“Anything You Can Do, I Can Do Meta”

Cuellar de Osorio v. Mayorkas (9th Cir. Sept. 26, 2012) (en banc) (Smith, Milan, dissenting) notes a circuit split about the significance of circuit splits:

[I]t is worth noting that there is currently a circuit split over whether the existence of a circuit split is evidence of statutory ambiguity [for purposes of deciding whether to apply Chevron deference]. Compare Snell Island SNF LLC v. NLRB, 568 F.3d 410, 419-20 (2d Cir. 2009) (evidence), vacated on other grounds, 130 S. Ct. 3498 (2010), McCreary v. Offner, 172 F.3d 76, 82-83 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (same), and In re S. Star Foods, Inc., 144 F.3d 712, 715 (10th Cir. 1998) (same), with Allapattah Servs., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 333 F.3d 1248, 1254 n.4 (11th Cir. 2003) (not evidence), aff’d, 545 U.S. 546 (2005), and Rosmer v. Pfizer Inc., 263 F.3d 110, 118 (4th Cir. 2001) (same).

Thanks to Fred Norton for the pointer.