Second Amendment Rights for Non-Violent Felons?

From Judge Ikuta’s concurrence in U.S. v. Duckett (9th Cir. Dec. 17):

Although I join the majority in full [in, among other things, rejecting the defendant's Second Amendment argument on the strength of Vongxay -EV], were I not bound by United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir.2010), I would examine whether, notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s dicta in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 2816-17 (2008), the government has a substantial interest in limiting a non-violent felon’s constitutional right to bear arms. See United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 693 (7th Cir.2010) (“[W]e recognize that § 922(g)(1) may be subject to an overbreadth challenge at some point because of its disqualification of all felons, including those who are non-violent.”); United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 645 (7th Cir.2010) (en banc) (Sykes, J., dissenting); United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1047 (10th Cir.2009) (Tymkovich, J., concurring). Indeed, other than felon disenfranchisement laws, which are grounded in § 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974), I can think of no other constitutional disability that applies only to a “certain category of persons … [who] may be excluded from ever exercising the right.” Skoien, 614 F.3d at 650 (Sykes, J., dissenting).