legal argument.

I agree that the 100-1 disparity was terrible policy. But the majority’s constitutional analysis strikes me as not just wrong but obviously so.

Over at MotherJones, Kevin Drum has an interesting post on the AP leak investigation: Here’s Why the Government Went Ballistic Over the AP Leak.

Also, over at Slate, Emily Bazelon and former VC blogger Eric Posner debate whether the subpoenas of the AP records were justified. Eric gets the better of the argument, I think, but it’s a helpful exchange either way.

On Friday, May 17, fifty-four Colorado Sheriffs filed a civil rights lawsuit in Federal District Court in Denver, against two anti-gun bills passed by the Colorado legislature in March. Joining the Sheriffs as Plaintiffs are the Colorado Farm Bureau, disabled persons, Outdoor Buddies (an organization that helps disabled persons participate in outdoor sports), the Colorado Outfitters Association (the trade association for hunting guides), the National Shooting Sports Foundation (the trade association for the firearms industry), magazine manufacturer Magpul, federally-licensed firearms dealers, the state’s largest shooting range, the Colorado State Shooting Association (governing body for the shooting sports in Colorado), and Women for Concealed Carry. The Complaint is available here.

The lawsuit involves House Bill 1224 (a sweeping ban on magazines, including small magazines) and House Bill 1229 (an unworkable system of background checks for temporary transfers of firearms, and for private sales). The Complaint alleges violations of the Second Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment (vagueness), and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act.

A 38 minute video of the press conference announcing the suit is available on YouTube. In this case, I am representing the Sheriffs.

Friday afternoon, Grand County Sheriff Rodney Johnson joined the case, bringing the number of plaintiff Sheriffs to 55 out of the 62 elected County Sheriffs in Colorado. (Denver and Broomfield have appointed Sheriffs who run the jail, but do not have the comprehensive responsibilities of the elected Sheriffs.) The Complaint will be amended next week to reflect Sheriff Johnson’s participation.

My wife and I recently watched Star Trek: Into Darkness, the second in the series of J.J. Abrams-directed”reboot” Star Trek movies that began in 2009. On the plus side, the film had some impressive action scenes and special effects. It also had more and somewhat better character development than its predecessor. Long-time fans of the series might like the many clever nods to the original series from the 1960s. At the very least, the movie was fun to watch, and I think we got our money’s worth.

Nonetheless, the negatives outweigh the positives. Unsurprisingly, Into Darkness has most of the same flaws as the previous Abrams Star Trek movie, which I criticized here. Both films essential turn Star Trek into an action movie that just happens to utilize Trek characters and settings. I am far from an uncritical admirer of Star Trek as envisioned by Gene Roddenberry and his successors. Nor was I ever the kind of fanatical Trekkie who goes to conventions wearing Vulcan ears or signs up for classes at the Klingon Language Institute. But, despite its many flaws, I admired the Star Trek franchise’s willingness to take on big questions about the kind of future we should want for humanity. Abrams’ “reboot” essentially ignores all serious issues, and just ramps up the action. I don’t deny that a “reboot” may have been needed, given the poor quality of the last several old-line Star Trek movies; but not a reboot that jettisons almost everything that made Star Trek interesting and unique.

In addition, Into Darkness has huge plot holes big enough to fly a whole fleet of Romulan warbirds through. In the interest of avoiding spoilers, I won’t go through them in detail. I will only note that, for the Federation to get into the predicament that is the main focus of the plot, Star Fleet’s leadership would have to be ridiculously stupid. To take just one of many examples, it seems that Star Fleet Headquarters and Earth generally have no fixed defenses of any kind against incoming warships and missiles, even though previous history clearly established that such defenses are both feasible given the level of their technology, and clearly necessary, given previous enemy attacks. Yet none of the characters even mention this and other comparably ridiculous mistakes, not even the supposedly hyper-logical Mr. Spock (who makes some whopping errors of his own in the movie, which are also ignored by the other characters).

Perhaps the real implicit message of the reboot movies is to endorse the views of social critics who worry that advancing technology has bred a “generation of nincompoops.” Maybe the producers expect the nincompoopery to get even worse in the future, infecting Vulcans and Klingons as well as humans. Indeed, if the Klingons, Romulans, and other rivals of the Federation were minimally competent, it’s hard to understand how the Star Fleet portrayed in the reboot movies could possibly have become a major power in the galaxy. Maybe the “darkness” into which the Federation has descended is a severe outbreak of extreme stupidity among Star Fleet’s best and brightest. Although I strongly disagree with this kind of technopessimism, a science fiction series that seriously explored the idea that high technology leads to a “dumbed down” society might be interesting. Unfortunately, Abrams’ movies seem to raise the issue only unintentionally.

A very interesting question, raised in Intercollegiate Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Board, a certiorari petition now pending before the Court. Profs. John Duffy (Virginia), Peter Strauss (Columbia), and Michael Herz (Cardozo) — an illustrious trio who often take quite different views about other subjects — have an item about this at Concurring Opinions; here’s an excerpt (click on the Concurring Opinions post for links):

Earlier this year, more than 100,000 citizens petitioned the White House to overturn a copyright rule issued by the Librarian of Congress that made unlocking a cell phone a crime. The White House responded by promising to seek legislation to overturn the Librarian’s rule. That was the most the President would or could do because “[t]he law gives the Librarian the authority,” and the Administration would “respect that process,” even though the Librarian acted contrary to the Administration’s views. See here. As the New York Times reported, “because the Library of Congress, and therefore the copyright office, are part of the legislative branch, the White House cannot simply overturn the current ruling.” See here.

There’s only one problem with all of this: The Department of Justice has been vigorously arguing precisely the contrary constitutional position in the federal courts.

According to the Administration’s filings in litigation that has now reached the Supreme Court, the Library of Congress is “an executive Department,” and the Librarian himself is “subject to plenary oversight by the President.” Justice Department lawyers have explained that Congress made a “purposeful decision to place the Library under the President’s direct control and supervision”; that the Librarian of Congress is the “Head” of this “executive Department”; that the President may remove the Librarian “at will” just as he may remove other heads of executive departments; and that this removal power creates the Librarian’s “here-and-now subservience” to the President. See pages 16 & 17 of the Government’s Brief in Opposition filed at the Supreme Court, available here and pages 23, 29 & 37 the Government’s Brief for Appellees filed in the Court of Appeals, available here.

In light of that clear legal position, an obvious question arises: If the Librarian is really a head of an executive Department subject to “plenary oversight by the President,” why hasn’t the President either taken responsibility for criminalizing cell phone unlocking or ordered the Librarian to reverse his decision?

The answer is that no one in the political arena actually believes for one minute that the Librarian is the head of an executive department. The current Librarian has repeatedly testified to Congress that the Library is “arm of the United States Congress,” “a “branch of the Legislative branch,” and “a unique part of the Legislative Branch of the government.” Members of Congress also understand this to be true. To take but one prominent example, Senator Orrin Hatch has noted not only that “the Copyright Office is in the legislative branch of the Government” but also that this arrangement presents difficulty because “whenever the Copyright Office is tasked with an executive-type function, [a] constitutional question arises.”

The President’s supposed powers of “plenary oversight” and at-will removal are utter fiction, as the controversy about cell phone unlocking shows....

Why then are the Administration’s lawyers arguing that the Librarian is a presidential underling? The answer is easy. The Librarian has been vested with the power to appoint all of the officers who execute the copyright laws—including the Registrar of Copyrights and the judges of the Copyright Royalty Board—but the “Appointments Clause” of the Constitution makes clear that such power can be lodged in the Librarian only if he is the head of an Executive Department....